

I. This report represents the response to U.S. Department of Justice Purchase Order 9 PSCRT 2114 issued on May 22, 1989. It reflects my activities, findings, conclusions and recommendations in connection with the following Department of Justice matters:

Guam Adult Correctional Facility DJ 168-91-3

Agana Jail DJ 168-91-2

The Guam Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Inpatient Unit DJ 168-91-1

The on-site tour to Guam was conducted from June 11 through June 23, 1989. Report writing was done between June 20 through June 30, 1989.

## II. Activities

The on-site review of conditions at the Guam Adult Correctional Facility (hereafter ACF) and the detention facility which replaced the Agana Jail (hereafter Rosario) was conducted with and under the guidance of Department of Justice attorneys Mellie H. Nelson and Verlin Hughes. This consultant utilized the travel time from Lincoln, Nebraska to Honolulu, Hawaii on June 11, 1989 to review materials on the project which had been supplied by the Justice Department. Included were the following materials related to the previous investigation of conditions of confinement on Guam:

- March 1986            Justification Memo Proposing Guam Investigations
- May 1986            Notice Letter to the Governor of Guam
- August 1987        Notice of Findings to the Governor of Guam
- December 1986     Expert Report by Osamu H. Matsutani
- April 1987         Expert Report by Robert J. Christensen
- August 1987        Expert Report by L. G. Grossman

In addition this consultant reviewed materials received from the Government of Guam in response to the May 4, 1989 letter from Verlin Hughes to Chief Deputy Attorney General Donald Paillette. These include:

- Current ACF and Rosario inmate census figures.
- Current ACF and Rosario staffing figures (by shift) and job descriptions.
- A description of available health care services.
- Recent fire safety inspection reports for the three facilities (including Mental Health).
- Recent Public Health sanitation inspection reports for the three facilities.
- Description of inmate access to a law library and/or other legal resources.
- Staffing report of the Mental Health Unit.
- Policies and procedures relating to medication and restraint practices for mental health patients.

After arrival in Honolulu and enroute to Guam, meetings were held with Ms. Nelson and Mr. Hughes to prepare for the on-site visit.

This consultant devoted three days to inspections of the ACF and the Rosario facility and related data gathering/fact finding. In order to accomplish our mission at all three facilities, Ms. Nelson and Mr. Hughes took responsibility for medical practices at ACF and Rosario and all aspects of the on-site visit to the Mental Health and Substance Abuse Inpatient Unit.

Our site visits started with a brief meeting on June 14, 1989 with Fred Black of the U.S. Attorney's Office. This was followed by a general meeting involving the inspection team; representatives from the Guam Attorney General's Office; and representatives from the Department of Corrections, the Guam Police Department, and the Guam Department of Mental Health. The participants included:

Mellie Nelson	U.S. Department of Justice
Verlin Hughes	U.S. Department of Justice
John Dahm	Consultant - U.S. Department of Justice
Donald Paillette	Guam Attorney General's Office
Dianne Pierson	Guam Attorney General's Office
Pat Mason	Guam Attorney General's Office
Marilyn Wingfield	Department of Mental Health
Louise Lettich, M.D.	Department of Mental Health
Tom Chargualaf	Guam Police Department
Angel Sablan	Department of Corrections
Rick Salas	Department of Corrections

The meeting enabled us to explain to the representatives of the Government of Guam what we would be doing during the next week.

After a brief stop at the office of the Director, Department of Corrections, the investigation team toured the Rosario facility. Currently it is housing pretrial detainees including those on overnight lockup. We were told that the Agana jail is still being renovated. When it is finished, it will presumably serve as the overnight lockup for the Guam Police Department.

