.1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3	WESTERN DIVISION
4	THE HON. JUDGE GARY ALLEN FEESS, JUDGE PRESIDING
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6	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
7	Plaintiff,)
8	v.) No. CV-00-11769-GAF
9	CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,)
10	Defendants.)
11)
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13	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
14	Hearing on Motion to Amend the Consent Decree
15	Los Angeles, California
16	Monday, May 15, 2006
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22	Lisa M. Gonzalez, CSR, RPR
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1	Los Angeles, California; Monday, May 15, 2006
2	11:00 a.m.
3 ·	THE CLERK: Calling Civil 00-11769, United States
4	of America v. the City of Los Angeles and others.
5	Counsel, please state your appearances.
6	MS. O'BEIRNE: For the plaintiff
7	Patricia O'Beirne. Also for the plaintiff is the Chief of
8	the Civil Rights Division Special Litigation Sections
9	Shanetta Cutlar, Deputy Chief Dan Weiss, and Attorney Je Yon
10	Jung.
11	THE COURT: Good morning.
12	MR. MERKIN: For the defendants, Frederick N.
13	Merkin, outside counsel assisting the City Attorney.
14	MR. DE LA GUERRA: Good morning, Your Honor.
15	Carlos de la Guerra, Assistant City Attorney appearing for
16	defendants.
17	Also for defendants today is Mr. Gerald Chaleff,
18	the head of the LAPD's Consent Decree Bureau who, with the
19	Court's permission, is available to answer any questions the
20	Court may have with respect to the compliance or
21	implementation of the Decree.
22	Mr. Chaleff was also involved in negotiating the
23	Decree and can speak to the language or intent of any of the
24	provisions, if necessary.
25	THE COURT. Oh I think I know what the Decree

1 means. 2 MS. LHAMON: Good morning, Your Honor. Catherine Lhamon from the ACLU for community intervenors. 3 4 MR. YAGMAN: Good morning. Steven Yaqman for the 5 intervenors. 6 Good morning. THE COURT: 7 MR. CHERKASKY: Mike Cherkasky for the monitor. 8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 9 The matter is on today for hearing on what the 10 parties have chosen to characterize as a Motion to Amend 11 under paragraph 180. One of the things that I'm going to 12 want some discussion on is I don't think it's a 180 motion 13 at all, I think it's a 179 motion, and I think there's an 14 attempt here to eviscerate 179 through the use of 15 Section 180. 16 But before we get there, I do have a question. 17 Maybe Mr. Chaleff is the person to answer this. I want to 18 know what the status of TEAMS II is as of today, right now. 19 MR. CHALEFF: Good morning, Your Honor. 20 Gerald Chaleff. 21 THE COURT: Good morning. MR. CHALEFF: As of right now -- let me back up. 22 23 TEAMS II consists of four parts. One is the deployment 24 system called DPS; one is the use-of-force system; one is

the complaint management system; and then the risk

management and information system, which is the system that integrates the other systems and provides the automatic action items and other analysis that's built into the system.

As of right now the deployment system is completely rolled out, it's implemented, and is being used; and that's the backbone of the system because unless you know who's where and who worked with who, and who were the supervisors and what they were doing, you can't do the analysis.

The use-of-force system is approximately, I believe, 90 percent rolled out and implemented and should be fully implemented by the middle of next month.

The complaint management system still has some issues, but we are beginning to phase it in, and they have begun training, but it's been a more difficult process because of some issues with the vendors, but the department's Efficient Standards Bureau and the TEAMS II team and the information people have all been working together to satisfy that problem, but the historical complaint information is in the system.

Risk management system will be starting to be rolled out during the summer, but to be fair, I would say more would be early fall, maybe September, where it will have the updated TEAMS II reports and begin to do some of

the action items.

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THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Okay. Let's see. For the City, here's my question. As I think you know from a number of prior hearings, TEAMS II is not just a material part of this, it's an essential part of this Consent Decree and the reforms that are to be implemented through this Consent Decree.

Paragraph 179 says that this Decree requires, before it can expire, two years of substantial compliance with each material provision of the Decree. Given that TEAMS II is not in effect yet and that the rollout is not even going to start on risk management, why is two years a sufficient extension, why shouldn't it be more at this point?

