PRISON LAW OFFICE DONALD SPECTER (SBN 83925) dspecter@prisonlaw.com SARA NORMAN (SBN 189536) 1 2 snorman@prisonlaw.com 3 1917 Fifth Street Berkeley, California 94710 Telephone: (510) 280-2621 Fax: (510) 280-2704 4 5 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA EASTERN DIVISION - RIVERSIDE 10 11 12 QUINTON GRAY, et al., on behalf of Case No. EDCV13-0444 VAP (OP) themselves and all others similarly 13 **CLASS ACTION** situated, 14 **EMERGENCY MOTION TO** Plaintiffs, **ENFORCE OR, IN THE** 15 ALTERNATIVÉ, MODIFY CONSENT DECREE 16 v. Judge: Hon. Virginia A. Phillips Date: To be determined 17 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE. Time: To be determined 18 Courtroom: Telephonic Defendant. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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PRISON LAW OFFICE 1 DONALD SPECTER (SBN 83925) dspecter@prisonlaw.com 2 SARA NORMAN (SBN 189536) snorman@prisonlaw.com 3 1917 Fifth Street Berkeley, California 94710 4 Telephone: (510) 280-2621 Fax: (510) 280-2704 5 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA EASTERN DIVISION – RIVERSIDE 10 11 12 OUINTON GRAY, et al., on behalf of Case No. EDCV13-0444 VAP (OP) themselves and all others similarly 13 **CLASS ACTION** situated, 14 **EMERGENCY MOTION TO** Plaintiffs, ENFORCE OR, IN THE 15 ALTERNATIVÉ, MODIFY CONSENT DECREE 16 v. Judge: Hon. Virginia A. Phillips Date: To be determined 17 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Time: To be determined 18 Courtroom: Telephonic Defendant. 19 20 21 **NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION** 22 TO THE PARTIES AND ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD: 23 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT as soon as the matter may be heard before 24 the Honorable Virginia A. Phillips, Plaintiffs move the Court to enforce the Consent 25 Decree to compel Defendants to meet their constitutional obligation to preserve life 26 and health in the Riverside County Jails during the coronavirus pandemic. 27 Given the urgency, Plaintiffs request that the Court set an expedited briefing 28

schedule and review this motion as soon as practicable.

The motion is based on this Notice of Motion and Motion, the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and the supporting declarations and associated documents, filed herewith.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES INTRODUCTION

Riverside County, like the rest of California and much of the country, is under a state of emergency due to the spread of the novel coronavirus and COVID-19, the deadly disease it causes. The County is bracing for the potentially catastrophic ravages of this pandemic.

California's Governor has taken significant steps to flatten the curve of new cases before hospitals are overwhelmed and the death toll skyrockets, as it has in other states. Declaration of Sara Norman in Support of Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion (Norman Decl.), filed herewith, Exh. A (Newsom March 19, 2020 Executive Order N-33-20). The primary components of the Governor's actions have been to require physical distancing to keep Californians at least six feet apart at all times and to prepare hospitals and health care workers for the coming surge in cases.

Neither of these requirements can be implemented in the Riverside County jails, however. Living conditions in the jails, with large dormitories so crowded that people sleep on the floor, make it impossible to practice physical distancing and set the stage for a disastrous spread of the virus. In addition, the jails lack medical settings necessary to treat COVID-19 patients with serious complications, so all such patients must be sent to outside hospitals, which already face a potentially overwhelming influx of patients.

According to the former head of California's prison system, correctional facilities are "a tinderbox of potential infection as you go forward, especially if you are just watching what's going on around the world." Norman Decl., Exh. B at 2.

Another former corrections chief from Colorado sounded a similar warning: "I don't think people understand the gravity of what's going to happen if this runs in a prison.... You're going to see devastation that's unbelievable." Norman Decl., Exh. C at 2.

Tragically, the pandemic has already taken a brutal toll at the jails. Two Riverside Sheriff's deputies have died of COVID-19, and at least 11 incarcerated people have been hospitalized due to the virus. Norman Decl., Exh. D. But the County faces far more severe illness and death if it fails to act now. The continued spread of the virus, unchecked by physical distancing -- considered essential by the Governor, the Court experts in this case, and public safety experts everywhere -- poses a dire threat to the nearly 4,000 people incarcerated there, as well as to the deputies, health care staff, and other staff who move in and out of the jails every day as they perform their essential jobs. Moreover, people housed at the jails are released daily, returning to their homes and families, and anyone in the jails who has to be hospitalized will be sent to a community hospital. This unavoidable movement means that any COVID-19 outbreak in the jails will inevitably spread to the community outside, further overwhelming health care resources and endangering the larger community.

