

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
ATLANTA DIVISION**

BLACK VOTERS MATTER FUND,  
and MEGAN GORDON, on behalf of  
herself and all others similarly  
situated,

*Plaintiffs,*

v.

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his  
official capacity as Secretary of State  
of Georgia; DEKALB COUNTY  
BOARD OF REGISTRATION &  
ELECTIONS,

*Defendants.*

CIVIL ACTION

FILE NO. 1:20-cv-01489-AT

**RESPONSE OF SECRETARY OF STATE BRAD RAFFENSPERGER  
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION  
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger (the “Secretary”) submits this response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“Motion”) [Doc. 2] in accordance with this Court’s Order [Doc. 9] and direction during the April 14, 2020 status conference.

**INTRODUCTION**

To mitigate the risk of harm to Georgia primary voters during the COVID-19 outbreak, the Secretary approved an unprecedented plan to mail

(1) absentee ballot request forms to Georgia's active voter roll; and (2) absentee ballot packets to all voters who request one. He also postponed the general primary date to June 9th, the last possible date it could be held in compliance with state and federal law. These extraordinary measures, taken to protect the safety of voters, have already cost the State over \$3 million at time when the State is facing overwhelming emergency medical costs and record budget shortfalls.

After these extraordinary measures were put into place, Plaintiffs alleged that a decades old and uncontroversial practice—not providing pre-paid postage to voters who mail absentee ballot requests or mail absentee ballots—is suddenly unconstitutional. No court in the country has reached that conclusion, and this Court should not be the first. Incidental costs to voting, such as postage, gas, time, or bus or rideshare fares, are neither poll taxes nor material burdens for voters who want to vote. As importantly, Georgia voters have numerous options to avoid paying postage, including (1) voting in person; (2) dropping off an absentee ballot at any county election office (or other places where secure drop boxes may be placed); (3) having third parties pay the cost of postage; and (4) utilizing the United States Post Office's ("USPS's") policy of delivering election mail that does not contain sufficient postage.

To be sure, this lawsuit does not turn on the pandemic. This lawsuit is about a new desire to change an old policy and have the State pay postage for voters who *choose* to mail an absentee ballot instead of voting in person or personally delivering their absentee ballot to county elections officials. The Complaint makes this clear: it raises a *per se* challenge that applies with or without the existence of a public health emergency. *See* [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 30, 39, 42, 45.] That Plaintiffs seek permanent declaratory and injunctive relief further proves the point. [Doc. 1 at 19.] Therefore, the public health emergency should be considered by this Court, but there should be no illusion that Plaintiffs request temporary relief that will conclude with the end of shelter-in-place.<sup>1</sup>

This Court has previously been unwilling to “dictate how the [government] should properly administer elections ... the ‘constitution leaves to states broad power to regulate the conduct of federal and state elections.’” *Ga. Shift v. Gwinnett Cty.*, No. 1:19-cv-01135-AT, 2020 WL 864938 \*5 (N.D.Ga. Feb. 12, 2020) (citation omitted). *See also Powell v. Power*, 436 F.2d

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<sup>1</sup> This remains true even after the Second Supplemental Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion. [Doc. 44.] While Plaintiffs withdrew the request that the State provide postage for absentee ballot request and absentee return envelopes, Plaintiffs appear to still seek a mandatory injunction for the June primary and certainly do for any potential runoff elections in August and the general election in November. [*Id.*]

84, 86 (2d Cir. 1970) (“Absent a constitutional or other unlawful infraction of that authority, the states are charged with making reasonable policy decisions to effectuate orderly elections.”). Respectfully, this Court should apply the same deference again so that elected State policymakers can engage in the type of balancing of interests—which now necessitate responding to a pandemic and pending economic recession—that are best handled at the State level.

### **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

#### **1. The Law Governing Absentee Ballots**

Under “normal circumstances, absentee ballot request forms are handled by county elections officials.” (SOS Aff. ¶ 7.)<sup>2</sup> Not more than 180 days before the date of an election, a voter may make a request for an absentee ballot “by mail, by facsimile transmission, by electronic transmission, or in person in the registrar’s or absentee ballot clerk’s office.” O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(A). While a voter may return a completed absentee ballot request form by email or facsimile without cost, if the voter chooses to mail the absentee ballot request, it is the voter’s responsibility to insure that the absentee ballot request has sufficient postage to be delivered. (SOS Aff.

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<sup>2</sup> The Declaration of Kevin Rayburn is attached hereto as Exhibit A. Defendants refer to the Affidavit of Kevin Rayburn as “SOS Aff.”

¶ 7(a).) Third parties may provide the postage if it is not in exchange for a particular vote. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-19-.01.

After confirming the person requesting the absentee ballot is an eligible Georgia voter and verifying the voter's signature, the county elections office mails an absentee voter packet to the voter, which includes an absentee ballot, a security envelope, and a pre-addressed envelope to return the absentee ballot to the county election office (an "Absentee Ballot Packet"). (SOS Aff. ¶ 7(b)); *see also* O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(b)(2). The county elections office has historically paid the cost of mailing the Absentee Ballot Packet to the voter. (SOS Aff. ¶ 7(b).)

After voting using the absentee ballot, a voter must seal it in the security envelope, place the security envelope in the pre-addressed return envelope, and sign the oath on the back of the return envelope. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-385; SOS Aff. ¶ 7(b). The voter then mails the absentee ballot to the county election office using postage provided either by the voter or a third party. *Id.*; *see also* Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-19-.01. The voter may also deliver the voted-absentee ballot—either personally or in some limited circumstances through specified third parties—to the county elections office

or, as recently approved by the State Election Board, to a secured absentee ballot drop box.<sup>3</sup> *Id.*

## 2. Adapting To A Pandemic.

On March 14, 2020, Governor Brian Kemp issued Executive Order 03.14.20.01, which declared a Public Health State of Emergency in Georgia due to COVID-19.<sup>4</sup> That same day, Secretary Raffensperger announced that he was postponing the presidential preference primary from March 24 to May 19 to coincide with the then-scheduled general primary election (the “General Primary”). (SOS Aff. ¶ 8.) On March 23, 2020, Governor Kemp issued another executive order imposing a limited shelter-in-place requirement for populations that were particularly susceptible to the COVID-19 virus.<sup>5</sup> The following day, the Secretary announced the unprecedented step of mailing every voter on Georgia’s active voter roll a personalized absentee ballot request form. (SOS Aff. ¶ 8(a).) The decision alleviated the need for all of Georgia’s active 6.9 million voters to request an absentee ballot request form,

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<sup>3</sup> The State Election Board voted on Wednesday, April 15, 2020, to allow the secured boxes. A true and accurate copy of the rule is attached as “Exhibit B.”

<sup>4</sup> A true and accurate copy of the Executive Order is attached as “Exhibit C.”

<sup>5</sup> A true and accurate copy of Executive Order 03.23.20.01 is attached as “Exhibit D.”

and preparing and mailing the document cost the State over \$3 million in direct costs. (*Id.*)

Also in response to the COVID-19 virus, the Secretary procured a vendor to handle the preparing, packaging, and mailing of Absentee Ballot Packets to voters that request an absentee ballot. (SOS Aff. ¶ 8(d).) This decision saved Georgia counties millions of dollars and “took a great deal of work off their hands so that they can focus on preparing for and holding their own elections amidst the current challenges.” (SOS Aff. ¶ 8(d).)

Voters who choose to vote by absentee ballot in the General Primary need only to sign and complete the absentee ballot request form the Secretary mailed them. (SOS Aff. ¶ 8(b).) Voters can either mail the completed form to his or her county election office utilizing the pre-addressed document, physically return the form to their county elections office, or electronically return the completed form to their county elections office via email or fax.<sup>6</sup> (*Id.*) Voters who chose to mail their absentee ballot request forms would continue to be responsible for obtaining postage directly or through third party groups. (*Id.*) Eligible voters who request an absentee ballot will receive them by mail at the Secretary’s cost. (SOS Aff. ¶ \_\_.)

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<sup>6</sup> The form sent by the Secretary includes an email address for each individual voter’s county election office. (SOS Aff. ¶ 8(b).)

As of April 16, 2020, over 75 counties' absentee ballot return envelopes have been printed and delivered to the Secretary's mail vendor, and the process continues. (SOS Aff. ¶ 8(d).) The mail vendor is expected to begin mailing the Absentee Ballot Packets on April 21, 2020. (*Id.*)

### 3. The Cost of the Pandemic.

The Secretary's decision to mail all active voters an absentee ballot application cost the Secretary over \$3 million. (SOS Aff. ¶ 8(a).) The total projected cost of the mailing efforts this year—is projected to exceed \$5.4 million, but additional printing and insertion costs of \$0.78 per ballot mail will apply. (SOS Aff. ¶ 9.) One-time federal funding was critical to achieving this policy goal.

For context, the Secretary's annual election budget for Fiscal Year 2020 was \$6,118,907.<sup>7</sup> (SOS Aff. ¶ 5.) The General Assembly has not yet passed a Fiscal Year 2021 budget (the 2021 Budget), which will fund state government from July 1, 2020, through June 30, 2021. (*Id.* ¶ 4.) However, there is no reason to believe that the Secretary will have additional funds in the 2021 Budget to cover the cost of Plaintiffs' proposed relief. In fact, as with all of state government, cuts are far more likely. Georgia is a balanced budget

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<sup>7</sup> This does not include the cost of new voting equipment, which is funded by a bond authorized by the General Assembly in 2019.



state, which means that it is constitutionally prohibited from engaging in deficit spending. (OPB Aff. ¶ 6.)<sup>8</sup> One of the anticipated impacts of the pandemic is a tremendous drop-off in state revenues: people are buying less, which means sales tax revenue will likely fall dramatically. *See* OPB Aff. ¶ 8. At the same time, job losses will cause a sharp fall in income tax revenue; they will also strain public assistance programs, as many more Georgians will qualify for Medicaid and other social programs due to their economic plight. (*Id.*) “Put simply, the State will be required to provide much more with far less.” (*Id.*)

The State is also spending more to fight the pandemic by purchasing, among other things, pandemic-related equipment like masks and gloves to temporary hospital beds. For example, the State is spending \$21.5 million to add 200 hospital beds at the Georgia World Congress Center.<sup>9</sup> Similar efforts (albeit at a smaller scale) are underway in Albany, Rome, Macon, and

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<sup>8</sup> The affidavit of Office of Planning and Budget Deputy Director Stephanie Beck is referred to as the “OPB Aff.” The affidavit is attached as “Exhibit E.”

<sup>9</sup> WABE News, *Coronavirus Updates: 200-Bed Surge Hospital Nears Opening At World Congress Center*, (Apr. 17, 2020), <https://www.wabe.org/coronavirus-updates-200-bed-surge-hospital-nears-opening-in-atlanta-exhibit-hall/>.

Gainesville. (*Id.*) States are also competing to replenish their supply of personal protective equipment (“PPE”), the price of which has skyrocketed.<sup>10</sup>

For context, media reports the following costs for critical personal protective equipment necessitated by the pandemic:

- Vinyl Gloves: \$0.06 per pair
- Latex Gloves: \$0.08 per pair
- Nitril Gloves: \$0.10 per pair
- KN95 Masks: \$4.00 each
- Hand Sanitizer: \$4.48 for an eight ounce bottle
- Isolation gowns: \$5.00 each<sup>11</sup>

Because Georgia is a balanced budget state, “budget priorities frequently compete in a zero-sum environment: every dollar spent on healthcare, for example, is a dollar that cannot be spent on education, elections, or other priorities.” (OPB Aff. ¶ 6.) The same is true in reverse. Every stamp that the Secretary is required to pay for will likely have to utilize some newly appropriated funds, because the Secretary’s current budget does not have funds for such anticipated costs. Any new or additional state appropriation

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<sup>10</sup> Daniella Diaz, Geneva Sands and Cristina Alesci, *Protective equipment costs increase over 1,000% amid competition and surge in demand*, CNN (Apr. 16, 2020), <https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/16/politics/ppe-price-costs-rising-economy-personal-protective-equipment/index.html>.

<sup>11</sup> James M. Berklin, *Analysis: PPE Costs Increase over 1,000% during COVID-19 Crisis*, McKnight’s Long Term Care news, <https://www.mcknights.com/news/analysis-ppe-costs-increase-over-1000-during-covid-19-crisis/>.

will necessarily mean that fewer funds will be put toward fighting the pandemic and dealing with the resultant after-effects. Plaintiffs have numerous options to deliver their ballots, those on the frontline of this pandemic need protective equipment and have few available alternatives.

The Cost of Plaintiffs' Requested Relief.

For the June (potential August) and November elections, it is difficult to estimate the cost of Plaintiffs' requested relief for several reasons: (1) the State does not yet know how many voters will request and/or return an absentee ballot; (2) the State cannot predict the number of runoffs that may result from the General Primary; and (3) the State does not yet have voter turnout estimates for the 2020 General Election. However, it is logical that voter turnout will be at least as high as the 2016 presidential election. There, Georgians cast 4,165,405 ballots for President, with 207,716 of those voting in the presidential election doing so by mail.<sup>12</sup>

Plaintiffs, who bear the burden of persuasion and of proof, have not provided any evidence or estimates to quantify the cost of their proposed initial or supplemental relief. The Secretary's preliminary estimates of cost are as follows:

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<sup>12</sup> A true and accurate copy of the 2016 election information is attached as "Exhibit F," and it is available online through the Secretary's website.

a. *Stamps*

Plaintiffs' first proposal, that the Secretary include stamps with every outgoing June primary Absentee Ballot Packet, [Doc. 44 at 4], is simply not possible because of how far along the printer and mail vendor are in getting the Absentee Ballot Packets to Georgia voters. (SOS Aff.) The Secretary also lacks the personnel to manually mail voters requesting (and mailing) absentee ballots a stamp. (SOS Aff.) As this Court is aware, the Secretary's resources are devoted to implementing new voting equipment, new election security methods, and fulfilling ongoing constitutional, statutory, and judicial obligations. Pulling state employees from these critical tasks to mail postage is simply not feasible.<sup>13</sup> In addition to the logistical impossibility of Plaintiffs' request, the cost of mail will be at least \$1.10 in postage (a stamp and the cost of the stamp to mail the stamp) plus the cost of the mailing envelope.

b. *Sticker Labels*

Plaintiffs' second revised proposal is for the Secretary to provide "sticker labels" using business reply mail services. To the Secretary's knowledge, utilizing business reply mail services will cost between \$1.40 and

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<sup>13</sup> Given the timing of the Plaintiffs' supplemental brief, the Secretary has not been able to determine the cost of hiring temporary workers to put a stamp in envelopes.

\$0.643 per piece of mail, depending on how the Secretary utilizes business reply mail. (SOS Aff. ¶ 13.) Any of these types of costs, however, will certainly be in addition to the cost of envelopes, a one-sheet instruction, cost to insert the stamp and instruction, ink jet address for the voter, data work, postal sort, handling, and delivery for insertion at the post office. (SOS Aff.) Because it requires communication with third party vendors, the Secretary has not had time to determine the additional costs associated with Plaintiffs' April 17, 2020 filing.

The Secretary's rough estimate is that the cost of providing mail for absentee ballot request forms and absentee ballot return envelopes can range from \$450,00 to \$4.2 million depending on turnout and the cost of mail. *See* SOS Aff. ¶ 17.

*c. Online Absentee Ballot Envelopes*

Plaintiffs' next proposal, making prepaid envelopes available online, will still cost \$1.40 to \$0.643 per mailing unit, as the process requires the use of business reply mail. (SOS Aff. ¶ 13.) It is unknown what additional costs, such as web design and potential hosting fees, may also apply.

Substantively, Plaintiffs acknowledge that such relief would exacerbate the very harm that provides the basis of their complaint; namely, that

“[m]any voters do not have Internet access.” [Doc. 1 at 12 (¶ 33).]<sup>14</sup> In addition to the lack of authority requiring the Secretary to expend limited state resources in the manner proffered by Plaintiffs, the Secretary is also at a loss to understand how Plaintiffs arrive at a point where the alleged injury can be remedied by a solution that utilizes the process giving rise to the alleged harm. [Doc. 1 at 12 (¶ 33).]<sup>15</sup>

d. *Increase Opportunities for Drop Off Absentee Ballots*

Next, Plaintiffs ask this Court to order the Defendants to place a secured absentee drop box at “any Post Office location in Georgia.” This is equally unworkable. First, there appear to be at least 602 post offices in Georgia.<sup>16</sup> It is unknown how many post office drop off locations are scattered across the State, or whether Plaintiffs intend the Defendants to place drop boxes at each of these locations as well. Either way, the cost of procuring and placing boxes that comply with the State Election Board rule is unknown, but certainly significant. (SOS Aff.)

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<sup>14</sup> As discussed more fully below, if an individual has the means to pay for Internet access, they surely have the means to purchase stamps (even online). This demonstrates the purported burden on the voter is, at best, minimal.

<sup>16</sup> United States Postal Service, information available at <https://webpmt.usps.gov/pmt011.cfm>

Moreover, it is unclear whether the Plaintiffs expect counties or the State to place the additional drop boxes. If the State, then the State will have additional costs of collecting and mailing the absentee ballots to county election officials for tabulation. The same mail rates will apply as discussed above. Also, the State does not know if it or Georgia's counties can simply enter federal property, place a drop off box and secured video cameras, and collect absentee ballots from the box.

This proposal shares some of the same problems with previous ones, because Plaintiffs' claim that many voters "cannot even travel to a post office or other public place because they do not have cars, and there is no ride-sharing programs or public transportation." [Doc. 1 at 12 (¶ 34).]

Presumably, however, if voters can drive to a post office (or just get to a mailbox), they can drop the election mail into the post office box. The USPS has previously issued specific guidance that normal procedures for short-paid and unpaid mail should not be followed when processing absentee ballot materials: absentee ballots are delivered to the election office and not

returned to the voter even if there is insufficient or no postage.<sup>17</sup> Postage will be collected from the election office at a later date. *Id.*

### **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy a stout burden that exceeds the normal, preponderance of evidence standard. “In this Circuit, [a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant *clearly established* the ‘burden of persuasion.’” *McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson*, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (brackets in original) (emphasis added). If a plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction, e.g., one that seeks to “to force another party to act, rather than simply to maintain the status quo ... the burden on the moving party increases.” *Exhibitors Poster Exch. v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp.*, 441 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir.1971).<sup>18</sup> Mandatory injunctions are “particularly disfavored, and should not be issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” *Martinez v. Mathews*, 544 F.2d 1233, 1243 (5th Cir. 1976). Last, in election cases, the burden imposed on plaintiffs is higher still.

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<sup>17</sup> *Postal Bulletin 22391 2014 Election and Political Mail Update*, United States Postal Service (June 12, 2014), [https://about.usps.com/postal-bulletin/2014/pb22391/html/front\\_cvr.htm](https://about.usps.com/postal-bulletin/2014/pb22391/html/front_cvr.htm).

<sup>18</sup> In *Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama*, 661 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1981), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as precedent the decisions of the Fifth Circuit adopted prior to October 1, 1981.



*Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006); *see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party*, 552 U.S. 442, 451 (2008).

Plaintiffs must at least “clearly” convince this Court of that (1) there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the complaint; (2) absent the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs will suffer an irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm to the Defendants; and (4) granting the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. *Fair Fight Action, Inc. v. Raffensperger*, No. 1:18-cv-4391-SCJ (N.D.Ga. Dec. 27, 2019) (Slip Op. at 10) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction).<sup>19</sup> Plaintiffs fail to satisfy these burdens.

### **ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY**

Before consideration of the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion, the Court must consider threshold jurisdictional issues and affirmative defenses that warrant dismissal of at least Count II of the Complaint. These defenses—standing, failure to state a claim, federalism, and ripeness—will be fully briefed in the Secretary’s Motion to Dismiss, which the Secretary intends to file before this Court’s hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion. With respect to the

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<sup>19</sup> The *Fair Fight Action, Inc.* decision is attached as “Exhibit G.”

merits of Plaintiffs' Motion, it does not satisfy Plaintiffs' immense burden to obtain a mandatory injunction for elections that are months away.

**I. Plaintiffs Failed To Establish That They Are Likely To Succeed On The Merits.**

**A. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for a violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in Count I.**

No court has ever held that the purchase of postage is a poll tax, under either the Twenty-Fourth Amendment or Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.<sup>20</sup> The few courts to consider the issue have rejected the same arguments Plaintiffs raise here and held that postage is an indirect cost associated with voting that does not deprive the voter of the right to vote. This just makes sense: a stamp is no different (and likely cheaper) than the cost of gasoline, ride-share fare, public transportation, taxi fare, or most other

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<sup>20</sup> Plaintiffs' Motion does not address Equal Protection as alleged in Count I of the Complaint. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim in Count I also fails because Plaintiffs have not pleaded the necessary elements of such a claim. Plaintiffs must show Defendants acted with a discriminatory intent or purpose and prove an actual discriminatory impact. *Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); *Palmer v. Thompson*, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971). The Complaint lacks any factual allegations showing intentionally discriminatory conduct by Defendants. Moreover, evidence of non-discriminatory intent is found where there is a strong state policy in favor of the challenged practice for non-discriminatory reasons, which exists here given the fiscal impact of prepaid postage. See *United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm'n*, 731 F.2d 1546, 1571 (11th Cir. 1984).

means of casting a ballot. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their *per se* poll tax claim.

The Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibits a state from denying the right of citizen to vote in a federal election “by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.” U.S. Const. amend. XXIV. A “poll tax” is defined as “a fixed tax levied on each person within a jurisdiction.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1498 (8th ed. 2004). Poll taxes “are laid upon persons...to raise money for the support of government or some more specific end.” *Coronado v. Napolitano*, No. CV-07-1089-PHX-SMM, 2008 WL 191987, at \*5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2008).<sup>21</sup>

The Twenty-Fourth Amendment has been utilized sparingly in challenges to state poll taxes since the Supreme Court relied on the newly ratified amendment to strike down Virginia’s poll tax in *Harman v. Forssenius*, 380 U.S. 528 (1965). Although Virginia removed its poll tax as an absolute prerequisite for voting in federal elections following ratification of the amendment, it substituted a provision whereby voters could qualify either by paying the customary poll tax or by filing a certificate of residence.

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<sup>21</sup> As will be addressed in the Secretary’s Motion to Dismiss, the Secretary does not impose any postage fee, the USPS does. Any revenue generated by postage goes to the USPS. By definition, therefore, stamps are not poll taxes. Moreover, any costs associated with a voter’s *choice* to utilize the mail service are not mandated by the Secretary, meaning any alleged harm is not caused by the Secretary.

*Id.* at 540. The Supreme Court noted that although the strict poll tax requirement had been removed, the alternative option of obtaining a certificate of residence was still a “cumbersome procedure” that had to be filed six months before the election. *Id.* at 541-42. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the option for voters to either pay a poll tax or go through an onerous process for every federal election violated the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s ban on poll taxes. *Id.* at 538. Virginia’s scheme, therefore, “unquestionably erects a *real obstacle to voting* in federal elections for those who assert their constitutional exemption from the poll tax.” *Id.* at 541-42 (emphasis added). A year later, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to Virginia’s poll tax remaining as a precondition to voting in state elections in *Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), although on Equal Protection grounds.

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that the State of Georgia has imposed an actual tax on voters as a condition of voting like in *Harman* and *Harper*. Nor can they; no reasonable argument can be made that the Secretary’s failure to affix pre-paid postage on absentee ballot return envelopes is a tax that must be paid to vote.

Recognizing this, Plaintiffs argue that postage is a “de facto poll tax” because voters must purchase a stamp as “a prerequisite to voting.” [Doc. 2-1,

at 14.] Plaintiffs’ “de facto poll tax” argument, however, fails because voters are not required to purchase a stamp as a “condition to obtaining a ballot.” *See Harper*, 383 U.S. at 668. Instead, a stamp is *only* necessary if a voter rejects one of the numerous other methods of voting in person or delivering absentee ballots. Plaintiffs have put forth no evidence that a single voter will be unable to vote in 2020 because of lack of access to postage. This is for good reason: the Secretary imposes no requirement to vote absentee and sets no preconditions on how voters choose to return their absentee ballots. Put simply, voters have plenty of options that do not require postage.

Plaintiffs fail to cite a single case that supports their argument that postage is a “de facto poll tax.” Indeed, the few courts that have addressed this issue have rejected the claim outright. In a recent decision, the first federal court to hear a similar challenge held that the Ohio Secretary of State did ***not*** impose a poll tax by failing to provide postage pre-paid envelopes for voters to return mail-in ballots. *See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. LaRose*, No. 2:20-cv-01638-MHW-EPD (S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2020) (Slip Op. at 25).<sup>22</sup> Like Plaintiffs, the *LaRose* plaintiffs challenged the state’s decision to implement a vote-by-mail campaign due to COVID-19, and similarly argued

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<sup>22</sup> This order, which has not yet been published, is attached as Exhibit H.

that requiring voters to supply their own postage was an unconstitutional poll tax. The court rejected that argument, finding that “to the extent obtaining a stamp is a ‘restriction on the right to vote,’ it is “the type of ‘evenhanded restriction[] that protect[s] the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself’ that satisfies *Harper*.” *Id.* (citations omitted). *See also Bruce v. City of Colorado Springs*, 971 P.2d 679, 685 (Colo. App. 1998) (deciding a requirement that voters “affix a stamp to their ballots” is reasonable and not an unconstitutional poll tax).

Other courts have similarly held that indirect costs associated with voting are not unconstitutional poll taxes, such as in the Voter ID context. *See Veasey v. Abbott*, 796 F.3d 487, 268 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that “indirect costs on voters” having to obtain the required identification “does not constitute a poll tax” because it does not “impose a material requirement solely upon those who refused to pay a poll tax”); *Gonzalez v. Arizona*, 677 F.3d 383, 407 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Although obtaining the identification required under [state law] may have a cost, it is neither a poll tax itself (that is, it is not a fee imposed on voters as a prerequisite for voting), nor is it a burden imposed on voters who refuse to pay a poll tax.”); *Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups*, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (denying preliminary injunction against Georgia’s Voter ID law because the costs associated with

obtaining an ID did not constitute an unconstitutional poll tax); *Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita*, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 827 (“the imposition of tangential burdens does not transform a regulation into a poll tax”).

Thus, Plaintiffs are simply wrong in stating that Voter ID laws are a “common example of a de facto poll tax” [Doc. 2-1 at 12], and neither of the cases they cite support this argument. In *Billups*, the district court initially enjoined Georgia’s Voter ID law because it required voters without the required identification to pay a fee to the State (from \$20 to \$30) to obtain an ID. *See Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups*, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1369-70 (N.D. Ga. 2005). But the court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of Georgia’s Voter ID law when it was amended to remove the fee, even though the plaintiffs still argued that there were other costs voters would incur in obtaining the ID. *Common Cause*, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 1335. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in *Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker*, 851 N.W.2d 262 (Wis. 2014).

Here, there is no requirement that a stamp be purchased as a condition of voting. Rather, postage is the kind of “tangential burden” associated with voting that does not rise to the level of a poll tax. *See Ind. Democratic Party*, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 827. There are other available options for voting, all of which have associated incidental costs (such as transportation costs, time

away from work, child care, and parking) that do not rise to the level of the kind of invidiously discriminatory poll tax struck down in *Harman*.<sup>23</sup> For these reasons, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits of their poll tax claim.

