# MONTANA THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT YELLOWSTONE COUNTY

ROBYN DRISCOLL; MONTANA DEMOCRATIC PARTY; and DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

COREY STAPLETON, in his official capacity as Montana Secretary of State,

Defendant.

Cause No. DV 20-408

JUDGE DONALD L. HARRIS

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, MEMORANDUM, AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

#### INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Robyn Driscoll, Montana Democratic Party, and Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee have sued Defendant Corey Stapleton, in his official capacity as Montana Secretary of State, to enjoin enforcement of the Ballot Interference Prevention Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-701 *et seq.*, and the election day receipt deadline for absentee ballots set forth in Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-201(3), Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-211(3), and Mont. Code Ann. § 13-19-106(5)(b). Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The parties have agreed to submit the issue of whether the Court should issue a preliminary injunction based upon the parties' briefs and affidavits. Both parties have waived their right to a hearing under Mont. Code Ann. §27-19-

303. The preliminary injunction issues have been fully briefed and the matter is now ripe for decision.

## I. The Ballot Interference Protection Act.

Except for election officials or United States postal workers, the Ballot Interference Protection Act (BIPA) restricts who can collect a voter's voted or unvoted ballot. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-703. BIPA permits only caregivers, family members, household members, or acquaintances to collect ballots, but prohibits them from collecting and conveying more than six ballots. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-703(2) and (3). The BIPA also requires every caregiver, family member, household member, or acquaintance who delivers another person's ballot to sign a registry and provide: (1) the individual's name, address, and phone number; (2) the voter's name and address; and (3) the individual's relationship to the voter whose ballot is being delivered. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-704. The BIPA imposes a \$500.00 fine for each ballot unlawfully collected. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-705.

# II. The Absentee Ballot Election Day Receipt Deadline.

The absentee ballot election day receipt deadline (Receipt Deadline) requires absentee ballots to be received at a designated election office, polling place, place of deposit, or by an authorized election official before 8:00 p.m. on election day. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-201(2)(e)(i)-(iv). Absentee ballots received after the 8:00 p.m. election day deadline are not counted. Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-201(3); Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-201(5)(b).

## III. Plaintiffs Alleged Constitutional Violations.

Plaintiffs claim that, without furthering any legitimate state interests, the BIPA and Receipt Deadline significantly burden the right to vote and infringe upon the rights to free speech, association, and due process. The Plaintiffs argue that the BIPA and Receipt Deadline violate the fundamental constitutional rights of suffrage, assembly, speech, and due process under Montana's Constitution. Mont. Const. art. II, § 13, § 6, § 7, and § 17¹. Unless enjoined, Plaintiffs assert that the BIPA and Receipt Deadline will make it significantly more difficult for many Montanans to vote or to have their votes counted.

## IV. State's Justifications for the BIPA and Receipt Deadline.

The State argues that the BIPA is necessary to prevent fraud when absentee ballots are collected and delivered. The State contends that the Receipt Deadline is necessary to treat absentee voters the same as in person voters and to provide timely, accurate election results. Because the BIPA and Receipt Deadline are alleged to serve legitimate and compelling state interests, the State argues that the laws are constitutional. The State further argues that Plaintiffs have failed to establish a *prima facie* case showing that a preliminary injunction is necessary.

## V. Preliminary Injunction Requirements.

Under Mont. Code Ann. § 27-19-201, a preliminary injunction may be granted:

- (1) when it appears that the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded and the relief or any part of the relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually;
- (2) when it appears that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce a great or irreparable injury to the applicant;
- (3) when it appears during the litigation that the adverse party is doing or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Because of time constraints, the Court will address the Plaintiffs' Article II, Section 13 claim and reserve ruling upon the other alleged constitutional violations at this time.

threatens or is about to do or is procuring or suffering to be done some act in violation of the applicant's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual;

- (4) when it appears that the adverse party, during the pendency of the action, threatens or is about to remove or to dispose of the adverse party's property with intent to defraud the applicant, an injunction order may be granted to restrain the removal or disposition;
- (5) when it appears that the applicant has applied for an order under the provisions of 40-4-121 or an order of protection under Title 40, chapter 15.