The Remedial Plan in this case is designed "to meet the minimum level of health care necessary to fulfill Defendant's obligations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. . ." Consent Decree, June 7, 2016, ECF No. 173 (Consent Decree), ¶ 9. Defendants' failure to implement basic protocols to contain the spread of COVID-19 in the jails clearly falls short of that obligation, as described by the Court's own experts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek to enforce the Consent Decree by requiring the County to submit a plan to the Court to implement the Governor's order for physical distancing for all Californians housed in the jails and to provide sanitation and other essential services generally accepted as necessary in

correctional facilities to provide for the basic health needs of incarcerated people.

The County has ample means to meet its constitutional obligation to contain the spread of this deadly infectious disease. The sanitation and educational components require some staff time and expenditure of funds but are not unmanageable. For physical distancing, the Sheriff has numerous options. There is a new jail in Indio that has not yet been activated; the Sheriff can use that space to transfer many of the people currently crowded into the other jails. He could further use his statutory authority pursuant to Government Code Section 8658 to relocate particularly vulnerable people to alternative secure settings in order to avert potentially deadly consequences and reduce the dire burden on County health care operations if vulnerable people remain inside to become infected. Other means are not necessary given these alternatives but are also available to reduce population density: the Sheriff can employ the population reduction measures he already has at his disposal to reduce the population density significantly in order to allow six feet of space between all people living in the jails. He can also do as other sheriffs have done, and exercise his emergency statutory authority pursuant to Government Code Section 8658 to release people to allow for physical distancing.

The Court should allow Defendant to develop a plan but should set the end goal: swift implementation of meaningful public health measures as recommended by the Court's own experts in this case. It is a matter of utmost urgency that the County implement such measures as will accomplish the goal of constitutional care, and the Court should order Defendant to produce a plan to that end.

ARGUMENT

I. Procedural History

This case was filed on March 8, 2013. Plaintiffs alleged that the County of Riverside failed to provide minimally adequate medical and mental health care to the people incarcerated in its jails, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth

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Amendments to the United States Constitution. (A Third Amended Complaint, filed on November 24, 2015, added a claim of discrimination against certain people with disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.) On September 2, 2014, the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

The Plaintiff class consists of "all prisoners . . . who are now, or will be in the future, subjected to the medical and mental health policies and practices of Riverside County." Consent Decree, ¶ 3. The medical subclass comprises "[a]ll prisoners . . . who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of the Riverside Jails"; the mental health subclass comprises "[a]ll prisoners . . . who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the mental health care policies and practices of the Riverside Jails"; and the disabilities subclass consists of "all prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to policies and practices of the Riverside jails regarding specialized or sheltered housing for prisoners due to their mobility impairments and need for assistive devices, and the provision and confiscation of accommodations for prisoners with mobility impairments." Third Amended Complaint, November 24, 2015, ECF No. 150.

In January 2015, the parties suspended regular and expert discovery for the purpose of settlement negotiations and hired neutral experts "to determine whether the health care currently provided poses a significant risk of serious harm to prisoners confined in the Jails and, if so, to make recommendations for improvements that will provide the minimum care guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution." Consent Decree, ¶ 4. The parties jointly selected Dr. Scott Allen, Professor of Medicine at the University of California-Riverside, as the expert on medical care and Dr. Bruce Gage, Chief Psychiatrist of the Washington State Department of Corrections, as the expert on mental health care. They submitted their final reports to the parties on July 15, 2015.

The parties subsequently negotiated a Remedial Plan to address the identified deficiencies and asked the Court to enter a Consent Decree to resolve Plaintiffs' claims. The parties further agreed that the Court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of its judgment. Consent Decree, ¶ 30. The Consent Decree also guarantees access to information for Plaintiffs and the experts and requires Defendant, "in consultation and collaboration with Plaintiffs' counsel, [to] develop and implement appropriate and adequate plans, policies, and practices to ensure compliance with the Remedial Plan." *Id.*, ¶¶ 10, 15, 20.

Since that time, the experts have made numerous trips to the jails and issued reports regarding their findings. Plaintiffs have done the same, engaging in fruitful negotiations with County officials from the Sheriff's Department as well as medical and behavioral health leadership in the County, as the County has worked to implement the Remedial Plan.

On March 16, 2020, Plaintiffs' counsel spoke to Defendants' counsel regarding the County's response to the COVID-19 threat in the jails, and followed the conversation with a letter on the same day. Norman Decl., ¶ 6 and Exh. E. Plaintiffs urged the County to adopt various measures in response to the virus, including early release to lessen population density to prevent rapid transmission, education of incarcerated people and staff, provision of hygiene supplies, and precautions for particularly vulnerable populations. *Id.* Plaintiffs requested a meeting with County officials and copies of any plans that cover any of the measures Plaintiffs discussed in the letter. *Id.*, p. 4. Defendant responded in writing on March 22, providing partial responses but no plan and no date for a meeting. Norman Decl., Exh. F. Plaintiffs provided follow-up questions the same day, Norman Decl., Exh. G, but to date have received no substantive response or documents and have had no conversations with County officials. Norman Decl., ¶ 8.