The Rosario facility is a small, single story structure consisting of a core area and two wings of cells. There are eighteen cells in the west wing and twelve in the east wing. The inmate population was 46 males at the time of our tour. None of the cells had toilets or washbasins. A "core area" room held four toilets, four washbasins and four showers. Inmates are escorted to this area as needed. A control center/office and small storage room are also in the core area. The yard area surrounding the building is small and steeply sloping. A washer and dryer (home type) for use by the inmates are located just outside the building. The perimeter fence is topped with razor ribbon and is quite close to the main building. A small building next to the gate has a room for non-contact visiting.

The Rosario facility is staffed by a contingent of officers from the Guam Police Department. Other basic services such as medical, food, and maintenance are supplied by the ACF which is located across the road from Rosario.

Following our tour of Rosario we toured the ACF. The inmate census here is usually about 100 persons. This facility is entirely surrounded by double fencing. There are no towers, but a perimeter patrol vehicle is utilized from 2 p.m. to 6 a.m. Within the fencing is an administrative complex housing a central control station, an armory, administrative offices, contact visiting area, reception unit (8 cells), maximum security unit (14 cells), medical/infirmarium area, and kitchen/dining area. A small education program operates out of one of the rooms in this administrative complex.

Upon completion of our tour of these areas we went to Building F. Originally intended as a vocational training building, three of its four wings are open-bay type dormitories for inmates. There are also common areas for showers, toilets, washing machine and clothes dryer. The fourth wing of Building F is used as a library/law library.

Next we looked at a largely abandoned structure within the compound just north of F Building. This is the old Guam penitentiary. Only two of the rooms are utilized--one is a weight room and the other is a chapel.

Following this we toured D unit. This building was designed as a housing unit. It consists of four wings of cells. Each wing has two levels. A control station is located in the center of the structure. Each cell has a toilet/lavatory. There are common day areas for each wing and common shower facilities/laundry facilities.

Our final stop on this tour of ACF was the women's unit which is located just outside the ACF perimeter fence. This unit has its own single fence. The facility consists of an older part with staff

offices and inmate rooms. A newer section contains cells and storage areas.

The activities during the following morning for this consultant included an in-depth look at the operation of the ACF institutional kitchen, a check of the activity and operation of central control, an interview with the head of the maintenance department, an inspection of the emergency electrical power generator, and a review of the institution's operations manual--including the emergency response plans.

The afternoon was spent reinspecting the inmate living areas of ACF with particular emphasis on the smoke detector/fire alarm systems and the emergency exits. Following this there was an interview with the correctional officer who serves as an electrician for the facility. Next this consultant reviewed several inmate files and interviewed the Corrections Social Worker Supervisor to gain the necessary information on the inmate classification system.

The morning of the third day of this on-site visit at ACF and Rosario started with an interview with the training officer and review of his training materials. Next came a return visit to the Rosario facility followed by a tour of the perimeter of ACF including the outside building used as a staging area for inmate work details and a return visit to the women's unit.

The afternoon's work consisted of a tour of the housing unit currently under construction within ACF, an inspection of the armory and an extensive close-out interview with Lt. Frank Crisostomo who had given this consultant generous amounts of his time throughout the three days in answering questions and arranging area visits and interviews.

Part of the next day (June 17, 1989) was spent reviewing notes, outlining tentative findings and conclusions, and meeting with Ms. Nelson and Mr. Hughes to discuss our findings in advance of the

meeting scheduled for Monday, June 19 to brief the staff of the Guam Attorney General and representatives from police and corrections.

On June 19 and June 20, 1989 this consultant participated in meetings with the Department of Justice attorneys and Guam government officials. Present at the meeting on June 19 were:

Mellie Nelson	U.S. Department of Justice
Verlin Hughes	U.S. Department of Justice
John Dahm	Consultant - U.S. Department of Justice
Donald Paillette	Guam Attorney General's Office
Pat Mason	Guam Attorney General's Office
Dianne Pierson	Guam Attorney General's Office
Angel Sablan	Department of Corrections
Joe Rios	Guam Police Department

At this meeting each of the Department of Justice representatives reported his/her preliminary findings relating to the three facilities. Specific language concerning a consent decree was proposed to the Guam Attorney General's Office.