**B. Count II: *Anderson/Burdick* Analysis of Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to vote claim.**

Plaintiffs also fail to show a likelihood of the merits on Count II, which alleges an impermissible burden on the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Doc. 1 at 18.] Unlike Count I, Count II is not a *per se* claim. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs frame the issue in near absolutist terms: “requiring voters to spend money in order to vote by mail is at least a ‘slight’ burden to all voters (and a severe one for some others) ... the government has no legitimate interest in forcing voters to pay for postage.” (*Id.*) Rhetoric aside, Plaintiffs acknowledge Count II requires this Court to conduct an *Anderson/Burdick* analysis, which weighs

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<sup>23</sup> Further, even if the Court finds that buying a stamp is a poll tax, which it is not, *Harman*’s discussion of burdensome alternative is inapplicable here. In *Harman*, the alternative to paying the poll tax was a burdensome process to prove residence. *See generally Harman*, 380 U.S. 528. Here, there are many alternatives to buying a stamp, including placing an absentee ballot envelope in a mailbox without a stamp or going to vote in person – the alternatives here are not a burdensome procedure to undertake before the voter can vote.



the burden on voting against the cost to the State to implement Plaintiffs' requested relief. [Doc. 2-1 at 16.] Here, the burdens on the State are truly significant, even more so during this public health emergency. They far outweigh any minimal harm articulated by Plaintiffs' evidence.

This Court has recently articulated the *Anderson/Burdick* analysis:

When deciding whether a state election law violates the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must weigh the character and magnitude of the burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary. *Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party*, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 117 S.Ct. 1364, 137 L.Ed.2d 589 (1997); *Burdick v. Takushi*, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992).

A law that severely burdens the right to vote must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. *Burdick*, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; *Democratic Executive Committee of Florida v. Lee*, 915 F.3d at 1318. 'And even when a law imposes only a slight burden on the right to vote, relevant and legitimate interests of sufficient weight still must justify that burden.' *Democratic Executive Committee of Florida v. Lee*, 915 F.3d at 1318-19; *Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups*, 554 F.3d 1340, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009). The more a challenged law burdens the right to vote, the stricter the scrutiny is to be applied. *Democratic Executive Committee of Florida v. Lee*, 915 F.3d at 1319; *Stein v. Ala. Sec. of State*, 774 F.3d 689, 694 (11th Cir. 2014).

*Curling v. Raffensperger*, 403 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2019)

(parenthetical quotations omitted).

Another court in this district recently denied a different election-related preliminary injunction using *Anderson/Burdick* analysis. *Fair Fight Action*, No. 1:18-CV-5391-SCJ (N.D. Ga. Dec. 27, 2019) (Slip Op.). There, Judge Jones wrote that if an “election law imposes only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.’” *Id.* (citing *Norman v. Reed*, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).

Importantly, the *Anderson/Burdick* analysis does not impose on states any burden of proof or evidentiary showing; the burden remains with the Plaintiffs. *Billups*, 554 F.3d at 1353; *see also Democratic Party of Hawaii v. Nago*, 833 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2016).

#### 1. Plaintiffs Have Not Demonstrated Any Burden To Voting.

As to the first question under *Anderson/Burdick*, Plaintiffs have failed to show an unconstitutional burden on their right to vote for two reasons. First, the affidavits provided by the Plaintiffs do not show that anyone will actually be unable to vote in the June primary (or any other election), nor do they show any meaningful burden. To the contrary, most of Plaintiffs’

witnesses concede that they already have stamps at home and will have no trouble mailing a return absentee ballot envelope, even amid the shelter-in-place order. For example:

“I always have postage stamps.” [Doc. 16 ¶ 12.]

“I’ve already mailed in my absentee ballot application and will vote by absentee ballot by mail....I have postage stamps.” [Doc. 12 ¶¶ 9, 11, 15.]

“My sister and I recently mailed in our absentee ballot applications using our own stamps.” [Doc. 14 ¶¶ 12, 13.]

“We have stamps to use for the upcoming elections.” [Doc. 25 ¶ 9.]

“I purchased a book of postage stamps last month from the post office.” [Doc. 27 ¶ 8.]

“Usually I get my stamps at the post office...Fortunately I got some before quarantine...” [Doc. 38 ¶ 9.]

“There is no financial hardship to me to vote by mail as opposed to alternatives.” [Doc. 31 at 2.]

Moreover, witnesses without stamps at home were able to purchase them other ways without visiting a post office. [Doc. 17 ¶ 10 (“I ordered the stamps online”)]; [Doc. 30 ¶ 8 (“I think my grocery store sells stamps, so I might purchase them there.”)]. This reflects the numerous ways to purchase stamps over the internet and through retail delivery. As social distancing restrictions are lifted, it will be even easier to obtain postage at the post office and other retail locations.

Of the 15 affidavits filed by Plaintiffs, only one witness claimed to lack the means to obtain postage because she is disabled. [Doc. 24]) However, voters who are physically disabled may receive assistance with absentee voting from a family member or caregiver. *See* O.C.G.A. 21-2-385. Further, State Election Board rules also permit third parties to provide postage to voters for the purpose of mailing a ballot, regardless of whether the voter is disabled. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-19-.01. In fact, two of Plaintiffs’ witnesses testified that they have distributed postage stamps to assist voters in prior elections. [Doc. 12 ¶¶ 15, 16; Doc. 16 ¶ 4.]

Under these circumstances, *Billups* is on point. There, the plaintiffs could not “locate a single voter who would bear a significant burden[, which] ‘provides significant support for a conclusion that [the challenged law] does not unduly burden the right to vote.’” 554 F.3d at 1354 (addressing photo identification law).

## 2. Alternatively, Any Burden On Voting Is Slight.

The State has found no authority—and Plaintiffs have cited none—holding that allowing the use of mail without pre-paid postage is a material burden on voting. This should end the inquiry, as the burden of persuasion remains on the Plaintiffs. *Billups*, 554 F.3d at 1353. The *LaRose* court recently concluded that any burden imposed by requiring voters to pay for the

cost of mailing an absentee ballot is, at worst, “minimal.” *LaRose*, Case No. 2:20-1638 (S.D.Ohio Apr. 3, 2020) (Slip Op. at 17). The “requirement that voters affix a stamp to their ballot application is no more than a minimal burden as stamps are available at multiple locations that remain open during the Governor’s stay-at-home order, including grocery stores. Those who do not wish to leave their homes to purchase stamps can purchase them online.” *Id.* The same analysis applies here, especially given that the class representative actually possesses stamps (as do virtually all of the 15 declarants), and the other declarants all have a means to obtain stamps. Thus, if there is any burden at all, it is quite minimal and, indeed, no different that it has been for decades.

### 3. The State’s Interests Are Important.

Only if this Court finds that Plaintiffs have provided competent evidence of an actual burden does it consider the next question under the *Anderson/Burdick* test: the government’s interest. Here, because the requirement that voters find their own postage applies to all voters in a non-discriminatory manner, the policy must be upheld so long as it satisfies an “important” goal: “the State need not establish a compelling interest to tip the constitutional scales in its direction.” *Burdick*, 504 U.S. at 434, 439. This is also true because of the “minimal” nature of the Plaintiffs’ alleged burden.

*See Timmons*, 520 U.S. at 358; *De La Fuente v. Padilla*, 930 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing *Timmons*), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 676, 205 L. Ed. 2d 440 (2019).

As demonstrated above, a purpose of the State’s longstanding decision not to pay the cost of return mail is financial. Courts have recognized that fiscal concerns are legitimate state interests when applying the *Anderson/Burdick* analysis: “Fiscal responsibility, even if only incrementally served, is undeniably a legitimate and reasonable legislative purpose.” *Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted*, 834 F.3d 620, 635 (6th Cir. 2016); *see also Wilson v. Birnberg*, 667 F.3d 591, 601 (5th Cir. 2012). These concerns are heightened now. As shown above, the State’s realistic budget projections are dire.<sup>24</sup> The dual pinch of declining revenue and growing expenditures has removed any room for error, much less new funding for unanticipated costs associated with decades old statutes. This is uniquely felt in the Secretary’s Office, which has already increased expenditures to assist with the

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<sup>24</sup> Even today, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution warned that “the state could face at least a \$4 billion shortfall over the next 15 months without more federal aid, likely meaning layoffs and furloughs across the government in the coming year.” James Salzer, *Report: Georgia Budget Shortfall May Top \$4 Billion Over The Next 15 Months*, Atlanta J. & Const. (Apr. 20, 2020), <https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/report-budget-shortfall-may-top-billion-over-next-months/bCh9sdsuYVJupfCivsTDbJ/>.

deployment of new voting equipment and training, as well as the cost (\$36,000 per month) of storing voting equipment it cannot use again due to court-imposed obligations in other litigation. Plaintiffs have introduced no evidence to the contrary.

Beyond the fiscal impact, overloading the voter with alternative means and information could likely lead to voter confusion. Some voters may think a stamp is necessary for their ballot to be delivered; others will look for some form of postage on the Internet; more still may call their county election officials. The best way to avoid voter confusion is to conduct this election like all prior elections. Voters can return absentee ballot request forms directly, in the mail, by electronic means, or by fax. They can return absentee ballots in person or by mail. The pandemic is causing enough confusion; dramatic changes to election law should not be another.

## **II. Plaintiffs Will Not Suffer Irreparable Injury Absent A Preliminary Injunction.**

To succeed under the second factor, Plaintiffs must show “a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury” absent a preliminary injunction. *Siegel v. LePore*, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000). Even if Plaintiffs establish a likelihood of success on the merits, the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would, standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief

improper. *See Snook v. Trust Co. of G. Bank of Savannah, N.A.*, 909 F.2d 480, 486 (11th Cir. 1990). As the Eleventh Circuit has emphasized the asserted irreparable injury “must be neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” *NE Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville*, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990).

Here, Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to vote will not be irreparably harmed absent injunctive relief. The State of Georgia has a no-excuse absentee voting system, and voters are welcome to deliver their absentee ballot to the elections officials if they do not want to mail their absentee ballot. O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-380, 21-2-385. Additionally, to provide additional options to voters delivering their absentee ballot to their county elections office, the State Election Board has promulgated a new rule that authorizes counties to use secure drop-boxes. *See Ex. B*. Third parties may provide postage to any voter and assist disabled voters in returning their absentee ballots. Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 183-1-19-.01. Finally, voters can vote in person on the voting machines on election day or during early voting. Plaintiffs’ subjective fears about the duration of the pandemic fail to establish that their right to vote will be irreparably injured.

### **III. Balancing the Equities and Public Interest.**



This Court has previously considered the remaining two factors—balancing the equities and public interest—together in election cases. See Curling v. Kemp, 334 F. Supp. 3d 1303, 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2018). It makes sense to do so again. In the light of the ongoing pandemic and the State’s other election obligations, the balancing of the equities and the public interests involved clearly favor Defendants. Plaintiffs claim that the State is forcing individuals to choose between exposure to COVID-19 and paying a poll tax. [Doc. 2-1 at 17-19.] This is a false choice.

First, as shown above, the longstanding policy of requiring voters to obtain postage—directly or indirectly through third parties—is not a poll tax. *See, e.g., LaRose*, Slip Op. at 25. Second, as also discussed above, any purported burden on Plaintiffs is minimal, particularly given the numerous means Plaintiffs have to deliver their absentee ballots without coming within six feet of other persons.

These minimal burdens pale in comparison to the burdens Plaintiffs seek to impose on the State. From a financial perspective, it costs more for the State to provide postage to a voter than it does for a voter to mail in the ballot. Also, a multitude of factors compel the conclusion that now is not the time to add additional burden to state coffers. This is to say nothing about

the likely increased voter confusion and disparities that Plaintiffs’ proffered relief will cause.

The temporal nearness of the June (potential August runoff) and November elections is also an important consideration, particularly given how long Georgia has required voters to pay their own postage (or secure it through third parties). Binding precedent requires this Court to “weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and its own institutional procedures” including, in particular, the “imminence of the election.” *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006). Federal courts have long admonished “that federal judicial bodies not upend the orderly progression of state electoral processes at the eleventh hour.” *Perry v. Judd*, 471 F. App’x 219, 220–21 (4th Cir. 2012); *see also Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964) (deciding that imminent elections “might justify a court in withholding the granting of immediately effective relief . . . .”); *Lair v. Bullock*, 697 F.3d 1200, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012); *Crookston v. Johnson*, 841 F.3d 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2016); *Veasey v. Perry*, 769 F.3d 890, 895 (5th Cir. 2014). And as this Court has recently noted, there is “a public interest in the Court promoting certainty with elections and not entering orders that create ‘voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls.’” *Gwinnett Cty. NAACP*

*v. Gwinnett Cty. Bd. of Registration & Elections*, No. 1:20-CV-00912-SDG, 2020 WL 1031897, at \*9 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2020) (quoting *Purcell*, 549 U.S. at 5).

Similarly, the fact that Plaintiffs waited decades to challenge the requirement that voters be responsible for returning their absentee ballot request forms and absentee ballots weighs strongly against them. *See, e.g., Fulani v. Hogsett*, 917 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir.1990); *Kay v. Austin*, 621 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying laches where candidate waited to file suit until two weeks after he knew he would not be listed on ballot); *Liddy v. Lamone*, 398 Md. 233, 919 A.2d 1276 (2007) (concluding that trial court erred in failing to apply equitable doctrine of laches to bar plaintiff's challenge to candidate's qualifications, filed too close to election). In short, “[t]here is no constitutional right to procrastinate.” *Dobson v. Dunlap*, 576 F. Supp. 2d 181, 183 (D. Me. 2008). As shown, the public health emergency does not change this analysis.

### **CONCLUSION**

For these reasons, the Secretary requests that this Court DENY Plaintiffs’ Motion.

Respectfully submitted this 20th day of April, 2020.

/s/ Vincent R. Russo

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**CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE**

Pursuant to L.R. 7.1(D), the undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing RESPONSE OF SECRETARY OF STATE BRAD RAFFENSPERGER IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION has been prepared in Century Schoolbook 13, a font and type selection approved by the Court in L.R. 5.1(B).

/s/ Vincent R. Russo  
Vincent R. Russo

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on this day, I electronically filed the foregoing  
**RESPONSE OF SECRETARY OF STATE BRAD RAFFENSPERGER  
IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY  
INJUNCTION** with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which  
will automatically send counsel of record e-mail notification of such filing.

This 20th day of January, 2020.

/s/ Vincent Russo  
Vincent R. Russo

# **Exhibit A**



**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
ATLANTA DIVISION**

BLACK VOTERS MATTER FUND, )  
and MEGAN GORDON, on behalf of )  
herself and all others similarly )  
situated, )

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his )  
official capacity as Secretary of State )  
of the State of Georgia, and DEKALB )  
BOARD OF REGISTRATION & )  
ELECTIONS, and all others similarly )  
Situating, )

Defendant. )

CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:20-CV-1489-AT

**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
OF KEVIN RAYBURN**

1. I am over the age of majority, of sound mind, and otherwise qualified to make this Declaration based upon my own personal knowledge. This Declaration is offered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 in support of Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger's ("Defendant" or "Secretary") Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in the above-captioned matter.
2. I am employed by the Georgia Office of Secretary of State as the Deputy Elections Director and Deputy General Counsel. My work includes assisting the Secretary with election administration.

**The Secretary's Budget**

3. The State operates on a fiscal year that commences on July 1 of each year.

4. During the 2020 legislative session, the General Assembly revised the 2020 budget, which the General Assembly first passed last year. The revised budget, which funds State government through June 30, 2020, is known as the “Amended Budget.” The General Assembly has not yet passed the Fiscal Year 2021 budget (the “2021 Budget”).
5. The Amended Budget provides the Secretary’s Elections Division with an overall annual budget of \$6,118,907. The General Assembly did not appropriate funds in the Amended Budget to cover the cost of providing postage for the return mail of absentee ballots from voters.

#### **Absentee Voting in the 2020 General Primary**

6. As in prior elections since 2005, voters in Georgia are not required to provide a reason in order to cast an absentee ballot in the 2020 General Primary, or any runoff, general election, or special election.
7. Under normal circumstances, absentee ballot request forms are handled by county election officials.
  - a. No more than 180 days prior to the date of the primary, any voter may make an application for an official absentee ballot of the voter’s precinct by mail, by facsimile transmission, by electronic transmission, or in person in the registrar’s or absentee ballot clerk’s office. It is the voter’s responsibility to complete and sign the application unless the voter is physically disabled or temporarily residing out of the voter’s county, in which case the application can be made by the voter’s mother, father, grandparent, aunt, uncle, sister, brother, spouse, son, daughter, niece, nephew, grandchild, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law of the age of 18 or over. If the voter mails an absentee ballot request, the voter pays the cost of postage. However, a voter may also return the

completed and signed form electronically to their county election office by fax or electronic mail.

- b. After a completed and signed absentee ballot request form is submitted to the proper county elections office, county election officials would ensure that the voter requesting the ballot is a registered voter and verify that the voter's signature on the application matches the signature on file, and if so, the county would mail the requesting voter an absentee ballot packet, which includes the absentee ballot, a secrecy envelope, and a pre-addressed envelope to return the absentee ballot to the county election office. The voter would vote the ballot, seal it in a secrecy envelope, and place the secrecy envelope in a pre-addressed envelope. The voter would pay the cost of postage to return the absentee ballot or a third party could pay the cost of postage. The voter must personally mail or personally deliver the voted absentee ballot packet to the board of registrars or absentee ballot clerk, except in limited circumstances provided by law.
8. In the light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Secretary undertook extraordinary measures to make sure that eligible Georgia voters would be able to utilize Georgia's long standing law that allows any voter to request an absentee ballot without excuse in the 2020 general primary (the "General Primary"). These efforts included moving the date of the Presidential Preference Primary, first from March 24 to May 19 to coincide with the General Primary, and then moving the combined General Primary/Presidential Preference Primary from May 19 to June 9. The Secretary, recognizing that there would be increased interest in absentee voting due to the COVID-19 pandemic, took specific action to make it easier for counties to handle this increased volume. Specifically:

- a. On March 24, 2020, the Secretary announced that the State, working through third party vendors, would mail every voter on Georgia's active voter roll a personalized absentee ballot request form. This first step has cost the State over \$3 million.
- b. When a voter received their absentee ballot request form, he or she would complete the information, sign the form, fold, and tape the document so the pre-printed address of the county election office became visible to postal workers. Consistent with every prior election year, the absentee ballot request forms do not contain prepaid postage. Consequently, the voter or a third party must pay postage to return the absentee ballot request form to the appropriate county election office. Alternatively, the voter could return the completed form electronically to the county email address supplied on the absentee ballot request form that was mailed out.
- c. Upon receipt of absentee ballot request forms, county election officials input the absentee ballot request into the voter registration system and verify that the signature on the form matches the voter's signature on file.
- d. The Secretary also procured a mail vendor to take the time and expense of preparing and labeling envelopes, preparing and packing the Absentee Ballot Packet (a ballot, return envelope, and inner secrecy envelope), and mailing out the Absentee Ballot Packet. Each of the absentee ballots and absentee ballot return envelopes necessarily varied depending on where the voter lived and what elections were on the ballot. In light of the anticipated increased use of absentee ballots, the Secretary chose to cover the mail vendor cost, which saved counties millions of dollars and took a great deal of work off their hands so that they can focus on preparing for holding their elections amidst the

current challenges. The absentee ballot return envelopes were approved by the Secretary of State and ordered for printing by the Secretary's vendor on March 30. As of April 16, 2020, over 75 county's absentee ballot return envelopes have been printed and delivered to the State mail vendor, and additional county return envelopes continue to be delivered to the mail vendor. The vendor's process to package and mail Absentee Ballots Packets remains ongoing, and the packets will start to be mailed to voters on April 21, 2020. A sample of absentee ballot envelopes is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.

- e. When voters receive their Absentee Ballot Packet, they will treat them like any typical election: the voter will complete the absentee ballot, slide it into the secrecy envelope, and place the secrecy envelope into the absentee ballot return envelope. As in every prior election, the voter is responsible for obtaining postage directly or through a third party or the voter can return the sealed and signed envelope directly to their county elections office. On Wednesday, April 15, the State Election Board passed an emergency rule that authorizes counties to establish secured absentee ballot drop boxes where voters may drop off completed absentee ballots to a secured location without using a stamp. A true and accurate copy of the rule is attached as "Exhibit 1."
9. The total cost for printing, personalizing, and mailing the absentee ballot applications was approximately \$3.1 million. The total cost for printing, design, and insertion of the Absentee Ballot Packets is approximately \$1.9 million, but additional printing and insertion costs of \$0.78 per ballot mail will apply. Postage cost to mail out the Absentee Ballot Packets is estimated to be approximately \$480,000, but could increase depending on the number of requests received. These costs do not include the costs that the state is incurring to purchase additional equipment to tabulate the

increased number of absentee ballots. The funds were taken from a grant given by the federal government pursuant to HAVA/CARE one-time funds. The federal funds are not provided on an ongoing basis.

### **Prepaid Postage**

10. The United States Postal Service (“USPS”) allows entities, including government entities, to use a business reply mail account (a “Business Reply Account”). Business Reply Accounts allow certain mailings (those that are designated with the business reply permit information) to be returned at no cost to the recipient. A Business Reply Account must be prefunded, meaning it draws down from existing funds on the account as opposed to relying on invoices that are paid at a later date.
11. The Secretary maintains a Business Reply Account for specific types of election mail: (a) state mail voter registration forms; (b) confirmation notice (a/k/a list maintenance letter); and (c) final notice to inactive voters (a/k/a NGE list maintenance letter). Many state mail voter registration forms, however, are returned to the Secretary’s office by hand-delivery, rather than through the mail, due to third-party organizations bundling state mail voter registration forms received at voter registration drives.
12. The Secretary’s current Business Reply Account requires prepaid postage envelopes be addressed to the Business Reply Account holder. Consequently, the Secretary cannot utilize its Business Reply Account to have voters send absentee ballot requests or absentee ballots anywhere but to the Secretary’s office. Put differently, without manually placing postage on each and every response to an absentee ballot request and absentee ballot return envelope, the Secretary cannot currently preprint self-addressed, postage-paid envelopes to be delivered by the Secretary that will be returned to county election officials with the current Secretary’s Business Reply Account. For the election mail be returned to county

election offices, all 159 county election offices would have to set up their own Business Reply Account, requiring significant time and an additional cost expected to exceed \$150,000.

13. Under the Secretary's current Business Reply Account, mail that is one ounce in weight or less (which, includes secured absentee ballots and absentee ballot envelopes), costs the Secretary \$1.40 for every piece of mail that is returned: \$0.55 cents is for the price of postage, and \$0.85 is for a handling fee. There is also an annual \$240 fee to maintain a Business Reply Account. The Secretary may be able to upgrade the Business Reply Account for an additional setup fee of \$725, for a total fee of \$965. The upgrade would allow the Secretary to reduce the cost of each mail to \$0.643 for the higher annual fee, but prepaid postage envelopes would still be addressed to the Secretary as the Business Reply Account holder, as the Business Reply Account has to be tied to the return address on the mailer.
14. Thus, in the immediate short term, voters will pay \$0.55 to return their absentee ballots, but the Secretary would be required to either pay \$1.40 per absentee ballot or even more if personnel were required to (or even could) affix postage to absentee ballot return envelopes. At best, and for elections after the General Primary, the Secretary would still be required to pay more than the voter: \$0.643 versus a \$0.55 stamp.

#### **The Cost of Plaintiffs' Proposed Relief**

15. Georgia voters are utilizing the absentee ballot method at a rate that is the highest in the State's history. Last week, the number of absentee ballot requests eclipsed that of the 2018 November General Election.
16. In addition to the logistical challenge of providing postage to voters who are in the process of receiving absentee ballots now, it is difficult to estimate the financial impact of having to provide postage for the General

Primary or any potential runoffs, because it is impossible to know how many voters (a) will request an absentee ballot; (b) will return the absentee ballot; and (c) will follow historical practice and use their own postage or that of a third party instead of relying on state taxpayers for postage.


17. It is impossible to precisely estimate the cost to the State for Plaintiffs' proposed relief, notwithstanding whether the requested relief could even be implemented without significant administrative costs since Business Reply mail is returned to the account holder. Assuming turnout is similar to the 2016 Presidential Preference Primary and a third of the ballots are returned by mail (approximately 700,000 ballots), which is a conservative estimate, the cost of only return postage for the absentee ballots would be \$450,100 at the cost of \$0.643 per ballot or \$980,000 at the current rate of \$1.40 per ballot. Similarly, assuming a General Election turnout at 4,500,000 total votes cast and the cost of \$0.643 per ballot, the cost to the State for return postage only would be estimated at: \$723,375 at a 25% vote-by-mail rate, \$1,446,750 at a 50% vote-by-mail rate, and \$2,170,125 at a 75% vote-by-mail rate. Of course, at the current \$1.40 per ballot rate, each of these estimates is more than doubled.
18. During November's General Election, one that includes a presidential campaign, it is only logical to presume that voter turnout will be higher. For example, in 2018 election, 3,949,905 ballots were cast. In the 2016 presidential election, 4,165,405 Georgians cast ballots.
19. In the General Primary, there are numerous statewide elections: a United States Senate primary (Democratic ballots only); two seats on the Supreme Court of Georgia are up for election (both are contested); five seats on the Georgia Court of Appeals (none are contested); two Public Service Commissioners (both contested). There are also numerous local elections, including contested legislative primaries. All 56 State Senate seats, and all



180 State Representative seats are on the ballot. About 37 counties have district attorney elections. And, there are approximately 141 Superior Court judgeships that are up for election; some are contested. A spreadsheet listing all elections on the ballot in the June 9th election is attached hereto as **Exhibit B**.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on 4/20/20.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Kevin Rayburn", written over a horizontal line.

Kevin Rayburn

Deputy Elections Director and Deputy General Counsel

## **Exhibit A**

From/De \_\_\_\_\_

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APPLY FIRST-CLASS  
MAIL POSTAGE HERE

APLICA EL FRANQUEO  
DE CORREO DE  
PRIMERA CLASE AQUÍ



**OFFICIAL ABSENTEE BALLOT**  
**BOARD OF REGISTRARS**

**BOLETA OFICIAL DE VOTO AUSENTE**  
**JUNTA DE REGISTRADORES**



GWINNETT COUNTY  
455 GRAYSON HWY STE 200  
LAWRENCEVILLE GA 30046-6388



# OATH OF ELECTOR

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## I the undersigned, do swear (or affirm)

- I am a citizen of the United States and of the State of Georgia.
- I possess the qualifications of an elector required by the laws of the State of Georgia.
- I am entitled to vote in the precinct containing my residence in the primary or election in which this ballot is to be cast.
- I am eligible to vote by absentee ballot.
- I have not marked or mailed any other absentee ballot, nor will I mark or mail another absentee ballot for voting in such primary or election; nor shall I vote therein in person.
- I have read and understand the instructions accompanying this ballot.
- I have carefully complied with such instructions in completing this ballot.

I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.