The above subsections are disjunctive, "meaning that findings that satisfy one subsection are sufficient." *Sweet Grass Farms, Ltd. v. Bd. Of Cty. Comm'rs of Sweet Grass Cty.,* 2000 MT 147, ¶ 27 (quoting *Stark v. Borner,* 226 Mont. 356, 359, 735 P.2d 314, 317 (1987)). Consequently, only one subsection of Mont. Code Ann. 27-19-201 needs be met to support the issuance of a preliminary injunction. *See Stark,* 735 P.2d at 317. Additionally, the "grant or denial of injunctive relief is a matter within the broad discretion of the district court based on applicable findings of fact and conclusions of law." *Weems v. State by & through Fox,* 2019 MT 98, ¶ 7 (quoting *Davis v. Westphal,* 2017 MT 276, ¶ 10).

Further, the district court "does not determine the underlying merits of the case in resolving a request for preliminary injunction." Weems, ¶ 18. And "[i]n the context of a constitutional challenge, an applicant for preliminary injunction need not demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, but 'must establish a prima facie case of a violation of its rights under' the Constitution." Id. (quoting City of Billings v. Cty. Water Dist. of Billings Heights, 281 Mont. 219, 227, 935 P.2d 246, 251 (1997)). "'Prima facie' means literally 'at first sight' or 'on first appearance but subject to further evidence or information." Weems, ¶ 18 (quoting Prima facie, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)). Because Plaintiffs have moved for a preliminary injunction

based on constitutional challenges, they must establish a *prima facie* case of a constitutional violation.

Section 13 of Montana's Constitution states: "All elections shall be free and open, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." Mont. Const. art. II, § 13. The right of suffrage is a fundamental right. See e.g. State v. Riggs, 2005 MT 124, ¶ 47 (citations omitted) ("A right is 'fundamental' under Montana's Constitution if the right ... is found in the Declaration of Rights.")

Because voting rights are fundamental, statutes like the BIPA and the Receipt Deadline that allegedly infringe upon the right to vote "must be strictly scrutinized and can only survive scrutiny if the State establishes a compelling state interest and that its action is closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the State's objective." *Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't. of Envtl. Quality*, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 63; *Finke v. State ex. Rel. McGrath*, 2003 MT 48, ¶ 15. The State must "prove the compelling interest by competent evidence." *Wadsworth v. State*, 275 Mont. 287, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174 (1996). Merely alleging that a compelling interest exists is not enough to justify interference with the exercise of a fundamental right. *Id*.

## VI. Findings of Fact.

- 1. In support of their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Plaintiffs submitted the following Affidavits:
  - a. Affidavit of Kenneth Mayer, Ph.D.
    - expert opinions on voter suppression effects of BIPA and Receipt Deadline;

1		Affidavit of Trent Bolger - Montana Democratic Party Get Out the Vote (GOTV), absentee ballot collection, Receipt Deadline;
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3	C.	Affidavit of Beth Brenneman - Disability Rights of Montana, absentee ballot collection, Receipt Deadline;
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6	<ul> <li>d. Affidavit of Shelbi Dantic</li> <li>- Montana Conservation Voters, absentee ballot collection, Receipt Deadline;</li> </ul>	Affidavit of Shelbi Dantic
7		
8	- Chair, Montana Democratic Party, GC	Affidavit of Robyn Driscoll - Chair, Montana Democratic Party, GOTV, absentee ballot collection
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10		Affidavit of Mary Glueckert - College student, MontPIRG, ASUM, student voting, absentee
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12	g.	<ul> <li>g. Affidavit of Denver Henderson</li> <li>- Missoula County Election Advisory Committee, BIPA, absentee ballot collection, Receipt Deadline, COVID-19;</li> </ul>
13		
14	h. Affidavit of Sophie Moor - MontPIRG, student vo minority voters:	Affidavit of Sophie Moon
15		- MontPIRG, student voting, Receipt Deadline, working class voters,
16	i.	Affidavit of Linda Stoll
17	i la	- Montana Association of County Clerk and Recorders; BIPA, absentee ballot collection, absentee ballot tracking, absentee ballot verification, proposed BIPA amendments, Native American
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19		voting;
20	j.	Affidavit of Mary Hall - Chief election official for Thurston County, Washington; postmark deadline, counting postmarked ballots after Election Day;
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23	- Ex Vo	Affidavit of Marci McLean - Executive director of Montana Native Vote and Western Native Voice; GOTV for Indigenous voters on reservations in Montana BIPA.
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- The Court finds that, without exception, all Affidavits were verified and that 2 the material allegations in each Affidavit were made positively and not upon information and belief.
- The Court finds that, for the purposes of determining whether the Plaintiffs 3. have presented a prima facie case for a preliminary injunction, the statements made by the Affiants are credible and based upon extensive personal experience. The Court further finds that the expert opinions expressed by Dr. Mayer are credible and persuasive. Dr. Mayer has extensive education, training, and experience in the field of election administration, the impact of direct and indirect costs<sup>2</sup> on voter turnout, and the relationship between socioeconomic and educational status on the ability to absorb voting costs<sup>3</sup>. The methodology Dr. Mayer used is widely recognized and accepted in his field. Dr. Mayer's expert testimony has been accepted by both state and federal courts<sup>4</sup>. His research has been published in many peer reviewed journals<sup>5</sup>. The Court finds that the State has not challenged Dr. Mayer's opinions.
- Based upon Plaintiffs' Affidavits, the Court finds that the BIPA and Receipt 4. Deadline will significantly suppress voter turnout by disproportionately burdening voters who are Native American<sup>6</sup>, elderly<sup>7</sup>, disabled<sup>8</sup>, poor<sup>9</sup>, parents working low-wage jobs<sup>10</sup>, college students<sup>11</sup>, first-time voters<sup>12</sup>, and voters who have historically relied on GOTV and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Includes administrative burdens and compliance costs.