On March 28, 2020, Plaintiffs proposed that the Remedial Plan be modified

on an emergency basis "to require (a) the release of enough people living in the jail 1 2 to allow for social distancing in all living spaces, and (b) the release of elderly and high-risk patients to protect them from the dangers of the pandemic behind bars." 3 4 Norman Decl., Exh. H. On March 30, 2020, Plaintiffs proposed an additional modification: "to require the County to provide, in cases of public health 5 emergencies, ample free soap for personal use, cleaning supplies to sanitize cells 6 7 and common living areas, and public health education regarding handwashing, sanitizing, and social distancing." Id., Exh. I. The modification proposal was made 8 pursuant to the Consent Decree, ¶ 11 ("Plaintiffs may seek to modify the Remedial 9 Plan if the plan does not effectively [ensure provision of constitutional care], or a 10 modification is necessary to ensure Plaintiff class members receive adequate 11 healthcare under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 12 Constitution"). 13 Plaintiffs further requested on March 28 that if Defendant disagreed, the 14 15 parties would stipulate to waive the dispute resolution mechanism set forth in the Consent Decree and agree to an expedited briefing schedule before the Court. *Id.*, 16 17 Exh. H. Defendant has not to date responded. Norman Decl., ¶ 10.

Also on March 28, Plaintiffs asked the Court experts to review the proposal and provide a response as soon as possible. Norman Decl., Exh. H. Dr. Allen, the medical expert, provided a Supplemental Report on March 30. Norman Decl., Exh. J (Supplemental Report of Scott Allen) (Allen Expert Report). Dr. Gage, the mental health expert, provided a Supplemental Report on March 31. Norman Decl., Exh. K (Supplemental Report of Bruce Gage) (Gage Expert Report). *See* Consent Decree, ¶ 27 (expert reports admissible at the request of either party).

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II. People Housed in the Riverside County Jails Are at Profound Risk of Serious Illness and Death from the COVID-19 Pandemic

A. COVID-19 is particularly dangerous in correctional settings COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus, is spreading rapidly

around the United States. As confirmed cases worldwide approach one million, U.S. cases have exceeded 300,000, with more than 7,500 deaths. Norman Decl., ¶ 13. The disease is dangerous because it is a novel virus: the pre-existing immunity that checks the spread of the common flu does not exist. Allen Expert Report, ¶ 3. It further causes serious and sometimes deadly respiratory complications in some patients, particularly those over 60 or with chronic medical problems. *Id.*, ¶ 4. There is no vaccine for COVID-19, nor is there a treatment, other than supportive care. Based on early data, it appears that about 20% of those infected will require hospitalization, and 5% will require treatment in an Intensive Care Unit. *Id.*, ¶ 4. Those requiring intensive treatment in a hospital setting will often require the use of ventilators, which are now in short supply around the world. The overall case-fatality rate "for those infected is estimated to be between 0.2% and 3%." *Id.*

COVID-19 spreads primarily through person-to-person droplets. Thus people in close proximity to each other are at highest risk for spreading the disease. The rate of spread for COVID-19 appears to be as high or higher than that for influenza or chicken pox. Id., ¶ 9. Thus, experts recognize that to mitigate the risk of infection and the impact of the virus, "physical distancing" is essential. Id., ¶ 14. That is why the Governor has ordered, and County officials have implemented, physical distancing measures to keep Californians at least six feet from each other. As a result, schools and businesses have closed, and parks and pools and playgrounds and other places that people congregate in groups have shut down because of the unacceptable risk of transmission of the virus.

This risk is particularly dangerous because "[t]raditional methods employed by jails and prisons to slow or prevent the spread of infectious diseases," including immediate testing and quarantining, do not work for COVID-19. *Id.*, ¶ 10. Currently, those methods are simply not available "because there is no rapid test [readily available] and current testing is in limited supply and most individuals who

are infectious are without symptoms early on in the process (for up to two weeks)." *Id.* Moreover, as explained further below, jails like Riverside's that are at or over capacity "will lack the flexibility required to successfully cohort or isolate individuals or groups." *Id.*

B. The Riverside jails present extremely high risk for rapid, uncontained spread of the disease

Congregate living facilities, including nursing homes, universities and cruise ships, all are at serious risk from the coronavirus, but "jails carry an even higher risk because jail settings have even closer living quarters." Id., ¶ 15. This is true of Riverside County jails, where detainees share bunk areas, dining facilities and bathroom facilities in extremely close quarters.

Currently, Riverside jails hold hundreds of people in dormitory settings. Two of the five jails – Indio Jail and Blythe Jail – consist almost entirely of congregate dorm housing. Norman Decl., Exh. L (Gage expert report, September 2019) at 25 ("Almost all inmates at both these facilities are in dormitory style units"). There are multiple dorms at the other jails: Robert Presley Detention Center (Presley), Cois Byrd Detention Center (Byrd), and Larry D. Smith Correctional Facility (Smith). *See* Norman Decl., Exh. M (Gage expert report, December 2017) at 29 (noting a 40-bed dorm); Norman Decl., Exh. N (Gage expert report, June 2018) at 17 (noting that housing units 12A and 14G are dorm settings); Norman Decl., Exh. O (Board of State and Community Corrections, 2018-2020 Biennial Inspection of Riverside County Sheriff's Office Jail and Court Holding Facilities).