SIGN  
HERE

SIGNATURE OR MARK OF ELECTOR

PRINTED NAME OF ELECTOR

DATE

**Oath of Person Assisting Elector (if any):** I, the undersigned, do swear (or affirm) that I assisted the above-named elector in marking such elector's absentee ballot as such elector personally communicated such elector's preference to me; and that such elector is entitled to receive assistance in voting under provisions of subsection (a) of Code Section 21-2-409.

This, the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 20\_\_\_\_\_

## **Reason for Assistance** (Check appropriate square):

- ☐ Elector is unable to read the English Language  
☐ Elector requires assistance due to physical disability.

SIGNATURE OF PERSON ASSISTING ELECTOR

PRINTED NAME OF PERSON ASSISTING ELECTOR DATE

## **THIS BOX IS FOR OFFICE USE ONLY.**

DATE RECEIVED

TIME RECEIVED

CERTIFIED AND APPROVED (SIGNATURE OF REGISTRAR)

# JURAMENTO DEL VOTANTE

## Yo, el abajo firmante, juro (o afirmo) que

- Soy ciudadano de los Estados Unidos y del estado de Georgia
- Que poseo los requisitos de un votante exigidos por las leyes del estado de Georgia;
- Que tengo derecho a votar en el distrito electoral que contiene mi residencia en las primarias o en las elecciones en que se usará este voto
- Que soy elegible para realizar un voto en boleta de voto ausente
- Que no he marcado ni enviado por correo ninguna otra boleta de voto ausente, ni marcaré o enviaré por correo otra boleta de voto ausente para votar en dichas primarias o elecciones, ni votaré en ellas personalmente.
- Y que he leído y entendido las instrucciones que acompañan este voto
- Y que he seguido cuidadosamente esas instrucciones al completar esta votación.

Entiendo que la oferta o aceptación de dinero o cualquier otro objeto de valor para votar por un candidato en particular, una lista de candidatos, una cuestión o una lista de cuestiones incluidas en esta elección constituye un acto de fraude electoral y es un delito grave conforme a la ley de Georgia.

FIRMAR  
AQUÍ

FIRMA O MARCA DEL VOTANTE

NOMBRE IMPRESO DEL VOTANTE

FECHA

**Juramento de la persona que asiste al votante (si corresponde):** Yo, el abajo firmante, juro (o afirmo) que ayudé al votante antes mencionado a marcar la boleta de voto ausente, ya que dicho votante me comunicó personalmente su preferencia; y que ese votante tiene derecho a recibir asistencia en la votación de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el inciso (a) del artículo 21-2-409 del Código.

A los \_\_\_\_\_ día de \_\_\_\_\_, de 20\_\_\_\_\_

## **Motivo de la asistencia (marcar la casilla correspondiente):**

- ☐ El votante no puede leer el idioma inglés ☐ El votante requiere asistencia debido a una discapacidad física.

FIRMA DE LA PERSONA QUE ASISTE AL VOTANTE

NOMBRE IMPRESO DE LA PERSONA QUE ASISTE AL VOTANTE

FECHA

# STOP

BEFORE YOU SEAL THIS ENVELOPE,  
YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

- ☐ Place your ballot in white envelope and seal.
- ☐ Sign the oath.
- ☐ Have you affixed sufficient postage?

*Georgia law provides that any person who knowingly falsifies information so as to vote illegally by absentee ballot or who illegally gives or receives assistance in voting, as specified in Code Section 21-2-568 or 21-2-573, shall be guilty of a felony.*

# DETÉNGASE

ANTES DE SELLAR ESTE SOBRE,  
DEBE HACER LO SIGUIENTE:

- ☐ Coloque su boleta en el sobre blanco y selle.
- ☐ Firma el jurmanto.
- ☐ ¿Ha colocado franqueo suficiente?

*La legislación de Georgia dispone que toda persona que a sabiendas falsifique información para votar ilegalmente por boleta de voto ausente o que preste o reciba asistencia para votar ilegalmente, según se especifica en los artículos 21-2-568 o 21-2-573 del Código, será culpable de un delito grave.*



FROM  
BOARD OF REGISTRARS

JUNTA DE REGISTRADORES

PRESORTED  
FIRST-CLASS MAIL  
U.S. POSTAGE  
PAID  
GEORGIA  
SECRETARY OF STATE

**455 GRAYSON HWY  
SUITE 200  
LAWRENCEVILLE GA 30046  
USA**


**RETURN SERVICE REQUESTED**



## **OFFICIAL ABSENTEE BALLOT / BOLETA OFICIAL DE VOTO AUSENTE**

**TO:  
PARA:**

Window:  
1-1/2" x 5"  
1" left, 2-15/16" bottom



Window:  
2-5/16" x 1-3/4"  
3/4" left, 3-3/4" bottom

Georgia Secretary of State Case 1:20-cv-01489-AT Document 51-1 Filed 04/20/20 Page 17 of 88  
Elections Division  
2 Martin Luther King Jr. Dr. SE  
802 West Tower  
Atlanta, GA 30334

PRESORTED  
FIRST-CLASS MAIL  
U.S. POSTAGE  
PAID  
GEORGIA  
SECRETARY OF STATE


RETURN SERVICE REQUESTED

# Official Absentee Ballot



Window:  
1-1/2" x 5"  
1" left, 2-15/16" bottom





Window:  
2-5/16" x 1-3/4"  
3/4" left, 3-3/4" bottom

From \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

APPLY  
FIRST-CLASS  
MAIL POSTAGE  
HERE



**OFFICIAL ABSENTEE BALLOT**  
**BOARD OF REGISTRARS**



APPLING COUNTY  
69 TIPPINS ST STE 205  
BAXLEY GA 31513-0494



## OATH OF ELECTOR

I, the undersigned, do swear (or affirm) that I am a citizen of the United States and of the State of Georgia; that I possess the qualifications of an elector required by the laws of the State of Georgia; that I am entitled to vote in the precinct containing my residence in the primary or election in which this ballot is to be cast; that I am eligible to vote by absentee ballot; that I have not marked or mailed any other absentee ballot, nor will I mark or mail another absentee ballot for voting in such primary or election; nor shall I vote therein in person; and that I have read and understand the instructions accompanying this ballot; and that I have carefully complied with such instructions in completing this ballot. I understand that the offer or acceptance of money or any other object of value to vote for any particular candidate, list of candidates, issue, or list of issues included in this election constitutes an act of voter fraud and is a felony under Georgia law.

**SIGN HERE:** \_\_\_\_\_

Signature or Mark of Elector

\_\_\_\_\_  
Printed Name of Elector

**Oath of Person Assisting Elector (if any):** I, the undersigned, do swear (or affirm) that I assisted the above-named elector in marking such elector's absentee ballot as such elector personally communicated such elector's preference to me; and that such elector is entitled to receive assistance in voting under provisions of subsection (a) of Code Section 21-2-409.

This, the \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 20 \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Person Assisting Elector

\_\_\_\_\_  
Printed Name of Person Assisting Elector

Reason for assistance (Check appropriate square):

- ☐ Elector is unable to read the English language.  
☐ Elector requires assistance due to physical disability.

Georgia law provides that any person who knowingly falsifies information so as to vote illegally by absentee ballot or who illegally gives or receives assistance in voting, as specified in Code Section 21-2-568 or 21-2-573, shall be guilty of a felony.

(This box for office use only.)

Date and Time Received: \_\_\_\_\_

Certified and Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

(Signature of Registrar)

## **STOP**

Have you signed the oath?

Have you placed your ballot in the white envelope and sealed it?

Have you affixed sufficient postage?

## **Exhibit B**

	A	B
1	<b>OFFICE LEVEL</b>	<b>OFFICE SOUGHT</b>
2	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ALAPAHA
3	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ALCOVY
4	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, APPALACHIAN
5	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ATLANTA
6	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, AUGUSTA
7	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BELL-FORSYTH
8	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BLUE RIDGE
9	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BRUNSWICK
10	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CHATTAHOOCHEE
11	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CHEROKEE
12	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, CONASAUGA
13	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, COWETA
14	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, DOUGHERTY
15	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, DUBLIN
16	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, EASTERN
17	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, FLINT
18	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, GWINNETT
19	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, HOUSTON
20	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN
21	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, MACON
22	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, MIDDLE
23	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, MOUNTAIN
24	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, NORTHERN
25	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OCMULGEE
26	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OCONEE
27	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OGEECHEE
28	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, PIEDMONT
29	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROME
30	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SOUTH GEORGIA
31	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN
32	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, STONE MOUNTAIN
33	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, TALLAPOOSA
34	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, TIFTON
35	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, TOOMBS
36	STATE/FEDERAL	DISTRICT ATTORNEY, TOWALIGA
37	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ALAPAHA%, TOMLINSON
38	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ALCOVY%,BENTON
39	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ALCOVY%,JOHNSON
40	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ALCOVY%,OTT
41	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ALCOVY%,WYNNE
42	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, APPALACHIAN%,WEAVER
43	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,ADAMS

	A	B
44	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,CARNESALE
45	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,COX
46	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,DUNAWAY
47	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,EDWARDS
48	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,GLANVILLE
49	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,KRAUSE
50	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,LAGRUA
51	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,MILLENDER
52	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,NEWKIRK
53	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,RICHARDSON
54	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,RIEDER
55	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTA%,RUSSELL
56	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTIC%,ROSE
57	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ATLANTIC%,RUSSELL
58	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, AUGUSTA%,BROWN
59	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, AUGUSTA%,CRAIG
60	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, AUGUSTA%,FLYTHE
61	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, AUGUSTA%,JOLLY
62	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, BELL- FORSYTH%,DICKINSON
63	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, BLUE RIDGE%,CANNON
64	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, BLUE RIDGE%,MCELYEA
65	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, BRUNSWICK%,GUY
66	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, BRUNSWICK%,HARRISON
67	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, BRUNSWICK%,KELLEY
68	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, BRUNSWICK%,SCARLETT
69	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CHATTAHOOCHEE%,GOTTFRIED
70	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CHATTAHOOCHEE%,LAND
71	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CHATTAHOOCHEE%,MCBRIDE
72	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CHATTAHOOCHEE%,MULLINS
73	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CHATTAHOOCHEE%,PETERS
74	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CHATTAHOOCHEE%,RUMER
75	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CHATTAHOOCHEE%,SMITH

	A	B
76	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CHEROKEE%,SSMITH
77	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CHEROKEE%,WATKINS
78	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CLAYTON%,MACK
79	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CLAYTON%,POWERS
80	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CLAYTON%,ROOKS
81	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COBB%,CHILDS
82	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COBB%,GREEN
83	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COBB%,INGRAM
84	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COBB%,KELL
85	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COBB%,POOLE
86	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COBB%,SCHUSTER
87	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COBB%,STALEY
88	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CONASAUGA%,MINTER
89	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CORDELE%,CHASTEEN
90	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CORDELE%,FACHINI
91	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, CORDELE%,HUGHES
92	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COWETA%,BAKER
93	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COWETA%,BLACKMON
94	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COWETA%,PALMER
95	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COWETA%,SAKRISON
96	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, COWETA%,SIMPSON
97	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, DOUGHERTY%,DARRISAW
98	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, DOUGHERTY%,LOCKETTE
99	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, DOUGHERTY%,MARSHALL
100	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, DOUGLAS%,MCCLAIN
101	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, DUBLIN%,GILLIS
102	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, DUBLIN%,GREEN
103	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, DUBLIN%,HELTON
104	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, EASTERN%,BASS
105	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, EASTERN%,FREESEMAN
106	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, EASTERN%,MORSE
107	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ENOTAH%,PARKS
108	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, FLINT%,PIPKIN



	A	B
109	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, FLINT%,VEAL
110	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, GRIFFIN%,BALLARD
111	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, GRIFFIN%,SAMS
112	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, GWINNETT%, W. DAVIS
113	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, GWINNETT%,BACHELOR
114	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, GWINNETT%,BEYERS
115	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, GWINNETT%,RICH
116	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, GWINNETT%,SCHRADER
117	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, GWINNETT%,WHITNER
118	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, HOUSTON%,ADAMS
119	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, HOUSTON%,LUKEMIRE
120	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, HOUSTON%,LUMSDEN
121	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN%,GRAHAM
122	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN%,HOUSE
123	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, MACON%,COLVIN
124	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, MACON%,MONROE
125	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, MIDDLE%,PALMER
126	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, MOUNTAIN%,CAUDELL
127	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, NORTHEASTERN%,BEARDEN
128	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, NORTHEASTERN%,GOSSSELIN
129	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, NORTHEASTERN%,OLIVER
130	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, NORTHERN%,MALCOM
131	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, NORTHERN%,PHELPS
132	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, NORTHERN%,WATSON
133	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OCMULGEE%,BURLESON
134	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OCMULGEE%,MASSEY
135	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OCMULGEE%,PETTY
136	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OCMULGEE%,PRIOR
137	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OCMULGEE%,TRAMMELL
138	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OCONEE%,JOHNSON
139	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OCONEE%,KAUFOLD
140	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OCONEE%,WALL

	A	B
141	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OGEECHEE%,BENNETT
142	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OGEECHEE%,MULDREW
143	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, OGEECHEE%,PEED
144	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, PATAULA%,EARNEST
145	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, PAULDING%,BEAVERS
146	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, PAULDING%,BUCCI
147	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, PAULDING%,LYLES
148	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, PIEDMONT%,BOOTH
149	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, PIEDMONT%,MINGLEDORFF
150	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, PIEDMONT%,PRIMM
151	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ROCKDALE%,MUMFORD
152	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ROME%,DURHAM
153	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, ROME%,NIEDRACH
154	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, SOUTH GEORGIA%,CHASON
155	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, SOUTH GEORGIA%,LANIER
156	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, SOUTHERN%,COWART
157	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, SOUTHWESTERN%,BROWN
158	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, SOUTHWESTERN%,SMITH
159	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, STONE MOUNTAIN%,ADAMS
160	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, STONE MOUNTAIN%,BARRIE
161	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, STONE MOUNTAIN%,HUNTER
162	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, STONE MOUNTAIN%,HYDRICK
163	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, STONE MOUNTAIN%,MORRIS
164	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, STONE MOUNTAIN%,SCOTT
165	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, STONE MOUNTAIN%,SEEILGER
166	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, TALLAPOOSA%,MURPHY
167	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, TIFTON%,CROSS
168	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, TOOMBS%,HAMMOND
169	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, TOOMBS%,HINESLEY
170	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, TOWALIGA%,FEARS
171	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, WAYCROSS%,BROOKS
172	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, WAYCROSS%,SPIVEY

	A	B
173	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, WESTERN%,HAGGARD
174	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF SUPERIOR COURT, WESTERN%,STEPHENS
175	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS%,BROWN
176	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS%,COOMER
177	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS%,DOYLE
178	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS%,GOBEIL
179	STATE/FEDERAL	JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS%,MARKLE
180	STATE/FEDERAL	JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT%,BETHEL
181	STATE/FEDERAL	JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT%,WARREN
182	STATE/FEDERAL	PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR
183	STATE/FEDERAL	PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, DISTRICT 1 - SOUTHERN, DISTRICT1
184	STATE/FEDERAL	PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, DISTRICT 4 - NORTHERN, DISTRICT 4
185	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 1
186	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 10
187	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 100
188	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 101
189	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 102
190	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 103
191	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 104
192	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 105
193	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 106
194	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 107
195	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 108
196	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 109
197	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 11
198	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 110
199	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 111
200	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 112
201	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 113
202	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 114
203	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 115
204	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 116
205	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 117
206	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 118
207	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 119
208	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 12
209	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 120
210	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 121
211	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 122
212	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 123
213	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 124

	A	B
214	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 125
215	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 126
216	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 127
217	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 128
218	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 129
219	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 13
220	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 130
221	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 131
222	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 132
223	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 133
224	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 134
225	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 135
226	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 136
227	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 137
228	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 138
229	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 139
230	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 14
231	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 140
232	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 141
233	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 142
234	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 143
235	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 144
236	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 145
237	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 146
238	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 147
239	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 148
240	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 149
241	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 15
242	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 150
243	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 151
244	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 152
245	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 153
246	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 154
247	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 155
248	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 156
249	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 157
250	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 158
251	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 159
252	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 16
253	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 160
254	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 161
255	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 162
256	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 163
257	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 164
258	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 165
259	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 166

	A	B
260	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 167
261	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 168
262	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 169
263	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 17
264	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 170
265	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 171
266	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 172
267	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 173
268	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 174
269	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 175
270	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 176
271	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 177
272	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 178
273	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 179
274	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 18
275	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 180
276	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 19
277	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 2
278	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 20
279	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 21
280	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 22
281	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 23
282	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 24
283	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 25
284	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 26
285	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 27
286	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 28
287	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 29
288	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 3
289	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 30
290	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 31
291	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 32
292	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 33
293	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 34
294	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 35
295	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 36
296	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 37
297	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 38
298	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 39
299	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 4
300	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 40
301	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 41
302	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 42
303	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 43
304	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 44
305	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 45

	A	B
306	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 46
307	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 47
308	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 48
309	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 49
310	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 5
311	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 50
312	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 51
313	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 52
314	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 53
315	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 54
316	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 55
317	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 56
318	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 57
319	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 58
320	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 59
321	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 6
322	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 60
323	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 61
324	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 62
325	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 63
326	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 64
327	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 65
328	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 66
329	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 67
330	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 68
331	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 69
332	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 7
333	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 70
334	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 71
335	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 72
336	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 73
337	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 74
338	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 75
339	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 76
340	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 77
341	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 78
342	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 79
343	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 8
344	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 80
345	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 81
346	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 82
347	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 83
348	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 84
349	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 85
350	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 86
351	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 87

	A	B
352	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 88
353	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 89
354	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 9
355	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 90
356	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 91
357	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 92
358	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 93
359	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 94
360	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 95
361	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 96
362	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 97
363	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 98
364	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 99
365	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 1
366	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 10
367	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 11
368	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 12
369	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 13
370	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 14
371	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 15
372	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 16
373	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 17
374	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 18
375	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 19
376	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 2
377	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 20
378	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 21
379	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 22
380	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 23
381	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 24
382	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 25
383	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 26
384	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 27
385	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 28
386	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 29
387	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 3
388	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 30
389	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 31
390	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 32
391	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 33
392	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 34
393	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 35
394	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 36
395	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 37
396	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 38
397	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 39



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398	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 4
399	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 4 (TO FILL THE UNEXPIRED TERM)
400	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 40
401	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 41
402	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 42
403	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 43
404	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 44
405	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 45
406	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 46
407	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 47
408	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 48
409	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 49
410	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 5
411	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 50
412	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 51
413	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 52
414	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 53
415	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 54
416	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 55
417	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 56
418	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 6
419	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 7
420	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 8
421	STATE/FEDERAL	STATE SENATOR, DISTRICT 9
422	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 1
423	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 10
424	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 11
425	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 12
426	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 13
427	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 14
428	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 2
429	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 3
430	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 4
431	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 5
432	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 6
433	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 7
434	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 8
435	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, DISTRICT 9
436	STATE/FEDERAL	UNITED STATES SENATOR%, PERDUE



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437	APPLING	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 2
438	APPLING	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 4
439	APPLING	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 5
440	APPLING	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
441	APPLING	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
442	APPLING	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
443	APPLING	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
444	APPLING	CORONER
445	APPLING	COUNTY SURVEYOR
446	APPLING	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
447	APPLING	SHERIFF
448	APPLING	TAX COMMISSIONER
449	ATKINSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION MEMBER, DISTRICT 2
450	ATKINSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION MEMBER, DISTRICT 4
451	ATKINSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION MEMBER, DISTRICT 5
452	ATKINSON	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 1
453	ATKINSON	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 3
454	ATKINSON	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 5
455	ATKINSON	COUNTY CORONER
456	ATKINSON	COUNTY SURVEYOR
457	ATKINSON	PROBATE JUDGE
458	ATKINSON	SHERIFF
459	ATKINSON	SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
460	ATKINSON	TAX COMMISSIONER
461	BACON	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 4
462	BACON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, CHAIRMAN
463	BACON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
464	BACON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
465	BACON	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
466	BACON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
467	BACON	CORONER
468	BACON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
469	BACON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
470	BACON	COUNTY SURVEYOR
471	BACON	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
472	BACON	SHERIFF
473	BACON	TAX COMMISSIONER
474	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, ANNA DISTRICT
475	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, ELMODEL
476	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, HOGGARDS MILL
477	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, MILFORD
478	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, NEWTON
479	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ANNA DISTRICT

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480	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ELMODEL
481	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, HOGGARDS MILL
482	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, MILFORD
483	BAKER	BAKER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, NEWTON
484	BAKER	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
485	BAKER	CORONER
486	BAKER	PROBATE/MAGISTRATE JUDGE
487	BAKER	SHERIFF
488	BAKER	TAX COMMISSIONER
489	BALDWIN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
490	BALDWIN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
491	BALDWIN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
492	BALDWIN	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
493	BALDWIN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
494	BALDWIN	CORONER
495	BALDWIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
496	BALDWIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
497	BALDWIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
498	BALDWIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
499	BALDWIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
500	BALDWIN	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
501	BALDWIN	SOLICITOR GENERAL
502	BALDWIN	SURVEYOR
503	BANKS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 1
504	BANKS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 2
505	BANKS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4
506	BANKS	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
507	BANKS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
508	BANKS	CORONER
509	BANKS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER CHAIR
510	BANKS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
511	BANKS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
512	BANKS	COUNTY SURVEYOR
513	BANKS	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
514	BANKS	SHERIFF
515	BANKS	TAX COMMISSIONER
516	BARROW	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
517	BARROW	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
518	BARROW	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
519	BARROW	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 8 AT LARGE
520	BARROW	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
521	BARROW	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
522	BARROW	CORONER

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523	BARROW	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
524	BARROW	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
525	BARROW	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
526	BARROW	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
527	BARROW	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
528	BARROW	SHERIFF
529	BARROW	TAX COMMISSIONER
530	BARTOW	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
531	BARTOW	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
532	BARTOW	CORONER
533	BARTOW	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
534	BARTOW	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
535	BARTOW	PROBATE JUDGE
536	BARTOW	SHERIFF
537	BARTOW	SOLE COUNTY COMMISSIONER
538	BARTOW	SURVEYOR
539	BARTOW	TAX COMMISSIONER
540	BEN HILL	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
541	BEN HILL	CORONER
542	BEN HILL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER AT LARGE
543	BEN HILL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2 POST 1
544	BEN HILL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3 POST 2
545	BEN HILL	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
546	BEN HILL	PROBATE JUDGE
547	BEN HILL	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 4
548	BEN HILL	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 5
549	BEN HILL	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 6
550	BEN HILL	SHERIFF
551	BEN HILL	TAX COMMISSIONER
552	BERRIEN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
553	BERRIEN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
554	BERRIEN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
555	BERRIEN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 7
556	BERRIEN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
557	BERRIEN	CORONER
558	BERRIEN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
559	BERRIEN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4 LRG
560	BERRIEN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5 LRG
561	BERRIEN	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
562	BERRIEN	SHERIFF
563	BERRIEN	TAX COMMISSIONER
564	BIBB	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
565	BIBB	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
566	BIBB	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
567	BIBB	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
568	BIBB	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5

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569	BIBB	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
570	BIBB	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
571	BIBB	CORONER
572	BIBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
573	BIBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
574	BIBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
575	BIBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
576	BIBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
577	BIBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 6
578	BIBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 7
579	BIBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 8
580	BIBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 9
581	BIBB	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
582	BIBB	MAYOR
583	BIBB	SHERIFF
584	BIBB	SOLICITOR OF STATE COURT
585	BIBB	TAX COMMISSIONER
586	BIBB	WATER AUTHORITY, DISTRICT 2
587	BIBB	WATER AUTHORITY, DISTRICT 3
588	BLECKLEY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
589	BLECKLEY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
590	BLECKLEY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
591	BLECKLEY	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
592	BLECKLEY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
593	BLECKLEY	CORONER
594	BLECKLEY	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
595	BLECKLEY	SHERIFF
596	BLECKLEY	SOLE COMMISSIONER
597	BLECKLEY	SURVEYOR
598	BLECKLEY	TAX COMMISSIONER
599	BRANTLEY	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
600	BRANTLEY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
601	BRANTLEY	CORONER
602	BRANTLEY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION POST 3
603	BRANTLEY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 1
604	BRANTLEY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 5
605	BRANTLEY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER CHAIRMAN
606	BRANTLEY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER POST 2
607	BRANTLEY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER POST 3
608	BRANTLEY	PROBATE
609	BRANTLEY	SHERIFF
610	BRANTLEY	SURVEYOR
611	BRANTLEY	TAX COMMISSIONER
612	BROOKS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
613	BROOKS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
614	BROOKS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5

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615	BROOKS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, LRG
616	BROOKS	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
617	BROOKS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
618	BROOKS	CORONER
619	BROOKS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
620	BROOKS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
621	BROOKS	COUNTY SURVEYOR
622	BROOKS	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
623	BROOKS	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
624	BROOKS	SHERIFF
625	BROOKS	TAX COMMISSIONER
626	BRYAN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3, POST 5 SPECIAL
627	BRYAN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
628	BRYAN	CORONER
629	BRYAN	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2, POST 4
630	BRYAN	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, VICE CHAIRMAN POST 2
631	BRYAN	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
632	BRYAN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
633	BRYAN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
634	BRYAN	PROBATE JUDGE
635	BRYAN	SHERIFF
636	BRYAN	SOLICITOR - GENERAL
637	BRYAN	STATE COURT JUDGE
638	BRYAN	TAX COMMISSIONER
639	BULLOCH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
640	BULLOCH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
641	BULLOCH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 7
642	BULLOCH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 8
643	BULLOCH	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
644	BULLOCH	CORONER
645	BULLOCH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, CHAIRMAN
646	BULLOCH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1, SEAT A
647	BULLOCH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2, SEAT A
648	BULLOCH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2, SEAT C
649	BULLOCH	COUNTY SURVEYOR
650	BULLOCH	MAGISTRATE COURT CHIEF JUDGE
651	BULLOCH	PROBATE JUDGE
652	BULLOCH	SHERIFF
653	BULLOCH	SOLICITOR-GENERAL
654	BULLOCH	TAX COMMISSIONER
655	BURKE	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
656	BURKE	CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
657	BURKE	CORONER

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658	BURKE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
659	BURKE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
660	BURKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER - DISTRICT 1
661	BURKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER - DISTRICT 3
662	BURKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER - DISTRICT 5
663	BURKE	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF BURKE COUNTY
664	BURKE	JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT
665	BURKE	SHERIFF
666	BURKE	TAX COMMISSIONER
667	BUTTS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
668	BUTTS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
669	BUTTS	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
670	BUTTS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
671	BUTTS	CORONER
672	BUTTS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
673	BUTTS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
674	BUTTS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
675	BUTTS	COUNTY SURVEYOR
676	BUTTS	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
677	BUTTS	SHERIFF
678	BUTTS	TAX COMMISSIONER
679	CALHOUN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
680	CALHOUN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
681	CALHOUN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
682	CALHOUN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
683	CALHOUN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
684	CALHOUN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, LRG
685	CALHOUN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
686	CALHOUN	CORONER
687	CALHOUN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
688	CALHOUN	COUNYT COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
689	CALHOUN	JUDGE OF PROBATE/MAGISTRATE COURT
690	CALHOUN	SHERIFF
691	CALHOUN	TAX COMMISSIONER
692	CAMDEN	BOARD OF COMMISSION, DISTRICT 5
693	CAMDEN	BOARD OF COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 3
694	CAMDEN	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 1
695	CAMDEN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
696	CAMDEN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
697	CAMDEN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
698	CAMDEN	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
699	CAMDEN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
700	CAMDEN	CORONER
701	CAMDEN	PROBATE JUDGE
702	CAMDEN	SHERIFF
703	CAMDEN	TAX COMMISSIONER