<sup>3</sup> Affidavit of Dr. Kenneth Mayer at 2-3

<sup>4</sup> Id.

<sup>5</sup> ld.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Affidavit of Linda Stoll

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Affidavit of Trent Badger and Affidavit of Robyn Driscoll

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Affidavit of Beth Brenneman

<sup>9</sup> Affidavit of Robyn Driscoll and Affidavit of Mary Glueckert

<sup>10</sup> Affidavit of Shelbi Dantic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Affidavit of Mary Glueckert and Affidavit of Sophie Moon

<sup>12</sup> Affidavit of Mary Glueckert

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ballot collection services like those provided by Western Native Voice<sup>13</sup>, MontPIRG<sup>14</sup>, Disability Rights Montana<sup>15</sup>, Forward Montana<sup>16</sup>, Montana Conservation Voters<sup>17</sup>, unionized labor 18, and the Montana Democratic Party 19.

- 5. The Court further finds that, in opposing the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the State failed to present any evidence to dispute the Plaintiffs' evidence (1) that the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes disproportionately burden the voters identified in paragraph 4 above or (2) that the statutes significantly suppress voter turnout by making voting more burdensome and costly for absentee voters.
- 6. The Court finds that the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes will only exacerbate voter suppression because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Requiring absentee voters to line up, fill out a registry form, and be quizzed by an election official before delivering someone else's ballot violates the social distancing required to prevent the unnecessary spread of COVID-19. Because a significant percentage of absentee voters deliver their ballots shortly before or on election day, long lines and crowded election offices will be commonplace<sup>20</sup>. The BIPA's registry requirement eliminated the previous use of secure ballot drop boxes that election officials could place at various sites throughout a community or county to make absentee voting easy, convenient, and safe. The COVID-19 pandemic will only increase absentee voting, thereby amplifying the voter suppression effects of the BIPA and Receipt Deadline<sup>21</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> Affidavit of Dr. Kenneth Mayer

<sup>14</sup> Affidavit of Mary Glueckert

<sup>15</sup> Affidavit of Beth Brenneman

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Affidavit of Dr. Kenneth Mayer

<sup>17</sup> Declaration of Shelbi Dantic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Affidavit of Denver Henderson

<sup>19</sup> Affidavit of Dr. Kenneth Mayer

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Affidavit of Dr. Kenneth Mayer

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> ld.