MR. DE LA GUERRA: Well, if I can answer that, Your Honor, piecemeal.

Certainly TEAMS II is a very important component, no question about that. We believe the extension for two years is because the balance of TEAMS II will be rolled out this year.

THE COURT: But two years from June 15th, 2006, there will not have been, there cannot have been as of that date two years of substantial compliance with just that provision of the Consent Decree, setting aside everything else? That which is essential to the Decree cannot have

been a subject of compliance, substantial compliance, for two years as of that date, can it?

MR. DE LA GUERRA: It would be close.

THE COURT: Well -- close? They're not even going to start rolling out risk management until this fall, and we don't know when it will actually be fully operational in a way that is meaningful, as required by the Consent Decree, do we?

MR. DE LA GUERRA: And just the way the Consent Decree, the existing one provides that it will be reevaluated, I assume the Court will reevaluate it in two years to determine whether or not and to what extent the City has complied with TEAMS II.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think that answers my question. My question is how is it possible that I could find two years from June that TEAMS II has been substantially complied with for a period of two years?

MR. DE LA GUERRA: Unless it rolls out now, you're correct, Your Honor, it will not be done exactly in two years.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from the Monitor briefly on just this issue.

Mr. Cherkasky, what can you tell me, you've heard what Mr. Chaleff has had to say.

What's your take on where TEAMS II's development

stands at this point?

MR. CHERKASKY: We agree with what Mr. Chaleff said. I think it has been an enormously challenging effort for Los Angeles, I think that they're working hard at it. At the same time Your Honor is absolutely right, there cannot be a rollout, no one's expecting a rollout of the full system until sometime substantially after the fall of 2006.

We read the Consent Decree much like as Your Honor has indicated that there cannot be substantial compliance unless there's a full two years of monitoring of a critical element of this Consent Decree.

of the City with respect to its Section 180 motion, it seems to me that what the City is asking the Court to do is to amend the Decree in a way that would eviscerate that Section 179, which is the compliance provision. Do you acknowledge that or if you don't acknowledge that, if that's not your position, how am I supposed to construe this motion otherwise?

MR. DE LA GUERRA: Your Honor, just the mere reading of 179 ignores the language of 180. 180 allows the parties to jointly stipulate to make modifications, changes, or amendments in the Decree. There are no limitations with respect to paragraph 180.

THE COURT: Doesn't 179 trump 180? I mean, isn't 179: The City must comply with these terms and conditions for a minimum of two years, each term and condition of this Decree for a period of two years before it can be said to be in substantial compliance with the decree? And are you telling me that the three lines of Section 180 can be read to just say, "Well, what we can do is if we're not in compliance, we'll just change the Decree and essentially determine through that mechanism that we are in compliance by eliminating the requirement of Section 179"?

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MR. DE LA GUERRA: That is not what we're doing here, Your Honor. In fact, we're asking that the provisions where the City is not in compliance be extended.

THE COURT: Partial substantial compliance, first of all, is a contradiction in terms and, second of all, is not a phrase which appears in the Decree at least -- I was looking at it over the weekend trying to find that concept. I don't see it there anywhere.

MR. DE LA GUERRA: Paragraph 179 envisioned a motion by DOJ to extend the entire Decree; that is not what has occurred here. So if we read 179 to kind of force the parties that that's the only route available, that's also inappropriate because 180 stands on its own. And there are no limitations on 180 that prevent it from doing something different and separate from 179.

And is it your position that the Court 1 THE COURT: 2. essentially just acts as a rubberstamp, whatever you folks 3 want to do, I'm just supposed to say, "Well, that's just the way it is, and the Court has no authority over this even 5 though it's an order of the Court"? 6 MR. DE LA GUERRA: Not at all. Your Honor, has 7 inherent authority to craft remedy which we believe it would be appropriate to simply extend those provisions where the 9 City is not in compliance. Those provisions can be severed 10 from the rest. 11 In fact, the Monitor in their paper has indicated 1.2 as much. 13 THE COURT: That's not how I read the Monitor's 14 paper. I'd be interested to hear what it is in the 15 Monitor's paper that you think leads to that conclusion. 1.6 If I may have a moment. MR. DE LA GUERRA: 17 THE COURT: And since we have people here who are 18 supposed to talk about language, I'll have Mr. Cherkasky 19 talk about his language after you've told me what you think 20 it means. 21 Your Honor, if I could refer to MR. DE LA GUERRA: the Monitor's filing on Page 3, lines 22 and 23. 22 Hold on. Page 3, lines 22 through 23. 23 THE COURT: 24 Okay.