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704	CANDLER	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
705	CANDLER	CORONER
706	CANDLER	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
707	CANDLER	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 1
708	CANDLER	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 3
709	CANDLER	COUNTY SURVEYOR
710	CANDLER	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
711	CANDLER	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
712	CANDLER	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 1
713	CANDLER	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 3
714	CANDLER	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 5
715	CANDLER	SHERIFF
716	CANDLER	SOLICITOR GENERAL
717	CANDLER	TAX COMMISSIONER
718	CARROLL	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
719	CARROLL	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
720	CARROLL	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
721	CARROLL	CORONER
722	CARROLL	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
723	CARROLL	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
724	CARROLL	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
725	CARROLL	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
726	CARROLL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
727	CARROLL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
728	CARROLL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
729	CARROLL	COUNTY SURVEYOR
730	CARROLL	PROBATE JUDGE
731	CARROLL	SHERIFF
732	CARROLL	SOLICITOR
733	CARROLL	STATE COURT JUDGE
734	CARROLL	TAX COMMISSIONER
735	CATOOSA	BOARD EDUCATION AT LARGE
736	CATOOSA	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 1
737	CATOOSA	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
738	CATOOSA	CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
739	CATOOSA	CHIEF MAGISTRATE OF THE MAGISTRATE COURT
740	CATOOSA	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
741	CATOOSA	CORONER
742	CATOOSA	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 1
743	CATOOSA	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 3
744	CATOOSA	PROBATE JUDGE
745	CATOOSA	SHERIFF
746	CATOOSA	TAX COMMISSIONER
747	CHARLTON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
748	CHARLTON	CORONER

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749	CHARLTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 2
750	CHARLTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 3
751	CHARLTON	PROBATE/MAGISTRATE JUDGE
752	CHARLTON	SCHOOL BOARD DISTRICT 2
753	CHARLTON	SCHOOL BOARD DISTRICT 4
754	CHARLTON	SHERIFF
755	CHARLTON	STATE COURT JUDGE
756	CHARLTON	TAX COMMISSIONER
757	CHATHAM	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
758	CHATHAM	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
759	CHATHAM	CORONER
760	CHATHAM	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
761	CHATHAM	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 1
762	CHATHAM	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 2
763	CHATHAM	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 3
764	CHATHAM	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 4
765	CHATHAM	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 5
766	CHATHAM	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 6
767	CHATHAM	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 7
768	CHATHAM	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 8
769	CHATHAM	JUDGE OF STATE COURT (COOLIDGE)
770	CHATHAM	JUDGE OF STATE COURT (FOWLER)
771	CHATHAM	JUDGE OF STATE COURT (SAPP)
772	CHATHAM	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
773	CHATHAM	PROBATE COURT JUDGE
774	CHATHAM	RECORDERS COURT JUDGE (ODELL)
775	CHATHAM	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 1
776	CHATHAM	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 2
777	CHATHAM	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 3
778	CHATHAM	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 7
779	CHATHAM	SHERIFF
780	CHATHAM	TAX COMMISSIONER
781	CHATTAHOOCHEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION - POST 1
782	CHATTAHOOCHEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION - POST 3
783	CHATTAHOOCHEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION - POST 5
784	CHATTAHOOCHEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 2
785	CHATTAHOOCHEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4
786	CHATTAHOOCHEE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
787	CHATTAHOOCHEE	CORONER
788	CHATTAHOOCHEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER - POST 1
789	CHATTAHOOCHEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER - POST 2
790	CHATTAHOOCHEE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
791	CHATTAHOOCHEE	PROBATE JUDGE
792	CHATTAHOOCHEE	SHERIFF
793	CHATTAHOOCHEE	TAX COMMISSIONER
794	CHATTOOGA	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1



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795	CHATTOOGA	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
796	CHATTOOGA	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
797	CHATTOOGA	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
798	CHATTOOGA	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
799	CHATTOOGA	CORONER
800	CHATTOOGA	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
801	CHATTOOGA	SHERIFF
802	CHATTOOGA	SOLICITOR GENERAL
803	CHATTOOGA	TAX COMMISSIONER
804	CHEROKEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION CHAIRPERSON
805	CHEROKEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
806	CHEROKEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
807	CHEROKEE	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
808	CHEROKEE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
809	CHEROKEE	CORONER
810	CHEROKEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
811	CHEROKEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
812	CHEROKEE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
813	CHEROKEE	SHERIFF
814	CHEROKEE	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED ALLEN DEE MORRIS)
815	CHEROKEE	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED MICHELLE HOLBROOK HOMIER)
816	CHEROKEE	SURVEYOR
817	CHEROKEE	TAX COMMISSIONER
818	CLARKE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
819	CLARKE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
820	CLARKE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
821	CLARKE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 8
822	CLARKE	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
823	CLARKE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
824	CLARKE	CORONER
825	CLARKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 10
826	CLARKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
827	CLARKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
828	CLARKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 6
829	CLARKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 8
830	CLARKE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
831	CLARKE	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
832	CLARKE	JUDGE OF STATE COURT 2
833	CLARKE	SHERIFF
834	CLARKE	TAX COMMISSIONER
835	CLAY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
836	CLAY	CORONER
837	CLAY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
838	CLAY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
839	CLAY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5

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840	CLAY	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
841	CLAY	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
842	CLAY	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
843	CLAY	PROBATE JUDGE
844	CLAY	TAX COMMISSIONER
845	CLAYTON	FOR CHIEF MAGISTRATE
846	CLAYTON	FOR CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
847	CLAYTON	FOR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 2
848	CLAYTON	FOR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
849	CLAYTON	FOR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 5
850	CLAYTON	FOR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 6
851	CLAYTON	FOR COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 7
852	CLAYTON	FOR COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
853	CLAYTON	FOR COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 2
854	CLAYTON	FOR COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 3
855	CLAYTON	FOR JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
856	CLAYTON	FOR JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF CLAYTON COUNTY (TO SUCCEED SHALONDA PARKER)
857	CLAYTON	FOR JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF CLAYTON COUNTY (TO SUCCEED LINDA S. COWEN)
858	CLAYTON	FOR SOLICITOR-GENERAL OF CLAYTON COUNTY
859	CLAYTON	FOR TAX COMMISSIONER
860	CLAYTON	SHERIFF
861	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS POST 3
862	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, POST 2
863	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, POST 5
864	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 2
865	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 3
866	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 5
867	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY CLERK OF COURT
868	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY CORONER
869	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY PROBATE JUDGE
870	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY SHERIFF
871	CLINCH	CLINCH COUNTY TAX COMMISSIONER
872	COBB	CHAIRMAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
873	COBB	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
874	COBB	CLERK OF STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY
875	COBB	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
876	COBB	COBB COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
877	COBB	COBB COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
878	COBB	COBB COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 1
879	COBB	COBB COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 3

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880	COBB	COBB COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 5
881	COBB	COBB COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 7
882	COBB	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
883	COBB	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
884	COBB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY, DIV II POST 2
885	COBB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY, DIV II POST 5
886	COBB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY, POST 1
887	COBB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY, POST 2
888	COBB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY, POST 3
889	COBB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY, POST 4
890	COBB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY, POST 6
891	COBB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF COBB COUNTY, POST 7
892	COBB	SHERIFF
893	COBB	SURVEYOR
894	COBB	TAX COMMISSIONER
895	COFFEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
896	COFFEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
897	COFFEE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
898	COFFEE	CORONER
899	COFFEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
900	COFFEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
901	COFFEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
902	COFFEE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
903	COFFEE	PROBATE JUDGE
904	COFFEE	SHERIFF
905	COFFEE	STATE COURT JUDGE
906	COFFEE	SURVEYOR
907	COFFEE	TAX COMMISSIONER
908	COLQUITT	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 2
909	COLQUITT	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 4
910	COLQUITT	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
911	COLQUITT	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
912	COLQUITT	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
913	COLQUITT	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
914	COLQUITT	CORONER
915	COLQUITT	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 6
916	COLQUITT	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
917	COLQUITT	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
918	COLQUITT	SHERIFF
919	COLQUITT	SOLICITOR GENERAL
920	COLQUITT	TAX COMMISSIONER
921	COLUMBIA	BOARD OF EDUCATION, CHAIRPERSON

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922	COLUMBIA	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
923	COLUMBIA	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
924	COLUMBIA	CORONER
925	COLUMBIA	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
926	COLUMBIA	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
927	COLUMBIA	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
928	COLUMBIA	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
929	COLUMBIA	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
930	COLUMBIA	SHERIFF
931	COLUMBIA	TAX COMMISSIONER
932	COOK	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 2
933	COOK	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 4
934	COOK	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
935	COOK	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
936	COOK	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
937	COOK	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
938	COOK	CORONER
939	COOK	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
940	COOK	TAX COMMISSIONER
941	COWETA	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
942	COWETA	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
943	COWETA	CORONER
944	COWETA	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 2
945	COWETA	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 2 AT LARGE
946	COWETA	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 5
947	COWETA	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 1
948	COWETA	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 4
949	COWETA	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 5
950	COWETA	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
951	COWETA	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
952	COWETA	SHERIFF
953	COWETA	SOLICITOR GENERAL
954	COWETA	SURVEYOR
955	COWETA	TAX COMMISSIONER
956	CRAWFORD	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
957	CRAWFORD	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
958	CRAWFORD	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
959	CRAWFORD	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
960	CRAWFORD	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
961	CRAWFORD	CORONER
962	CRAWFORD	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
963	CRAWFORD	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
964	CRAWFORD	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
965	CRAWFORD	JUDGE, PROBATE COURT
966	CRAWFORD	SHERIFF

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967	CRAWFORD	TAX COMMISSIONER
968	CRISP	BOARD OF COMMISSIONER - DISTRICT 1, POST 2
969	CRISP	BOARD OF COMMISSIONER - DISTRICT 2, POST 1
970	CRISP	BOARD OF EDUCATION, CITY OF CORDELE DISTRICT
971	CRISP	BOARD OF EDUCATION, WEST CRISP DISTRICT
972	CRISP	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
973	CRISP	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
974	CRISP	CORONER
975	CRISP	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
976	CRISP	SHERIFF
977	CRISP	TAX COMMISSIONER
978	DADE	CHAIRPERSON / COUNTY EXECUTIVE
979	DADE	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
980	DADE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
981	DADE	CORONER
982	DADE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
983	DADE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 4
984	DADE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 5, AT LARGE
985	DADE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 3
986	DADE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 4
987	DADE	PROBATE COURT JUDGE
988	DADE	SHERIFF
989	DADE	TAX COMMISSIONER
990	DAWSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
991	DAWSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
992	DAWSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
993	DAWSON	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
994	DAWSON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
995	DAWSON	COUNTY COMMISSION, CHAIRPERSON
996	DAWSON	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 2
997	DAWSON	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 4
998	DAWSON	JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT
999	DAWSON	SHERIFF
1000	DAWSON	SURVEYOR
1001	DAWSON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1002	DECATUR	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1003	DECATUR	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1004	DECATUR	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1005	DECATUR	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1006	DECATUR	CLERK OF COURT
1007	DECATUR	CORONER
1008	DECATUR	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 5
1009	DECATUR	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2

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1010	DECATUR	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1011	DECATUR	PROBATE JUDGE
1012	DECATUR	SHERIFF
1013	DECATUR	STATE COURT JUDGE
1014	DECATUR	TAX COMMISSIONER
1015	DEKALB	ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF STATE COURT (TO SUCCEED BRIAN ROSS)
1016	DEKALB	ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF STATE COURT (TO SUCCEED KIESHA R. STOREY)
1017	DEKALB	ASSOCIATE JUDGE OF STATE COURT (TO SUCCEED RONALD B. RAMSEY, SR.)
1018	DEKALB	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 1
1019	DEKALB	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 4
1020	DEKALB	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 5
1021	DEKALB	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 6
1022	DEKALB	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 1
1023	DEKALB	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
1024	DEKALB	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 5
1025	DEKALB	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 7
1026	DEKALB	CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (CEO)
1027	DEKALB	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1028	DEKALB	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1029	DEKALB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT (TO SUCCEED DAX E. LOPEZ)
1030	DEKALB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT (TO SUCCEED JANIS C. GORDON)
1031	DEKALB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT (TO SUCCEED MIKE JACOBS)
1032	DEKALB	JUDGE OF STATE COURT (TO SUCCEED WAYNE M. PURDOM)
1033	DEKALB	PROBATE JUDGE
1034	DEKALB	SHERIFF
1035	DEKALB	SOLICITOR
1036	DEKALB	TAX COMMISSIONER
1037	DODGE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1038	DODGE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1039	DODGE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
1040	DODGE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1041	DODGE	CORONER
1042	DODGE	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
1043	DODGE	COUNTY COMMISSION DISTRICT 1
1044	DODGE	COUNTY COMMISSION DISTRICT 4
1045	DODGE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1046	DODGE	PROBATE JUDGE
1047	DODGE	SHERIFF
1048	DODGE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1049	DOOLY	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 2
1050	DOOLY	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 4
1051	DOOLY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1052	DOOLY	CORONER

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1053	DOOLY	COUNTY COMMISSION DISTRICT 2
1054	DOOLY	COUNTY COMMISSION DISTRICT 4
1055	DOOLY	PROBATE JUDGE
1056	DOOLY	SHERIFF
1057	DOOLY	TAX COMMISSIONER
1058	DOUGHERTY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1059	DOUGHERTY	CORONER
1060	DOUGHERTY	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 1
1061	DOUGHERTY	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 3
1062	DOUGHERTY	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 5
1063	DOUGHERTY	PROBATE COURT JUDGE
1064	DOUGHERTY	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER AT LARGE
1065	DOUGHERTY	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 1
1066	DOUGHERTY	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 5
1067	DOUGHERTY	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 3
1068	DOUGHERTY	SHERIFF
1069	DOUGHERTY	STATE COURT JUDGE
1070	DOUGLAS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1071	DOUGLAS	COMMISSION CHAIR
1072	DOUGLAS	COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1073	DOUGLAS	CORONER
1074	DOUGLAS	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
1075	DOUGLAS	PROBATE JUDGE
1076	DOUGLAS	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 1
1077	DOUGLAS	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 5
1078	DOUGLAS	SHERIFF
1079	DOUGLAS	STATE COURT JUDGE
1080	DOUGLAS	TAX COMMISSIONER
1081	EARLY	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 2
1082	EARLY	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 4
1083	EARLY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1084	EARLY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5 LRG
1085	EARLY	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1086	EARLY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1087	EARLY	CORONER
1088	EARLY	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1089	EARLY	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
1090	EARLY	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1091	EARLY	PROBATE JUDGE
1092	EARLY	SHERIFF
1093	EARLY	TAX COMMISSIONER
1094	ECHOLS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4
1095	ECHOLS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 5
1096	ECHOLS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1097	ECHOLS	CORONER
1098	ECHOLS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 1

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1099	ECHOLS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 2
1100	ECHOLS	ECHOLS COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 3
1101	ECHOLS	PROBATE JUDGE
1102	ECHOLS	SHERIFF
1103	ECHOLS	TAX COMMISSIONER
1104	EFFINGHAM	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, CHAIRMAN
1105	EFFINGHAM	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1106	EFFINGHAM	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1107	EFFINGHAM	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1108	EFFINGHAM	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1109	EFFINGHAM	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1110	EFFINGHAM	CORONER
1111	EFFINGHAM	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1112	EFFINGHAM	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1113	EFFINGHAM	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1114	EFFINGHAM	SHERIFF
1115	EFFINGHAM	TAX COMMISSIONER
1116	ELBERT	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1117	ELBERT	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1118	ELBERT	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1119	ELBERT	CORONER
1120	ELBERT	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1121	ELBERT	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1122	ELBERT	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1123	ELBERT	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
1124	ELBERT	SHERIFF
1125	ELBERT	SOLICITOR GENERAL
1126	ELBERT	TAX COMMISSIONER
1127	EMANUEL	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1128	EMANUEL	CORONER
1129	EMANUEL	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 1
1130	EMANUEL	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
1131	EMANUEL	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 7
1132	EMANUEL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 1
1133	EMANUEL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 3
1134	EMANUEL	JUDGE OF MAGISTRATE COURT
1135	EMANUEL	JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT
1136	EMANUEL	JUDGE OF THE STATE COURT OF EMANUEL COUNTY
1137	EMANUEL	SHERIFF
1138	EMANUEL	TAX COMMISSIONER
1139	EVANS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1140	EVANS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1141	EVANS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
1142	EVANS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1143	EVANS	CORONER



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1144	EVANS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1145	EVANS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1146	EVANS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 6
1147	EVANS	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1148	EVANS	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1149	EVANS	SHERIFF
1150	EVANS	SOLICITOR-GENERAL OF STATE COURT
1151	EVANS	TAX COMMISSIONER
1152	FANNIN	CHIEF JUDGE OF MAGISTRATE COURT
1153	FANNIN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1154	FANNIN	CORONER
1155	FANNIN	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION (SUCCEED CHAD GALLOWAY)
1156	FANNIN	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION (SUCCEED LEWIS DEWEESE)
1157	FANNIN	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION (SUCCEED TERRY D BRAMLETT)
1158	FANNIN	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
1159	FANNIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER POST 1
1160	FANNIN	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1161	FANNIN	SHERIFF
1162	FANNIN	SURVEYOR
1163	FANNIN	TAX COMMISSIONER
1164	FAYETTE	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 1
1165	FAYETTE	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
1166	FAYETTE	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 5
1167	FAYETTE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1168	FAYETTE	CORONER
1169	FAYETTE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 1
1170	FAYETTE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 2
1171	FAYETTE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 5
1172	FAYETTE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1173	FAYETTE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE - DISTRICT 1
1174	FAYETTE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE - DISTRICT 2
1175	FAYETTE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE - DISTRICT 3
1176	FAYETTE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE - DISTRICT 4
1177	FAYETTE	SHERIFF
1178	FAYETTE	SOLICITOR GENERAL OF STATE COURT
1179	FAYETTE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1180	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, POST 2
1181	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, POST 3
1182	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1183	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1184	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1185	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY CHIEF MAGISTRATE

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1186	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1187	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY CORONER
1188	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY PROBATE JUDGE
1189	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY SHERIFF
1190	FLOYD	FLOYD COUNTY TAX COMMISSIONER
1191	FORSYTH	CHIEF MAGISTRATE OF FORSYTH COUNTY
1192	FORSYTH	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1193	FORSYTH	CORONER
1194	FORSYTH	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1195	FORSYTH	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1196	FORSYTH	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1197	FORSYTH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1198	FORSYTH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1199	FORSYTH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1200	FORSYTH	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1201	FORSYTH	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF FORSYTH COUNTY
1202	FORSYTH	SHERIFF
1203	FORSYTH	TAX COMMISSIONER
1204	FRANKLIN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 1
1205	FRANKLIN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 2
1206	FRANKLIN	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1207	FRANKLIN	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1208	FRANKLIN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1209	FRANKLIN	CORONER
1210	FRANKLIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1211	FRANKLIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1212	FRANKLIN	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1213	FRANKLIN	SHERIFF
1214	FRANKLIN	TAX COMMISSIONER
1215	FULTON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1216	FULTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1217	FULTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1218	FULTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 6
1219	FULTON	FULTON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 1
1220	FULTON	FULTON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 3
1221	FULTON	FULTON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 4
1222	FULTON	JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT
1223	FULTON	SHERIFF
1224	FULTON	SOLICITOR GENERAL
1225	FULTON	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED DIANE E. BESSEN)
1226	FULTON	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED JANE MORRISON)
1227	FULTON	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED JOHN R. MATHER)

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1228	FULTON	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED MYRA H. DIXON)
1229	FULTON	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED PATSY Y. PORTER)
1230	FULTON	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED SUSAN EDLEIN)
1231	FULTON	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED WESLEY B. TAILOR)
1232	FULTON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1233	GILMER	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1234	GILMER	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1235	GILMER	CORONER
1236	GILMER	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION POST 1
1237	GILMER	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION POST 2
1238	GILMER	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION POST 3
1239	GILMER	COUNTY COMMISSIONER POST 1
1240	GILMER	PROBATE JUDGE
1241	GILMER	SHERIFF
1242	GILMER	SURVEYOR
1243	GILMER	TAX COMMISSIONER
1244	GLASCOCK	BOARD OF EDUCATION AT LARGE
1245	GLASCOCK	BOARD OF EDUCATION, GIBSON DISTRICT
1246	GLASCOCK	BOARD OF EDUCATION, MILL DISTRICT
1247	GLASCOCK	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1248	GLASCOCK	CORONER
1249	GLASCOCK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, GIBSON DISTRICT
1250	GLASCOCK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, MILL DISTRICT
1251	GLASCOCK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, MITCHELL/EDGEHILL
1252	GLASCOCK	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1253	GLASCOCK	SHERIFF
1254	GLASCOCK	TAX COMMISSIONER
1255	GLYNN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, AT LARGE POST 2
1256	GLYNN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1257	GLYNN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1258	GLYNN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1259	GLYNN	BRUNSWICK-GLYNN COUNTY JOINT WATER AND SEWER COMMISSION POST 1
1260	GLYNN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, AT LARGE POST 2
1261	GLYNN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1262	GLYNN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1263	GLYNN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1264	GLYNN	COUNTY CORONER
1265	GLYNN	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1266	GLYNN	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1267	GLYNN	PROBATE JUDGE
1268	GLYNN	SHERIFF
1269	GLYNN	SOLICITOR OF STATE COURT
1270	GLYNN	STATE COURT CLERK

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1271	GLYNN	STATE COURT JUDGE
1272	GLYNN	SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
1273	GLYNN	TAX COMMISSIONER
1274	GORDON	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1275	GORDON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1276	GORDON	CORONER
1277	GORDON	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 2
1278	GORDON	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4
1279	GORDON	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 6
1280	GORDON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1281	GORDON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1282	GORDON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1283	GORDON	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1284	GORDON	SHERIFF
1285	GORDON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1286	GRADY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1287	GRADY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1288	GRADY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1289	GRADY	CLERK OF COURT
1290	GRADY	CORONER
1291	GRADY	COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 1
1292	GRADY	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 3
1293	GRADY	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 4
1294	GRADY	MAGISTRATE
1295	GRADY	PROBATE JUDGE
1296	GRADY	SHERIFF
1297	GRADY	TAX COMMISSIONER
1298	GREENE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1299	GREENE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1300	GREENE	CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF EDUCATION
1301	GREENE	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1302	GREENE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1303	GREENE	CORONER
1304	GREENE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1305	GREENE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1306	GREENE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1307	GREENE	SHERIFF
1308	GREENE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1309	GWINNETT	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1310	GWINNETT	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1311	GWINNETT	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1312	GWINNETT	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1313	GWINNETT	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1314	GWINNETT	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
1315	GWINNETT	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1

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1316	GWINNETT	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1317	GWINNETT	FOR JUDGE, STATE COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY (TO SUCCEED EMILY BRANTLEY)
1318	GWINNETT	FOR JUDGE, STATE COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY (TO SUCCEED CARLA E. BROWN)
1319	GWINNETT	FOR JUDGE, STATE COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY (TO SUCCEED JOHN F. DORAN)
1320	GWINNETT	FOR JUDGE, STATE COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY (TO SUCCEED SHAWN F. BRATTON)
1321	GWINNETT	JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT
1322	GWINNETT	SHERIFF
1323	GWINNETT	TAX COMMISSIONER
1324	HABERSHAM	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1325	HABERSHAM	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1326	HABERSHAM	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1327	HABERSHAM	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1328	HABERSHAM	CORONER
1329	HABERSHAM	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1330	HABERSHAM	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1331	HABERSHAM	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1332	HABERSHAM	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1333	HABERSHAM	SHERIFF
1334	HABERSHAM	SOLICITOR OF STATE COURT
1335	HABERSHAM	STATE COURT JUDGE
1336	HABERSHAM	TAX COMMISSIONER
1337	HALL	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 3
1338	HALL	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4
1339	HALL	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1340	HALL	CORONER
1341	HALL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, AT LARGE
1342	HALL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 2
1343	HALL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 4
1344	HALL	HALL COUNTY CLERK OF COURT
1345	HALL	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1346	HALL	JUDGE OF STATE COURT TO SUCCEED BREAKFIELD
1347	HALL	JUDGE OF STATE COURT TO SUCCEED ROBERTS
1348	HALL	SHERIFF
1349	HALL	SURVEYOR
1350	HALL	TAX COMMISSIONER
1351	HANCOCK	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1352	HANCOCK	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1353	HANCOCK	CORONER
1354	HANCOCK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1355	HANCOCK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1356	HANCOCK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1357	HANCOCK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1358	HANCOCK	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT

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1359	HANCOCK	SHERIFF
1360	HANCOCK	TAX COMMISSIONER
1361	HARALSON	CLERK, SUPERIOR COURT
1362	HARALSON	CORONER
1363	HARALSON	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1364	HARALSON	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1365	HARALSON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, CHAIRMAN
1366	HARALSON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1367	HARALSON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1368	HARALSON	JUDGE, PROBATE COURT
1369	HARALSON	MAGISTRATE JUDGE, CHIEF
1370	HARALSON	SHERIFF
1371	HARALSON	SURVEYOR
1372	HARALSON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1373	HARRIS	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1374	HARRIS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1375	HARRIS	CORONER
1376	HARRIS	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1377	HARRIS	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1378	HARRIS	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1379	HARRIS	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
1380	HARRIS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1381	HARRIS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1382	HARRIS	JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT
1383	HARRIS	SHERIFF
1384	HARRIS	TAX COMMISSIONER
1385	HART	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1386	HART	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1387	HART	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1388	HART	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1389	HART	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1390	HART	CORONER
1391	HART	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1392	HART	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1393	HART	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1394	HART	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1395	HART	PROBATE JUDGE
1396	HART	SHERIFF
1397	HART	TAX COMMISSIONER
1398	HEARD	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1399	HEARD	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1400	HEARD	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1401	HEARD	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1402	HEARD	CORONER
1403	HEARD	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIR
1404	HEARD	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1