- 7. Based upon Dr. Mayer's Affidavit, the Court finds that there has never been a documented case of absentee ballot collection fraud in Montana.
- 8. The Court finds that the Receipt Deadline disproportionately burdens voters who mail their absentee ballots when compared to voters who vote in person. The Receipt Deadline requires mailed absentee ballots to be received by 8:00 p.m. on election day. If a mailed absentee ballot is not received by 8:00 p.m. on election day, it is not counted. The Receipt Deadline deadline disenfranchises voters who vote before election day, but whose ballots are not delivered by the United States Postal Service until after election day. Delivery times can vary as much as two weeks in Montana depending upon a voter's location<sup>22</sup>. Even if living in the same city, delivery times can vary from one to seven days.
- 9. The Court finds that the disparity and inconsistency of how long it takes to deliver a mailed absentee ballot significantly burdens absentee voters (1) because they must vote at least a week before the election to have a good chance of having their vote counted; (2) because they have less time and information to decide how to vote; and (3) because there is no guarantee that, even by voting a week early, their ballot will be delivered in time to be counted.
- 10. The Court also finds that there is considerable confusion and misunderstanding among voters about when they must vote by mail. Many believe, based upon filing income tax returns and paying property taxes, that their vote will be counted if postmarked on or before election day. Others reasonably believe that their mailed ballot will be delivered expeditiously if mailed a day or two before election day, especially if mailed to their local election office.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Id.

- 11. The Court finds that this misunderstanding and confusion disproportionately burdens first time voters, persons with less education, and persons who have historically relied on ballot collection services.
- 12. The Court finds that, during the current 2020 election cycle, the combined effects of the BIPA and Receipt Deadline will cause thousands of Montanans to not vote or will result in their votes not being counted.
- 13. Though the State alleges that the BIPA promotes the State's compelling interest in preventing voting fraud, the Court finds that the State has failed to present any evidence of absentee ballot collection fraud in Montana.
- 14. The Court finds that the BIPA serves no legitimate purpose: it does not enhance the security or integrity of absentee voting; it does not reduce the costs or burdens of conducting elections; it does not make absentee voting easer or more efficient; it does not reduce confusion about absentee voting requirements; and it does not increase voter turnout.
- 15. The Court finds that not a single election official in Montana supported the BIPA in legislative hearings; nor has the State presented any evidence from any election official that the BIPA: (1) will promote the integrity, security or efficiency of absentee voting; (2) will reduce election costs or burdens; and (3) will increase voter turnout. The evidence from election officials has been just the opposite. In fact, one election official from Cascade County who testified before the State Administration and Veteran Affairs Committee on February 27, 2020 characterized the BIPA as the "Voter Suppression Act of 2018." Plaintiffs' Ex.3 at p. 24.

- 16. The Court finds that the State also failed to present any evidence that the Receipt Deadline promotes a compelling state interest.
- 17. The Court finds that the Receipt Deadline fails to treat in person and absentee ballot voters uniformly. As long as in person voters are in line by 8:00 p.m. on election day, their ballots are counted no matter how many hours after the 8:00 p.m. deadline they actually vote. Not so with absentee voters, whose votes will not be counted if received after the 8:00 p.m. deadline even if they voted days before the deadline.
- 18. While the State has a compelling interest in accurately tabulating and reporting election results in a timely fashion, the State failed to present any evidence that the Receipt Deadline furthers that interest. The State does not limit the time period for certifying election results; Montana counts federal write-in ballots for military and overseas votes until the Monday after election day and provisional ballots are not even counted until six days after election day. The State failed to present any evidence that using a postmark deadline, where all mailed ballots are counted if postmarked on or before election day and received by the same deadline for federal write-in ballots for military and overseas voters, would frustrate the State's ability to timely certify election results. The Court finds that, by using a postmark deadline, the State can accurately and timely certify election results without disenfranchising the thousands of eligible voters whose ballots are now ignored under the Receipt Deadline.

#### VII. Conclusions of Law.

1. The Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of presenting a *prima facie* case through credible and persuasive evidence that the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes

burden and interfere with the fundamental right to vote guaranteed by article II, section 13 of Montana's Constitution.

