Case No. 5:17-cv-02514-JGB-SHKx

Assigned to Hon. Jesus G. Bernal

DEFENDANT THE GEO GROUP, INC.'S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER REQUIRING COVID-19 PREVENTIÓN MEASURES FOR NATIONWIDE HUSP CLASS

September 16, 2019 December 24, 2018

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I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs' application for a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") on an emergency basis does not seek relief related to COVID-19. Rather, it uses the pandemic, and the justifiable unease throughout the country, to make an end run around the remaining process in the current case and skip to the merits of whether GEO's policies relating to detainees' cleanup of their living areas constitutes forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA") 18 U.S.C. § 1589 et. seq. This regrettable exploitation of the COVID-19 crisis facing the nation should not be tolerated by this Court.

Plaintiffs provide absolutely no evidence that detainees are at a higher risk of contracting COVID-19 by cleaning up after themselves in their general living areas. Nor do they provide a legal justification that housekeeping tasks, in the current COVID-19 environment, violate the TVPA. Indeed, it is unclear how detainees are at a higher risk of contracting COVID-19 by complying with a policy that serves to ensure that basic tenets of personal hygiene are followed. It defies reason that reducing detainees diligence and responsibility for their own personal hygiene would be an appropriate response to COVID-19—let alone one this Court should endorse. While cleanliness is always important, it is of paramount importance now.

Furthermore, a nationwide injunction is not appropriate here. Plaintiffs have not produced evidence from all facilities related to their current claims, instead relying upon declarations from only two (2) facilities. See ECF 253 (containing declarations from two (2) facilities). As Justice Thomas recently explained, nationwide injunctions "are beginning to take a toll on the federal court system—preventing legal questions from percolating through the federal courts, encouraging forum shopping, and making every case a national emergency for the courts and for the Executive Branch." *Trump* v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425, 201 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2018). This is surely true here where Plaintiffs seek nothing more than a preview of this Court's opinion on the merits of their claim, wholly unrelated to COVID-19. This Court should not be thrust

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into "rushed, high-stakes, low-information decisions" regarding a novel and complex application of the TVPA absent concrete evidence that doing so would alleviate the spread of COVID-19. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). For these reasons, Plaintiffs' TRO should be denied.

II. GEO'S RESPONSE TO COVID-19.

Plaintiffs' TRO presents a broad overview of the current pandemic facing the United States, but fails to provide any information about the extensive response by both GEO and ICE within detention facilities to curtail detainee exposure to COVID-19 and ensure the safety and security of all those who live and work at GEO facilities. In so doing, Plaintiffs paint a picture of inevitable spread within the GEO facilities which they claim can be redressed only through the elimination of housekeeping requirements. ECF 251-1. To the contrary, GEO (and ICE) have implemented expansive policies to address the COVID-19 risks and ensure the safety of all detainees. Through these polices, GEO detainees are currently cohabiting similar to millions across the country—with added precautions to their daily lives, diligent personal hygiene, and regimented social distancing.

Among these measures, GEO has created polices at its facilities² consistent with

¹ The certified class includes 12 facilities: Adelanto, Aurora, Broward, Mesa Verde, Montgomery, Northwest/Tacoma, South Texas, Folkston, Joe Corley, LaSalle, Pine Prairie, and South Louisiana. Because Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing a TRO is proper, and because Plaintiffs have submitted declaration evidence related only to LaSalle Ice Processing Center ("LIPC") and Aurora ICE Processing Center ("Aurora"), GEO focuses on those facilities in this response. GEO further notes that the "submission of general news articles does not constitute 'material' evidence" and therefore should not be considered to be "evidence" by this Court. Geagea v. Holder, 466 F. App'x 502, 508 (6th Cir. 2012).

² For purposes of this motion, GEO addresses those facilities for which Plaintiffs' submitted evidence: LIPC and Aurora. Plaintiffs submitted three (3) declarations from detainees at the LIPC and one (1) from Aurora. GEO also submits evidence from the Adelanto facility, even though the named Plaintiffs were not detained during the pendency of COVID-19, their experiences are limited to the Adelanto facility where they were detained. GEO also presents evidence from the Northwest Ice Processing Center in Tacoma, Washington ("NWIPC") because the declaration submitted herein is publicly available on PACER. Given the truncated response time for this response, GEO was limited to evidence from these facilities. Given additional time, GEO could submit information about other facilities about which the Court has concerns. That said, Plaintiffs bear the initial burden and have failed to present any evidence as to the majority of GEO facilities that are part of the Case No. 5:17-cv-02514-JGB-SHKX

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the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention Facilities. See Declaration of David Van Pelt, Exs. 1 (Dec. of Janecka), 2 (Dec. of Ceja), 3 (Dec. of Cole), and 4 (Dec. of Langford). With these principles in mind, GEO has enhanced information, limited exposure from outside visitors, and increased sanitation. Id. As a result of these measures, the LIPC, Aurora, NWIDC, and the Adelanto ICE Processing Center ("Adelanto Facility") do not have any reported cases of COVID-19.³ Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 (Dec. of Valdez).