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1405	HEARD	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1406	HEARD	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1407	HEARD	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1408	HEARD	SHERIFF
1409	HEARD	TAX COMMISSIONER
1410	HENRY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1411	HENRY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1412	HENRY	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1413	HENRY	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1414	HENRY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1415	HENRY	CORONER
1416	HENRY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1417	HENRY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1418	HENRY	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1419	HENRY	SHERIFF
1420	HENRY	SOLICITOR GENERAL
1421	HENRY	STATE COURT JUDGE 1
1422	HENRY	TAX COMMISSIONER
1423	HOUSTON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1424	HOUSTON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1425	HOUSTON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1426	HOUSTON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 7 AT LARGE
1427	HOUSTON	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1428	HOUSTON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1429	HOUSTON	CORONER
1430	HOUSTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 3
1431	HOUSTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 4
1432	HOUSTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 5
1433	HOUSTON	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1434	HOUSTON	SHERIFF
1435	HOUSTON	SOLICITOR-GENERAL
1436	HOUSTON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1437	IRWIN	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1438	IRWIN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1439	IRWIN	CORONER
1440	IRWIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1441	IRWIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1442	IRWIN	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1443	IRWIN	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1444	IRWIN	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 2
1445	IRWIN	SCHOOL BOARD, DISTRICT 4
1446	IRWIN	SHERIFF
1447	IRWIN	TAX COMMISSIONER
1448	JACKSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 1
1449	JACKSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4

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1450	JACKSON	CHAIRMAN OF BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
1451	JACKSON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1452	JACKSON	CORONER
1453	JACKSON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1454	JACKSON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1455	JACKSON	JUDGE OF MAGISTRATE COURT
1456	JACKSON	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1457	JACKSON	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
1458	JACKSON	SHERIFF
1459	JACKSON	SOLICITOR OF STATE COURT
1460	JACKSON	SURVEYOR
1461	JACKSON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1462	JASPER	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1463	JASPER	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1464	JASPER	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1465	JASPER	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1466	JASPER	CORONER
1467	JASPER	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1468	JASPER	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1469	JASPER	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1470	JASPER	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1471	JASPER	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1472	JASPER	SHERIFF
1473	JASPER	TAX COMMISSIONER
1474	JEFF DAVIS	BOARD OF EDUCATION AT LARGE
1475	JEFF DAVIS	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1476	JEFF DAVIS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1477	JEFF DAVIS	CORONER
1478	JEFF DAVIS	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1479	JEFF DAVIS	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1480	JEFF DAVIS	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1481	JEFF DAVIS	MEMBER, COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1482	JEFF DAVIS	MEMBER, COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1483	JEFF DAVIS	MEMBER, COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1484	JEFF DAVIS	SHERIFF
1485	JEFF DAVIS	TAX COMMISSIONER
1486	JEFFERSON	BOARD OF COMMISSION, CHAIRMAN
1487	JEFFERSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION - DISTRICT 2
1488	JEFFERSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION - DISTRICT 4
1489	JEFFERSON	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1490	JEFFERSON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1491	JEFFERSON	CORONER
1492	JEFFERSON	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 2
1493	JEFFERSON	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 4



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1494	JEFFERSON	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1495	JEFFERSON	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
1496	JEFFERSON	SHERIFF
1497	JEFFERSON	SOLICITOR-GENERAL
1498	JEFFERSON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1499	JENKINS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1500	JENKINS	CORONER
1501	JENKINS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 1
1502	JENKINS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 3
1503	JENKINS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 4
1504	JENKINS	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1505	JENKINS	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 1
1506	JENKINS	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 3
1507	JENKINS	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 4
1508	JENKINS	SHERIFF
1509	JENKINS	TAX COMMISSIONER
1510	JOHNSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1511	JOHNSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1512	JOHNSON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1513	JOHNSON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1514	JOHNSON	CORONER
1515	JOHNSON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1516	JOHNSON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1517	JOHNSON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1518	JOHNSON	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1519	JOHNSON	PROBATE JUDGE
1520	JOHNSON	SHERIFF
1521	JOHNSON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1522	JONES	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1523	JONES	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1524	JONES	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1525	JONES	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1526	JONES	CORONER
1527	JONES	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1528	JONES	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1529	JONES	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1530	JONES	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1531	JONES	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1532	JONES	SHERIFF
1533	JONES	TAX COMMISSIONER
1534	LAMAR	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1535	LAMAR	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1536	LAMAR	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1537	LAMAR	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1538	LAMAR	CORONER
1539	LAMAR	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3

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1540	LAMAR	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1541	LAMAR	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1542	LAMAR	SHERIFF
1543	LAMAR	TAX COMMISSIONER
1544	LANIER	BOARD OF EDUCATION, CHAIRMAN
1545	LANIER	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1546	LANIER	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1547	LANIER	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1548	LANIER	CORONER
1549	LANIER	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 3
1550	LANIER	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 4
1551	LANIER	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1552	LANIER	SHERIFF
1553	LANIER	TAX COMMISSIONER
1554	LAURENS	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1555	LAURENS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1556	LAURENS	CORONER
1557	LAURENS	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1558	LAURENS	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1559	LAURENS	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1560	LAURENS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1561	LAURENS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1562	LAURENS	PROBATE JUDGE
1563	LAURENS	SHERIFF
1564	LAURENS	TAX COMMISSIONER
1565	LEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1566	LEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1567	LEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1568	LEE	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1569	LEE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1570	LEE	CORONER
1571	LEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1572	LEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1573	LEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1574	LEE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1575	LEE	SHERIFF
1576	LEE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1577	LIBERTY	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1578	LIBERTY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1579	LIBERTY	CORONER
1580	LIBERTY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1581	LIBERTY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1582	LIBERTY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1583	LIBERTY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER CHAIRMAN
1584	LIBERTY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1585	LIBERTY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5

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1586	LIBERTY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 6
1587	LIBERTY	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1588	LIBERTY	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
1589	LIBERTY	SHERIFF
1590	LIBERTY	SOLICITOR OF STATE COURT
1591	LIBERTY	TAX COMMISSIONER
1592	LINCOLN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1593	LINCOLN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1594	LINCOLN	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1595	LINCOLN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1596	LINCOLN	CORONER
1597	LINCOLN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1598	LINCOLN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1599	LINCOLN	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1600	LINCOLN	SHERIFF
1601	LINCOLN	TAX COMMISSIONER
1602	LONG	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 1
1603	LONG	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 2
1604	LONG	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 3
1605	LONG	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 4
1606	LONG	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 5
1607	LONG	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1608	LONG	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1609	LONG	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1610	LONG	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1611	LONG	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1612	LONG	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1613	LONG	CORONER
1614	LONG	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1615	LONG	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
1616	LONG	SHERIFF
1617	LONG	TAX COMMISSIONER
1618	LOWNDES	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1619	LOWNDES	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1620	LOWNDES	CORONER
1621	LOWNDES	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1622	LOWNDES	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1623	LOWNDES	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
1624	LOWNDES	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 7
1625	LOWNDES	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
1626	LOWNDES	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1627	LOWNDES	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1628	LOWNDES	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1629	LOWNDES	SHERIFF
1630	LOWNDES	SOLICITOR GENERAL

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1631	LOWNDES	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED ELLEN GOLDEN)
1632	LOWNDES	STATE COURT JUDGE (TO SUCCEED JOHN KENT EDWARDS, JR.)
1633	LOWNDES	TAX COMMISSIONER
1634	LUMPKIN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1635	LUMPKIN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1636	LUMPKIN	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1637	LUMPKIN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1638	LUMPKIN	CORONER
1639	LUMPKIN	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
1640	LUMPKIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1641	LUMPKIN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1642	LUMPKIN	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1643	LUMPKIN	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1644	LUMPKIN	SHERIFF
1645	LUMPKIN	TAX COMMISSIONER
1646	MACON	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
1647	MACON	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 5
1648	MACON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1649	MACON	CORONER
1650	MACON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 2
1651	MACON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 4
1652	MACON	PROBATE/MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1653	MACON	SHERIFF
1654	MACON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1655	MADISON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1656	MADISON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1657	MADISON	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1658	MADISON	CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
1659	MADISON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1660	MADISON	CORONER
1661	MADISON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1662	MADISON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1663	MADISON	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1664	MADISON	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1665	MADISON	SHERIFF
1666	MADISON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1667	MARION	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 2
1668	MARION	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
1669	MARION	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 4
1670	MARION	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1671	MARION	CORONER
1672	MARION	COUNTY COMMISSIONER AT LARGE
1673	MARION	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 1
1674	MARION	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 4
1675	MARION	COUNTY SURVEYOR

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1676	MARION	JUDGE OF PROBATE/MAGISTRATE COURT
1677	MARION	SHERIFF
1678	MARION	TAX COMMISSIONER
1679	MCDUFFIE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1680	MCDUFFIE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1681	MCDUFFIE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
1682	MCDUFFIE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, SUPER DISTRICT 2
1683	MCDUFFIE	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1684	MCDUFFIE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1685	MCDUFFIE	CORONER
1686	MCDUFFIE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2, SEAT A
1687	MCDUFFIE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2, SEAT B
1688	MCDUFFIE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1689	MCDUFFIE	SHERIFF
1690	MCDUFFIE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1691	MCINTOSH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1692	MCINTOSH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1693	MCINTOSH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5 LRG
1694	MCINTOSH	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1695	MCINTOSH	CORONER
1696	MCINTOSH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1697	MCINTOSH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1698	MCINTOSH	JUDGE OF PROBATE AND MAGISTRATE COURT
1699	MCINTOSH	SHERIFF
1700	MCINTOSH	TAX COMMISSIONER
1701	MERIWETHER	CORONER
1702	MERIWETHER	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 2
1703	MERIWETHER	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 4
1704	MERIWETHER	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1705	MERIWETHER	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1706	MERIWETHER	PROBATE JUDGE
1707	MERIWETHER	SHERIFF
1708	MERIWETHER	TAX COMMISSIONER
1709	MILLER	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1710	MILLER	CORONER
1711	MILLER	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1712	MILLER	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1713	MILLER	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1714	MILLER	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1715	MILLER	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1716	MILLER	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1717	MILLER	JUDGE STATE COURT
1718	MILLER	PROBATE JUDGE
1719	MILLER	SHERIFF

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1720	MILLER	SOLICITOR GENERAL
1721	MILLER	TAX COMMISSIONER
1722	MITCHELL	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1723	MITCHELL	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1724	MITCHELL	CORONER
1725	MITCHELL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1726	MITCHELL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1727	MITCHELL	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1728	MITCHELL	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1729	MITCHELL	JUDGE OF STATE COURT
1730	MITCHELL	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1731	MITCHELL	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1732	MITCHELL	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1733	MITCHELL	MEMBER, BOARD OF EDUCATION, LRG
1734	MITCHELL	SHERIFF
1735	MITCHELL	SOLICITOR OF STATE COURT
1736	MITCHELL	TAX COMMISSIONER
1737	MONROE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1738	MONROE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1739	MONROE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 6
1740	MONROE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1741	MONROE	CORONER
1742	MONROE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, CHAIRMAN
1743	MONROE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1744	MONROE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1745	MONROE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1746	MONROE	PROBATE JUDGE
1747	MONROE	SHERIFF
1748	MONROE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1749	MONTGOMERY	BOARD OF EDUCATION - DISTRICT 1
1750	MONTGOMERY	BOARD OF EDUCATION - DISTRICT 2
1751	MONTGOMERY	BOARD OF EDUCATION - DISTRICT 3, POST 1
1752	MONTGOMERY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1753	MONTGOMERY	CORONER
1754	MONTGOMERY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER - DISTRICT 1
1755	MONTGOMERY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER - DISTRICT 2
1756	MONTGOMERY	COUNTY COMMISSIONER-DISTRICT 3, POST 1
1757	MONTGOMERY	PROBATE JUDGE
1758	MONTGOMERY	SHERIFF
1759	MONTGOMERY	TAX COMMISSIONER
1760	MORGAN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1761	MORGAN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1762	MORGAN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1763	MORGAN	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1764	MORGAN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1765	MORGAN	CORONER

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1766	MORGAN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1767	MORGAN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1768	MORGAN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1769	MORGAN	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1770	MORGAN	SHERIFF
1771	MORGAN	TAX COMMISSIONER
1772	MURRAY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1773	MURRAY	CORONER
1774	MURRAY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 1
1775	MURRAY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 2
1776	MURRAY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
1777	MURRAY	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 4
1778	MURRAY	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1779	MURRAY	JUDGE OF THE MAGISTRATE COURT POST 1
1780	MURRAY	JUDGE OF THE MAGISTRATE COURT POST 2
1781	MURRAY	SHERIFF
1782	MURRAY	SOLE COUNTY COMMISSIONER
1783	MURRAY	TAX COMMISSIONER
1784	MUSCOGEE	CORONER
1785	MUSCOGEE	COUNCIL AT-LARGE
1786	MUSCOGEE	COUNCIL DISTRICT 2
1787	MUSCOGEE	COUNCIL DISTRICT 4
1788	MUSCOGEE	COUNCIL DISTRICT 6
1789	MUSCOGEE	COUNCIL DISTRICT 8
1790	MUSCOGEE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1791	MUSCOGEE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1792	MUSCOGEE	MUNICIPAL COURT CLERK
1793	MUSCOGEE	MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE
1794	MUSCOGEE	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 1
1795	MUSCOGEE	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 3
1796	MUSCOGEE	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 5
1797	MUSCOGEE	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER DISTRICT 7
1798	MUSCOGEE	SHERIFF
1799	MUSCOGEE	SOLICITOR-GENERAL
1800	MUSCOGEE	STATE COURT JUDGE
1801	MUSCOGEE	SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
1802	MUSCOGEE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1803	NEWTON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1804	NEWTON	CORONER
1805	NEWTON	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1806	NEWTON	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1807	NEWTON	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
1808	NEWTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1809	NEWTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1810	NEWTON	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1811	NEWTON	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT

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1812	NEWTON	SHERIFF
1813	NEWTON	TAX COMMISSIONER
1814	OCONEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION CHAIR, POST 1
1815	OCONEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4
1816	OCONEE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 5
1817	OCONEE	CHAIRMAN, COUNTY COMMISSION
1818	OCONEE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1819	OCONEE	CORONER
1820	OCONEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 1
1821	OCONEE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 4
1822	OCONEE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1823	OCONEE	SHERIFF
1824	OCONEE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1825	OGLETHORPE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1826	OGLETHORPE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
1827	OGLETHORPE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1828	OGLETHORPE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1829	OGLETHORPE	COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
1830	OGLETHORPE	CORONER
1831	OGLETHORPE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1832	OGLETHORPE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1833	OGLETHORPE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1834	OGLETHORPE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1835	OGLETHORPE	SHERIFF
1836	OGLETHORPE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1837	PAULDING	CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1838	PAULDING	COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
1839	PAULDING	CORONER
1840	PAULDING	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 1
1841	PAULDING	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1842	PAULDING	PROBATE JUDGE
1843	PAULDING	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 1
1844	PAULDING	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 3
1845	PAULDING	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 4
1846	PAULDING	SCHOOL MEMBER BOARD AT LARGE
1847	PAULDING	SHERIFF
1848	PAULDING	SUPERIOR COURT CLERK
1849	PAULDING	TAX COMMISSIONER
1850	PEACH	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1851	PEACH	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1852	PEACH	CORONER
1853	PEACH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER - AT LARGE
1854	PEACH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER POST 1
1855	PEACH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER POST 3
1856	PEACH	PROBATE JUDGE
1857	PEACH	SCHOOL BOARD POST 1



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1858	PEACH	SCHOOL BOARD POST 3
1859	PEACH	SHERIFF
1860	PEACH	TAX COMMISSIONER
1861	PICKENS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 1
1862	PICKENS	BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4
1863	PICKENS	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1864	PICKENS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1865	PICKENS	CORONER
1866	PICKENS	COUNTY COMMISSION, CHAIRMAN
1867	PICKENS	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1868	PICKENS	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1869	PICKENS	SHERIFF
1870	PICKENS	TAX COMMISSIONER
1871	PIERCE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1
1872	PIERCE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1873	PIERCE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1874	PIERCE	CORONER
1875	PIERCE	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 1
1876	PIERCE	COUNTY COMMISSION, DISTRICT 3
1877	PIERCE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1878	PIERCE	PROBATE JUDGE
1879	PIERCE	SHERIFF
1880	PIERCE	SURVEYOR
1881	PIERCE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1882	PIKE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1883	PIKE	CORONER
1884	PIKE	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN
1885	PIKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1886	PIKE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1887	PIKE	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1888	PIKE	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1889	PIKE	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 3
1890	PIKE	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 4
1891	PIKE	SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 5
1892	PIKE	SHERIFF
1893	PIKE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1894	POLK	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
1895	POLK	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 5
1896	POLK	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 6
1897	POLK	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1898	POLK	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1899	POLK	CORONER
1900	POLK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 1
1901	POLK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 2
1902	POLK	COUNTY COMMISSIONER DISTRICT 3
1903	POLK	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT

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1904	POLK	SHERIFF
1905	POLK	TAX COMMISSIONER
1906	PULASKI	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
1907	PULASKI	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 4
1908	PULASKI	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 7
1909	PULASKI	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1910	PULASKI	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1911	PULASKI	CORONER
1912	PULASKI	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1913	PULASKI	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1914	PULASKI	SHERIFF
1915	PULASKI	SOLE COMMISSIONER
1916	PULASKI	TAX COMMISSIONER
1917	PUTNAM	BOARD OF COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1918	PUTNAM	BOARD OF COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1919	PUTNAM	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1920	PUTNAM	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1921	PUTNAM	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 5
1922	PUTNAM	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1923	PUTNAM	CORONER
1924	PUTNAM	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1925	PUTNAM	SHERIFF
1926	PUTNAM	TAX COMMISSIONER
1927	QUITMAN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, CHAIRPERSON
1928	QUITMAN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 1, POST 2
1929	QUITMAN	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2, POST 1
1930	QUITMAN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1931	QUITMAN	CORONER
1932	QUITMAN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 1
1933	QUITMAN	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 2
1934	QUITMAN	PROBATE JUDGE
1935	QUITMAN	SHERIFF
1936	QUITMAN	TAX COMMISSIONER
1937	RABUN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1938	RABUN	CORONER
1939	RABUN	COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER, POST 1
1940	RABUN	COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER, POST 2
1941	RABUN	COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONER, POST 3
1942	RABUN	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 2
1943	RABUN	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4
1944	RABUN	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 5
1945	RABUN	COUNTY SURVEYOR
1946	RABUN	PROBATE JUDGE
1947	RABUN	SHERIFF
1948	RABUN	TAX COMMISSIONER
1949	RANDOLPH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2

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1950	RANDOLPH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 3
1951	RANDOLPH	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
1952	RANDOLPH	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1953	RANDOLPH	CORONER
1954	RANDOLPH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 2
1955	RANDOLPH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1956	RANDOLPH	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
1957	RANDOLPH	MAGISTRATE JUDGE
1958	RANDOLPH	PROBATE JUDGE
1959	RANDOLPH	SHERIFF
1960	RANDOLPH	TAX COMMISSIONER
1961	RICHMOND	AUGUSTA COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1
1962	RICHMOND	AUGUSTA COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
1963	RICHMOND	AUGUSTA COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
1964	RICHMOND	AUGUSTA COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 7
1965	RICHMOND	AUGUSTA COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 9
1966	RICHMOND	CHIEF JUDGE, CIVIL AND MAGISTRATE COURT
1967	RICHMOND	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1968	RICHMOND	CORONER
1969	RICHMOND	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
1970	RICHMOND	JUDGE OF THE STATE COURT OF RICHMOND COUNTY (TO SUCCEED KELLIE MCINTYRE)
1971	RICHMOND	JUDGE OF THE STATE COURT OF RICHMOND COUNTY (TO SUCCEED PATRICIA BOOKER)
1972	RICHMOND	MARSHAL OF CIVIL AND MAGISTRATE COURT OF RICHMOND COUNTY
1973	RICHMOND	PRESIDING JUDGE, CIVIL AND MAGISTRATE COURT
1974	RICHMOND	SHERIFF
1975	RICHMOND	SOLICITOR-GENERAL
1976	RICHMOND	TAX COMMISSIONER
1977	ROCKDALE	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
1978	ROCKDALE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1979	ROCKDALE	CORONER
1980	ROCKDALE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 1
1981	ROCKDALE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 2
1982	ROCKDALE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 3
1983	ROCKDALE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 4
1984	ROCKDALE	COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, POST 5
1985	ROCKDALE	COUNTY COMMISSION CHAIR
1986	ROCKDALE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, POST 1
1987	ROCKDALE	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF ROCKDALE COUNTY
1988	ROCKDALE	JUDGE OF THE PROBATE COURT
1989	ROCKDALE	SHERIFF
1990	ROCKDALE	TAX COMMISSIONER
1991	SCHLEY	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS - AT LARGE
1992	SCHLEY	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 2

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1993	SCHLEY	BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 3
1994	SCHLEY	BOARD OF EDUCATION AT LARGE
1995	SCHLEY	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 2
1996	SCHLEY	BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
1997	SCHLEY	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
1998	SCHLEY	CORONER
1999	SCHLEY	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT
2000	SCHLEY	SHERIFF
2001	SCHLEY	TAX COMMISSIONER
2002	SCREVEN	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT OF SCREVEN COUNTY
2003	SCREVEN	CORONER OF SCREVEN COUNTY
2004	SCREVEN	JUDGE OF MAGISTRATE COURT OF SCREVEN COUNTY
2005	SCREVEN	JUDGE OF PROBATE COURT OF SCREVEN COUNTY
2006	SCREVEN	JUDGE OF STATE COURT OF SCREVEN COUNTY
2007	SCREVEN	MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 2
2008	SCREVEN	MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 3
2009	SCREVEN	MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 5
2010	SCREVEN	MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS DISTRICT 6
2011	SCREVEN	MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 2
2012	SCREVEN	MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 3
2013	SCREVEN	MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 5
2014	SCREVEN	MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION DISTRICT 6
2015	SCREVEN	SHERIFF OF SCREVEN COUNTY
2016	SCREVEN	STATE COURT SOLICITOR
2017	SCREVEN	TAX COMMISSIONER OF SCREVEN COUNTY
2018	SEMINOLE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
2019	SEMINOLE	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
2020	SEMINOLE	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
2021	SEMINOLE	CORONER
2022	SEMINOLE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
2023	SEMINOLE	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 5
2024	SEMINOLE	COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, DISTRICT 1
2025	SEMINOLE	PROBATE JUDGE
2026	SEMINOLE	SHERIFF
2027	SEMINOLE	TAX COMMISSIONER
2028	SPALDING	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 2
2029	SPALDING	BOARD OF EDUCATION, DISTRICT 4
2030	SPALDING	CHIEF MAGISTRATE
2031	SPALDING	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT
2032	SPALDING	CORONER
2033	SPALDING	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 1

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2034	SPALDING	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 3
2035	SPALDING	COUNTY COMMISSIONER, DISTRICT 4
2036	SPALDING	PROBATE JUDGE
2037	SPALDING	SHERIFF
2038	SPALDING	STATE COURT JUDGE
2039	SPALDING	TAX COMMISSIONER
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2488	STEPHENS	TAX COMMISSIONER
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2526	TALIAFERRO	SHERIFF
2527	TALIAFERRO	TAX COMMISSIONER
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2658	TROUP	SOLICITOR GENERAL
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2677	TWIGGS	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT

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2722	WALKER	SHERIFF
2723	WALKER	STATE COURT JUDGE

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2726	WALKER	TAX COMMISSIONER
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2769	WASHINGTON	CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT

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2872	WORTH	SOLICITOR GENERAL
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## **Exhibit B**



**RULES  
OF  
STATE ELECTION BOARD**

**CHAPTER 183-1  
GEORGIA ELECTION CODE**

**SUBJECT 183-1-14  
ABSENTEE VOTING**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

183-1-14-0.6-.14 Secure Absentee Ballot Drop Boxes

**RULE 183-1-14-0.6-.14 Secure Absentee Ballot Drop Boxes**

(1) For the Elections held on June 9, 2020, County registrars are authorized to establish one or more drop box locations as a means for absentee by mail electors to deliver their ballots to the county registrars. Placing a voted absentee ballot into the drop box shall be deemed delivery pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 21-2-385 and is subject to the limitations on who may deliver a ballot on behalf of an elector.

(2) A drop box shall only be located on county or municipal government property generally accessible to the public.

(3) Drop box locations may open beginning 49 days before Election Day and shall close at 7:00 p.m. on Election Day. On Election Day, every drop box shall be closed and ballots collected at 7:00 p.m. Counties shall provide notice of the location of each drop box by posting such information on the home page of the county election website no later than the day the drop boxes are placed in a location.

(4) Drop box locations must have adequate lighting and use a video recording device to monitor each drop box location. The video recording device must either continuously record the drop box location or use motion detection that records one frame, or more, per minute until detection of motion triggers continuous recording.

(5) Video recordings of the drop box locations must be retained by the county registrars for 30 days after the final certification of the election, or until conclusion of any contest involving an election on the ballot in the county jurisdiction, whichever is later, and shall be made available to Secretary of State investigators upon request.

(6) A drop box shall be constructed of durable material able to withstand vandalism and inclement weather. The opening slot of a drop box shall not allow ballots to be tampered with or removed and shall be designed to minimize the ability for liquid to be poured into the drop box or rain water to seep in.

(7) A drop box shall be securely fastened to the ground or an immovable fixture.

(8) If the drop box utilizes a drop-slot into a building, the ballots must drop into a locked container, and both the drop-slot and the container must be monitored by video recording devices.

(9) A drop box shall be clearly labeled “OFFICIAL ABSENTEE BALLOT DROP BOX”. Each drop box location shall clearly display signage developed by the Secretary of State regarding Georgia law related to absentee ballot harvesting and destroying, defacing, or delaying delivery of ballots.

(10) The county registrars must arrange for collection of the ballots from each drop box location at least once every 24 hours. On Election Day, every drop box shall be closed and ballots collected at 7:00 p.m. Collection of ballots from a drop box must be made by a team of at least two people. Any person collecting ballots from a drop box must have sworn an oath in the same form as the oath for poll officers set forth in O.C.G.A. § 21-2-95. The collection team shall complete and sign a ballot transfer form upon removing the ballots from the drop box, which shall include the date, time, location and number of ballots. The ballots from the drop box shall be immediately transported to the county registrar and processed and stored in the same manner as absentee ballots returned by mail are processed and stored. The county registrar or a designee thereof shall sign the ballot transfer form upon receipt of the ballots from the collection team.

Authority: O.C.G.A. § 21-2-31

## **Exhibit C**



# THE STATE OF GEORGIA

## EXECUTIVE ORDER

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BY THE GOVERNOR:

### DECLARATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH STATE OF EMERGENCY

- WHEREAS:** In late 2019, a new and significant outbreak of respiratory disease caused by a novel coronavirus emerged in Wuhan, China; and
- WHEREAS:** The respiratory disease caused by the novel coronavirus, known as "COVID-19," is an infectious virus that can spread from person-to-person and can result in serious illness or death; and
- WHEREAS:** On March 13, 2020, President Donald Trump declared the outbreak of COVID-19 a national emergency; and
- WHEREAS:** The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has identified the potential public health threat posed by COVID-19 both globally and in the United States, and has advised that the person-to-person spread of COVID-19 will continue to occur globally, including within the United States; and
- WHEREAS:** The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has noted that COVID-19 is proliferating via "community spread," meaning people have contracted the virus in areas of Georgia as a result of direct or indirect contact with infected persons, including some who are not sure how or where they became infected; and
- WHEREAS:** Laboratory testing has confirmed more than sixty cases of COVID-19 in Georgia; and
- WHEREAS:** In consultation with the Commissioner of Public Health, the Georgia Coronavirus Task Force, and other state health and emergency preparedness officials, I have determined a public health emergency exists, and that it is necessary and appropriate to take action to protect the health, safety, and welfare of Georgia's residents and visitors to ensure COVID-19 remains controlled throughout this State, as provided by Code Section 38-3-51; and
- WHEREAS:** The uninterrupted supply of medical goods and other emergency related materials, supplies, goods, and services during this

emergency is an essential need of the public and any perceived or actual shortage threatens public welfare; and

**WHEREAS:** The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§ 390 *et seq.*, prescribes limits on the hours of service for operators of commercial vehicles, and federal law, 23 U.S.C. § 127, sets forth certain weight limitations for vehicles on interstate highways; and

**WHEREAS:** 49 C.F.R. § 390.23 allows the Governor of a state to suspend these rules and regulations for commercial vehicles responding to an emergency for up to thirty (30) days, if the Governor determines an emergency condition exists.