On June 20 the following individuals met:

Mellie Nelson	U.S. Department of Justice
Verlin Hughes	U.S. Department of Justice
John Dahm	Consultant - U.S. Department of Justice
Donald Paillette	Guam Attorney General's Office
Pat Mason	Guam Attorney General's Office
Dianne Pierson	Guam Attorney General's Office

Mr. Paillette rejected the idea of signing a consent decree and suggested that within sixty days the Government of Guam would complete or be in the process of completing work to correct all deficiencies we had cited. There was brief discussion by Ms. Nelson of other options open to the Department of Justice. The meeting was adjourned, thus completing the on-site inspection phase of this project.

### III. Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

When one compares the situation described in the reports generated by the Department of Justice consultants in 1986-87 with the situation in June 1989, it is apparent that the Government of Guam has made substantial progress in improving the conditions of confinement and treatment of its prisoners. Yet there remain significant problems which need to be addressed. Some of these are obvious and should have been dealt with immediately. For example, the smoke detectors/fire alarm system was rendered inoperative in parts of the ACF due to fires several months ago, yet very little has been done to repair or replace the system.

For the most part, the issues described in the material which follows were investigated because they were cited in the August 1987 Notice of Findings to the Governor of Guam.

#### A. Adult Correctional Facility (ACF)

##### 1. Life/Fire Safety Issues

##### a. Fire Alarm and Smoke Detection Systems.

This remains as a major problem at the ACF. The original plan for the facility called for smoke detectors and alarm pull stations at all inmate living locations and selected locations elsewhere. The detectors and alarms were to sound locally as well as in the central control station. Such systems were partially installed and then allowed to fall into partial disrepair as the result of fires at various locations.

Specifically, the findings are as follows:

- In Building F the smoke detectors and alarm pull stations work but are not wired into Central Control.
- In Building D none of the smoke detectors or alarm pull stations work and have been inoperative since the last fire. The system has never been wired into Central Control.
- In the administrative complex there are no smoke detectors in the kitchen/dining room. Alarm pull stations do activate in Central Control. In the maximum security section the smoke detectors have not worked since the last fire down there. Alarm pull stations do work and activate in Central Control. All other areas in the administrative complex seem to have properly working smoke detectors and alarm pull stations. This includes the reception unit and the infirmary.
- In the women's unit there were smoke detectors in the newer section but none in the older part which contains a good deal of wood construction. None of the systems are wired into Central Control.

#### Recommendations

- Repair the smoke detectors and alarm pull stations in Unit D and wire those systems into Central Control.
- Wire the smoke detectors and alarm pull stations in Unit F into Central Control.
- Repair the smoke detectors in maximum security, being

certain that they and the alarm pull stations activate in Central Control.

- Place smoke detectors in the dining room, kitchen and food storage offices which activate in Central Control.
- Add additional smoke detectors in the older part of the women's unit and wire the entire smoke detector/alarm pull station system into Central Control.
- Be certain that the new housing unit being built within ACF has an adequate smoke detector/alarm pull station system which is wired into Central Control.

b. Fire Drills

There is a policy at ACF that there be monthly fire drills. There was no evidence that there had been an implementation of this policy.

Recommendations

Fire drills conducted monthly exceed the standards at most prisons for long term inmates. Fire drills should be conducted quarterly in all inmate living and activity areas as well as in administrative areas. These drills may be simulated in areas where release of inmates from cells causes a significant security problem. Reports of these quarterly drills (which should be conducted at different times for various parts of the institution) should be maintained and submitted for review to the chief executive officer. These reports should detail items such as the date and time of the drill, the area(s) evacuated, the

evacuation times, any fire/safety problems revealed by the drill and what should be (and subsequently was) done to correct the problems.

c. Fire Extinguishers

The ACF seems to have enough hand held fire extinguishers in living locations and activity areas. Some of these, however, are stored in control stations on the floor. In a few instances the extinguishers have been removed from wall mounted, wooden boxes.