- 2. The State has failed to demonstrate through competent evidence that there is any compelling state interest that warrants the burdens and interference on the right to vote imposed by the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes.
- 3. If a preliminary injunction is not granted, the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes will cause irreparable harm to thousands of Montana voters by preventing absentee ballot voters from voting or by disenfranchising those whose absentee ballots are received after election day.
- 4. This Court concludes that the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes are subject to strict scrutiny and that the State must demonstrate though competent evidence that the statutes further compelling state interests. This Court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction, however, would not change even under the balancing test advocated by the State, i.e. balancing the burdens the statutes impose against the interests the state advances for burdening voting rights. The Court has found that the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes advance no legitimate state interests, yet place significant burdens on the fundamental right to vote. The State would not prevail even under the balancing test it advocates.
- 5. Based upon the evidence submitted thus far, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits and would be entitled to a permanent injunction to enjoin the enforcement of the BIPA and Receipt Deadlines statutes.
- 6. The Court concludes that, pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 27-19-201(1) and (2), a preliminary injunction should issue enjoining the enforcement of the BIPA and

Receipt Deadline statutes because the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes violate the right to vote. The Court reserves ruling upon whether these statutes also violate additional constitutional rights as Plaintiffs allege.

#### VIII. Memorandum.

While not essential to the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court will address the additional arguments asserted by the State.

## 1. Plaintiffs' delay in seeking a preliminary injunction.

The State argues that Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion should be denied because Plaintiffs' delay in seeking a preliminary injunction until just before the June 2 primary election undermines their claim of irreparable harm. Def.'s Resp. 2. In Montana, the right to vote is a fundamental right guaranteed by Montana's Constitution. *State v. Riggs*, 2005 MT 124, ¶ 47. The loss of a constitutional right "constitutes irreparable harm for the purpose of determining whether a preliminary injunction should be issued." *Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass'n v. State*, 2012 MT 201, ¶ 15 (citing *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). As set forth above, the Plaintiffs have shown the BIPA and the Receipt Deadline violate Montanans' constitutional right to vote. The Plaintiffs have demonstrated irreparable harm for the purposes of determining whether a preliminary injunction should be issued.

The State also argues that Plaintiffs should be estopped from complaining about irreparable harm due to their delay in bringing the case. Def.'s Resp. 2. The cases the State cites to support its argument, however, are inapplicable here because those courts were faced with determining irreparable injury for copyright, trademark, and antitrust and trade violations, not constitutional violations. Def.'s Resp. 2-3 (citing *Oakland Tribune, Inc.* 

v. Chronical Publ'g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985); Garcia v. Google, Inc. 768 F.3d 733, 746 (9th Cir. 2015); Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 276-77 (2nd Cit. 1985)). The Plaintiffs have shown irreparable harm per se by presenting a prima facie case that the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes violate Montanans' constitutional right to vote.

## 2. Timing of preliminary injunction.

The State also argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has "repeatedly emphasized" its disfavor of altering election rules by injunction on the eve of an election because such orders can result in "voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls." Def.'s Resp. 3 (quoting *Rep. Nat'l Comm. V. Dem. Nat'l Comm.*, 206 L.Ed. 2d 452, 453-54 (2020) (*pur curiam*); *Purcell v. Gonzalez*, 549 U.S. 1 (2006)). However, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:

[i]mportantly, in their preliminary injunction motions, the plaintiffs did not ask the District Court allow ballots mailed and postmarked after election day . . . be counted . . . [t]hat is a critical point in the case . . . the District Court unilaterally ordered absentee ballots mailed and postmarked after election day . . . still be counted . . . [e]xtending the date by which ballots may be cast by voters—not just received by the municipal clerks but cast by voters—for an additional six days after the scheduled election day fundamentally alters the nature of the election.

Rep. Nat'l Comm. 206 L. Ed. 2d 452 at 1206-7.

Rep. Nat'l Comm. is not applicable here for several reasons. First, the relief sought by the Plaintiffs here is the relief granted by this Court. Second, this Court is not altering the "date by which ballots may be cast by voters," but rather whether absentee ballots postmarked on or before election day can be counted. The preliminary injunction does not "fundamentally alter the nature of the election". *Id.* Third, the injunction here will not result in voter confusion nor will it disenfranchise voters. Instead, the Court's preliminary

injunction will mitigate the voter suppression effects of the BIPA and Receipt Deadline statutes. Specifically, those absentee ballots received by the election office after the Receipt Deadline and those delivered by persons outside the statutory exceptions in BIPA will now be counted. Because the preliminary injunction granted here does not "fundamentally alter the nature of the election" or result in voter confusion or disenfranchisement, the State's reliance on *Rep. Nat'l Comm* is misplaced. *Id.* 