MR. DE LA GUERRA:

May I read?

THE COURT: You mean "While monitoring of discrete paragraphs is certainly possible."

MR. DE LA GUERRA: Sure. The Monitor's position is simply that they want the extension to prevent a backslide. It doesn't say that the provisions that have been complied with somehow cannot be monitored or should be monitored because you can't separate them from those provisions where there has not been compliance.

THE COURT: Well, isn't the Monitor really suggesting precisely the contrary, that is, that so long as there has been compliance the Monitor and the City need not expend a substantial amount of time focused on those aspects of the provision, but that they should remain a part of the provision so that periodically if the Monitor thinks some review is appropriate, the Monitor can do that, and the Court still has jurisdiction over the question? Isn't that what the Monitor's saying?

MR. DE LA GUERRA: Well, the Monitor has said that, but the basis for saying that is simply because they want to prevent or protect against backsliding, not because it is necessary. There's a distinction there.

THE COURT: You mean that we've got such a history of compliance with reform on the part of the department that we should just be very comfortable that backsliding won't happen? That is contrary to the last 40 years of history of

this City. And what the Monitor is saying is, "Not on my watch." That's what the Monitor is saying, I think.

We'll give Mr. Cherkasky a moment to speak for himself, but that's what I'm reading in this document.

MR. DE LA GUERRA: Would you like him to speak now or --

THE COURT: Well --

All right. Mr. Cherkasky.

MR. CHERKASKY: Your Honor, the Monitor's position I think is clear, which is that the Consent Decree in 179 specifically talks about this Decree as a whole, and it doesn't parse it out, it doesn't, in fact, have any provisions to separate the provisions. It talks about substantial compliance and that, in fact, refers to "material terms of the agreement," and "material" refers to overall objective of the intent of this Decree.

And that is not something that can be parsed, the overall objectives of this Decree. We were certainly not suggesting anything other than -- in fact, very specifically, 180 degrees differently, that this Consent Decree has to be looked as one. In fact, to separate it and to having a ticking and tying exercise, in fact, negates the intent that we believe has been the four corners of this Decree.

THE COURT: I take it both from your reports, from

documents that have been filed, Mr. Cherkasky, that you would agree that the department has perhaps for the first time in a long time made substantial strides forward in terms of reform efforts. Would you agree with that?

MR. CHERKASKY: I would.

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And, in fact, Your Honor, one of the things I think has to be said today is that overwhelmingly the parties agree, there are some areas where we do not agree, but overwhelmingly we agree that LAPD has made great strides, that they have overwhelmingly acted in good faith; that some of the institutional change, in fact, we had hoped to see in audits, in the IG's Office, in training, they, in fact, not only are greatly reformed, but we think that they're the standard for the country, that that's what this Consent Decree was supposed to do.

In paragraph 6 of the Consent Decree it very clearly talks about why we, in fact, are entering into this Consent Decree, and we're entering into it to remediate the problems of the lack of respect for civil rights and to, in fact, create a department that has been practices. We have some of those, but, in fact, the job is not done.

And it is very, very clear in the papers, the joint papers of the two parties that the job's not done. We completely agree with the Court's position that 180 is being used in some ways to get around 179, and it's clear

from the provisions of 180 that 180 -- that the two parties, by clear paragraph, cannot, in fact, force this Court to adopt that provision. It says, in fact, except where the Court rejects the amendment.

And we, in fact, believe that the two parties have indicated while great progress, there is not substantial compliance of all material provisions and, therefore, they're trying to have it both ways. And we don't think that's appropriate.

THE COURT: Now, I put some words in your mouth and if I'm wrong, I want you to correct me, but it's my understanding that if the Decree goes forward in its entirety that that doesn't necessarily mean that you and the City have to spend a lot of time and energy focusing on those things where there has been compliance. Am I right abut that?

MR. CHERKASKY: No, no. You are absolutely right, Your Honor.

Clearly, there are limited resources throughout this arrangement and, in fact, we think that it is critical that we take a high-level view over the key aspects that have not been complied with: Clearly TEAMS II, some uses of force, some of the aspects of the gathering of data and the nondiscrimination aspects.

There are a series of aspects which we think are

material and substantial, have not been complied with, and we believe that those are the things in the next two years we need to focus on.

But to, in fact, at this point say we're no longer going to have or the Court's no longer going to have jurisdiction over the rest of this Decree, again, we would submit that this Decree is one, that you can't parse this out; it can't be a ticking and tying exercise. It has to be the overall intent to, in fact, have material compliance with material provisions.

So, yes, we would actually intend to focus on those other aspects, but still have the ability if something goes wrong to look at and monitor the rest of the Decree.

THE COURT: All right, Thank you.

Counsel, do you want to respond?

MR. DE LA GUERRA: What Mr. Cherkasky just said about ticking and tying is exactly what would occur if you extend all the provisions and just say: Okay. We're really not going to monitor these over here, it is a ticking and tying that's going on. So the basis then is jurisdiction to see if anything goes wrong. Well, there can always be something that goes wrong. Even if we are in 100 percent compliance, there can be something that goes wrong, and so the risk of preventing this backslide would occur regardless of whether or not we were at 10 percent, 50 percent, or

100 percent compliance. It sounds like it's simply an issue of jurisdiction where it's not monitoring, but simply in case something goes wrong.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from the Department of Justice.

MS. O'BEIRNE: Thank you, Your Honor.

I would submit to you that the intent of the Decree is best achieved by focusing on the measures which have not been substantially complied with. I think that no one will dispute here that there is a substantial portion of this Consent Decree where reform still needs to be met. I do not agree with Your Honor that we are attempting to eviscerate paragraph 179 through paragraph 180. Paragraph 179 calls for that the agreement will terminate unless DOJ makes a motion to extend the entire agreement. We have not done so here. We did not find that it was appropriate in this case.

THE COURT: And I wonder why? I have real questions about why the department wants to, in my view, walk away from parts of this Decree.

MS. O'BEIRNE: Your Honor, we are not walking away from parts of this Decree at all, what we are doing is recognizing where there has been compliance and --

THE COURT: By the way, are you telling me that you don't think I have the authority to extend this since

you haven't made a motion under 179?

MS. O'BEIRNE: Not at all, Your Honor. We believe that our motion under 180 is the only motion that is within the four corners of the agreement itself, but Your Honor does have inherent authority to enforce the Consent Decree by moving to extend it. I think that's in appropriate circumstances. I just don't think those are the circumstances that exist here where there has been substantial compliance with discrete provisions which can be carved out.

THE COURT: If we look at this document and we look at what Mr. Cherkasky has said and what I've been saying for several years now, and what the parties agreed to in the beginning was a totality of an objective, a singular objective to reform the department for reasons -- for problems that had historical roots going back quite some period of time.

So the document is created, it is a singular piece of paper, although it's very long, but it has a principal objective, and all of the provisions of that document are aimed at achieving the overall objective.

So why now are we hearing that there are discrete provisions and that these discrete provisions should be viewed and analyzed separately when those so-called discrete provisions were incorporated in the first instance to

attain a singular objective, which was the overall reform?

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MS. O'BEIRNE: Yes, Your Honor, that was the way the Consent Decree was written and that was what the parties agreed. We have now had five years of experience with this Consent Decree, and even before that, Your Honor, my office spent years investigating this police department in order to establish our claims, in order to bring the Complaint, in order to negotiate the Consent Decree which also took many months. So we are well aware, and we take serious -- we take our responsibility for enforcing this Decree very seriously, but to answer Your Honor's question after having five years of experience with this Decree, we believe now that it's most important to focus on those areas where there has not been compliance yet.

And if you look at the --

THE COURT: The Monitor is saying exactly that.

The Monitor is saying that look, there's no question that operationally that is going to happen, but don't take away the ability during the course of working on those areas to turn back and say, "What is going on over here where we had made so much progress? Are we still in the -- are we still at the point where we're satisfied with that progress?"

And what you're suggesting is take away the jurisdiction of the Court and the Monitor's ability to look at that, and unless and until there's substantial compliance

with the whole thing seems to me that that's ill-advised.

MS. O'BEIRNE: Your Honor, if you look at the provisions that we are suggesting be allowed to expire, we're talking about some of the provisions that were the easiest for the defendants to come into compliance with.

The most -- the meat of this Consent Decree still remains, and we are very much concerned, and we appreciate Your Honor's concern about the progress of TEAMS II, and we monitor that very, very carefully. And we are very much looking forward to that being fully implemented this year, but the ones that we are talking about allowed to expire, we're talking about a situation where the student has made As in Home Ec and shop and now it's time for them to stop taking those classes and start focusing on the real meat subjects that they need to focus on.

And I understand that it's the Monitor's position that he still intends to spot check or review those, but once TEAMS II comes up and is fully implemented, that's going to take more resources, I think, than any other Consent Decree requirement to monitor that.

I want him focused on that and focused on these more important issues like complaint investigations, categorical use-of-force investigations, and not checking to see whether a form was filled out correctly or whether a report was delivered in seven days or whether it was eight

or nine or ten days.

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THE COURT: Well, it's most important since both of you -- I don't know if you were here during the original negotiation. I think you might have been --

MS. O'BEIRNE: Yes, I was, Your Honor.

of the points that both sides made is: That the Monitor's not our agent, we're not responsible for him, he's your agent. So I don't care what you want the Monitor to do, the Monitor's going to do what I want him to do because he's my agent in this process, and I'm comfortable that

Mr. Cherkasky has a very clear understanding of how this department works and what he needs to do, and how to allocate the resources, the limited resources, that are available to him. So that I'm not concerned about, number 1.

Number 2. I don't think you want to talk about the Home Ec analogy because we're talking in those circumstances about a task that you undertake, you complete it, you don't do it any more. Here we're talking about all the things that have to be day in, day out, week after week, month after month, year after year. It's part and parcel what the department must do constantly. They can never say these are things that we can stop doing now because that's not the nature of their business. So it's not a very

effective metaphor from my standpoint.

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Well, I have some serious reservations about the argument.

Let me hear from the intervenors. Who wants to be heard first?

MR. YAGMAN: I'll be very brief, Your Honor.

I had written down to make the same comment that the Court said about the Home EC and shop and how they were being treated as the most important subjects rather than things like English and American history.

I think the Consent Decree should be extended for five years to motivate the LAPD to reform and with the possibility of earlier termination if and only if there has been full compliance with the Decree and with the reforms that were agreed to. That would give the LAPD an opportunity to earn itself out of the Consent Decree rather than piecemeal, each time bumping it ahead. So I think that that's what the Court ought to consider doing. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Yagman.

MS. LHAMON: Good morning, Your Honor. I'll also try to be brief.

I think it's important first to take a look at what the cases say about the Court's authority to extend the Consent Decree. They provide consistently that the Court's inherent authority is to make sure that the parties have the

relief that was originally bargained for in the Decree -that's the Holland case from the Third Circuit at Page 200,
287; and then the Thompson case from the Fourth Circuit said
last year that the Court in modifying the Consent Decree
should, quote, "strive to preserve the essence of the
parties' bargain." The essence of the parties' bargain, as
this Court has already recognized was to extend the entire
Consent Decree if there was substantial noncompliance.

I think it's also important to talk about what's in the provisions that the City and the DOJ have asked not to extend. Some of them are not meat provisions and that's fair, but some of them are meat provisions, as the Department of Justice has characterized them. They seek not to extend paragraph 75 which discourages the filing of complaints.

THE COURT: When I see smoke coming from the fingers of the court reporter, I know that counsel is speaking too fast.

MS. LHAMON: Thank you. I'll try to slow down. Thank you for the reminder.