Recommendations

Fire extinguishers ready for use must be mounted on the walls. If fire extinguishers have been removed from wooden boxes for placement elsewhere, these boxes should be taken off the walls.

d. Electrical Wiring

F Unit was never intended to be a housing unit. Its use as an inmate living area has created an "ad hoc" series of electrical wiring schemes which has rendered the entire system in the unit unsafe. Most other areas showed no unsafe conditions such as open wires. Reverse polarity in wall plugs may still be a problem. We did not have the technical equipment to check for this condition.

Recommendations

The rewiring of Unit F must be completed without delay.

A certified electrician must be hired by the ACF maintenance department to upgrade the electrical system

as load levels in various areas change and to maintain the overall system. Such a staff addition should also be knowledgeable about the electrical functioning of the smoke detector/fire alarm system (see A.l.a. above) as well as the perimeter alarm system and other electrical equipment.

e. Combustible Property in Inmate Cells/Dorms

Generally the institution has done a good job in controlling the amount of combustible property controlled by inmates. The one exception is the amount of combustible material used by inmates to cover the door windows in some inmate rooms. This constitutes a significant fire hazard.

Recommendation

Removal of these combustible window coverings is very important not only from a fire safety viewpoint, but also from a security viewpoint since they make inmate monitoring and counts difficult.

f. Improper Storage of Flammable/Toxic Materials

At the time of the inspection this did not appear to be the problem it had been in 1986-87. There is very little flammable/toxic material in evidence within ACF or the women's unit. However a problem involving control of these materials in the infirmary TV room was noted.

Recommendations

This is an important life/safety issue which should be monitored through keeping of detailed inventory

records, close supervision of inmates using these materials, and periodic inspections by senior level staff. The materials noted in the infirmary TV room must be secured away from inmates.

g. Maintenance of Emergency Exit Doors

This did not appear to be the problem it had been in 1986-87. Several of the doors checked showed evidence of recent lock maintenance. All doors checked were functional and staff had the keys to open them. Exits were clearly marked.

Recommendations

In a humid climate, the deterioration of locks due to rusting is a constant problem. The institutional locksmith should be checking all locking devices on a periodic basis to ensure they will continue to function. Ongoing preventive maintenance is very important in this area, and in all of the areas involving electrical or mechanical systems.

2. Sanitation

a. Personal Hygiene

The inmate showers in housing units D and F do not supply hot water and were quite dirty. The showers in reception and maximum security did not have hot water. Only one of the two showers there was working. The common area toilets in F Unit were insufficient in number, dirty, and some did not work. The plumbing throughout F Unit leaked. Inmate interviews at ACF revealed insufficient supplies of personal hygiene articles such as toilet paper, toothpaste and soap.

### Recommendations

Consideration should be given to having hot water available for inmate showers. Inmates equipped with proper cleaning materials should work under direct staff supervision to clean the showers and toilets on a daily basis. Inoperable toilets and showers must be repaired. Leaky plumbing must be replaced. Basic materials for personal hygiene must be supplied to all inmates. It is also recommended that an additional maintenance position be added to the staff to handle painting or installing tiles in the showers as well as the preventive maintenance necessary in the plumbing area.

#### b. Laundry Services

Inmates are presently using home type washing machines on the living units to do their laundry and often hang their clothes in the living units to dry. The hanging laundry reduces visibility for staff supervision, creates a potential fire hazard and would be an impediment to quick evacuation of an area. The washing machines do not have hot water.