As to increased information for detainees, GEO has held multiple town hall meetings for detainees whereby detainees can ask medical professionals questions about COVID-19. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4. These town halls serve to keep detainees aware of the ongoing situation. *Id.* Further, detainees are provided with information about COVID-19 in their living areas as well as instructional videos about how they can wash their hands properly. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Additionally, GEO and ICE have implemented a number of limitations to reduce the introduction of any outside sources of contamination into a facility and allow for social distancing. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4. ICE has temporarily stopped all inperson visitation for detainees and their family and friends with the exception of detainees' attorney visits. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4. Attorneys who wish to enter the building must wear Personal Protective Equipment ("PPE") including a surgical mask, goggles, and gloves. Id. Otherwise, all visits are restricted to videoconferencing on tablets that are provided to detainees. Id. All individuals entering the facilities, including GEO employees and ICE staff, must pass a screening for COVID-19 including completing a questionnaire and having their temperature taken. Any individuals with a fever or who report recent travel or symptoms on their questionnaires are denied access. *Id.* GEO

certified class.

³ GEO reiterates that this information is limited to these facilities because of the truncated timeline for a response and the fact that Plaintiffs did not provide accounts of individuals detained at other facilities.

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employees are instructed to stay home if ill and are not allowed to work if they show any symptoms consistent with COVID-19. *Id*.

GEO has also placed restrictions on detainee contact within the facility to decrease the spread of COVID-19. The facilities have placed restrictions on any new detainees who arrive at the facility. Exs.1, 2, 3, and 4. Detainees are screened for COVID-19 exposure prior to entering the building; detainees who present symptoms or other travel related risks for exposure to COVID-19 are either turned away or housed in medical negative pressure rooms. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4. Detainees who do not present symptoms are placed in separate housing, quarantined from the existing population for a minimum of fourteen (14) days and monitored for signs and symptoms of COVID-19. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4. This treatment of potentially asymptomatic detainees comports with the CDC's recommendations that an asymptomatic individual should avoid contact with others for seven (7) to ten (10) days.⁴ Research indicates that 99% of individuals who fall ill do so within 14 days.⁵ Additionally, GEO has adjusted how detainees are housed to ensure that each living unit or pod is significantly below its typical capacity, which provides for additional space and social distancing between detainees. Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4. GEO has also worked to allow social distancing during mealtimes, recreation, library use, and common area use through a number of facility-specific measures based upon the unique characteristics of each facility. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Furthermore, GEO has implemented enhanced hygiene practices. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4. The facilities utilize cleaning products that the EPA has deemed to be effective against COVID-19. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4. GEO has also assessed its stock of soap and

⁴ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (hereinafter "CDC"), Discontinuation of Isolation for Persons with COVID-19 Not in Healthcare Settings, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus /2019-ncov/hcp/disposition-in-home-patients.html (updated April 4, 2020) (last accessed April 7, 2020).

⁵ Lauer SA, The Incubation Period of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) From Publicly Reported Confirmed Cases: Estimation Application, available https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/32150748 (last visited April 7, 2020). CASE No. 5:17-cv-02514-JGB-SHKX

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cleaning supplies at each facility to ensure there is no risk of a shortage in the near future. Id. GEO diligently monitors the detainee population and ensures that all detainees have access to soap and cleaning supplies at all times. *Id.* Additionally, new polices require staff to increase the cleaning of high-touch surfaces, ensuring that living areas and other portions of the facility are cleaned multiple times per day. Id. GEO is not diluting disinfectants below effective levels. *Id.* GEO also plays a video on a loop in all housing areas that demonstrates the proper handwashing technique. *Id.*

Furthermore, GEO staff have been issued surgical masks within the past week. Going forward each GEO staff member will receive three (3) masks a week with instructions for their use and disposal. Id. There can be no question that GEO is taking the risks associated with COVID-19 seriously and implementing extensive measures to reduce the risk of infection. See Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4. GEO's measures are clearly working, as there are no reported cases of COVID-19 at the LIPC, Aurora, NWIPC and Adelanto Facility. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is substantially identical to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D.Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief." See Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 2 (2008). In seeking injunctive relief, Plaintiffs "face a difficult task in proving that [they are] entitled to this 'extraordinary remedy'." See Earth Island Inst. v. Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010), citing Winter, supra, 555 U.S. at 23. A plaintiff "must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter, supra, 555 U.S. at 20. A "possibility" of irreparable harm is insufficient; irreparable harm must

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be likely absent an injunction. *Id.*; see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's earlier rule that the "possibility" of irreparable harm, as opposed to its likelihood, was sufficient in some circumstances to justify a preliminary injunction).

Plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that each of these four (4) factors are met. DISH Network Corp. v. FCC, 653 F.3d 771, 776-77 (9th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiffs Cannot Establish A Likelihood of Success on the Merits. a.

Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Seek A TRO.

The "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing" contains three (3) requirements. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). First, a plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" *Id*. The "injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–2 (1983) (citations omitted). Second, the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the Court." Id. Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative" that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 560-61(internal citations omitted). Redressability requires that there "be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of"; the injury cannot be the result of third party actions, *Lujan*, supra, 504 U.S. at 560, or self-inflicted, Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 418 (2013).