They seek to expire paragraph 75 of the Consent Decree, which prohibits discouraging the filing of complaints and requires that complaint form 1.28, investigation of any officer who discourages or refuses complaint filing.

They also seek to expire paragraph 152 which requires the inspector general to ensure complainants are not discouraged from filing complaints.

They seek to expire paragraph 82 which requires officers investigating categorical use-of-force incidents to report other misconduct they discover during investigation.

They seek to expire 92 which prohibits retaliation against any employee reporting misconduct. They seek to expire paragraph 139 which requires the Inspector General to review retaliation complaints from the LAPD employees.

I think it's important to look at material noncompliance that has taken place in these provisions and also to examine, frankly, what we risk if these provisions are expired. We risk reinstituting the code of silence. What we're talking about here is shrouding what's happening in the police department.

Also there has been material noncompliance as recently as the last quarterly report from the Independent Monitor for paragraph 75 and 152 which deal with the discouraging of the filing of complaints. The Independent Monitor found on Page 63 of his last report that he identified certain instances not identified by the Office of the Inspector General in which the complaint intake process was not facilitated by the personnel taking the complaints or where it can even be viewed that the filing of a

complaint was being discouraged.

He says, for example, in one sting audit, "The undercover complainant was given three options with respect to how the complaint could be followed up. One of those options included placing faith in the sergeant taking the complaint that he would identify, locate and inform the officers involved in the alleged incidents that their behavior was inappropriate" — this is a quote — "In another, the sergeant taking the call kept repeating to the undercover complainant to slow down, slow down" a problem for me as well, "seemed overly questioning with respect to the statements that the complainant was making, and generally displayed behavior consistent with discouraging the complaint."

Given these incidents, we are not in a position to see material compliance with the taking of complaints and to see those provisions expire.

Likewise, for the quarter ending only 11 months ago, the Independent Monitor found only 50 percent compliance with the requirement that officers investigating categorical use of force report other misconduct discovered during the investigations. 50 percent compliance is not material compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree.

Likewise, with respect to paragraph 92 which prohibits retaliation against any employee for reporting

misconduct, in the 17th quarterly report the Monitor withheld the termination of compliance because the anti-retaliation policy was new and related training was under development. We are not in a position now where we have seen material compliance with the meaty provisions that the DOJ and the City are talking about having excised from this Consent Decree.

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It's also important to note that these provisions are not discrete in and of themselves and stand-alone provisions.

For paragraph 75 and paragraph 152 which deals with the filing of complaints, those paragraphs, paragraph 75 requires that a complaint form 1.28 investigation of any officer who discourages the filing of complaints be instituted.

And paragraph 152 requires the Inspector General to review complaint-intake information to ensure officers do not discourage the filing of complaints be instituted.

And paragraph 152 requires the Inspector General to review complaint-intake information to ensure officers do not discourage the filing of complaints.

Intertwined containing provisions are paragraph 90 and paragraph 136. Paragraph 90 requires managers to evaluate all complaint form 1.28 investigations to identify problems and training needs.

Paragraph 136 requires the Inspector General to audit complaint form 1.28 investigations. It's critical that these intertwined provisions do continue with the rest of the Consent Decree.

And finally, Your Honor, I'm very concerned that the City and the DOJ have asked that the Inspector General should take over the Independent Monitor's functions within just one year. We have no evidence to date that the Inspector General is ready now to take over that function, although I very much hope that in the new Attorney General's Office will be able to do that. As much as the Inspector General's Office has made strides and is moving forward, the most recent report from the Independent Monitor noted that, quote, With few exceptions, the Monitor has found the Inspector General's review of audits noncompliant ever since the Monitor's first successful compliance and continued to do so in this most recent report.

Thank you, Your Honor.

All right. Does the City wish to be heard?

MR. DE LA GUERRA: Yes, Your Honor.

If I can respond briefly to Ms. Lhamon's comment. The fact that some of these provisions are being requested to expire does not mean that the reasons behind them go away, that the reforms simply evaporate. The department has put into place policies, orders, manual sections that will

continue to do the types of things that we are asking simply be removed as part of the Decree. The audits of officers discouraging complaints that will continue. In fact, under paragraph 97, audits are done continually.