In addition, the jails house too many people: Indio's dorms were at 150% of capacity in December 2019, according to the Board of State and Community Corrections inspection, and people were sleeping on the floor at Presley, Byrd, and Smith. Norman Decl., Exh. O at 2-3.

The dorms at Indio Jail, in particular, are crowded and unsanitary. As Plaintiffs wrote in the February 2017 report,

We are concerned about prisoners spending long periods of time in the extremely crowded and close quarters of Housing Unit 15 and other similar units at Indio (Units 13 and 14). These housing units consist of a small dayroom with a shower on the other side of a small divider. The cells are just behind the dayroom. The dayroom is off a dark hallway which is behind a locked door separating it from the mail jail corridors; there is no fresh air. We saw more than 20 people crowded into the dayroom, which is their entire living space while they are awake....The ventilation is minimal and the shower frequently in use. One prisoner described how difficult and dangerous it is to experience withdrawal from opiate addiction in those extremely close quarters, with frequent vomiting and uncontrolled bowel movements. Other prisoners described the experience of being in a small, unventilated space where often two or more people are going through withdrawal. People universally described it as extremely unhygienic, unsafe, and stressful, with the lack of movement or programming compounded by the inescapable sights, sounds, and smells of people in extreme distress.

Norman Decl., Exh. P (Pltfs' February 2017 report), at 2-3. As of December 2019, these conditions had not materially changed. Norman Decl., ¶ 18. As Dr. Gage explains, the dirty conditions in the jail provide a vector for disease: "[t]he jails are operationally challenged to conduct cleaning and sanitization at the frequency and level needed to prevent the spread of the virus through contact with surfaces having

In addition to their dismal housing conditions, many people are routinely held in crowded holding tanks with 10-20 other people, sometimes for several days. By their accounts, people held in the Riverside jails often spend time in large holding cells in close proximity to other people when they are first processed into the jails, when transferring between jails for court dates or alternate housing, or when leaving for or returning from outside medical appointments. On every tour of the jails, Plaintiffs hear reports of stays of several days in these holding cells, often under extremely crowded, unsanitary, and dangerous conditions. Plaintiffs have repeatedly reported these incidents to the County. For example, the most recent reports included the following accounts:

-- One patient "reported he was held in a holding cell for four days at RPDC when he was booked on September 13 [2019]; he said he slept on the floor and on benches. He said there were no sheets, blankets, grooming supplies, or showers, and the number of people in the tank

live virus." Gage Expert Report, ¶ 7.

varied between seven and 15." Norman Decl., Exh. Q (Pltfs' December 2019 report) at 4.

-- another patient "reported that he spent more than three days in a holding cell in intake at RPDC ...[in September 2019]... while waiting for housing assignment. He said he was going through heroin withdrawal and there were 16-20 people in the holding cell, with one toilet and one sink. He thought several others in the cell were also going through withdrawal. He reports he spent another four days in intake one month later after he was rehoused at RPDC, and this time there were about 15 people in the cell. He said that three weeks later he spent three days in a holding cell again after he was again rehoused. At that point, he estimates there were about 12 people in the holding cell with him." *Id*.

-- another patient "reported he spent three days in a holding cell in Cois Byrd following surgery on his foot for a staph infection at the Riverside University Medical Center. He said he had an open wound but no dressing change, medications, or facilities to clean the wound for that entire time. He said there were usually 10-11 other people in the cell with him..." *Id*.

-- another patient "said that at Smith, the week prior to the tour [in January 2019], he spent two to three days in a holding cell at intake with seven or eight other people, sleeping on the floor.... He was shortly thereafter found to have staph or MRSA in his finger and sent to the emergency room. The long-term stay in extremely close quarters is clearly a public health concern, given his condition; although staff could not have known of it at the time, this situation illustrates why such practices present a risk of harm to people's health." Norman Decl., Exh. R (Pltfs' January 2019 report) at 3.

In addition to living space problems, health care space in the jails is also inadequate even under ordinary conditions. The most serious deficiency is the lack of an infirmary that can provide any complex care. According to the Court's medical expert, this means that the only access incarcerated people have to a higher level of care is through community emergency rooms or the County hospital.

Expert Report of Scott Allen, M.D., November 25, 2015, ECF No. 152-1, at 22.