### Recommendations

At the very least, hot water must be supplied to the washing machines on the unit, perhaps using booster heaters, to ensure sanitary cleaning of clothes thus preventing the spread of disease and infection. According to the "Guidelines for Hand Washing and Environmental Control - 1985" issued by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, laundry should be done for at least twenty minutes in water at 160 degrees F. A

somewhat lower temperature is allowed if sanitizers are used. Dryers ought also to be made available.

A better solution, and one which probably would be more cost effective in the long run, would be to construct a central laundry with commercial grade washers and dryers. This laundry operation could employ a number of inmates (thereby reducing idleness) and should be scaled large enough to do laundry for the ACF (including the women's unit), Rosario Detention Unit, and the nearby Youth Correctional Facility.

c. Food Service Health and Sanitation

The food service area of ACF was very clean and well maintained. The only concerns here have to do with equipment repair and maintenance. At the time of our visit, the large "walk-in" refrigerator was not working due to compressor problems. Food stuffs in the cooler were on the verge of spoiling. While this situation had just happened, two smaller refrigerators had been out for several days. The main heating element in the dishwasher had been out for almost a month, waiting for a new element to be shipped. These dishes which had to be used were being sanitized and washed in cold water. Most of the meals were served on paper plates and eaten with plasticware.

Recommendations

As indicated above (A.I.d.) an electrician on staff to periodically check equipment (preventive maintenance) and to repair items that break down due to daily, prolonged use would help a great deal in keeping the food service equipment in operation. The dishwasher

and the refrigerators must be repaired and put back in service.

### 3. Institutional Violence Levels

The investigative reports of 1986-87 indicate an unusually high level of homicides and other inmate violence at ACF. During this investigation it was found that the situation had improved considerably. The 1986-87 reports identified a number of factors which the investigators believed contributed to creating a context for violence. These will be treated in what follows.

#### a. Inadequate Classification

Placing violent and non-violent inmates together, housing older inmates with younger ones--all this increases the risk of violence in an institution. In checking into the current classification system for ACF, it was found that sufficient data is being compiled on each inmate, the data is reviewed at a number of levels, and appropriate job and housing assignments are being made based on this data. There has been much improvement here.

#### Recommendations

The classification of inmates might be improved by using a quantitative system of assessing points for violence, length of sentence, substance abuse, previous record, type of crime, etc. This would streamline the placement of the inmate in the level system. Subsequent reclassification of inmates using a quantitative system to weigh institutional behavior, participation in work and treatment programs, and percentage of sentence served could streamline the

process of advancing the inmate through the level system.

b. Inadequate Security

There have been considerable increases to the security staff in recent years. These increases have been effectively used to increase inmate supervision, particularly in the housing units, thereby reducing opportunities for inmate-on-inmate violence. Procedures to guide security and other institutional staff are very well written and organized. The radio communication equipment functions well. The main security problems are in the area of perimeter security. The infrared motion detection system around the ACF perimeter has not worked from the day it was installed. The perimeter fence around the women's unit is about to fall down in places.

Recommendations

An assessment by an outside technical consultant familiar with the infrared system should be made to determine whether or not it could be repaired and how much it would cost. If the infrared system cannot be repaired, the perimeter patrol should be increased to two vehicles as the inmate population inside increases. The perimeter fence at the women's unit should be repaired as soon as possible.

c. Inequitable Treatment of Inmates

While there were previous (1986-87) reports that some staff showed favoritism to inmates who were their family members, we found no evidence of this and received no inmate complaints about this. The

institution is sensitive to this issue and staff seemingly report immediately any situation involving assignment near an inmate family member.

#### Recommendation

None.

#### d. Inmate Idleness

The addition of security staff has allowed for more work opportunities for inmates. Seven to eight inmate details of up to five inmates each provide useful labor for other governmental agencies. There is a small education program. But the advent of life-without-parole sentencing and other factors are likely to increase the ACF population, putting a great strain on the available programs. If the population increases, the planned restoration of F-Unit to a facility for programs may not take place. That, in turn, will remove a significant possibility for reducing idleness. Continuing to use F-Unit for housing will only compound the institution's problems since it currently needs a good deal of work if it continues to be a living unit.