**NOW, THEREFORE, PURSUANT TO CODE SECTION 38-3-51, AND THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, IT IS HEREBY**

**ORDERED:** That a Public Health State of Emergency exists in the State of Georgia due to the public health emergency from the spread of COVID-19.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That all resources of the State of Georgia shall be made available to assist in activities designed to address this emergency, control the spread of COVID-19, and aid recovery efforts.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency shall activate the Georgia Emergency Operations Plan (GEOP) in response to this emergency.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That the Georgia Department of Public Health, as the state agency responsible for emergency management services under *GEOP Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8 - Public Health and Medical Services*, shall coordinate with the Center for Disease Control and Prevention for release of the Strategic National Stockpile as necessary and appropriate in response to this Public Health State of Emergency.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency is designated as the lead agency for responding to this public health emergency and shall coordinate all emergency response activities and other matters pertaining to this Public Health State of Emergency.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That acting pursuant to the Governor's authorization, the Georgia Department of Public Health shall coordinate with the Georgia Emergency Management and Homeland Security Agency to take any action necessary to protect the public's health, including, without limitation:

- (1) Planning and executing public health emergency assessments, mitigation, preparedness response, and recovery for the state;
- (2) Coordinating public health emergency responses between state and local authorities;
- (3) Establishing protocols to control the spread of COVID-19;
- (4) Coordinating recovery operations and mitigation initiatives;
- (5) Collaborating with appropriate federal government authorities, elected officials of other states, private organizations, or private sector companies;
- (6) Organizing public information activities regarding the state's public health emergency response operations, including educating the public on prevention of the spread of COVID-19 based on Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's guidelines and the best scientific evidence available;
- (7) Providing special identification for public health personnel involved in this Public Health State of Emergency;
- (8) For all persons meeting the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's definition of a Person Under Investigation ("PUI"), implementing a program of active monitoring, which may include a risk assessment within twenty-four (24) hours of learning that the person meets the PUI criteria and twice-daily temperature checks for a period of at least fourteen (14) days or until the PUI tests negative for COVID-19; and
- (9) Implementing quarantine, isolation, and other necessary public health interventions consistent with Code Sections 31-12-4 and 38-3-51(i)(2) or as otherwise authorized by law.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That all state and local authorities as well as public and private hospitals, healthcare facilities, clinics, and medical personnel shall fully comply with orders by the Governor as authorized by Georgia law, in furtherance of this Order.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** The Georgia Composite Medical Board is authorized to grant temporary licenses to physicians who apply for a temporary medical license and are currently licensed as a physician in good standing by equivalent boards in other states to assist with the needs of this public health emergency.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** The Georgia Board of Nursing is authorized to grant temporary licenses to nurses who apply for a temporary license and are currently licensed in good standing as an Advanced Practice Registered Nurse, Licensed Practical Nurse, or Registered Professional Nurse by an equivalent board in another state to assist with the needs of this public health emergency.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That in accordance with 49 C.F.R. 390.23(a)(1)(i)(A), the federal rules and regulations limiting hours operators of commercial vehicles may drive are suspended to ensure that carrier crews are available as needed to provide emergency relief. This declared emergency justifies a suspension of Part 395 (driver's hours of service) of Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The suspension will remain in effect for thirty (30) days from the date of this Order or until the emergency condition ceases to exist, whichever is less.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That no motor carrier operating under the terms of this emergency declaration will require or allow an ill or fatigued driver to operate a motor vehicle. A driver who notifies a motor vehicle carrier that he or she needs immediate rest will be given at least ten (10) consecutive hours off-duty before being required to return to service.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That weight, height, and length for any such vehicle traveling through the State of Georgia for the purposes of providing disaster relief and/or preparation, which traverses roadways maintained by the State of Georgia, shall not exceed the following:

- (1) A maximum gross vehicle weight for vehicles equipped with five (5) weight bearing axles, with an outer bridge span of not less than fifty-one (51) feet, shall not exceed a gross vehicle weight of ninety-five (95) thousand pounds, a maximum width of ten (10) feet and an overall length of one hundred (100) feet. Continuous travel is authorized, with the proper escorts.
- (2) If the width of said vehicle exceeds eight (8) feet six (6) inches and is traveling after daylight, defined as thirty (30) minutes before sunset to thirty (30) minutes after sunrise, the transporter is required to have a vehicle front and a rear escort/amber light when traveling on a two lane roadway and a vehicle rear escort when traveling on a four lane highway.

Transporters are responsible for ensuring they have proper oversize signs, markings, flags, and escorts as defined in the Georgia Department of Transportation Rules and Regulations.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That commercial vehicles operating outside the normal weight, height, and length restrictions under the authority of this Executive Order shall be issued permits by the Georgia Department of Public Safety. Said vehicles shall be subject to any special conditions the Georgia Department of Public Safety may list on applicable permits. Nothing in this Executive Order shall be construed to allow any vehicle to exceed weight limits posted for bridges and like structures, nor shall anything in this Executive Order be construed to relieve compliance with restrictions other than those specified in this Executive Order or from any statute, rule, order or other legal requirement not specifically waived herein. Oversize permits may be issued by the Georgia Department of Public Safety, Motor Carrier Compliance Division, during normal business hours, Monday through Friday by calling 404-624-7700 or through the Georgia Permitting and Routing Optimization System online portal at <https://gapros.dot.ga.gov/>.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That during preparation, response, and recovery activities for this Public Health Emergency, price gouging of goods and services necessary to support Public Health would be detrimental to the social and economic welfare of the citizens of this State, and thus Code Section 10-1-393.4, prohibiting price gouging, remains in effect.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That pursuant to Code Section 38-3-51(a), the General Assembly shall convene for a special session, beginning on March 16, 2020, at 8:00 A.M. for the purpose of concurring with or terminating this Public Health State of Emergency.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That the State of Emergency shall terminate on April 13, 2020, at 11:59 P.M., unless it is renewed by the Governor.

This 14<sup>th</sup> day of March 2020, at 10:15 A.M.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
GOVERNOR



## **Exhibit D**



# THE STATE OF GEORGIA

## EXECUTIVE ORDER

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### BY THE GOVERNOR:

- WHEREAS:** On March 14, 2020, due to the impact of COVID-19 on the State of Georgia, I issued Executive Order No. 03.14.20.01, declaring a Public Health State of Emergency in Georgia; and
- WHEREAS:** The Georgia General Assembly concurred with Executive Order 03.14.20.01 by joint resolution on March 16, 2020; and
- WHEREAS:** The number of COVID-19 cases in Georgia continues to rise; and
- WHEREAS:** The Georgia Department of Public Health has determined that COVID-19 is spreading throughout communities, requiring the implementation of certain restrictions to limit the spread; and
- WHEREAS:** The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has determined that older adults and people of any age who have serious underlying medical conditions may be at higher risk for more serious complications from COVID-19; and
- WHEREAS:** Code Section 38-3-51(c)(4) vests the Governor with the power to perform and exercise such other functions, powers, and duties as may be deemed necessary to promote and secure the safety and protection of the civilian population; and
- WHEREAS:** Code Section 38-3-51(d)(1) vests the Governor with the power to suspend any regulatory statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state business, or the orders, rules, or regulations of any state agency if strict compliance with any statute, order, rule, or regulation would in any way prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action in coping with the emergency or disaster; and
- WHEREAS:** Code Sections 31-2A-4 and 31-12-4 vest the Department of Public Health with the power to segregate and isolate individuals with certain communicable diseases or conditions when said individuals' exposure to the general population is likely to endanger the health of others; and

**WHEREAS:** In consultation with the Governor's Coronavirus Task Force and health and emergency preparedness officials, I have determined that the following temporary actions are necessary and appropriate to protect the health, safety, and welfare of Georgia's residents and visitors.

**NOW, THEREFORE, PURSUANT TO THE AFOREMENTIONED GEORGIA LAW AND THE AUTHORITY VESTED IN ME AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, IT IS HEREBY**

**ORDERED:** That the Department of Public Health shall order certain persons within the State of Georgia who have serious underlying conditions likely to cause an increased spread of COVID-19, if such persons were to become infected, to isolate, quarantine, or shelter in place within their homes or place of residence. This order by the Department of Public Health shall include the following populations within the State:

- (1) Those persons who live in a nursing home or long-term care facility;
- (2) Those persons who have chronic lung disease;
- (3) Those persons who are currently undergoing cancer treatment; and
- (4) Those persons included in Department of Public Health Administrative Order 03.22.20.01.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That the Department of Public Health shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to effectuate this Order, including provisions to allow persons quarantined, isolated, or sheltered in place according to this Order to seek essential services, make necessary travel, and receive specific visitors in end-of-life circumstances.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That all businesses which possess a license to operate as or otherwise meet the definition of "Bar" as defined by Code Section 3-1-2(2.1) shall cease operation while this Order is in effect.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That no business, establishment, corporation, non-profit corporation, or organization shall allow more than ten (10) persons to be gathered at a single location if such gathering requires persons to stand or to be seated within six (6) feet of any other person.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That the Department of Public Health is authorized to mandate the closure of any business, establishment, corporation, non-profit

corporation, or organization not in compliance with this order for a period not to extend beyond the term of this Order.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall provide available resources to assist in the enforcement of this Order.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That in order to mitigate the possibility of more severe action in the future, the Department of Public Health, in accordance with Code Section 38-3-51(i)(1)(E), shall undertake a public information activities to encourage organizations and businesses to protect the public by adhering to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines for preventing the spread of the novel coronavirus, COVID-19. The public information campaign shall encourage businesses to undertake more extensive sanitation efforts, to encourage curbside pick-up or home delivery of purchased items, to limit personal interaction during transactions, and to limit the number of persons within their place of business.


**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** That if one or more of the provisions contained in this Order shall be held to be invalid, in violation of the Georgia Constitution, in violation of Georgia law, or unenforceable in any respect, such invalidity, violation, or unenforceability shall not affect any other provisions of this Order, but, in such case, this Order shall be construed as if such invalid, illegal, or unenforceable provision had never been contained within the Order.

**IT IS FURTHER**

**ORDERED:** All provisions of the Order shall become effective for a period of fourteen days, beginning at 12:00 P.M. on Tuesday, March 24, 2020, and expiring at 12:00 P.M. on Monday, April 6, 2020.

This 23<sup>rd</sup> day of March 2020, at 5:58 P.M.



GOVERNOR

## **Exhibit E**

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
ATLANTA DIVISION**

BLACK VOTERS MATTER FUND, )  
and MEGAN GORDON, on behalf of )  
herself and all others similarly )  
situated, )

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his )  
official capacity as Secretary of State )  
of the State of Georgia, and DEKALB )  
BOARD OF REGISTRATION & )  
ELECTIONS, and all others similarly )  
Situating, )

Defendant. )

CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:20-CV-1489-AT

**DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY  
OF STEPHANIE BECK**

1. I am over the age of majority, of sound mind, and otherwise qualified to make this Declaration based upon my own personal knowledge. This Declaration is offered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 in support of Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger's ("Defendant" or "Secretary") Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction in the above-captioned matter.
2. I am employed by the State of Georgia, and I am a Deputy Director at the Governor's Office of Planning and Budget ("OPB"). The duties of OPB include: preparing the State budget, revenue and expenditure forecasting, providing budget analysis, and working with other constitutional officers and executive branch agencies, including the Office of Secretary of State,

regarding their budget requests and implementation of the appropriations acts passed by the General Assembly.

3. The State operates on a fiscal year that commences on July 1 of each year.
4. During the 2020 legislative session, the General Assembly revised the 2020 budget, which the General Assembly first passed last year. The revised budget, which funds State government through June 30, 2020, is known as the “Amended Budget.” The General Assembly has not yet passed the Fiscal Year 2021 budget (the “2021 Budget”).
5. State budgets are based on revenue estimates, and the General Assembly is prohibited from appropriating funds that exceed the revenue estimates set by the Governor.
6. Because Georgia has a constitutional requirement to balance the State budget, it cannot engage in deficit spending. Consequently, budget priorities frequently compete in a zero-sum environment: every dollar spent on healthcare, for example, is a dollar that cannot be spent on education, elections, or other priorities.
7. Due to declining State revenues before the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic and, excluding reserve funds that were utilized to combat the pandemic, the Amended Budget reflects less state revenues than the budget that passed the General Assembly in 2019.
8. The pandemic’s economic impact cannot be understated, and it negatively impacts State budgets in two ways. First, the slower economy generates less revenue for the State Treasury. Second, many of these same factors also lead to increased enrollment in public assistance programs. Put simply, the State will be required to provide much more with far less.

9. Current projections indicate that the State will likely and simultaneously be forced to cut overall spending (beyond those already in the Amended Budget) and dramatically increase healthcare expenditures.
10. Indeed, it is anticipated that the Coronavirus's negative impact on the State revenues will likely exceed that of the Great Recession of 2008. At the same time, it is equally true that spending on healthcare related matters is anticipated to increase. Put simply, the Amended Budget does not include State funds to pay the cost of postage for every absentee ballot in the general primary and any runoff elections. It will also be difficult to provide postage for absentee ballots in the 2020 general election and any potential runoffs.


I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on April 20, 2020.

Stephanie Beck  
[Stephanie Beck]  
[Deputy Director]



## **Exhibit F**


[Statewide Results](#)
[Results by County](#)

**General Election**  
**November 8, 2016**

**Registered Voters:** 5,443,046

**Ballots Cast:** 4,165,405

**Voter Turnout:** 76.53 %

**Counties Partially Reported:** 0 of 159  
**Counties Completely Reported:** 159 of 159

**Website last updated** 12/1/2016 2:06:22 PM EST

**OFFICIAL RESULTS**  
**Provisional ballots are included**

[Summary](#) > Vote type summary

<b>President of the United States</b>						
<b>Choice</b>	<b>Election Day</b>	<b>Absentee by Mail</b>	<b>Advance in Person</b>	<b>Provisional</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Percent</b>
DONALD J. TRUMP (REP)	863,089	102,766	1,120,743	2,506	2,089,104	51.05%
HILLARY CLINTON (DEM)	753,766	98,417	1,020,966	4,814	1,877,963	45.89%
GARY JOHNSON (LIB)	69,198	6,533	49,249	326	125,306	3.06%

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## **Exhibit G**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA  
ATLANTA DIVISION

FAIR FIGHT ACTION, INC., *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, *et al.*,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.

1:18-CV-5391-SCJ

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction concerning the State of Georgia's recent voter list maintenance activities in which the status of a large number of Georgia voters on the State's inactive elector list was changed to cancelled status. Doc. No. [159].<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs use the words "removed" and "purged" throughout their arguments. However, Defendants have presented evidence and assert that the use of these words to describe the present circumstances is not correct, because no voter is ever removed from the voter rolls. In the process of voter list maintenance (which is permitted under applicable federal law, specifically the National Voter Registration Act, "NVRA," 52 U.S.C. § 20501, *et al.*), the affected voter's

According to a press release from the Secretary of State's Office, the list was comprised of 313,243 inactive voters.<sup>2</sup> Of these 313,243, there were 108,306, who had filed a change of address request with the United States Postal Service showing they have moved to a different county or state and 84,376, who had election mail returned as undeliverable, totaling 192,682. For purposes of the pending motion, Plaintiffs are not contesting the cancellation of the registrations of these 192,682 voters. It is the remaining 120,561 voters (defined as having had no contact with their county election officials since January 1, 2012 and did not respond to two notices), which are at issue. Subsequent to the filing of Plaintiffs' motion, the Secretary of State returned 22,000 of the 120,561 voters to the voting roll (after review of Plaintiffs' briefing

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status is changed from inactive to cancelled, which means that the voter is no longer eligible to vote. Doc. No. [172], p. 10, n.6 (citing Harvey Dec. ¶ 5). Notwithstanding Defendants' argument, the Court recognizes that the applicable Georgia statute utilizes the word "removed." See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-235(b) ("the elector shall be *removed* from the inactive list of electors.") (emphasis added).

<sup>2</sup> [https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/georgia\\_secretary\\_of\\_states\\_office\\_cleans\\_voter\\_file\\_by\\_4\\_as\\_required\\_by\\_law](https://sos.ga.gov/index.php/elections/georgia_secretary_of_states_office_cleans_voter_file_by_4_as_required_by_law) (last visited Dec. 23, 2019); see also Defs. Hearing Ex. 1 (Dec. 19, 2019).

and based upon the definition of a calendar year). Thus, it is now approximately 98,000 voters that are at issue.<sup>3</sup>

## **I. BACKGROUND<sup>4</sup>**

In 2018, Plaintiffs Fair Fight Action, Inc. (“Fair Fight Action”), Care in Action, Inc. (“Care in Action”), Ebenezer Baptist Church of Atlanta, Georgia, Inc. (“Ebenezer”), Baconton Missionary Baptist Church, Inc. (“Baconton”), Virginia-Highland Church, Inc. (“Virginia-Highland”), and The Sixth Episcopal District, Inc. (“Sixth Episcopal District”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) sued Defendants Brad Raffensperger (in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Georgia and as Chair of the State Election Board of Georgia), Members of the State Election Board in their official capacities (Rebecca N. Sullivan, David J. Worley, and Seth Harp), and the State Election

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<sup>3</sup> At the December 16, 2019 hearing, Defense Counsel indicated that there were about 50,000 of these individuals who would have been canceled under Plaintiffs’ interpretation of the law. However, Plaintiffs state that this number is incorrect and was probably based on the misunderstanding as to the calendar year for purposes of counting inactivity. Plaintiffs expert also explained that other corrections were also made by the Secretary of State based on a data transfer issue. See Dec. 19, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 27:7-10.

<sup>4</sup> All citations are to the electronic docket unless otherwise noted, and all page numbers are those imprinted by the Court’s docketing software.

Board (collectively, the “Defendants”), alleging that there are “serious and unconstitutional flaws in Georgia’s elections process” and that Defendants’ actions have “deprived Georgia citizens . . . particularly citizens of color, of their fundamental right to vote.” Doc. No. [41], ¶ 2. More specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants enforced unconstitutional and otherwise unlawful legislation, such as O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234, which Plaintiffs refer to as “Use it or Lose it” and Defendants characterize as voter list maintenance.<sup>5</sup>

At the time of the filing of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit, Georgia’s statutory voter list maintenance authority was found in O.C.G.A. §§ 21-2-234 and 235 and required the Secretary of State to send a postcard to voters with whom there had been “no contact” for *three* calendar years. If the voter failed to return the postcard, the voter’s status was changed to “inactive.” If the voter still did not vote in the next two general elections, he or she was removed from the registration rolls (or as Defendants’ assert, the registration status was changed to cancelled).

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<sup>5</sup> Plaintiffs also refer to the statute as “voter list purge,” which as stated above, Defendants have presented evidence showing that this is an inaccurate description. See n.1, *supra*.

During the 2019 Legislative Session, the Georgia General Assembly passed House Bill 316 (“HB 316”). HB 316, which was signed into law by the Governor on April 2, 2019, amends the Georgia Election Code to, among other things, provide for more notice under Georgia’s voter-list-maintenance process. HB 316 amended O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234 to mandate that the Secretary of State cannot remove voters from registrations rolls unless there has been “no contact” with them for *five* calendar years—as opposed to the previous *three* calendar years. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234(a)(2). HB 316 also amended O.C.G.A. § 21-2-234 to require notice to the voter not less than thirty days but no more than sixty days prior to the cancellation of the voter’s registration. Id. § 235(b).

The approximately 98,000 voters presently at issue are the voters who were placed on the inactive list (for no contact) under the prior statutory provision of three years “no contact” and prior to the enactment of HB 316’s five year “no contact” provisions. Defendants do not see HB 316 as retroactive or “backward” looking and have subjected the voters at issue to voter registration cancellation, even though they had less than five calendar years of no contact prior to being placed on the inactive elector list. Doc. No. [159-2], p. 11.



In Count IV of their Complaint, *as amended*, Plaintiffs allege that Georgia's voter-list-maintenance process violates Georgia voters' rights to procedural Due Process under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Doc. No. [41], ¶¶ 69–81, 205. The Complaint further states: “[t]he “use it or lose it” statute, as well as its enforcement by Defendants, unlawfully disenfranchise voters or severely burden their right to vote by penalizing voters based on their voting choices, providing voters inadequate notice, and failing to ameliorate the [registration cancellations] by offering same-day registration.” *Id.* ¶ 77.

On December 16, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction in which they seek to enjoin Defendants from canceling the voter registrations of 98,561 “inactive” voters. Doc. No. [159].<sup>6</sup> The Court held a hearing on the same date. During this hearing, Defense Counsel indicated that the “nuclear silo start process” began

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<sup>6</sup> Plaintiffs indicated at the hearing that a supplemental pleading was unnecessary to address the recent circumstances presented in their motion. However, the Court finds that because the events at issue happened after the filing of the complaint, the better practice is to supplement the complaint. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (“On motion and reasonable notice, the court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.”).

on September 24, 2019 and the system completes the program on December 16, 2019, without anyone taking an action to “push the button,” to complete the process. Counsel also indicated that undoing the coding to stop the process, was challenging because there were other categories of cancellation in the program (besides the active voter cancellation). Counsel further indicated that if the already-running automated list maintenance process were stopped, the process becomes manual, which introduces the possibility for human error. Counsel also indicated that the State of Georgia was already within the ninety-day federal statutory timeline in which it could perform list maintenance and stopping the process would render the State of Georgia not being able to perform list maintenance again until the year 2021. Counsel further indicated that it is easier to reinstate the voters rather than stop the ongoing automated process, because the voter registrations could be restored in an overnight, twenty-four to forty-eight-hour process.

The Court declined to grant an emergency restraining order, finding the absence of imminent irreparable injury, based in large part on Defense Counsel’s representation as to the ease of ability to restore the registrations of the voters at issue within twenty-four to forty-eight hours. Doc. No. [164].

The parties thereafter briefed the preliminary injunction portion of the motion (Doc. Nos. [172] and [177]) and the Court held a second hearing on December 19, 2019. Doc. No. [180]. As stated above, in the interim time period between the emergency December 16, 2019 hearing and the December 19, 2019 preliminary injunction hearing, Defendants returned approximately 22,000 Georgia voters to the voter roll by changing their status from cancelled to inactive status. During the December 19, 2019 hearing, the parties presented testimony (from expert witness, Dr. Michael McDonald and Georgia Elections Director, Chris Harvey) and exhibits. Doc. Nos. [180], [181].

Post-hearing, the Court posed two additional questions to the parties, concerning the asserted injury and state interests.<sup>7</sup> The parties submitted their responses on December 23, 2019. Doc. Nos. [184], [185].

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<sup>7</sup> The Court's exact questions are as follows:

The Court notes the parties' different statutory interpretations of HB 316.

Pursuant to Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 779 (1983), the Court must consider "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendment that the plaintiff[s] seek[] to vindicate." Id. at 789. The Court asks Plaintiffs to address the following question: What is the precise injury that will be suffered by the

This matter is now ripe for review.

## II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court considers four factors when deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65: (1) whether there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the complaint;<sup>8</sup> (2) whether the preliminary injunction is necessary to prevent

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approximately 120,000 people at issue here if this preliminary injunction is denied?

Additionally, pursuant to Anderson, the State must put forward “precise interests” as “justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” Id. at 789. “[T]he Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of those interests, it must also consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.” Id. The Court asks Defendants to address the following question: Notwithstanding its Eleventh Amendment argument, what interest does the State have in applying its interpretation of H.B. 316 to the approximately 120,000 people at issue here?

<sup>8</sup> It appears to the Court that Plaintiffs are arguing the likelihood of success on the merits of their motion for preliminary injunction; however, the Court’s review of applicable authority indicates that the standard involves likelihood of success on the merits of the *complaint*. See Forsyth Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 633 F.3d 1032, 1042 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[t]he County failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its complaint.”); Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2013) (indicating that the petitioner had to establish “a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his complaint.”); Indigo Room, Inc. v. City of Fort Myers, 710 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that the district court did not

irreparable injury; (3) whether the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the preliminary injunction would cause to the non-movant; and (4) whether the preliminary injunction would be adverse to the public interest.<sup>9</sup> Parker v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034–35 (11th Cir. 2001). Injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy and should not be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of persuasion as to each of these four factors. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000).<sup>10</sup> In addition, “[a]t the preliminary injunction stage, a district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, if the evidence is ‘appropriate given the character and objectives of

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abuse its discretion in denying injunction motion because it properly concluded that movants failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of two counts of their complaint); and Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that the district court ruled that the organizations and voters had proved a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their complaint).

<sup>9</sup> Factors three and four also involve consideration of whether the movant has shown reasonable diligence. See Benisek v. Lamone, --- U.S. ---, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1944, 201 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2018) (“a party requesting a preliminary injunction must generally show reasonable diligence.”).

<sup>10</sup> However, if a movant is unable to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the court need not consider the other preliminary injunction requirements. See Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011).

the injunctive proceeding.” Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1995). The decision to grant preliminary injunctive relief is within the broad discretion of the district court. Majd-Pour v. Georgiana Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1984).

### III. ANALYSIS

The crux of Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion involves the question of what should happen to the approximately 98,000 voters that were placed on the State of Georgia’s inactive list (for no contact) prior to the enactment of HB 316. Plaintiffs assert that a constitutional question is presented by the circumstances and this Court should apply the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick balancing test (involving consideration of the asserted injury and the state’s interest) to evaluate whether the voting restriction at issue violates Due Process or the First Amendment. Plaintiffs also assert that the State of Georgia has no interest in removing voters from the rolls in violation of its own laws. Doc. No. [176], p. 2. In contrast, Defendants assert the Eleventh Amendment and the Pullman Doctrine *inter alia* to challenge the propriety of Plaintiffs’ motion. As the Defendants’ arguments are

jurisdictionally based, the Court will consider those arguments first.<sup>11</sup> The Court will thereafter consider Plaintiffs' constitutional claim.