C. Despite repeated pleas, the County has provided minimal information regarding preparation for the pandemic and there is no indication that essential population density reduction measures have been instituted

As noted in the Section I, *supra*, Plaintiffs have made repeated requests for information, plans, and meetings regarding Defendant's response to the looming COVID-19 threat in the jails. Plaintiffs requested plans on March 16 and have to

date received none. Norman Decl., ¶ 8 and Exhs. E, G, H, and I. Plaintiffs asked to speak with County officials on March 16, 22, 25, 28, and 31, and April 1 and 3, but have never had a telephone call. *Id.*, ¶ 8 and Exhs. E, G, H, T, U, and V.

The one substantive communication provided to Plaintiffs, on March 22, contained broad generalizations and no concrete data or information. *Id.*, Exh. F. Plaintiffs' follow-up questions of the same date have gone unanswered. *Id.*,¶ 8.

D. Time is of the essence to prevent COVID-19 from exacting a deadly toll in the Riverside jails as well as the Riverside Community

The conditions in the Riverside jails create a tinderbox for rapid spread of the virus, imperiling the people who live there, the staff who work there, and the community at large. Allen Expert Report, ¶ 13. The harm is not speculative – people are already dying of COVID-19 in the Riverside jails. Norman Decl., Exh. D. The stakes could not be higher.

Rapid response is critical because under the existing conditions, a large number of incarcerated people are likely to become sick within a short period. When that happens, a substantial number will require medical intervention at local hospitals, "thus increasing the risk of infection to the public at large and overwhelming treatment facilities." Allen Expert Report, ¶ 12. Dr. Allen explains,

As local hospital systems become overwhelmed by the patient flow from jail outbreaks, precious health resources will be less available for people in the community. To be more explicit, a detention center with a rapid outbreak could result in multiple detainees—five, ten or more—being sent to the local community hospital where there may only be six or eight ventilators over a very short period. As they fill up and overwhelm the ventilator resources, those ventilators are unavailable when the infection inevitably is carried by staff to the community and are also unavailable for all the usual critical illnesses (heart attacks, trauma, etc.).

Id., ¶ 13.

The County must be ordered to meet its constitutional obligation to prevent the spread of infectious illness, including through implementation of physical distancing and stringent hygiene measures. The County can achieve this by moving detainees out of congregate living facilities. By so doing, "the tinderbox scenario of a large cohort of people getting sick all at once is less likely to occur, and the peak volume of patients hitting the community hospital would level out." *Id.* By flattening the curve of the new infections, Riverside can avoid the crisis of overloaded community resources. "In the first scenario, many people from the jail *and the community* die unnecessarily for want of a ventilator. In the latter, survival is maximized as the local mass outbreak scenario is averted." *Id.* (emphasis in original).

III. The County Has Acted with Deliberate Indifference to the Imminent Risk that People in its Custody are Likely to Fall Severely Ill or Die Because of COVID-19.

Under the terms of the Consent Decree, the County must provide constitutionally adequate medical care to the people living in its jails: "The Remedial Plan is designed to meet the minimum level of health care necessary to fulfill Defendant's obligations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Consent Decree, ECF No. 173, ¶ 9. In the face of the current public health crisis, the County has failed to live up to that commitment.

It is well established that "[a] prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994); *see Parsons v. Ryan*, 754 F.3d 657, 677 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). Specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized that officials may not be "deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a serious, communicable disease." *Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993). This is true even when "the complaining inmate shows no serious current symptoms." *Id*; *see also Hutto v. Finney*, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978) (finding Eighth Amendment violation and noting incarcerated people were placed in conditions where infectious diseases could spread easily). By failing to act meaningfully and decisively to prevent the rapid spread of COVID-19 in its jails, the County has violated the

Consent Decree and failed to fulfill its obligations under the U.S. Constitution.¹

People in the jails are at substantial risk of severe illness or death Α. due to COVID-19.

"To establish unconstitutional treatment of a medical condition . . . a prisoner must show deliberate indifference to a 'serious' medical need." Doty v. Ctv. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). "A medical need is serious if failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted). Indicators of a serious medical need include: whether "a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain." McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (overruled on other grounds).

COVID-19 is an undeniably serious threat for people living in the Riverside iails for several reasons. First, many people in the jails are elderly and have underlying medical conditions that make them particularly vulnerable to severe complications or death from the virus. Allen Expert Report, ¶ 19. Second, everyone who lives in the jails is at an unnecessary and disproportionate risk of

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¹ Many members of the Plaintiff class are pre-trial and are thus protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. *See Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 533-37 (1979); *Pierce v. Cty. of Orange*, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainee are not required to prove that an official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to their health or safety; instead, they need only prove that the official "did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved." Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, deprivations of health care that violate the rights of the convicted population *a fortiori* violate the rights of those who are pretrial. *See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.*, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that the protections of the Due Process clause "are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner"); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment is "more protective"). Because the County's actions plainly violate the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiffs rely primarily on cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment in this motion.

contracting COVID-19 because it is transmitted primarily person-to-person and the fundamental prevention technique -- physical distancing -- is impossible in many of the crowded dormitories in the County's jails. *See supra*, Section II.B. Finally, access to cleaning supplies has been a chronic problem in many areas of the jails, with general cleanliness a problem in several jail facilities. *See supra*, Section II.B; Gage Expert Report, ¶ 7. Failure to clean and sanitize frequently also places people at enhanced risk of infection. *Id*.