#### 3. BIPA's passage by referendum.

The State next argues that because the BIPA was passed by Montana voters by a wide majority, the referendum was a "demonstration of a compelling state interest." Def.'s Resp. at 6 (citing *Montana Auto. Ass'n v. Greely*, 193 Mont. 378, 384, 632 P.2d 300, 303 (1981)). In *Montana Auto. Ass'n*, the Montana Supreme Court stated that "the statewide vote on I-85 is a demonstration of a compelling state interest in the enactment of I-85." *Id.* However, the Court also declared portions of the initiative unconstitutional. *Id.* While the Montana Supreme Court has recognized that a statewide initiative passed by Montana voters can indicate a compelling state interest, initiatives must still pass constitutional muster. Whether enacted by the legislature or by voter referendum, statutes cannot violate the Constitution. The State's argument that the BIPA's enactment by referendum shields the BIPA from constitutional scrutiny is mistaken.

#### Voter fraud in other states.

The State argues that voter fraud in other states constitutes a compelling state interest for adopting the BIPA. The State contends that Montana "need not wait for evidence of fraud [in Montana] to justify preventative measures." Def.'s Resp. at 7. The State's argument ignores the Plaintiffs' evidence: (1) that the BIPA targets **non-fraudulent** 

absentee ballot collection in Montana; (2) that Montana already has a comprehensive set of statutes that prohibit and criminalize fraudulent voting activities, Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-101 *et seq.*; and (3) that while the BIPA suppresses voting, it does nothing to advance the integrity or security of Montana elections. The State failed to present any evidence that Montana's pre-BIPA statutory scheme for preventing voter fraud would be insufficient to deter fraudulent absentee ballot collection practices. To put in perspective the success of Montana's pre-BIPA statutes prohibiting voter fraud, for the decade from 2006 through 2016, there has not been a single case of ballot collection fraud even though voters cast 7,079,953 absentee or mail ballots in Montana.<sup>23</sup>

For those reasons, the State's reliance on the Morley blog-posting entitled "Election Modifications to Avoid During the Covid-19 Pandemic," Lawfare (Apr. 17, 2020), is misplaced. Morley warns that elections officials should avoid adopting new election strategies in response to the Covid-19 epidemic that may create unforeseen problems with election administration and security. Morley identifies one such strategy as authorizing absentee ballot collection. Morley advises that "election officials should reject ... the use of third-party 'designated persons' – frequently referred to as 'ballot harvesters' – to collect absentee ballots from voters (except in jurisdictions where state law expressly authorizes their use)." Morley recommends that, "[e]lection officials should not expand the use of third-party ballot harvesting, particularly as a response to the pandemic." Morley's concerns do not support the BIPA. The BIPA was not enacted in response to COVID-19; the BIPA targets non-fraudulent absentee ballot collection; and Montana has permitted

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Affidavit of Dr. Kenneth Mayer

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third-party absentee ballot collection for many years without a single case of fraud being reported.

Based upon the above Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

- 1. The Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction is **GRANTED**;
- 2. The Defendant and his agents, officers, employees, successors, and all persons acting in concert with each or any of them are **IMMEDIATELY** restrained and prohibited from enforcing the provisions of the Ballot Interference Prevention Act, Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-701 *et seq.* and the election receipt deadline for absentee ballots set forth in Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-201(3), Mont. Code Ann. § 13-13-211(3), and Mont. Code Ann. § 13-19-106(5)(b) pending resolution of the Plaintiffs' request that the Defendant be permanently enjoined from enforcing the statutes cited above;
- 3. All absentee ballots postmarked on or before election day shall be counted, if otherwise valid, provided such ballots are received by the deadline for federal write-in ballots for military and overseas voters; and
- 4. The Court waives the requirement that the Plaintiffs post a security bond for the payment of costs and damages as permitted by Mont. Code Ann. § 27-19-306(1)(b)(ii).

DATED this 22 day of May, 2020.

DONALD L. HARRIS, District Court Judge

Peter M. (Mike) Meloy Matthew Gordon J. Stuart Segrest, Asst. A.G. Aislinn W. Brown, Asst. A.G. Hannah Tokerud, Asst. A.G.