#### **A. Eleventh Amendment**

In opposition to Plaintiffs' motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' motion and legal theory are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because Plaintiffs are essentially asking this Court to adjudicate state law for the first time (and otherwise address state-law claims in federal court). Doc. No. [172], pp. 2, 8, 16. More specifically, Defendants' argument recognizes that Plaintiffs and Defendants have different interpretations of the effect of HB 316 on the approximately 98,000 voters at issue. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief requires this Court to endorse Plaintiffs' interpretation of state law, which is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and State sovereign immunity. *Id.* at p. 16. Defendants assert that the reality of

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<sup>11</sup> "Because the Eleventh Amendment represents a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Article III, federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims that are barred by the Eleventh Amendment." McClendon v. Ga. Dep't of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) ("the Eleventh Amendment defense . . . partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar") and Duke v. James, 713 F.2d 1506, 1510 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing the Pullman abstention (from the exercise of federal jurisdiction) doctrine).

Plaintiffs' motion is that "it is a declaratory judgment claim regarding compliance with HB 316 masquerading as a constitutional argument." Id. at p. 17. Defendants further argue that "Plaintiffs cannot succeed in suggesting their relief is based in federal law when it requires this Court to determine a novel issue of state law." Id. at p. 18.

In opposition, Plaintiffs state that their claims arise from the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, not state law – and that their arguments do not require the Court to analyze novel issues of state law. Doc. No. [177], p. 3.

The Eleventh Amendment states in relevant part: "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The United States Supreme Court has held that "a suit against state officials on the basis of state law contravenes the Eleventh Amendment." Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984).<sup>12</sup> The Court also indicated that when injunctive relief is

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<sup>12</sup> "The Supreme Court [in Pennhurst] has explained that the rationale for the



sought, “an error of law by state officers acting in their official capacities will not suffice to override the sovereign immunity of the State where the relief effectively is against it.” Id. at 113 (citations omitted). The Court further stated: “it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.” Id. at 106.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed the Pennhurst decision on numerous occasions. In their briefing, Plaintiffs primarily rely upon the Eleventh Circuit’s 1989 decision in Brown v. Georgia Department of Revenue, 881 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989). In Brown, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennhurst does not apply when a plaintiff alleges a violation of the federal Constitution. Id. at 1023. The Eleventh Circuit stated that under Pennhurst, “the determinative question is not the relief ordered, but whether the relief was ordered pursuant to state or federal

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[exception to the Eleventh Amendment that allows state officials to be sued for prospective relief, i.e., Ex parte Young doctrine] ‘rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights,’ but in a case alleging that a state official has violated state law, this federal interest ‘disappears.’” Ala. v. PCI Gaming Auth., 801 F.3d 1278, 1290 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).

law.” Id. In the case *sub judice*, no relief has been ordered, so the Court cannot necessarily answer this determinative question.<sup>13</sup>

Additional Eleventh Circuit authority indicates that when the gravamen of the complaint appears to be that the State improperly interpreted and failed to adhere to a state statute, there is a Pennhurst problem – as despite references to the United States Constitution in the pleadings, the claims necessarily rely on a determination that a state official has not complied with state law,<sup>14</sup> a determination that is barred by sovereign immunity. See S&M Brands, Inc. v. Georgia ex rel. Carr, 925 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019) and DeKalb Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680, 688 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that “the district court cannot

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<sup>13</sup> Phrased a different way, in Pennhurst, the Supreme Court indicated that “the general criterion for determining when a suit is in fact against the sovereign is the effect of the relief sought.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 107 (emphasis added). In the case *sub judice*, the Court finds that the effect of the relief sought by Plaintiffs is a determination by this Court that Defendants have not complied with state law.

<sup>14</sup> For example, Plaintiffs use the phrase “violation of state law” at numerous times in their briefing and hearing exhibit/PowerPoint. See e.g., Doc. Nos. [159-1], p. 23; [176], pp. 2, 7 n.1.

enjoin [a state] to follow the district court's interpretation of [the state's] own constitution."').<sup>15</sup>

While the Court recognizes Plaintiffs' arguments and citation of authority to the contrary, as well as its ability to review state statutes,<sup>16</sup> the gravamen of the Plaintiffs' pending motion appears to be that the Secretary of State (and therefore the State of Georgia) has improperly interpreted and failed to adhere to Georgia's new voter list maintenance statute (HB 316).<sup>17</sup> This is evidenced by the motion's numerous references to violation of state law and the fact that Plaintiffs are not seeking an injunction as to the entirety of the

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<sup>15</sup> This Court's independent research only found one case to the contrary, Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981); however, the applicability and precedential weight of that case is doubtful, considering that it was decided pre-Pennhurst and involved a substantive due process claim, as opposed to the procedural due process claim at issue here.

<sup>16</sup> As stated by Judge Gerald Tjoflat, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution "allows federal courts to review state statutes, but federal courts are limited to refusing to apply the provisions they find unconstitutional." Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1348 (11th Cir. 2019) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). Here, the Court is not being asked to find a statute unconstitutional. Plaintiffs are asking the Court to find a state official's interpretation of a statute unconstitutional.

<sup>17</sup> More specifically, the case of Democratic Executive Committee v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) cited by Plaintiffs is distinguishable in that the arguments in that case did not center upon a violation of state law.

approximately 300,000 voter registrations that were subject to cancellation. Accordingly, in light of the above-stated authority, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs' motion to the extent that it requires a conclusion by this Court that Plaintiffs' interpretation of HB 316 is correct.<sup>18</sup>

### **B. Pullman Doctrine**

While the Court considers the Eleventh Amendment analysis determinative, in the interest of caution, the Court will consider Defendants' Pullman abstention doctrine argument. Defendants assert the Pullman abstention doctrine, on the ground that "Plaintiffs' Motion is predicated upon only one discrete subset of list-maintenance activities that has not been adjudicated by state courts [and further argue that] this Court should refrain from adopting Plaintiffs' arguments on an unsettled issue of state law." Doc. No. [172], p. 20.

"Under the Pullman abstention doctrine, a federal court will defer to 'state court resolution of underlying issues of state law,'" before a substantial

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<sup>18</sup> The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs also present an alternative argument in the event that the Court declines to engage in statutory interpretation or otherwise finds that HB 316 is ambiguous as to the voters at issue. To this regard, the Court will continue with its analysis and consider the constitutional question, *infra*.

federal constitutional question can be decided. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1174; see also Railroad Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). In considering abstention, the court “must take into account the nature of the controversy and the importance of the right allegedly impaired.” Id. In light of said consideration, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “voting rights cases are particularly inappropriate for abstention.” Id. In lieu of abstention, the Eleventh Circuit has indicated that “the preferable way to obtain state court resolution of those state law issues is through the certification process established by” the state supreme court. Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001); cf. Roe v. State of Ala., 43 F.3d 574, 582 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We agree that federal courts should refrain from holding a state election law unconstitutional when a reasonable alternative course of action exists. We are, therefore, reluctant to reach a final decision in this case while the proper application of the [State] Election Code remains muddled. There are two ways to show deference to the state decisionmakers in this matter: we can leave the plaintiffs to their state remedies; or we can certify a question to the Supreme Court of [the state], retain jurisdiction, and await that court’s answer.”) (citations omitted). In light of this authority, the Court finds that it would not

be appropriate to apply the Pullman abstention doctrine to this voting rights case. Nevertheless, the Court still does not proceed to interpreting the statute, because from this Court's brief review, the answer as to how HB 316 applies to the voters who were already on the State of Georgia's inactive elector list (prior to enactment of HB 316) is not clear cut and both Plaintiffs and Defendants have offered reasonable interpretations for how HB 316 affects the voters at issue. Cf. Duncan, 657 F.2d at 699 (providing an overview of authority concerning clear and vague statutes in the context of the Pullman abstention doctrine). In essence, HB 316 is open to interpretation and could reasonably be interpreted as either party contends. In addition, an interpretation of HB 316 by this Court at this stage of the case creates a possibility for conflicting interpretations in the event that a state court later decides the issue — there would be an interpretation by the federal court and an interpretation by the state court. Cf. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 122 n.32 (“when a federal decision on state law is obtained, the federal court's construction often is uncertain and ephemeral”).

As stated above, the preferable way to obtain resolution of the state law issue is through the certification process by the state supreme court. However,

neither party has asked to certify a question to the Georgia Supreme Court.<sup>19</sup> Plaintiffs also have an additional remedy in the form of seeking a mandamus in the state courts. Nevertheless, as stated above, the Court considers the Eleventh Amendment analysis, *supra*, determinative to the extent that the issues involve proper interpretation (and violation) of state law.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> The Court recognizes that it may *sua sponte* certify a question the Georgia Supreme Court; however, as indicated at the December 19, 2019 hearing, the Court is concerned as to timing in that the date that the Georgia Supreme Court will return an answer is unknown and Plaintiffs have continuously expressed a desire to resolve this case in March of 2020.

<sup>20</sup> The interplay between the Pennhurst/Eleventh Amendment ruling and the Pullman abstention doctrine has been described as follows.

The configuration of the Pennhurst litigation was identical to the litigation in Pullman. Both cases involved lawsuits filed in federal court, which raised both state claims and federal constitutional claims against state officials, but which could have been resolved on the state law claims alone. The Supreme Court, however, did not consider Pullman abstention as a potential resolution of the Pennhurst litigation. Instead, the Court replaced the methodology of a discretionary stay envisioned in Pullman with a rule of mandatory dismissal. As a result, the role of Pullman abstention in allocating decisionmaking responsibility in suits against state officials was transmuted substantially without a word of explanation by the Court.

Keith Werhan, Pullman Abstention After Pennhurst: A Comment on Judicial Federalism, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 449, 454 (1986).

### C. Constitutional Claim

Assuming, *arguendo*, that Plaintiffs' motion does not seek a ruling by the Court regarding the correct statutory interpretation of HB 316 and whether the three-year or five-year "no contact" provision applies to the approximately 98,000 voters at issue, the Court proceeds with the following constitutional analysis of HB 316 and, in particular, the "no contact" scheme therein.

The Supreme Court "has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). This equal right to vote, however, "is not absolute; the States have the power to impose voter qualifications, and to regulate access to the franchise in other ways." Id.; see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) ("It does not follow, however, that the right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for political purposes through the ballot are absolute.").

"The Supreme Court has rejected a litmus-paper test for constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State's election laws and instead has applied a flexible standard." Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1351 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, a



reviewing court must first “consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.” Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). A court must then “identify and evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.” Id. “Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.” Id.; see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. If a State’s election law imposes only “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). But if a State’s election law imposes a “severe” burden, it must be “narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.” Id. (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). In other words, “lesser burdens . . . trigger less exacting review.” Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997).

Accordingly, the Court begins by evaluating the burden of this “no contact” scheme on Plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

“Ordinary and widespread burdens, such as those requiring nominal effort of everyone, are not severe.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quotation omitted). However, burdens “are severe if they go beyond the merely inconvenient.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that the burden imposed on voters by the “no contact” scheme is “severe” and that, should their motion for preliminary injunction be denied, the “precise injury” the approximately 98,000 voters at issue will suffer is “complete disenfranchisement.” See generally Doc. Nos. [159-1]; [184]. Plaintiffs contend that removing voters solely due to inactivity – without any other evidence that said voters have moved – raises a substantial risk that individuals will be erroneously deprived of their constitutional right to vote. See Doc. No. [169-1], p. 19. They specifically cite to a 2018 Election Assistance Commission Report, in which statistics show that the State of Georgia mailed 478,295 voter confirmation notices in advance of the 2018 election to individuals it suspected of having moved. See Doc. No. [184-2]. Of those confirmation notices, more than 75% of the notices were neither responded to nor returned as

undeliverable, suggesting that a substantial number of the notices were never read.<sup>21</sup> Id.

Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that once a voter is removed from the voter roll under the “no contact” scheme, the likelihood of complete disenfranchisement is high for two reasons. See Doc. No. [184], pp. 3–5. First, the State of Georgia does not notify individuals that their voter registration has been cancelled. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that the first moment that many voters learn that they have been removed from the voter rolls is when they arrive at the polls on Election Day. Because the State of Georgia does not offer same-day registration, said individuals are therefore ineligible to vote. Second, for the individuals who have learned that they have been removed from the voter rolls, there is only a narrow window of time for said individuals to re-register before the next election, as Georgia law requires voters to register weeks before any election. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-224.

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<sup>21</sup> Plaintiffs also point to Mr. Harvey’s testimony at the preliminary injunction hearing, in which he acknowledged that “[t]here are a lot of people that don’t check their mail” and that, upon receiving confirmation notices, voters may think it’s a “mailer,” “an advertisement,” or “marketing things that look like . . . official documents.” See Dec. 19, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 79:1–79:18.

Defendants, in response, argue that Plaintiffs have provided no evidence of *any* burden that the “no contact” scheme imposes on the right to vote, let alone a “severe” burden. See generally Doc. Nos. [172]; [185]. In support of this contention, Defendants rely on the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Billups. Therein, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a state law requiring voters to produce photo identification prior to casting a ballot. See 554 F.3d at 1355. Employing the Anderson-Burdick balancing test, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs “failed to prove that any individual would bear a significant burden” because they could not “identify a single individual who would be unable to vote because of the Georgia statute or would face an undue burden to obtain a free voter identification card.” Id. at 1354. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit found that “the burden on Georgia voters is ‘slight’” and, thus, that the state interest need not be “compelling.” Id. (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439).

Defendants argue that, like the plaintiffs in Billups, Plaintiffs have failed to prove that any individual would bear a significant or “severe” burden due to the “no contact” scheme. Namely, in support of their motion, Plaintiffs include eight declarations from Georgia voters. See Doc. Nos. [159-3]; [159-4]; [159-5]; [159-6]; [159-7]; [159-8]; [159-9]; [159-12]. Plaintiffs initially stated that

all eight of these voters were due to be removed from the voter rolls under the “no contact” scheme despite that fact that none of these voters had ever moved. Doc. No. [159-1], p. 15. In response, however, Defendants contend that four of the voters (Linda Bradshaw, Keme Hawkins, Tommie Jordan, and Deepak Eidnani) remain on the official list of voters as “active” voters. See Doc. No. [172], pp. 13–14. Thus, these four voters are eligible and able to vote.

Moreover, Defendants contend that the other four voters (Clifford Thomas, David Hopkins, Charlesetta Young, and Kilton Smith) were removed from the voter rolls after failing to respond to the two confirmation notices sent pursuant to the “no contact” scheme under HB 316.<sup>22</sup> At this time, there is no evidence that any of these four voters were burdened or precluded from returning the two confirmation notices, which are prepaid and preaddressed.

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<sup>22</sup> The Court notes that these four voters dispute that they ever actually received confirmation notices. However, Defendants contend that Secretary of State records show that confirmation notices were in fact sent to these four voters. See Doc. No. [172-1]. “The common law has long recognized a rebuttable presumption that an item properly mailed was received by the addressee.” Chung v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 975 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (quoting In re Farris, 365 F. App’x 198, 199 (11th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that these four voters never actually received confirmation notices “is insufficient to rebut the presumption.” In re Farris, 365 F. App’x at 200 (“The mere denial of receipt, without more, is insufficient to rebut the presumption.”).

Additionally, there is no evidence at this time that any of the four voters are precluded or burdened by registering to vote again. In fact, at the preliminary injunction hearing, Mr. Harvey testified that re-registering to vote after being removed from the voter rolls for “no contact” is no different from registering to vote in the first instance. See Dec. 19, 2019 Hearing Transcript at 47:23–48:4. A voter can re-register to vote by going online to use the Online Voter Registration system or renewing one’s driver’s license or identification card with the Department of Driver Services. Id.

Based on the limited factual record before the Court, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial likelihood of success that the burden imposed by the “no contact” scheme (*i.e.*, returning a prepaid, preaddressed confirmation notice and/or re-registering to voter) is severe.

The Court now turns to the State’s purported interests in enforcing the “no contact” provision under its interpretation of HB 316. Because the burden of said provision is “slight,” the state interest need not be “compelling . . . to tip the constitutional scales in its direction.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439. Rather, “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify” the restrictions. Id. at 434.

Defendants have identified three State interests in enforcing the “no contact” provision under its interpretation of HB 316. First, Defendants state that State of Georgia has an interest—both generally and as compelled by federal law—in maintaining reliable lists of electors. See Doc. No. [185], p. 4. Under the NVRA, states are required to make “a reasonable effort to remove registrants who are ineligible to vote from the official list of eligible voters.”<sup>23</sup> 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(4)(a). Congress mandates this, in part, “to protect the integrity of the electoral process; and . . . [to] ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501(b)(3) and (b)(4). Second, Defendants state that the State of Georgia and the Secretary of State have an interest in applying election laws as written specifically. See Doc. No. [185], p. 5. Finally, Defendants maintain that the “no contact” scheme eliminates voter confusion and improves election-day operations. Doc. No. [185], p. 5. For example, Defendants argue that inaccurate voter lists that

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<sup>23</sup> The method employed by the State of Georgia—both prior to and after the enactment of HB 316—is contemplated by the NVRA and has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., ---U.S.---, 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1842 (2018). As Plaintiffs correctly note, however, the Supreme Court in Husted only addressed whether the challenged voter-list-maintenance process complied with the NVRA and did not address the constitutionality of said process.

incorporate individuals who have moved and are no longer eligible may cause local election officials to improperly assess where equipment and personnel should be deployed on election day in 2020. Id. at pp. 5–6.

Plaintiffs, in response, argue that the State has waived or disclaimed any such interest in applying a three-year “no contact” provision to the approximately 98,000 individuals at issue since HB 316 amended the “no contact” provision to require five years of inactivity. In doing so, Plaintiffs overstate the burden on the State under the Anderson-Burdick test. As discussed *supra*, Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood of success that the burden imposed by the “no contact” scheme is “severe.” Accordingly, under the Anderson-Burdick, the State is only required to articulate an important regulatory interest in enforcing their interpretation of said provision. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439. The Court finds that all three of the above-stated regulatory interests are sufficient to satisfy that obligation under the Anderson-Burdick test.

The Court therefore concludes that, at this time, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing a substantial likelihood of success that the “no contact” scheme set forth in HB 316 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments.



Because Plaintiffs have failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, the Court need not examine whether Plaintiffs have will irreparable harm, or whether a balance of hardships weighs in Plaintiffs' favor, or, finally, whether the public interest would support the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1242.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. [159]) is **DENIED** on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and the principles of sovereign immunity do not permit a federal court to enjoin a state (or its officers) to follow a federal court's interpretation of the State of Georgia's laws. Such interpretation is within the province of the state court. As to the remainder of Plaintiffs' constitutional claim, the motion is also **DENIED** on the ground that Plaintiffs have failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the "no contact" provision violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It is important to note that the Court has not conclusively determined the rights of the parties, but in accordance with

applicable authority, only balanced the equities in the interim as this litigation proceeds.<sup>24</sup>

While the denial of this motion is based upon the Eleventh Amendment and respect for state sovereignty, the Court has not ignored the fundamental significance of voting under our constitutional structure.<sup>25</sup> In recognition of this important right, the Court would be remiss not to express its serious concern that there needs to be an immediate and accurate interpretation by the state court of HB 316 as to its effect on the voters who were already on the State's inactive list prior to the effective date of HB 316. To this regard, the Court will allow Plaintiffs, upon request, to stay the pending litigation to seek emergency relief at the state court level (or otherwise certify a question the Georgia Supreme Court). In light of the immediacy of the situation in District 171, it is within the authority of the Secretary of State to return any cancelled voters to inactive status to allow Plaintiffs reasonable time to seek a decision from the state court.

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<sup>24</sup> See Democratic Exec. Comm. of Fla. v. Lee, 915 F.3d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that "the purpose of the injunction is not to conclusively determine the rights of parties, but only to balance the equities in the interim as the litigation proceeds.").

<sup>25</sup> Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432.

The Court also, pursuant to its inherent authority to control the conduct of the parties, **ORDERS** Defendants to make additional diligent and reasonable efforts (through notices on the Secretary of State's website and press releases) to inform the general public (especially those in House District 171, who face a December 30, 2019 deadline to re-register) of this Court's order in regard to the voter list maintenance process and the need for the canceled voters to re-register to vote during the applicable registration time period.<sup>26</sup>

**IT IS SO ORDERED** this 27th day of December, 2019.

s/Steve C. Jones  
**HONORABLE STEVE C. JONES**  
**UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE**

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<sup>26</sup> See generally Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., 307 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002) (discussing inherent authority).

## **Exhibit H**

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
EASTERN DIVISION**

**League of Women Voters  
of Ohio, et al.,**

**Plaintiffs,**

**v.**

**Frank LaRose,**

**Defendant.**

**Case No. 2:20-cv-1638**

**Judge Michael H. Watson**

**Magistrate Judge Deavers**

**OPINION AND ORDER**

Plaintiffs sue Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose (“Secretary LaRose”) and seek an emergency temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to prevent Ohio’s primary election from taking place in the time and manner prescribed by House Bill 197 (“H.B. 197”). Mot., ECF No. 4. The State of Ohio, the Ohio Democratic Party (“ODP”), and the Ohio Republican Party (“ORP”) moved for, and were granted, leave to intervene as Defendants. Order, ECF No. 38. Likewise, the Libertarian Party of Ohio (“LPO”) moved for, and was granted, leave to intervene as a Plaintiff. *Id.* LPO moves for a TRO or preliminary injunction as well.<sup>1</sup> ECF No. 31. The Court granted Honest Elections Project’s motion to file an amicus

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<sup>1</sup> The Court has reviewed LPO’s reply brief, ECF No. 53, but does not consider the arguments (not to mention new claims) raised for the first time in that brief.

brief, ECF No. 25, and the Court now grants Disability Rights Ohio's ("DRO") motion to file an amicus brief, ECF No. 54-1.<sup>2</sup>

## **I. FACTS<sup>3</sup>**

### **A. Background**

Ohio's primary election was scheduled for March 17, 2020. On March 9, 2020, Governor Mike DeWine declared a state of emergency in response to the spread of COVID-19. Within a matter of days, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, President Donald Trump declared the COVID-19 outbreak a national emergency, and, in Ohio, all schools were closed, gatherings limited, and restaurants and bars closed for dining-in.

Confusion ensued on March 16, 2020, the day before the election, after Governor DeWine announced that it was unsafe to hold in-person voting for the primary election. A lawsuit was filed in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas seeking an emergency delay of the election, but the request was denied later that same day. Ultimately, Ohio's Department of Health Director Dr. Amy Acton issued an order prohibiting polling locations from operating on March 17, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thereafter, Secretary LaRose issued

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<sup>2</sup> To the extent DRO seeks to argue a new claim, such as a claim that H.B. 197 violates the ADA, that is not included in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, the Court does not consider it.

<sup>3</sup> All relevant facts are taken from Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, ECF No. 4, unless stated otherwise.

Directive 2020-06, which suspended in-person voting in the primary election until June 2, 2020. See LaRose Ex 3, ECF No. 44-3.

On March 17, 2020, two lawsuits were filed in the Ohio Supreme Court and Franklin County Court of Common Pleas challenging Secretary LaRose's authority to issue that Directive. See *State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose*, No. 2020-0388 (Ohio Sup. Ct. Mar. 17, 2020); *Reardon v. LaRose*, No. 20-cv-2105 (Franklin Cty. Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 17, 2020)<sup>4</sup>. The case filed in the Supreme Court requested that the date of the primary be re-set for an earlier time and that voting be only through the mail.<sup>5</sup>

The Ohio General Assembly became involved and on March 25, 2020, unanimously passed H.B. 197, a comprehensive COVID-19 bill, which also established April 28, 2020, as the deadline by which absentee ballots must be received. Secretary LaRose rescinded his prior directive, and on March 27, 2020, Governor DeWine signed the bill into law. It is that bill that is challenged in this lawsuit.

Specifically, H.B. 197, Section 32, part of an overarching COVID-19 relief bill, implements, as relevant, the following for completing voting in Ohio's primary election:

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<sup>4</sup> Appeal voluntarily dismissed on March 31, 2020. See *Reardon, et al. v. LaRose*, No. 20AP-160 (10th Dist. Ohio Mar. 31, 2020).

<sup>5</sup> ODP voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit in the Ohio Supreme Court after H.B. 197 was passed. ODP Resp. 4 n.1, ECF No. 48; see also *State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose*, 202 Ohio LEXIS 762, (Sup. Ct. Ohio Mar. 27, 2020) (Order granting ODP's application for dismissal).

- Voids Secretary LaRose's Directive 2020-06, § 32(A);
- Prohibits the processing of voter registration applications submitted after February 18, 2020, § 32(B)(3);
- Permits eligible voters to apply for an absentee ballot up through noon on April 25, 2020 (with exceptions for voters under O.R.C. § 3509.08) and votes cast by absentee mail ballot<sup>6</sup> postmarked by April 27, 2020, and received by May 8, 2020<sup>7</sup>, to be counted, § 32(C), (E)
  - Defines eligible electors as those individuals who have not already cast a ballot in the March 17, 2020 primary election or other special election, and who were registered to vote as of February 18, 2020, § 32(C)(1)(a); and
- Requires Secretary LaRose to send out postcards to registered voters notifying them how to apply for and submit an absentee ballot and the deadlines for doing so. § 32(C)(2).<sup>8</sup>

H.B. 197, Section 32.

Plaintiffs allege that, by prohibiting the processing of voter registration applications after February 18, 2020, H.B. 197 violates the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 ("NVRA"), which requires registration be made available

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<sup>6</sup> With very limited exceptions for in-person voting. § 32(D)(1).

<sup>7</sup> With limited exceptions. § 32(E)(2)–(3).

<sup>8</sup> Currently Ohio Revised Code § 3509.03 requires applicants to "make a written application" for absentee ballots. Plaintiffs allege that this requirement will disproportionately burden voters who do not have means for or access to printers, envelopes, or stamps. However, the Court takes judicial notice of the FAQ section of the Secretary of State's website which does not require a pre-printed form, as long as a written submission of a request for an absentee ballot includes the required information. It also permits calling your county board of elections and requesting that an absentee ballot application be sent to you. See Ohio Secretary of State Website, "I don't have a printer. Can I request a vote-by-mail ballot?," <https://www.sos.state.oh.us/elections/voters/2020-primary-frequently-asked-questions/>, last visited April 1, 2020. It still appears, however, that the voter is responsible for postage required to mail-in the absentee ballot application.



thirty days before any election for federal office. Plaintiffs also argue that H.B. 197 creates an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order that mandates the following:

(1) Any qualified Ohio elector who submitted a voter registration application or updated their registration information between February 19, 2020, and 30 days prior to the day on which the 2020 primary election is set to conclude shall have their registration information processed and be permitted to vote in the 2020 Primary Election;

(2) At least 21 days prior to the close of polls for the 2020 primary election, county boards of elections shall mail all registered electors who have not already voted in the election a primary ballot for each party with candidates on the ballot, return postage pre-paid, with instructions to cast only one ballot and return the ballot in the official pre-paid postage envelope;

(3) Any elector who has not received a mail absentee ballot at least 14 days prior to the close of polls for the 2020 primary election may submit a request for such a ballot to their local board of election by phone;

(4) Any elector who qualifies for in-person voting pursuant to H.B. 197, § 32(D)(1), and who received a mail absentee ballot, can vote a regular in-person ballot if they bring their absentee ballots to their local board of election;

(5) Any elector who does not receive their mail absentee ballot prior to the postmark date for mail absentee ballots shall be permitted to vote a provisional ballot in person at their local board of election;

(6) Any elector will be permitted to cure any deficiencies in their provisional ballots or absentee ballot identification envelopes by mail, phone, or email up through the day prior to the day the official canvass is required to begin;

(7) The conclusion of the 2020 primary election be set at such a time as will allow election officials to provide orderly notice to electors and administer the election in the manner provided for herein;

(8) Defendant LaRose to issue a directive notifying Ohio's eighty-eight county boards of elections of the aforementioned requirements; and

(9) Defendant LaRose to educate and inform electors about: the timeline and process for voting in the upcoming election; and that if they did not receive an absentee ballot in the mail they may contact their boards of elections and (a) confirm whether they have been sent a ballot, and (2) if they have not received a ballot, request a ballot by phone.