#### Recommendations

As indicated above, inmate idleness can be further reduced by operating a central laundry and by increased attention to sanitation of showers and toilets. The education program could be expanded to more inmates. Finally, the inmate idleness factor could be reduced and positive rehabilitation encouraged by reinstating the inmate furlough program. Family visits and program oriented furloughs can do much for inmates,

particularly those who have served a good portion of their sentences and have been well behaved.

#### 4. Staff Training and Development

A well trained staff is crucial to the operation of a safe, clean and secure institution. Significant deficiencies in staff training noted in the 1986-87 visits undoubtedly contributed to many of the problems noted then. Since those visits, the ACF has improved significantly in the area of staff training and development. A structured on-the-job training program consisting of 120 hours of institution familiarization is now required of all new employees. In addition 28 new and veteran employees have taken a 14 week corrections training course at Guam Community College. This training is based on the training given by the California Department of Corrections. The ACF is presently putting together a second group to take this course. The ACF has also begun to require annual refresher training for all employees. The main weakness in the present training program is the fragmentation of training records and lack of monitoring. Presently the Director's office keeps some training records, the training officer keeps some, and the chief executive officer of ACF keeps some records.

#### Recommendations

The Department's training officer should keep all training records for individuals working in the Department. Monitoring to ensure that each person gets the required number of hours of initial and refresher training can thus take place. By computerizing these records both the Director and the chief executive officer of ACF can be periodically appraised of each person's progress in obtaining required training.

5. Access by Inmates to Attorneys and Courts

Issues in these areas denoted in the 1986-87 reports have been largely laid to rest. Legal materials are available in the inmate library. Inmates may request and receive escorted visits to the law library in Agana for more extensive research. Monitoring of telephone calls to attorneys and monitoring of attorney-client mail are no longer done. There were no inmate complaints concerning access to courts or attorneys made during our visit. The only problem noted is that inmate telephones for all calls are located in close proximity to housing unit control centers. This would allow staff to overhear the inmate end of an inmate-attorney phone call.

Recommendation

The ACF should consider having a telephone for inmate use located away from the housing unit control stations, thus affording a greater degree of privacy for attorney calls.

B. Detention Facility (Rosario)

1. Life/Fire Safety Issues

a. Fire Alarm and Smoke Detection Systems

This is a major problem at Rosario. At the time of our visit the entire system was not operating and had been nonfunctional for a month.

Recommendations

Repair the existing smoke detection and fire alarm system. Consider wiring it into the Central Control at ACF.

b. Fire Drills

There was no evidence that fire drills had even taken place at Rosario.

Recommendations

Fire drills should be conducted quarterly. These drills may be simulated for certain inmates whose release from their cells causes a significant security problem. Reports of these quarterly drills (which should be conducted at different times of the day) should be maintained and submitted to the police chief for review. These reports should detail items such as the date and time of the drill, the area(s) evacuated, the evacuation times, and fire/safety problems revealed by the drill and what should be (and subsequently was) done to correct the problems.

c. Fire Extinguishers

Rosario seems to have enough hand-held extinguishers. However they were stored on the floor under the desk in the control station. The extinguishers had been removed from wall mounted wooden boxes in the core area between the two cellblocks.

Recommendations

Fire extinguishers must be mounted on the walls whenever they are intended for use. Since the extinguishers have been removed from the wall mounted wooden boxes, these boxes should be removed.

d. Locks

All cells are individually locked & no central locking device. Additionally, the Rosario facility uses padlocks on some of its cells. This substantially increases the amount of time it takes for staff to unlock cells and evacuate inmates in the event of fire.

Recommendation

An "air pak" breathing apparatus should be available and staff trained in its use. This should enable staff to get all the cells unlocked in the event of a smoky fire.