The Supreme Court has held that "a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought." Davis v. Federal Election Com'n, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 2769 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought"); Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1645, 1650-51 (2017). "[A] plaintiff who has been subject to injurious conduct of one kind possess by virtue of that injury the

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necessary stake in litigating conduct of another kind, although similar, to which he has not been subject." Lewis v. Casev, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982)). While the Court already found standing for Plaintiffs' to bring suit for other permanent injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000), and they cannot for this request for a TRO.

1. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish A Concrete, Non-Hypothetical Injury.

Plaintiffs fail to establish that they would suffer a concrete, non-hypothetical injury absent entry of a TRO, and therefore they lack standing to seek emergency prospective relief. *Clapper*, 568 U.S at 418. None of the Plaintiffs bringing this TRO are detained, i.e., the actual movants are not the beneficiaries of any change in the housekeeping policy, nor do they face any adverse consequences if the policy is not changed—which forms the basis for their motion and requested relief. See Declaration of Van Pelt ¶ 6. And, none of the movants have demonstrated an elevated risk of COVID-19 due to any acts or omissions of GEO. COVID-19 was not a pressing concern when this case was certified, or when Plaintiffs were detained, and therefore Plaintiffs have not established that they have suffered injuries related to the COVID-19 specific relief they seek here. Plaintiffs have not submitted any additional evidence that would support a finding that they have standing. To be sure, there is no risk that any of the named Plaintiffs, all of whom live outside of the GEO facilities, and one (1) of whom lives in Somalia. Put simply, none of the Plaintiffs have met their burden to show they are at an increased harm of COVID-19 because of the housekeeping policies within GEO-ICE detention centers. Thus, they lack standing to bring this TRO since regardless of the outcome, their status quo will remain unchanged and they will suffer no injury. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018) (rejecting standing for a statewide gerrymandering challenge because a plaintiff's remedy must

be limited to his injury).

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2. Plaintiffs Cannot Establish That Their Proposed Relief is Likely to Redress Concerns about the Spread of COVID-19.

To establish standing, Plaintiffs must also demonstrate "a 'substantial likelihood' that the relief sought would redress the injury. Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2010). They cannot do so here.

Despite opening their brief with a bold and unsupported statement that "COVID-19 has found its way into GEO detention facilities," the GEO facilities where all declarants and Plaintiffs were formerly detained currently have zero cases of COVID-19. Thus there is no basis for claiming that the housekeeping duties would expose detainees to a higher risk of COVID-19. And, even if COVID-19 were present in the GEO facilities, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the relief sought in this case is likely to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in any meaningful way. Here, Plaintiffs challenge only the housekeeping tasks within GEO's facilities on the basis that keeping one's area clean increases the risk of COVID-19.8 Yet, Plaintiffs do not

⁶ Indeed, Plaintiffs' concurrent motion for discovery as to COVID-19 in the various facilities makes clear that Plaintiffs' motion is premature because they currently do not possess the requisite evidentiary basis for their claims.

⁷ Ms. Frazer has been released from Aurora. C Ex. 2, Ceja Decl. Messiers Karim, Mancia, Novoa, and Campos Fuentes were released from the Adelanto Facility before COVID-19 came to fruition. Van Pelt Decl. ¶ 7. Ms. Dejaso submitted a declaration for a case unrelated to the present case which states that as of March 27th she was detained at the LIPC. ECF 253-2. Ms. Bosque also submitted a declaration dated March 27th for a separate case stating that she is currently detained at the LIPC. ECF 253-1. Neither individual as able to sign their declaration. ECF 253-1, 235-2. Ms. Barrios did not submit a declaration herself, rather her attorney submitted a declaration in an unrelated case describing his understanding of their conversation—which creates obvious hearsay issues. ECF 253-4. Surely, Plaintiffs could have, at a minimum reached out to Ms. Barrios' attorney and asked him for a declaration specific to this case but did not do so. Ms. Barrios' declarations should not be considered by this Court because they were not created for this action, do not directly address the clams at issue here, and are not subject to cross-examination. To the extent the Court considers her declaration, it states that she was detained at the LIPC as of April 1, 2020.

⁸ To the contrary, the CDC has made clear that cleaning one's living area helps prevent the spread of COVID-19. CDC, Cleaning and Disinfection Households, 52631576;4 Case No. 5:17-cv-02514-JGB-SHKX

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challenge the practice of obtaining Voluntary Work Program ("VWP") volunteers to assist with cleaning tasks in the housing areas. ECF 252-2. And, Plaintiffs do not seek to have detainees who participate in that cleaning program enjoined from doing so. Id. Thus, even if successful, any order will not enjoin all detainee cleaning, just a small subset of detainees. Certainly, even assuming arguendo that reduced cleaning could somehow help prevent the spread of COVID-19, the relief Plaintiffs seek will not meaningfully stop the spread of COVID-19. Certainly, Plaintiffs have claimed that cleaning their living space as part of the VWP and cleaning their common areas as part of the housekeeping plan are separate tasks that have an overlap in duties. See ECF Nos. 192-3 through 192-6. Because Plaintiffs do not seek to enjoin all cleaning within the facilities, is unclear how the relief Plaintiffs seek could be logically tied to the spread of COVID-19 as the same individuals would still be free to perform the same or similar cleaning tasks as part of the VWP after any TRO issues. 10

Plaintiffs Do Not Present Evidence that Ceasing 3. **Cleaning Under the Housekeeping Policies Would** Prevent or Reduce the Spread of COVID-19.

Where the alleged relief will do nothing to redress prior injuries or prevent future injuries, Plaintiffs do not have standing. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960 (9th Cir.2009). "The line of causation between the defendant's action and the plaintiff's harm must be more than attenuated." *Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil* Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotes omitted), cert denied, –

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cleaning-disinfection.html (last visited April 7, 2020).

⁹ It is altogether unclear why or how COVID-19 is more likely to spread among individuals who live together and must clean up after themselves for no compensation, but somehow less likely to spread among those who participate in the VWP. This omission is perhaps the most telling indication of how tenuously tied to COVID-19 Plaintiffs' motion truly is.

¹⁰ GEO notes that Ms. Dejaso complains about her participation in the VWP, referencing the dollar per day she is paid. These duties would continue even if Plaintiffs receive all relief they seek here as Plaintiffs do not seek to halt the operation of the VWP. Nor could they as their claim that detainees should be classified as "employees" does not provide relief from performing the tasks in question. Case No. 5:17-cv-02514-JGB-SHKX

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133 S.Ct. 2390, 185 L.Ed.2d 1116 (2013). Here, Plaintiffs present no evidence that ending general housekeeping policies would make it less likely for individuals to contract COVID-19 in the future. Plaintiffs concede that "[s]ocial distancing, i.e., physical separation from known or potentially infected individuals, and vigilant hygiene, including washing hands with soap and water, are the only known effective measures for protecting vulnerable people from COVID-19." ECF 252-1, 10. GEO currently ensures both of these measures have been implemented in its facilities. See Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. GEO abides by social distancing, to the extent possible in a detention setting, by reducing the number of detainees in each living unit, reducing who comes and goes from each facility, reducing the number of individuals who participate in various programs including library time and recreation, and limiting detainee contact to only those who have been screened for COVID-19 risk factors. *Id.* GEO also instructs all detainees on proper handwashing and provides ample soap for detainees to frequently wash their hands. *Id.* As an added precaution, GEO has enhanced the cleaning of high-touch surfaces within its facilities. *Id*.

Plaintiffs seem to indicate that infection is inevitable, regardless of detention status, explaining that "most people in the United States will be exposed to the virus '[i]n the coming months." ECF 252-1, 9. At the same time, GEO has managed to avoid infections at the LIPC, Aurora, NWIPC and Adelanto Facility, through the implementation of its policies despite the fact that the facilities are located in population centers with high infection rates including Washington and California. Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Plaintiffs offer no evidence that those who are detained will fare any better in avoiding COVID-19 if they do not participate in the housekeeping policy. 11 To the contrary, CDC guidance makes clear that "routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces," such as the housekeeping tasks performed by detainees, help to

¹¹ The only citation related to cleanliness within ICE detention centers, as it relates to COVID-19, cited the inability of a facility to "keep the detention facilities sufficiently clean to combat the spread of the virus." ECF 252-1 at n. 78. This is inapposite to the present case where GEO has implemented robust cleaning measures to combat the spread of the virus. Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. CASE No. 5:17-cv-0251<u>4-JGB-SHKX</u> 52631576;4

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reduce the spread of COVID-19.12 Thus, because Plaintiffs' proposed relief is not substantially likely to reduce the likelihood detainees will contract COVID-19, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to establish causation and therefore do not have standing.

Plaintiffs Fail to Establish a Likelihood of Success on the Merits of b. their TVPA claim.

In Plaintiffs' motion, they cite to the TVPA as the basis for their claim for relief and likely success on the merits. ECF 252-1, 15. The TVPA makes it a penalty to force individuals to work under the threat of serious harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1589. Thus, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin GEO from implementing programs in its detention centers whereby detainees clean their living areas. However, this cause of action is wholly unrelated to COVID-19 and the potential for it to spread throughout GEO's facilities. Rather, were this Court to issue a TRO that would prohibit GEO from asking all detainees to help ensure the hygiene of the detained population and corresponding living areas it would be antithetical to stopping the spread of COVID-19. Further, any such order would lack a legal basis in the TVPA.

Plaintiffs do not indicate how it is a violation of the TVPA to require routine cleaning of an individual's living area in the midst of a pandemic. 13 Plaintiffs instead state that "GEO's acquisition of free labor by threatening Class Members with reprisal violates the TVPA." ECF 252-1. But, this lacks a basis rooted in the current COVID-19 crisis and instead relies upon Plaintiffs' class certification arguments. Plaintiffs provide no legal support for how the TVPA would apply to prevent GEO from requiring detainees to contribute to cleaning their own areas during a pandemic to

¹² Cleaning and Disinfection for Households, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cleaning-disinfection.html

¹³ Plaintiffs' reliance upon previously filed briefs in support of their ongoing claims for relief are insufficient to establish why *emergency* relief is appropriate here, as a result of COVID-19. Plaintiffs cannot vaguely allege injuries related to COVID-19 that are unrelated to their claim for relief and satisfy their burden to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.

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ensure they avoid serious harm. Nor do Plaintiffs explain how the TVPA provides a basis for this Court to order GEO to test detainees of COVID-19 or provide PPE to detainees. As Plaintiffs have failed to establish a legal basis for relief, they have equally failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. Tillett v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. CV 14-73-BLG-SPW, 2014 WL 12543843, at *1 (D. Mont. June 11, 2014) ("[Plaintiff] fails to state a legal basis for a preliminary injunction. Vague references to laws without further analysis are insufficient."); Cannabis Sci., Inc. v. Afaneh, No. 2:13-CV-00114-GMN, 2013 WL 273219, at *3 (D. Nev. Jan. 23, 2013) (failure to establish a legal basis for a claim indicates a Plaintiff cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits).

Plaintiffs cite to Barrientos for the proposition that detention facilities are not excluded from the reach of the TVPA, which they claim establishes they are likely to succeed on the merits of their underlying claim (unrelated to COVID-19). Barrientos v. CoreCivic, Inc., 2020 WL 964358 (11th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020). Yet, when read in full, Barrientos explicitly endorsed the housekeeping procedures at issue in this action stating:

To be clear, our opinion should not be read to call into question the legality of . . . longstanding requirements that detainees or inmates be required to perform basic housekeeping tasks . . . in the interest of maintaining order in an immigration detention facility, the PBNDS authorize punishments for detainees who, among other things, refuse to complete basic personal housekeeping tasks or organize work stoppages. See generally PBNDS § 3.1. Our decision should likewise not be read to imply that these basic disciplinary measures, on their own, give rise to TVPA liability.

Id. at *7 (emphasis added). Here, the relief sought is directly contrary to Barrientos, relief from general housekeeping requirements without any showing of "serious harm." Thus, Barrientos does not provide Plaintiffs a colorable basis for claiming they are likely to succeed on the merits.

To the extent that Plaintiffs will argue that COVID-19 itself is the "serious CASE No. 5:17-cv-02514-JGB-SHKX

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harm" which Plaintiffs in the facility face, it is not a harm imposed by GEO. Indeed it is an external force that no one, neither this Court, nor GEO can control. Surely, the omnipresent threat of COVID-19 cannot be fairly attributed to an intention of GEO to threaten harm to detainees—a threshold issue for TVPA liability. See ECF 252-1, 22 (citing US v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1170 (9th Cir. 2011)). Rather, any TVPA claim is limited to the threats, that if proven, would allegedly be within GEO's control, as enumerated by Plaintiffs in their brief as the threats of solitary confinement, disciplinary housing transfers, loss of privileges, and criminal prosecution—none of which are alleged to occur during the current COVID-19 crisis. ECF 252.1.

Indeed, it appears that instead of tying the motion to any current concern related to COVID-19, Plaintiffs attempt shortcut to the merits of the TVPA claim in this case in order to obtain a ruling from this Court that they are likely to prevail on the merits. As support, Plaintiffs offer evidence previously submitted in connection with their motion for class certification which is wholly unrelated to the COVID-19 pandemic. In short, they seek to have critical policies that lie at the core of this case litigated through a truncated, emergency process. Because Plaintiffs fail to tie their requested relief under the TVPA to the impact of COVID-19, or any legal basis in the TVPA, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and their motion should be denied.

Plaintiffs Have an Available Remedy at Law.

Throughout their brief, Plaintiffs cite to Hernandez v. Wolf, No. 5:20-cv-00617-TJH in support of their position.¹⁴ Yet, rather than strengthen Plaintiffs' position,

¹⁴ Plaintiffs cite extensively to the documents in *Hernandez v. Wolf* in support of their position, but fail to attach those documents to their submission rendering it impossible for GEO to respond to the substance of the same. Therefore, this Court should not consider that case, beyond the minute entries, in reaching a conclusion here. All documents in case number 5:20-cv-00617-TJH, save for the minute entries upon which GEO bases its understanding of the case, have been sealed from public view and are not accessible to the public or individuals who are not parties to that litigation. It is not clear to GEO how Plaintiffs obtained these sealed documents or the consequences of quoting their text in public filings with this Court.

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Hernandez undermines Plaintiffs' position. In Hernandez, a detainee sought release from an ICE detention facility on the basis of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Hernandez v. Wolf, No. 5:20-cv-00617-TJH, Dkt. No. 1. The basis for his motion was the spread of COVID-19 and his particular risk factors. The court entered a TRO releasing Mr. Hernandez. Likewise, other cases cited by Plaintiffs in their brief indicate that individuals who are at higher risk of COVID-19 have an adequate remedy at law through habeas relief, negating the need for injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs Will Not Suffer Immediate Irreparable Harm in the d. **Absence of Injunctive Relief.**

To satisfy the second requirement for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must show that it is "likely"—not merely possible—that they will suffer irreparable harm. See L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. Nat'l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, the threat of a likely injury must be "immediate." See Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). Indeed, Plaintiffs concede that the "single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction" is irreparable harm. ECF 252-1, 24.