The Court's own experts have made it abundantly clear that crowded congregate living quarters, inadequate cleaning, and the disproportionate presence of vulnerable populations makes the jails ripe for the rapid spread of COVID-19 and thus potentially very dangerous to the people locked inside them during the pandemic as well as the staff and surrounding communities. Allen Expert Report, ¶¶ 9-10, 14-16 Gage Expert Report, ¶¶ 5-10. There is clear consensus among public health experts, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, on these points. *See* Allen Expert Report, ¶¶ 10, 16. Tragically, two Riverside sheriff's deputies have already died of the virus and numerous people living in the jail have tested positive. Norman Decl., Exh. D. It is only a matter of time before the death toll increases.

B. The County's Failure to Take Adequate Steps to Protect Against the Spread of COVID-19 Constitutes Deliberate Indifference.

"A showing of deliberate indifference . . . requires a showing that the defendant knew of an excessive risk to inmate health or safety that the defendant deliberately ignored." *Grenning v. Miller-Stout*, 739 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014); *see also Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 839-40 (adopting subjective recklessness as the test for deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment). Failure to prevent the spread of a contagious illness constitutes deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. *See Hutto*, 437 U.S. at 682; *Gates v. Collier*, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300, 1303 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding plaintiffs entitled to relief under Eighth Amendment due to,

among other conditions, allowing "inmates with serious contagious diseases . . . to mingle with the general prison population"). It is well established that the Government may not "ignore a condition of confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious illness." *Helling*, 509 U.S. at 33. *See Brown v. Plata*, 563 U.S. 493, 508-09, 519-20 (2011) (affirming population reduction order and citing findings that "[o]vercrowding had increased the incidence of infectious disease" in California prisons, and that crowded living quarters "where large numbers of prisoners may share just a few toilets and showers [were] 'breeding grounds for disease'").

The County is well aware of the risk posed by COVID-19. *See* Allen Expert Report, ¶ 17; Norman Decl., Exhs. E, G, H, I, T, U, and V. The County's response to these warnings has been opaque, with a consistent failure or refusal to provide meaningful information about any steps taken. Norman Decl., Exhs. F, T, U, and V. As a result, Plaintiffs can have no confidence that any meaningful steps have been taken to mitigate the deadly potential of the disease. Specifically, significant improvements in access to soap, disinfectant, and other hygiene measures are necessary, but there is no clear plan aside from a general assurance that the County "follow[s] public health guidelines to maintain hygiene for the inmates," which includes "soap and access to water" and "access to cleaning supplies." Norman Decl., Exh F. Plaintiffs' follow-up questions have gone unanswered, so Plaintiffs can have no confidence that soap is available free of charge, for example, and that the cleaning supplies include disinfecting agents demonstrated to be effective against the coronavirus. *See* Norman Decl., ¶ 8.

Moreover, population density in the dorms presents a serious risk of harm but Defendant has provided no plan to address it in a concrete way, including whether people with high risk of morbidity and mortality have been included in any density reduction measures. Norman Decl., Exh. F. This gap occurs despite ample authority regarding the urgency to take action, including clear direction from the

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Court's experts, appointed to advise Defendant and the Court regarding essential steps to reach constitutional levels of care. In particular, the County has apparently not elected to spread out the population in the jails, which is the most effective means to prevent the rapid spread of the virus and to protect the medically vulnerable. Allen Expert Report, ¶ 10; Gage Expert Report, ¶ 8.

C. The Court Should Enforce the Consent Decree

The Consent Decree grants the Court "the power to enforce the agreement through specific performance and all other remedies permitted by law." Consent Decree, ¶ 30. Plaintiffs seek enforcement of the following provisions of the Consent Decree: first, the requirement that Defendant, "in consultation and collaboration with Plaintiffs' counsel," must "develop and implement appropriate and adequate plans, policies, and practices to ensure compliance with the Remedial Plan," and second, the requirement that "Defendant shall provide Plaintiffs with access to information, including all Riverside Jail facilities, documents, records, and staff, that Plaintiffs believe in good faith is necessary to monitor Defendant's compliance with the Remedial Plan," and that such information shall be provided "within 15 calendar days of their request." Id., ¶¶ 10, 20. Plaintiffs' requests for plans and further information from Defendant of March 16 and 22 have gone unanswered.² Norman Decl., ¶ 8.

Plaintiffs request that the Court exercise its authority under the Consent

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² Plaintiffs recognize that the Consent Decree sets forth a dispute resolution process: the parties shall negotiate any dispute in good faith, may request reports from the Court experts in an attempt to resolve the disagreement, and shall then attempt to resolve the matter through mediation with Judge Raul Ramirez prior to filing a motion for relief to the Court. Consent Decree, ¶¶ 27-19. The first two requirements have been met. Norman Decl, ¶ 6, Exhs. E-I, T-V. Given the urgent nature of the proceedings, Plaintiffs request the Court modify the Consent Decree to allow for urgent appeal for enforcement directly to the Court.

Decree to order Defendants to submit a plan for compliance with the Court Expert's recommendations by April 10, 2020. In particular, the plan must address the need for ready access to hygiene materials and physical distancing in the jails and detail the steps the County will take to achieve it. Dr. Allen has already provided Defendant with an example of a plan. Allen Expert Report, ¶ 17.

Such steps need not involve release of prisoners or reduction of the jail population. The empty jail at Indio provides the readiest means by which population density may be reduced and lives saved. *See, e.g.*, Gage Expert Report, ¶ 8-9; Allen Expert Report, ¶ 10. It is within the Court's power to direct transfers of people from one correctional facility to another in order to maintain minimum constitutional health standards. *Plata v. Brown*, No. 01-cv-1351-TEH, 2013 WL 3200587, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2013). Further, Section 8658 of the California Government Code grants Defendant the power when faced with emergencies like COVID-19 to relocate vulnerable populations:

In any case in which an emergency endangering the lives of inmates of a state, county, or city penal or correctional institution has occurred or is imminent, the person in charge of the institution may remove the inmates from the institution. He shall, if possible, remove them to a safe and convenient place and there confine them as long as may be necessary to avoid the danger, or, if that is not possible, may release them.

See also Cal. Penal Code § 4012 ("When a pestilence or contagious disease breaks out in or near a jail, and the physician thereof certifies that it is liable to endanger the health of the prisoners, the county judge may, by a written appointment, designate a safe and convenient place in the county, or the jail in a contiguous county, as the place of their confinement."); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 101029 & 120155 (granting the Sheriff authority to enforce public health orders "issued for the purpose of preventing the spread of any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease").

Counties across California have invoked these statutes to prevent the spread

See, e.g., Request for Judicial Notice, filed herewith, Exhs. 1-5: Order Authorizing Sacramento County Sheriff's Department to Grant Release (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento Cty. Mar. 25, 2020) (granting the Sheriff authority to release 421 people from county jail "because the parties agree that it is in the best interest of public health to reduce the population of the Sacramento County Jail System"); General Order Releasing Named Persons from Santa Rita Cty. Jail Due to COVID-19 Pandemic, In re: List of 247 Persons in Santa Rita County Jail (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty. Mar. 19, 2020) (ordering the release of 247 sentenced people from the Alameda County jails "in light of the COVID-19 pandemic"); Local Rule 4.115, Emergency Rule Adopting Temporary Emergency Bail Schedule, (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda Cty.) (suspending the Uniform Bail Schedule and adopting an emergency bail schedule "(d]uring the COVID-19 crisis) (effective April 3, 2020); Standing Order of the Court Deferring Sentence Surrender Dates and Permitting Sheriff to Authorize Credit for Participation in the Sheriff Work Program (Cal Super. Ct., Santa Clara Cty. Mar. 18, 2020) (recognizing that people who live or work in the jail "are at a particular risk to COVID-19 due to the confined nature of the jail environment" and that "[r]educing the jail population is a critical preventative measure for inmates and staff," and so continuing all surrender dates for 60 days and authorizing extended credit for sheriff's work program, pursuant to agreement between the People and the defense); Ruling re: Authorizing Release of Sentenced Inmates Pursuant to Gov. Code Section 8658, In re the Application of Orange County Sheriff's Dep't, (Cal. Super. Ct., Orange Cty. Mar. 27, 2020) (finding that "inmates in the Orange County Jail live, work, eat and recreate within a close environment in which it is not feasible to maintain six (6) feet of distance between each inmate," which "heightens the potential for COVID-19 to spread," and so clarifying the Sheriff's authority to r

⁴Request for Judicial Notice, filed herewith, Exhs. 6-9: Consent Order, *In re Request to Commute or Suspend County Jail Sentences*, Docket No. 084230 (N.J. Mar. 22, 2020) (ordering the release of a large class of people incarcerated in county jail "in light of the Public Health Emergency" caused by COVID-19); *Committee for Public Counsel Servs. v. Chief Justice of the Trial Ct.*, Case No. SJC-12926 (Mass. April 3, 2020) (Slip. Op.) (recognizing "that the situation is urgent and unprecedented, and that a reduction in the number of people who are held in custody is necessary," and so ordering courts to hold expedited bail hearings with a rebuttable presumption of release for many pretrial detainees, and ordering the prisons and jails to provide daily reports regarding COVID-19 to defense attorneys); Amended Order, *In re Statewide Response by Washington State Courts to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency*, No. 25700-B-607 (Wash. Mar. 20, 2020) (ordering courts to "hear motions for pretrial release on an expedited basis" and "find[ing] that for those identified as part of a vulnerable or at-risk population by the Centers for Disease

IV. In the Alternative, the Court Should Modify the Remedial Plan to Include Basic Measures to Protect Class Members against the Threat of COVID-19

If this Court finds this motion warrants a remedy outside the scope of the Consent Decree, Plaintiffs request the Court modify the Remedial Plan to direct such action. *See* Consent Decree, ¶ 11 ("Plaintiffs may seek to modify the Remedial Plan if the plan does not effectively [ensure provision of constitutional care], or a modification is necessary to ensure Plaintiff class members receive adequate healthcare under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution"). In particular, the Remedial Plan should include basic measures to protect class members against the threat of COVID-19, to allow for meaningful physical distancing in the dorms and essential sanitation measures.

This Court "retains the authority, and the responsibility, to make further amendments to [an] existing order or any modified decree it may enter as warranted by the exercise of its sound discretion." *Plata*, 563 U.S. at 542; *see also Kelly v. Wengler*, 822 F.3d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Courts have long had inherent power to modify court orders in changed circumstances."); *cf. Parsons v. Ryan*, 949 F.3d 443, 454 (9th Cir. 2020) (affirming district court's power to issue injunctions

Control, COVID-19 is presumed to be a material change in circumstances"); General Order Bond for Certain Offenses (Tex. Crim. Dist. Ct. Trial Div. Mar. 21, 2020) (ordering "the immediate release of people arrested and charged with certain non-violent state jail felony offenses).

and enforcement orders to enforce prison conditions settlement agreement). Specifically, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), this Court may modify "a final judgment, order, or proceeding" if "applying it prospectively is no longer equitable." As prospective relief "is drafted in light of what the court believes will be the future course of events, . . . a court must never ignore significant changes in the law or circumstances underlying an injunction lest the decree be turned into an instrument of wrong." Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714-15 (2010) (citations omitted).⁵

A party seeking modification must show that "a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of the decree. If the moving party meets this standard, the court should consider whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance." *Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail*, 502 U.S. 367, 383 (1992). The court should apply a "flexible approach," *id.* at 381, in recognition that the parties could not "anticipate every exigency that could conceivably arise during the life of a consent decree," *id.* at 385. A "flexible approach" is particularly important in institutional reform cases like this one because these cases "reach beyond the parties involved directly in the suit and

impact on the public's right to the sound and efficient operation of its institutions."

Id. at 381 (citations omitted). In such cases, the "ability of a district court to modify

⁵ Rule 60(b)(5) applies to *all* orders and judgments with prospective application. *See Armstrong v. Brown*, 768 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding the modification of a stipulated injunction, and holding that "[t]he ongoing, intractable nature of this litigation affords the district court considerable discretion in fashioning relief"); *Bellevue Manor Assocs. v. United States*, 165 F.3d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that "*Rufo* sets forth a general, flexible standard for all petitions brought under the equity provision of Rule 60(b)(5)" and applying *Rufo* to court-ordered injunction in a private commercial case); *Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger*, 599 F.3d 984, 986, 994 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing *Rufo*'s application to motion to modify injunction arising out of parties' stipulation).

a decree in response to changed circumstances [is] all the more important . . . [b]ecause such decrees often remain in place for extended periods of time, [and] the likelihood of significant changes occurring during the life of the decree is increased." *Id.* at 380-81.

A. The Global Pandemic Constitutes a Changed Circumstance

The degree to which the coronavirus global pandemic has impacted every aspect of life in the United States and around the world cannot be overstated. At the time of this writing, over a hundred million Americans, and all Californians, have been ordered to shelter in their homes except for essential needs. There have been hundreds of thousands of cases and at least 7,500 deaths reported in the United States. Norman Decl., ¶ 13. Health care facilities around the world have experienced or are bracing for an extraordinary influx of patients, as the virus sweeps through populations and strikes the most vulnerable as well as many others. *See* Section II.A, *supra*.

B. The Relief Requested Would Directly Address the Needs of the Medically Vulnerable Population and Those Living in Congregate Settings and Would Therefore Be Tailored to the Changed Circumstances

Plaintiffs request relief closely tailored to the recommendations of the Court's own experts, who agree that the County must modify the Remedial Plan to allow for physical distancing and to provide for basic sanitation needs for people incarcerated in the jails.

The enforcement sought is directly tailored to the risk of harm to the Plaintiff classes in the current coronavirus pandemic.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court to enforce the Consent Decree by ordering Defendant to submit a plan for compliance with the Court Experts' recommendations and respond to Plaintiffs' information requests by

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April 10, 2020. In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek an order modifying the Remedial Plan to require the County to fully implement the Governor's order for physical distancing for all Californians housed in the jails and to provide sanitation and other essential services generally accepted as necessary in correctional facilities to protect basic health of incarcerated people. Dated: April 6, 2020 PRISON LAW OFFICE **By:** __/s/ Sara Norman_ **SARA NORMAN** Attorneys for Plaintiffs