2. Sanitation

a. Showers/Toilets/Wash Basins

These are all located in a room adjacent to the core area. This entire area needed a good cleaning. Two of the showers had no shower head. There was no hot water for showers, shaving or washing up.

Recommendations

The missing shower heads must be replaced and the entire area must be cleaned. Regular daily cleaning of the area by inmates under staff supervision is recommended. Hot water should be supplied.

b. Laundry Services

Presently inmates do their own laundry without benefit of hot water. A home-type washer and dryer are provided.

Recommendations

At the very least, hot water must be provided to the washing machine to ensure sanitary cleaning of clothes thus preventing the spread of disease and infection. A better solution would be the construction and use of a central laundry at ACF discussed above (A.2.b).

c. Drainage

A trench containing stagnant water was found right outside the facility. It served as a breeding place for mosquitoes about which both inmates and staff complained.

Recommendations

Drainage should be corrected so water runs freely and is not allowed to collect in stagnant pools. Spraying for mosquitoes may also be necessary if areas adjacent to correctional property contain breeding places.

d. Ventilation

Inmates and staff at Rosario complained of a lack of ventilation. Our observations bore out the truth of this contention.

Recommendation

Placement of large electric fans at the end of the range areas would do much to alleviate this problem.

3. Cell Accommodations

a. Bedding

Bedding is provided mainly by inmate families. Several cells had no sheets or mattresses--forcing some inmates to sleep on concrete floors.

#### Recommendations

Rosario must purchase and issue flame retardant mattresses and sheets to alleviate this problem. All inmates should have sheets and mattresses unless the inmate's behavior indicates otherwise.

#### b. Padded Cell

Concrete and steel construction are standard for most jail cells, including those at Rosario. However there was no padded cell to handle the out-of-control detainee who is psychotic or under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

#### Recommendation

Alter one of the cells at Rosario to provide a less potentially dangerous environment for the out-of-control inmate.

#### 4. Food Service

For the most part, the food service at Rosario seemed adequate. However there were inmate complaints verified by staff about lack of consistency in portion size, insufficient amounts of food, and meals which did not contain all the items on the menu.

#### Recommendations

Recognizing the difficulty in supplying food to a facility whose population changes significantly from day-to-day or within a day, communications could perhaps be improved between Rosario and the ACF kitchen which prepares the meals. The kitchen should be prepared to send additional food as substitution for short portions or as the inmate count increases. Sometimes sack meals (sandwiches, etc.) are the only solution if additional inmates arrive shortly before or during mealtimes.

5. Crowding and Lack of Activity

The Rosario facility is fairly crowded with a large percentage of its cells holding two inmates. There is very little activity for the inmates except for out-of-cell periods on the range in front of the cells. The out-of-cell time is limited to two 30 minutes periods a day.

Recommendation

Consideration should be given to putting in a weight room with exercise equipment and to constructing an area for basketball on the yard and allowing limited numbers of inmates at a time outside in the yard area. It would also be beneficial to have a television set for each cellblock.

6. Access by Inmates to Attorneys and Courts

Provision is made for attorneys and inmates to visit in private. Rosario inmates may use the ACF library for legal materials. However there is no provision for private telephone contact between an inmate and his attorney.

Recommendation

A telephone should be available at Rosario for private inmate-attorney calls.

7. Visiting

The Rosario visiting room is very small with poor ventilation. Visits frequently take place along the fence which drastically increases the possibility of contraband being passed.

Recommendation


Installation of air conditioners in the visiting room would allow more people to occupy it under much more comfortable conditions.

8. Staff Training

There was no evidence that the police officers working at Rosario had formal correctional training.

Recommendation

The Guam Community College staff who handle police academy training for the Guam Police Department should develop a one week short course in jail operations. Police officers presently working at Rosario should take the course, as should recruits who may expect to work at Rosario.



John J. Dahm

Corrections Consultant



Date of Report