Here, Plaintiffs will not suffer any harm regardless of the outcome of their motion. Plaintiffs are no longer detained and do not participate in the housekeeping policy or related tasks currently. The likelihood that Plaintiffs are exposed to COVID-19 has absolutely no relationship to whether the housekeeping policies are enforced at GEO facilities. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot establish this critical prerequisite to a TRO, and for that reason alone their motion must be denied. Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiffs' were to refile their TRO to include an individual who is currently detained; a current detainee would likewise not suffer immediate and irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief.

Eliminating the housekeeping policies temporarily would not alter detainees' movements within the facility or vis-à-vis one another, rendering it an utterly ineffective means of addressing COVID-19. As noted above, detainees would still be

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able to interact, mingle, participate in cleaning tasks in the VWP, and make contact with common living area surfaces (subject to GEO's COVID-19 policies)—all potential risks for COVID-19. But the detainees would have no responsibility for cleaning those same areas. Thus, halting the housekeeping policies would not only fail to make headway in preventing the spread of COVID-19, it would be antithetical to the CDC's recommendations for preventing the spread. The CDC has recommended that all individuals practice "routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces" within their homes, including tables, desks, toilets, faucets, sinks, and handles—as may be cleaned in the housekeeping program.¹⁵ The CDC does not explicitly recommend that individuals have others clean up after them and instead suggests that those who cohabitate should be cognizant of keeping high touch surfaces clean. 16 Thus, Plaintiffs proposed relief would not meaningfully reduce the spread of COVID-19, and in fact would be inconsistent with the clear guidance from the CDC.

On the other hand, if Plaintiffs' TRO does not enter, GEO will continue to implement its rigorous COVID-19 response plan including implementing the social distancing procedures, enhanced cleaning procedures, and informational campaigns as described in Section II *supra* and the declarations attached to this response. These steps, unlike those Plaintiffs seek as relief, would continue to have a meaningful impact in reducing the spread of COVID-19 within GEO's facilities. Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Because all aspects of GEO's COVID-19 response would continue absent suspension of the housekeeping policies and because Plaintiffs have offered no evidence whatsoever that suspension of the policies would have a meaningful impact upon the spread of COVID-19, Plaintiffs cannot show immediate irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief. In fact, based upon the same facts presented here, another District Court recently concluded that the threat of COVID019 in the NWIPC did not

APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

¹⁵ Cleaning and Disinfection for Households, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/prevent-getting-sick/cleaning-disinfection.html ¹⁶ *Id*.

meet the standard for irreparable harm, explaining:

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"[G]iven the measures [GEO is] currently taking, the court cannot conclude either that the spread of COVID-19 inside the NWDC is inevitable, or that Respondents will be unable to contain it if it occurs. No one can entirely guarantee safety in the midst of a global pandemic. However, the standard under which the court evaluates Petitioners' second TRO motion is not guaranteed

circumstances—but rather a likelihood of irreparable harm. The evidence before the court does not meet that standard.

impossible standard to

Dawson v. Asher, Case No. C20-040JLR-MAT (W. D. Wash. April 8, 2020). Thus, a TRO should not issue.

- e. The Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest Weighs Against a Preliminary Injunction.
 - i. The Public Interest is Served by Following the Directives of Public Health Officials, Not the Whims of Plaintiffs' Counsel.

meet no matter the

Moreover, the public interest is best served by allowing the orderly medical processes and protocols implemented by government professionals. *See Youngberg v. Romeo*, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982) (urging judicial deference and finding presumption of validity regarding decisions of medical professionals concerning conditions of confinement). Here, the best methods for preventing spread of COVID-19 have been created by top officials within the federal government which have been implemented by GEO. Exs. 1, 2, 3, and 4 (explaining that GEO's guidance has been created based upon CDC recommendations and those from ICE). These measures include ensuring adequate stocks of hygiene and cleaning supplies, informing detained individuals about the importance of personal hygiene, and "routinely cleaning and disinfecting surfaces and objects that are frequently touched." None of the

¹⁷ Centers of Disease Control, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/faq.html
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information submitted by Plaintiffs runs contrary to this guidance. Rather, Plaintiffs submit extensive information from the CDC in support of their motion—conceding it is the proper authority to provide policies for a COVID-19 response. ECF 252-1. Yet Plaintiffs seek to eliminate one of the many measures GEO is taking in accordance with CDC guidance. Exs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, supra note 18. Because Plaintiffs' request for a TRO would run directly contrary to the guidance from professional health officials, the public interest weighs against issuance of a TRO.

ii. The Provision of Class-Wide Testing and Personal Protective **Equipment (PPE) is Contrary to the Public Interest.**

As part of the relief sought, Plaintiffs ask this Court to order GEO to test all members of the certified class in this case. ECF 252-1, 7.18 The certified class includes a large number of individuals who are not detained (including the named Plaintiffs) a similarly large number of individuals who are no longer within the United States (including Plaintiff Karim in Somalia), and all individuals currently detained who are also class members. ECF 252-1, 7. In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek weekly testing of all class members who are currently detained.¹⁹ ECF 252-2 4. Thus, Plaintiffs seek relief for not only those individuals who are subject to the current housekeeping policies, but also for those individuals detained throughout the United States. There can be no question that the class members include individuals spread across the world. Plaintiffs seek this relief at the expense of the needs of the public. Across the United States the inability to obtain access to COVID-19 testing has hampered patient care.²⁰

¹⁸ GEO notes that in their proposed order, Plaintiffs seek weekly testing of all class members who participate in general housekeeping tasks. ECF 252-2. It is unclear which form of relief Plaintiffs are seeking due to these inconsistent representations. Nevertheless, this section applies equally to either form of testing.

¹⁹ All detainees are responsible for cleaning up after themselves as required by ICE's PBNDS and therefore every detainee would be eligible for testing under Plaintiffs' proposed relief.

²⁰ Sheila Kaplan, Despite Promises, Testing Delays Leave Americans 'Flying Blind', available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/health/coronavirus-testing-us.html (last accessed April 7, 2020) ("Doctors and officials around the country say that lengthy delays in getting results have persisted and that continued uneven access to tests has prolonged rationing and hampered patient care.").

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To that end, the CDC has made clear, "[n]ot everyone needs to be tested for COVID-19."21 Those who seek testing are advised that "[w]hile supplies of these tests are increasing, it may still be difficult to find a place to get tested."²² In fact, the Office of the Inspector General recently investigated the challenges that hospitals are facing in addressing the current COVID-19 pandemic. Chief among the challenges cited by the Inspector General was "that severe shortages of testing supplies and extended waits for test results limited hospitals' ability to monitor the health of patients and staff."²³ Thus, reducing the supply of this already limited resource, without a clear justification for doing so (including by following the qualifications delineated by the CDC), would be a detriment to the public who would face additional shortages in order to test detainees who are not presenting symptoms and do not meet CDC or medical guidelines for testing (presuming GEO could even obtain a sufficient number of tests to satisfy the requests herein).

Likewise, PPE is in limited supply across the nation. The same Inspector General Report made clear that "widespread shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) put staff and patients at risk."²⁴ The shortages are well known to the CDC, which advises that "PPE shortages are currently posing a tremendous challenge to the US healthcare system because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Healthcare facilities are having difficulty accessing the needed PPE and are having to identify alternate ways to provide patient care."25 To that end, the CDC provides stringent guidance for

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Centers for Disease Control and prevention, Testing for COVID -9, available at https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/testing.html (last accessed April 7, 2020).

²² *Id*.

²³ Office of the Inspector General, Hospital Experiences Responding to the COVID-19 Pandemic: Results of **National** Pulse Survey March 23-27. available 2020, https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-06-20-

^{00300.}asp?utm_source=web&utm_medium=web&utm_campaign=covid-19-hospital-survey-04-06-26 2020 (last visited April 7, 2020). 27

²⁴ *Id*.

²⁵Centers for Disease Control, Strategies to Optimize the Supply of PPE and Equipment, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/ppe-strategy/index.html (last visited April 7, 2020). Case No. 5:17-cv-02514-JGB-SHKX

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the use of PPE, focused on ensuring medical professionals have what they need and discouraging use by those who are not infected or who do not need it.²⁶ Thus, like with testing, drawing from the currently limited supply of PPE and taking from the hospitals that need it as a merely precautionary measure would be to the detriment of the general public. Accordingly, to provide this relief to Plaintiffs would be counter to the public interest.

iii. A Nationwide Injunction is Against the Public Interest to Have **Issues Presented to District Courts Nationwide.**

Justice Thomas made clear that the authority of a district court to enter a nationwide injunction is tenuous at best. *Hawaii*, 138 S. Ct. at 2429 (Thomas, J. concurring) ("In sum, universal injunctions are legally and historically dubious. If federal courts continue to issue them, this Court is dutybound to adjudicate their authority to do so."). The Ninth Circuit has similarly indicated that nationwide injunctions should be properly limited, explaining that "nationwide injunctive relief may be inappropriate where a regulatory challenge involves important or difficult questions of law, which might benefit from development in different factual contexts and in multiple decisions by the various courts of appeal." Los Angeles Haven Hospice, Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 664 (9th Cir. 2011) And, the balance of courts agree that "nationwide injunctive relief is discouraged where it would 'substantially thwart the development of important questions of law' and prevent other courts from ruling on the validity of the regulation. See e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984); see also Virginia Society for Human Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Commission, 263 F.3d 379, 393 (4th Cir. 2001).

Here, there can be no question that the TVPA claims brought by Plaintiffs raise novel and complex issues of law. These issues should not be resolved, nationwide, where other Courts are grappling with similar issues. Indeed, the district court in

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²⁶ *Id*.

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Barrientos has this exact issue, the application of the TVPA to detention facilities that implement discipline consistent with the PBNDS, pending before it. See e.g. Barrientos v. CoreCivic, M.D. Ga. Case No. 4:18-cv-00070-CDL, 2018 WL 1836209 (M.D.Ga.). Likewise, the Southern District of California is grappling with the same issue. See Owino v. CoreCivic, S. D. Cal. Case No. 3:17-cv01112-JLS-NLS. While these are a few examples, many courts across the country are dealing with the same issue. See e.g., Menocal v. GEO, D. Colo. Case No. 1:14-cv-02887. Some of these cases have been pending for years and extensive discovery has occurred. These cases should not be superseded by a TRO in this case which would impact facilities in most federal appellate circuits. This is particularly true where Plaintiffs have provided scant evidence to support their motion, relying upon recycled declarations from other cases, and addressing only two (2) of the twelve (12) facilities for which they seek an injunction. The TVPA issues should be allowed to move through the district courts and provide guidance to those addressing this novel issue.

Additionally, courts across the nation are grappling with the appropriate response to COVID-19 in detention settings. This is evident through Plaintiffs' own submissions which consist largely of declarations that are pending before other district courts across the country. There are countless other motions across the country seeking release from custody or other changes in policy at ICE facilities as a result of COVID-19. See e.g. Fabiola-Almeida v. Barr, 20-cv-490-RSM-BAT, Dkt. No. 11 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 6, 2020). Courts have reached varied results, including the astute analysis from the Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of Washington. Judge Martinez's recent order is instructive here:

"[T]he court cannot conclude either that the spread of COVID-19 inside NWDC is inevitable, or that the Attorney General will be unable to contain it if it occurs. No one can entirely guarantee safety in the midst of a global pandemic. However, the standard under which the court evaluates [Plaintiff's] TRO motion is not guaranteed safety—an impossible standard to meet no matter the circumstances—but rather a

likelihood of irreparable harm. The evidence before the court does not meet that standard."

Patel v. Barr, 20-cv-488-RSM-BAT, Dkt. No. 9 (W.D. Wash. April 2, 2020); but see Basank v. Decker, 2020 WL 1481503 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2020) (granting a TRO in connection with a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that Plaintiffs had established likely due process violations). The differing decisions in each judicial district provide for additional considerations for future courts addressing similar issues. This judicial marketplace of ideas is helpful to all other judges who are sure to face similar issues in the coming months. Thus, should the Court conclude injunctive relief is permissible here, which it should not, it should enter relief only as to those facilities for which Plaintiffs have submitted evidence: LIPC and Aurora. Under no circumstances would a broader injunction be appropriate in this case.

IV. PLAINTIFFS MUST PAY A BOND

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), a court may issue a temporary restraining order "only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained." A court may execute the bond on a restraining order if it finds that "the enjoined or restrained party was 'wrongfully enjoined or restrained." *Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.*, 16 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1994). "[A] party has been wrongfully enjoined within the meaning of Rule 65(c) when it turns out the party enjoined had the right all along to do what it was enjoined from doing." *Id.* at 1036. Here, should the Court issue injunctive relief, which it should not, Plaintiffs should be required to pay a bond consistent with the Rule. "The district court may dispense with the filing of a bond when it concludes there is no realistic likelihood of harm to the defendant from enjoining his or her conduct." *Jorgensen v. Cassiday*, 320 F.3d 906, 919(9th Cir.2003). Here, Plaintiffs cannot establish that there is no likelihood of harm in enjoining GEO's conduct. Indeed, any TRO would require significant restructuring of

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the current facility protocols with respect to COVID-19 in the midst of an already trying time. Additionally, there can be no question that Plaintiffs have not provided any precedential authority that would indicate that if a TRO were to issue, it would be likely that the TRO would not later be reversed. Nor have they provided a sufficient showing on the merits to justify confidence that any TRO would not be quickly reversed. For these reasons, Plaintiffs should be required to submit a bond, the amount of which, would be set by this Court. Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1086 (9th Cir. 2009). At a minimum, this bond should include GEO's "potential defense costs, an offer which if accepted would itself ensure that Defendants' expenses will be reimbursed" if injunctive relief is reversed. *Id*.

V. THE RELIEF AVAILABLE UNDER THE TVPA IS LIMITED

The only statute upon which Plaintiffs base their claim for relief upon is the TVPA. As detailed above, the connection between the TVPA and detainees risk of contracting COVID-19 by regularly cleaning their living areas is tenuous at best. And, even if this Court were to grant relief to Plaintiffs in the form of a TRO under the TVPA—contrary to the clear balance of the equities above—under the TVPA, it could only enjoin the use of labor that is obtained under the threat of serious harm (even though no labor is so obtained). That is to say, the Court could enjoin GEO from enforcing certain types of punishments for detainees who refuse to clean their living areas during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, even if the Court were to order temporary relief under the TVPA, GEO would still be able to request that detainees clean their areas more frequently (absent any punishment or coercion) and could emphasize the importance of cleanliness during the current COVID-19 pandemic. Further, there can be no doubt that the TVPA does not provide for the provision of PPE as a remedy for a violation of the TVPA.

Additionally, to the extent Plaintiffs' proposed order seeks to have this Court take judicial notice of the facts and findings in Hernandez v. Wolf, No. 5:20-cv-00617-TJH, this relief should not be granted. As detailed above, the pleadings and documents 52631576;4

in *Hernandez* are sealed from public viewing and inaccessible to GEO and its counsel. Thus, GEO is unable to review or rebut any points therein. Thus, they are an improper subject of judicial notice.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons listed herein, Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order should be denied.

Dated: April 8, 2020

AKERMAN LLP

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