TRO Mot. 1–2, ECF No. 4.

Furthermore, as noted above, the Court has granted permission for the State of Ohio, the ODP, the LPO, and the RPO to intervene in this action. The Court also granted Honest Elections Project's and DRO's motions to file amicus briefs. While the Court does not set forth each of their arguments herein, it has considered everything submitted by these parties in coming to this Opinion and Order. The Court will discuss certain of their arguments, where appropriate, *infra*.

## **II. STANDARD OF REVIEW**

Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. In determining whether to grant such relief, the Court considers four factors: (1) whether the movant has established a substantial probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) whether an injunction would substantially harm third parties; and (4) whether an injunction would serve the public interest. *Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc.*, 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2010). The factors are not

prerequisites; rather, they must be balanced in weighing the equities involved. *Capobianco, D.C. v. Summers*, 377 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 2004).

### **III. ANALYSIS**

As a preliminary matter, no party has disputed Plaintiffs' standing in this case, but the Court has an independent duty to ascertain whether the plaintiffs in a case have standing. The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs' standing argument and is satisfied that standing exists to assert these claims. Accordingly, the Court turns to an analysis of the TRO factors.

#### **A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

##### **1. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993**

Plaintiffs first allege that H.B. 197 violates the NVRA's thirty-day registration requirement by prohibiting boards of elections from processing any voter registration applications received after February 18, 2020. Pls.' Mot. 13, ECF No. 4 (citing 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1))<sup>9</sup>.

ODP agrees with Plaintiffs and argues that by establishing April 28, 2020, as the last day for voting, the Ohio legislature effectively set a new date for Ohio's primary election. ODP Resp. 10, ECF No. 48. ODP advances their argument under both the NVRA and Article V, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution, which largely mirrors the NVRA's requirements and establishes that all citizens

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<sup>9</sup> Formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973gg-10.

over eighteen years old, who have “been registered to vote for thirty days, ha[ve] the qualifications of an elector, and [are] entitled to vote at all elections.”

LPO echoes Plaintiffs’ and ODP’s arguments and adds that H.B. 197 violates Article I, § 4 of the United States Constitution by interfering with Congress’s authority to regulate the time and manner of federal elections. LPO Mot. 10–11, ECF No. 31.

The State of Ohio contends that Plaintiffs are operating under the faulty premise that the Ohio 2020 primary election was moved to April 28, 2020.<sup>10</sup> State of Ohio Resp. 8, ECF No. 52. Instead, the State of Ohio argues that the primary election was not cancelled on March 16, 2020, only the polling locations for in-person voting the next day were closed due to a public health crisis. *Id.* at 9. Likewise, the State of Ohio argues that H.B. 197 did not cancel or reset the 2020 primary election to April 28, 2020, it just extended the deadline by which already registered voters could cast an absentee ballot. *Id.* In support, they argue that H.B. 197 does not establish a new election date because all votes already cast in the 2020 primary election up and through March 16, 2020, are being held and will be counted. *Id.* (citing H.B. 197 § 32(B)). Thus, the State of Ohio argues, this is not “a ‘re-do’ of the primary election” that requires a re-opening of voter registration. *Id.* at 10. Rather, this is an “election modification” in that Secretary LaRose is “accept[ing] as valid everything that transpired before

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<sup>10</sup> Secretary LaRose advances similar arguments. See Secretary LaRose Memo in Opp. 14–18, ECF No. 44.

an election emergency arose and simply authoriz[ing] additional methods of, or time for, voting.” *Id.* at 11 (quoting Morley, Michael T., Symposium: Election Emergencies: Voting in the Wake of Natural Disasters and Terrorist Attacks, 67 Emory L.J. 545, 548–50 (2018)) (comparing an election modification, such as here, with an election cancellation, which entirely nullifies the originally scheduled election with the expectation that a new one will be held at a later date).

“In 1993, Congress passed the NVRA as a measure meant to reinforce the right of qualified citizens to vote.” *U.S. Student Ass’n Found. v. Land*, 546 F.3d 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “The NVRA reflects the view of Congress that the right to vote ‘is a fundamental right,’ that government has a duty to ‘promote the exercise of that right,’ and that discriminatory and unfair registration laws can have a ‘damaging effect on voter participation’ and ‘disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.’” *Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long*, 682 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 2012) (citations to former code provision omitted). Section 8(a)(1) of the NVRA provides that “each State shall . . . insure that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election . . . not later than . . . 30 days . . . before the date of the election.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1).<sup>11</sup> Under the NVRA, “election” means “a

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<sup>11</sup> “A person is registered to vote for purposes of Section 8 when ‘the valid voter registration form of the applicant is: (1) ‘submitted to the appropriate State motor vehicle authority’ in accordance with 52 U.S.C. § 20504 (registration by application simultaneous with an application for a motor vehicle driver’s license); (2) submitted by postmarked mail in accordance with 52 U.S.C. § 20505; (3) ‘accepted at the voter

general, special, primary, or runoff election.” See 52 U.S.C. § 20502 (terms synonymous with meanings set forth in 52 U.S.C. § 30101).

Here, Plaintiffs’ arguments under the NVRA are unlikely to succeed on the merits because the cases upon which Plaintiffs rely are distinguishable, and Ohio has complied with the NVRA’s requirements.

Ohio’s extension of its absentee ballot deadline is not comparable to the cases upon which Plaintiffs rely. For example, in *Kemp*, there was a special runoff election scheduled more than thirty days after the original voter registration deadline established for the general election. See *Georgia St. Conf. of the NAACP v. Kemp*, No. 1:17-cv-1397, Order on Preliminary Injunction, Doc. 29 (N.D. Ga. May 4, 2017). The court in that case found that the failure to permit voters to register up until thirty days before the runoff election violated the NVRA. But the runoff election in that case was a new election, with new candidates and different ballots, thereby triggering the NVRA’s registration provision.

In *Arizona Democratic Party v. Reagan*, the district court found that the Arizona Secretary of State’s failure to account for a federal holiday (Columbus Day) in establishing its voter registration deadline for the general election violated the NVRA’s thirty-day requirement because otherwise eligible voters were unable

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registration agency’ in accordance with 52 U.S.C. § 20506 (in-person registration at registration sites or government offices designated by each state); or (4) otherwise ‘received by the appropriate State election official.’ 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1)(A) — (D).” *Ariz. Democratic Party v. Reagan*, No. CV-16-03618, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153431, at \*41 (D. Az. Nov. 3, 2016) (citation omitted).

to submit their applications when the post office was closed for the holiday. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153431, at \*\*40–47.

The State of Ohio and Secretary LaRose correctly distinguish between an election modification, which we have here, and an election cancellation. COVID-19 presented Defendants with an unprecedented situation where in-person voting was no longer safe because of a global-health crisis. But unlike in *Kemp* or *Reagan*, there is not a new election scheduled for April 28, 2020. Rather, this is just a modification and extension of the date by which voters—who were otherwise eligible and prepared to cast their votes in-person on March 17, 2020—can submit their votes, primarily by absentee ballot. Under Ohio law, eligible persons interested in voting in Ohio’s March 17, 2020 primary were required to register by February 18, 2020. That February deadline came and went before any change was made to the March 17, 2020 in-person voting. In other words, had in-person voting taken place on March 17, 2020, people who had not registered to vote by February 18, 2020, would not have been able to show up that day and cast a vote. As such, the State complied with the NVRA in granting registration up to thirty days before “the election.”

House Bill 197 does not change the date of “the election”; it merely extends the deadline for submitting absentee ballots for the March 17, 2020 election until April 28, 2020, and established that only certain people could submit their votes in person on April 28, 2020. By its own terms, it refers to the election as the “March 17, 2020 primary election.” *E.g.*, H.B. 197 § 32(B)(1), (2),

(C)(1). It provides methods for voters “who ha[d] not already cast a ballot in the March 17, 2020, primary election” to vote “in that election.” *Id.* at (C)(1).

Because H.B. 197 does not establish a new election or new election date, Ohio did not violate the NVRA by leaving the cut-off for voter registration as February 18, 2020. *Cf. Morley*, 67 Emory L.J. at 554 (discussing how New York employed a similar election modification process after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in that it did not extend the voter registration deadline but did extend the deadline by which already registered voters could request an absentee ballot, although this action appears not to have been challenged under the NVRA).

Finally, although the Court does not rely on the intent of the statute, the Court finds that this decision is not contrary to the purpose of the NVRA. Granting Plaintiffs’ requested relief would not protect the ability of individuals to register, but, instead, would confer an extra benefit to a group of people who had missed their window of opportunity to register by February 18, 2020, before any change was made by the Ohio legislature.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their NVRA claim. For the same reasons, the Court finds LPO is unlikely to succeed on its argument that the Ohio Legislature has exceeded its authority and violated Article I, § 4 of the United States Constitution by keeping the registration date February 18, 2020.



## 2. First and Fourteenth Amendments

Plaintiffs also contend that the Ohio Legislature's changes to the voting procedures for the March 17, 2020 primary election amount to an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Voting is a fundamental and precious right, and “[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). However, “there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these schemes . . . affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote . . . .” *Id.* “Nevertheless, the state’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.” *Id.* Indeed, voting regulations do not automatically trigger strict scrutiny even when they impact the right to vote because, as the Supreme Court has instructed, “states ‘may, and inevitably must, enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election- and campaign-related disorder.’” *Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell*, 462 F.3d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting *Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party*, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997); citing *Storer v. Brown*, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).

The Court must determine the nature of the burden the regulation places on voters when setting the standard of review to apply. “While a rational basis standard applies to state regulations that do not burden the fundamental right to vote, strict scrutiny applies when a state’s restriction imposes ‘severe’ burdens.” *NE Ohio Coalition for Homeless v. Husted*, 696 F.3d 580, 592 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing *Obama for Am. v. Husted*, 697 F.3d 423, 428 (6th Cir. 2012)). If, however, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ right to vote is burdened, but not “severely” burdened, the Court analyzes Plaintiffs’ claim under the flexible *Anderson-Burdick* standard.

Under the *Anderson-Burdick* test,

A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate” against “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,” taking into consideration “the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”

*Burdick v. Takushi*, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting *Anderson*, 460 U.S. at 789). “There is no ‘litmus test’ to separate valid from invalid voting regulations; courts must weigh the burden on voters against the state’s asserted justifications and ‘make the ‘hard judgment’ that our adversary system demands.’” *Obama for Am.*, 697 F.3d at 429 (quoting *Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd.*, 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court)). “However slight that burden may appear . . . it must be justified by relevant and legitimate

state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’” *Crawford*, 533 U.S. at 191 (citation omitted).

**a. Burden on the Right to Vote**

Under the *Anderson-Burdick* test, the Court must first “consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.” *Anderson*, 460 U.S. at 789.

Plaintiffs allege that H.B. 197 provides insufficient time to effectively conduct voting in Ohio. In support, they point to Secretary LaRose’s own statements to the Ohio General Assembly, which advocated for a June 2, 2020 deadline. See Secretary LaRose Letter to Legislatures, dated March 21, 2020, Am. Compl. ¶ 44, ECF No. 5.

Plaintiffs also allege that the process for extending voting primarily through absentee ballots is unnecessarily complicated and cumbersome, thereby disenfranchising or discouraging voters from participating. For example, H.B. 197 requires eligible voters to correctly fill out an absentee ballot application (either by printing it out or writing it down on some sort of paper); mail it to their local board of elections using their own stamps and envelopes; wait for their application to be processed; receive their ballot in the mail; fill the ballot out correctly; and mail the ballot back so that it is postmarked by April 27, 2020. All of this must take place for millions of Ohio voters.

Plaintiffs contend that this process in this tight timeframe “leaves no room for delay” because there may not be time to correct any errors in the applications in time to postmark absentee ballots by April 27, 2020, if the initial absentee ballot application requests are denied. Further, they argue, the length of this process could be compounded by delays at the post office or restrictions in place because of the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in some voters being unable to postmark their ballots in time to be counted. Plaintiffs also argue that the mail-in only option burdens voters’ rights to vote, especially those who are economically disadvantaged, by requiring voters to access a printer to print off the official ballot request form<sup>12</sup> and to obtain postage for the absentee ballot request. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the in-person voting options provided for in H.B. 197 are insufficient and too narrowly drawn, thereby disenfranchising voters who are unable to complete the absentee ballot process or who would otherwise prefer to vote in person. Plaintiffs argue that all of the above-described aspects of H.B. 197 make it a severe burden on the right to vote.

The Court finds H.B. 197 does not impose a severe burden on the right to vote. First, voters had various opportunities to vote, both by mail and in person, prior to late March 16, 2020, when the polls were closed.

Second, under H.B. 197, certain voters can still vote in person on April 28, 2020.

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<sup>12</sup> As noted just above and again, *infra*, voters need not possess a printer to request an absentee ballot.

Third, all voters who have not yet voted and who cannot vote in person on April 28, 2020, can still vote by requesting and submitting a mail-in ballot. Plaintiffs contend that the deadline for doing so, and the requirements of printing out the ballot request form and obtaining proper postage to submit the ballot request, unduly burden the right to vote.

The Court recognizes that due to the current COVID-19 pandemic, which has required many places of business (including libraries and other places where Plaintiffs may wish to print a ballot request form) to close, voters may face a difficulty submitting the ballot request form. But, Secretary LaRose has already taken steps to make submission as easy as possible by, for example, permitting voters to submit a ballot request on any piece of paper containing the required information instead of requiring voters to submit the official ballot request form. Further, voters can request the absentee ballot application by calling their county board of elections.

The requirement that voters affix a stamp to their ballot application is no more than a minimal burden as stamps are available at multiple locations that remain open during the Governor's stay-at-home order, including grocery stores. Those who do not wish to leave their homes to purchase stamps can purchase them online. And, contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, Secretary LaRose's mailing of informative postcards does not cause any delay—voters need not wait to receive the postcard; they are free to begin requesting their absentee ballots prior to receiving that postcard.

Still, given that H.B. 197 sets the voting deadline at April 28, 2020, the bill creates a tight deadline to accomplish the proper request and submission of a ballot. The Court therefore concludes that H.B. 197 creates, *at most*, a modest burden on the right to vote and will be analyzed under the *Anderson-Burdick* framework. It is not a severe burden subject to strict scrutiny.

**b. The State's Interests**

The Court agrees with Defendant and Intervenor Defendants that the State's interests outweigh the burdens caused by the generally applicable, nondiscriminatory procedures laid out in H.B. 197.

Certainly, the State has an interest in curbing the global COVID-19 pandemic. The prohibition of gatherings of large amounts of people is central to the President's guidelines on social distancing that are effective until April 30, 2020, and the Governor's stay-at-home order for the State of Ohio, which has been extended to May 1, 2020. Accordingly, the State has a strong interest in limiting in-person voting during this period of crisis. Limiting in-person voting to only those who are disabled or unable to receive mail is a justifiable burden on the rights of those who would otherwise prefer to vote in person<sup>13</sup> but can vote by mail when weighed against the State's interest in preventing its hospitals from

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<sup>13</sup> The Court also notes the inconsistency between Plaintiffs arguing, on the one hand, that the inability to vote in person is an unconstitutional burden on their right to vote and, on the other, that some voters will be unconstitutionally burdened by having to potentially expose themselves or their family members to the virus at a post office in order to obtain postage to mail an absentee ballot application.

exceeding critical capacity and preventing as many illnesses and deaths from COVID-19 as possible. It also prohibits the disenfranchisement of persons who are categorically unable to vote by mail due to disability or the inability to receive mail.

Further, Secretary LaRose, the State of Ohio, and ODP have adequately explained the justifications for requiring voters to submit an application for an absentee ballot rather than mailing out ballots directly to voters. As Secretary LaRose explained, he is required by law to properly verify a voter's identity and a voter's signature—whether submitted absentee by mail, early in-person, or at the polls on election day—as part of that verification process. LaRose Resp. 22, ECF No. 44 (citing R.C. 3505.18; 3509.03(B)(5)). Thus, allowing a person to request an absentee ballot over the phone or online without an accompanying signature undermines that important voter verification safeguard. *Id.*

Moreover, this is a primary election, and voters in Ohio can only vote in one primary. If voters did not request a particular ballot, they would not be able to register with one of the political parties. Moreover, Secretary LaRose would have to mail up to four separate ballots to every voter.<sup>14</sup> It would require a massive undertaking to print and mail so many ballots to voters, not to mention the confusion it would cause given that voters are only allowed to submit one of

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<sup>14</sup> The Court agrees with the State of Ohio's footnote 10—Ohio's primary requires different mechanics than the states Plaintiffs seek to emulate.

the ballots.<sup>15</sup> Mailing up to four ballots to each voter would inevitably result in the disenfranchisement of some voters who would erroneously return more than one ballot and not have their vote counted at all. Given how easy Secretary LaRose is making it to request an absentee ballot (the ability to request it online or via phone, the ability to send multiple ballot requests within the same envelope, and not requiring the request to be on the official form), the State's interest in sending only one ballot to each voter outweighs any burden that requesting the ballot<sup>16</sup> imposes on voters.

Furthermore, the State of Ohio argues that H.B. 197's postcard process is more efficient and streamlined than the process outlined in Secretary LaRose's Letter to the Legislature and, thus, is manageable. See State of Ohio Resp. 19–20, ECF No. 52; see *also* Secretary LaRose Resp. 26–27, ECF No. 44 and Grandjean Dec., ECF No. 44-2 (explaining why mailing an absentee ballot application to each registered voter in time for the April 28, 2020 deadline is unworkable). Indeed, Secretary LaRose's response indicates that he will be able to carry out the process established by H.B. 197 and, conversely, contends that

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<sup>15</sup> Plaintiffs' arguments are inconsistent. They argue both that sending four separate ballots will not confuse voters, while arguing elsewhere that having to fill out an absentee ballot request as well as a ballot will confuse voters.

<sup>16</sup> ODP argues the Court should require Secretary LaRose to include a ballot request form at the bottom of the postcard that H.B. 197 requires him to mail out. ODP's suggestion was filed on April 1, 2020, after the Court was informed on the March 31, 2020, teleconference that the postcards were already being printed. It is simply not feasible to grant ODP's requested relief as the postcards have already been printed and requiring a reprint would, among other difficulties, cause additional delay on an already tight timeline.



all of Plaintiffs' requested relief is unworkable.<sup>17</sup> See Secretary LaRose Resp. 10, 19–25, ECF No. 44; Grandjean Dec., ECF No. 44-2.

The compressed timeframe for the completion of absentee voting does pose a burden on voters. Those who request the ballot by mail will have to wait for their request to reach the county board of elections, then wait for the ballot to be mailed back to and reach the voter, and then, the voter must fill out the ballot and have it postmarked in time to be counted. Any delay on the part of the voter, county board of elections, or the postal service could result in the voter's ballot not being counted.

Nonetheless, at the time the State enacted H.B. 197, this timeframe was justified, and it remains so. Secretary LaRose had advocated for a June 2, 2020 voting deadline, but ODP requested April 28, 2020, specifically to permit it to send delegates to the Democratic National Convention ("DNC"). ODP made the same argument in favor of the April 28, 2020 deadline in this litigation before the DNC delayed its convention on April 2, 2020. Similarly, LPO argued that voting must conclude by May 12, 2020, in order for LPO to send delegates to its national convention. RPO likewise argued against extending the voting deadline. And, ODP has informed the Court that the delay of the DNC does not change

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<sup>17</sup> Further, the Court notes that in Secretary LaRose's letter to the Ohio General Assembly, in which he advocated for a June 2, 2020 voting deadline, he explained that he could not complete *his* proposed plan earlier than June 2, 2020. But his proposed plan was different than H.B. 197.

ODP's position on this matter because the delay does not impact the rules or deadlines for certifying state party delegations.

The State of Ohio certainly has an interest in concluding voting early enough to permit the major political parties to send delegates to their national conventions, and this interest outweighs the burden that the tight timeframe imposes on Ohio voters. ODP has explained that, notwithstanding the fact that the DNC has been rescheduled, there remains a deadline of June 20, 2020, for state parties to certify to the DNC's Secretary the state party's delegation to the convention. ODP requires that the election be at least eight weeks prior to that June 20, 2020 deadline in order to meet the same.

The fact that other states have afforded more voting opportunities to their voters, in this case by extending their primaries until June 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, is not persuasive evidence undermining Ohio's interest in concluding voting by April 28, 2020. There is no evidence regarding whether the political parties in those other states have adopted delegate selection plans like ODP's that require approximately eight weeks of post-primary actions, nor is it at all clear whether ODP could have a different delegate selection plan approved in order to accommodate a later deadline for submitting absentee ballots while still meeting the June 20, 2020 DNC certification deadline.

LPO and RPO offer similar arguments in support of concluding voting quickly, and the Court finds them equally applicable to the State of Ohio's interest in having the deadline on April 28, 2020, notwithstanding the DNC's change in

date. In particular, the Court rejects LPO's supplemental argument that the Court no longer needs to keep the April 28, 2020, deadline but should establish a deadline by May 12, 2020. LPO did not address DPO's argument that the certification deadline has not changed for the DNC.

Finally, given the upheaval that the change to the voting process has already created, the Court agrees that the State has a strong interest in minimizing disorder and easing the burdens on county boards of elections. By permitting the boards of elections to continue to use the absentee-balloting system already in place and changing only the deadline for accepting those ballots, H.B. 197 furthers that interest. State of Ohio Resp. 15, ECF No. 52 (citing *Mays v. LaRose*, No. 19-4112, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS, at \*\* 18–21 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 2020)).

Plaintiffs cite to *Fla. Dem. Party v. Scott*, 215 F. Supp. 3d 1250 (N.D. Fla. 2016) and *Ga. Coal. for the People's Agenda, Inc. v. Deal*, 214 F. Supp. 3d 1344 (S.D. Ga. 2016) to support their argument that “federal courts have moved similar election deadlines that were rendered burdensome by emergencies.” Mot. 18, ECF No. 4. Those cases do not persuade the Court that Plaintiffs in this case are entitled to relief.

In *Scott*, the timing of a hurricane created an emergency that resulted in over a hundred thousand people who were likely to register in the final week of voter registration being evacuated. 215 F. Supp. 3d at 1257. This left those voters “foreclosed from the only methods of registering to vote.” *Id.* The court in

*Scott* found that this created a severe burden on the right to vote because some people were unable to register, and, therefore, “categorically” denied the right to vote. *Id.* There is no such categorical denial of the right to vote here. Plaintiffs have alleged that there could be timing or logistical issues that make voting more challenging than it might otherwise be, but there is not even an allegation of a broad, categorical denial of the right to vote.

*Deal* provides very little in the way of persuasive authority.<sup>18</sup> That case also dealt with a mandatory evacuation caused by a hurricane. 214 F. Supp. 3d at 1345. This resulted in the local board of elections office being closed for the last few days of the registration window. *Id.* Despite this, the state declined to extend the registration deadline. *Id.* The court noted that it “harbor[ed] significant reservations concerning the ultimate merits of Plaintiffs’ claims” but nevertheless concluded that they had established a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to warrant injunctive relief. *Id.* The court did not reference *Anderson-Burdick*, opine on the level of the burden on the plaintiffs’ voting rights, or engage in a detailed analysis of why the state’s interest was insufficient to outweigh that burden.

In sum, the Court finds that the State of Ohio’s interests outweigh the burden on voting rights caused by H.B. 197’s various relevant provisions such

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<sup>18</sup> This is perfectly understandable considering the court there was facing an emergency situation and issued an opinion the same day oral argument was held.

that H.B. 197 is not an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

### **3. Poll Tax**

LPO, in one sentence of its motion, suggests that H.B. 197 is an “impermissible poll tax in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.”<sup>19</sup> LPO Mot. for TRO 10, ECF No. 31 (citing *Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections*, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)). LPO did not attempt to develop this argument, and neither Defendant responded to it. Nevertheless, the Court has considered the issue and finds that, to the extent obtaining a stamp is a “restriction on the right to vote,” it is not “unrelated to voter qualifications.” See *Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd.*, 553 U.S. 181, 189 (2008). Instead, it is the type of “evenhanded restriction[] that protect[s] the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself” that satisfies *Harper*. See *id.* at 189–90 (quoting *Anderson*, 460 U.S. at 788, n.9); see LaRose Resp. 22, ECF No. 44 (citing R.C. 3505.18; 3509.03(B)(5) (explaining that a signature is needed to protect against voter fraud)).

### **B. Irreparable Harm**

If Plaintiffs are correct that some people will be unable to have their votes counted because of the voting procedures laid out in H.B. 197, the harm they would suffer would be irreparable. However, this alleged harm is speculative and

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<sup>19</sup> LPO’s lack of development of its poll tax argument is not rescued by its more detailed reply (after Defendants did not even address LPO’s motion).

is outweighed by the other three factors the Court considers when ruling on the motion for a temporary restraining order.

### **C. Harm to Third Parties**

As shown by Intervenor's motions, Plaintiffs' request to postpone the deadline for voting in the March 17, 2020 primary yet again could cause harm to both LPO and ODP. LPO contends that it will be prevented from participating at its convention if voting does not conclude by, at the latest, May 12, 2020. ODP argues that it could be prevented from participating in the DNC if voting is extended beyond the currently scheduled date of April 28, 2020. Accordingly, the Court finds that at least some of Plaintiffs' requested relief would cause harm to third parties.

### **D. Public Interest**

The public has an interest in a free and fair election. The public also has an interest in avoiding further voter confusion. Because Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims and because further changes to the election procedure could cause significant additional voter confusion, the Court finds that the public interest factor weighs against granting Plaintiffs their requested relief.

The Supreme Court has cautioned that "[c]ourt orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase." *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1, 4–5 (2006) (per curiam). The Sixth Circuit has previously found that "the difficulty in altering the

ballot printing and distribution at this late date . . . weighs heavily against an injunction.” *Estill v. Cool*, 295 F. App’x 25, 27 (6th Cir. 2008) (ballot printing and distribution was scheduled to begin the day after the Sixth Circuit issued its opinion, nineteen days after this Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction); see also *SEIU Local 1 v. Husted*, 698 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2012) (“As a general rule, last-minute injunctions changing election procedures are strongly disfavored.” citing *Purcell*, *supra*). Accordingly, the Court finds that the public interest in the election proceeding as determined by the Ohio Legislature in H.B. 197 weighs against granting Plaintiffs’ requested relief.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

The Constitution does not require the best plan, just a lawful one. As is apparent from the briefing in this lawsuit, every group has a different idea of what the best plan would be. But the Court will not declare the Ohio Legislature’s unanimous bill to be unconstitutional simply because other options may have been better. For the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO, ECF No. 4, is **DENIED**. LPO’s motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction, ECF No. 31, is likewise **DENIED**.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

/s/ Michael H. Watson

MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT