case 2:20-cv-04247-CJC-JEM Document 14 Filed 06/08/20 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:95

Residential Reentry Center ("Orion RRC") in Van Nuys, California. (Mot. at 1–3.) Respondents Juan Herrera, Residential Relocation Manager of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") for the District of Los Angeles, and Kim Beakey, BOP Regional Reentry Administrator, move to dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. (Dkt. 9 [hereinafter "MTD"].) For the following reasons, Respondents' motion to dismiss is **GRANTED**, the Petition is **DENIED**, and this case is **DISMISSED**.

II. BACKGROUND

In June 2016, Petitioner was convicted in this District before Judge John A.

Kronstadt for making a false statement in a passport application. *United States v. Daniel Sweeney*, No. 8:15-CR-00103-JAK, Judgment, Dkt. 78 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016). Judge Kronstadt sentenced Petitioner to six months' imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. *Id.* Under the terms of his supervised release, Petitioner was ordered not to commit another federal, state, or local crime. *Id.* However, after his release, Petitioner was convicted of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of California Penal Code § 245(a)(4) in Orange County Superior Court. *See id.*, Dkt. 94. In response, Judge Kronstadt revoked Petitioner's supervised release and imposed a 24-month term of imprisonment to run consecutively with any state sentence. *Id.*, Dkt. 99.

Petitioner is currently serving the final four months of the resulting federal sentence at Orion RRC, a federally contracted residential reentry facility, or "halfway house," that serves federal and state prisoners. (Mot. at 2.) According to Petitioner, Orion RRC houses approximately 100 inmates, all of whom are allowed to leave the Center for jobs, job training, and family and medical visits. (*Id.*) Petitioner alleges that Orion RRC has not implemented federal, state, and local public health guidelines for mitigating the spread COVID-19 inside detention facilities. (*Id.*) Specifically, he alleges

that Orion RRC requires residents to sleep and live in close quarters, forces them to clean bathrooms and common areas without proper equipment, does not observe social distancing protocols, does not have on-site medical staff, does not screen residents for COVID-19, and does not provide inmates with masks, hand sanitizer, or other hygienic products. (*Id.* at 2–3, 5–6.)¹

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues that these conditions violate his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and seeks immediate release from federal custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and/or 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (*Id.* at 8–9.) The Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of Petitioner's claim under either provision.

A. Immediate Release Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241

Section 2241 allows "the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge" to consider a writ of habeas corpus "within their respective jurisdictions," from a person claiming to be "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and (c)(3). A district court considering an application for a writ of habeas corpus shall "award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court may summarily dismiss a habeas petition if "it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to

¹ Respondents dispute these allegations and assert that "Orion RRC maintains robust screening, social distancing, sanitation, and education practices." (MTD at 6.) Specifically, Respondents assert that new inmates are screened for COVID-19 symptoms, that sleeping and seating areas are spaced six feet apart, and that residents receive free masks and hand sanitizer. (*Id.* at 6–7.)

relief in the district court." *See* Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts ("Habeas Rules") at R. 4.

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Federal law "opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment"—a petition for habeas corpus and a civil rights complaint. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004). Habeas petitions are "the exclusive vehicle" for claims fall within "the core of habeas corpus"—that is, claims challenging "the fact or duration of the conviction or sentence." See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). By contrast, a civil rights action is the "proper remedy" for a claimant asserting "a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody." See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973); see also Nettles, 830 F.3d at 927 (holding that a civil rights action is the "exclusive remedy" for such a challenge); Green v. Fox, 2015 WL 4932822, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2015) (explaining that "challenges to a prisoner's conditions of confinement must be brought through a civil rights action, rather than through a habeas corpus petition"), judgment entered, 2015 WL 4932823 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2015), aff'd, 703 F. App'x 458 (9th Cir. 2017). The key inquiry is whether success on Petitioner's claim would "necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release." See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934. If success would not necessarily lead to expedited release, the claim falls outside the core of habeas corpus and is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Schulze v. Kobayashi, 2020 WL 2544407, at *1 (D. Haw. May 19, 2020) (citing *Nettles*, 830 F.3d at 935).

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Petitioner challenges the conditions of his confinement under the Eighth Amendment. Although he requests immediate release, his claims would not necessarily lead to this remedy if successful. For example, the Court might determine that an injunction requiring Orion RRC to come into compliance with state and federal guidelines was the only appropriate remedy. *See id.* (finding that petitioner's claim fell outside the core of habeas corpus because success would not necessarily lead to

petitioner's release); *Bolden v. Ponce*, 2020 WL 2097751, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2020) (holding that petitioner's challenge to the conditions of his confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic should have been asserted in a civil rights complaint and not in a habeas petition, despite his request for immediate release); *Shook v. Apker*, 472 Fed. App'x 702, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that, "[d]espite the relief he seeks," petitioner's challenges to the adequacy of medical care concerned "the conditions of his confinement and are properly brought under *Bivens*," not as a habeas petition). Accordingly, Petitioner's claims are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.²

B. Compassionate Release Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

Petitioner also seeks compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (*See* Mot. at 8–9.) This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider such a request. Under the First Step Act of 2018, federal inmates may seek compassionate release directly from the sentencing court if the BOP denies, or fails to timely address, an administrative request for release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). As relevant here, eligible claimants may seek sentence reduction for "extraordinary and compelling reasons." *Id.* § 3582(c)(1)(A). However, based on the plain language of the statute, a request for compassionate release can only be submitted to the BOP and the original sentencing court. *See id.*; *Bolden*, 2020 WL 2097751, at *2 (holding that only the original sentencing court can entertain requests for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)); *Thody v. Swain*, 2019 WL 7842560, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2019) (same); *Mohrbacher v. Ponce*, 2019 WL 161727, at *1 & n.l (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2019) (same); *United States v. Rala*, 954 F.3d 594, 595 (3d Cir. 2020) (same). Accordingly, this Court cannot consider Plaintiff's

² Although the Court has discretion to recharacterize a habeas petition as a civil rights complaint, see

Nettles, 830 F.3d at 936, the Court declines to do so here. If converted into such a complaint, the Petition would be subject to the procedural and substantive requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), which are not addressed by Petitioner. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e. Notably, Petitioner has not specified whether he exhausted administrative remedies as required

request for relief under 18 U.S.C. $\S 3582(c)(1)(A)$. Petitioner may submit this request to the BOP and Judge Kronstadt.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents' motion to dismiss is **GRANTED**, and this action is **DISMISSED** for lack of jurisdiction. Nothing in this Order prohibits Petitioner from asserting these claims in a civil rights action or from seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) from the BOP and sentencing Court. *See Bolden*, 2020 WL 2097751, at *3 n.3.

DATED: June 8, 2020

CORMAC J. CARNEY

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

³ The Court also notes that the Petition does not address the exhaustion requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).