The fact that the intervenor points to Holland as the basis for extending the whole thing -- if I can just read part of Holland to the Court:

"If the district court decides to use its compliance enforcement power to extend the Decree, the Court must make specific findings regarding the exact Decree provisions or sections with which defendant failed to comply and must determine which sections of the Decree must be extended to remedy this noncompliance."

And so it requires also a narrowing, not just the broad language that Ms. Lhamon wanted to quote.

As the Monitor himself has said in his filing, this is a different department now than what they found in 2001.

The Court mentions the 40-year history. Certainly not disputing that things have gone on over the past 40 years, but certainly the department needs to be given credit for the reforms and the changes that have occurred over the last five years which I can enumerate, but I'm sure the Court is aware of them.

THE COURT: You've put them in writing. I'm

certainly aware of what's been going on.

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All right. Ms. O'Beirne.

MS. O'BEIRNE: Thank you, Your Honor.

A couple of points I want to make in response to the ACLU's presentation.

The only paragraphs that the parties have put in their joint motion as requesting that the -- that they be allowed to expire are the ones where the parties have agreed and the Monitor has also agreed that a substantial compliance as that term is defined in the Consent Decree has been achieved. If the Monitor disagrees with me on that point, I certainly would be happy to discuss that with him and amend our filing to that effect, but we consulted very carefully with the Monitor over a long period of time over these provisions. And the other point I wanted to make is we were very careful to make sure and check with the Monitor that if these provisions were to expire that that would not hamper the continued monitoring of the provisions that remain.

I also want to address Your Honor's point about the Monitor and particularly about the Department of Justice's role in this case here. My office, the Special Litigation Section and Civil Rights Division, has tremendous experience in investigating and negotiating and enforcing compliance with Consent Decrees and agreements regarding the

statutes that we enforce.

We currently have over 100 matters open in our office, over 60 of these involve enforcing compliance with Consent Decrees and other agreements involving claims of unlawful or unconstitutional conduct. At any time over 40 percent of our staff is on the road either conducting on-site investigations or compliance visits or compliance activities. We do not hesitate to bring contempt actions or file suits when it's appropriate.

We've entered into 28 Consent Decrees in the last ten years, seven of those involving police departments. We have tremendous success with the work we do. We bring all of this experience and all this commitment to every single matter under our jurisdiction.

Your Honor, we're the plaintiffs here. I know that you said that you consider this to be your Consent Decree, but we also consider it to be our Consent Decree.

As I mentioned we spent years in investigation and negotiation of the Consent Decree, but even once the Consent Decree was entered our responsibilities continued. We have review and approval responsibility for all the scores of new policies, we never rubber-stamped a single one, they all went back with substantial edits and comments and questions. That was work that did not involve the Monitor.

The design of TEAMS II, we spent almost two years

negotiating and working with the City to make sure that that design was appropriate and met the requirements of the design paragraphs of the Consent Decree. We had private consultants that we gave them the benefit of, we met countless times, thousands of e-mails and hours of meetings and phone calls just to get that design document approved. The Monitor had no role in that.

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Not only do we consider it our responsibility to ensure that the defendants are complying with the Consent Decree, but it's also our responsibility to make sure that the Monitor is doing his job appropriately, focusing on the areas that he's supposed to focus on and monitoring the Consent Decree the way the parties intended. To that end, we are here every month attending the monthly compliance meetings, we are actively involved in the discussions regarding what the Monitor has accomplished over the month and what the defendants have accomplished. We make requests and suggestions and comments where it's appropriate. We comment on the Monitor's draft report every quarter.

In the beginning years of this Consent Decree our comments ran 30 single-spaced pages for a hundred page report. Like everything else, it's gotten better, but we have taken this job very seriously.

We've also, over the past five years, we've undertaken our own investigation independent of the Monitor

regarding issues that we had concerns about. We have at times recommended to the Monitor that he find the defendants out of compliance with provisions where he wanted to find them in compliance, and we've negotiated and had disputes about that.

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We've directed the Monitor's attention to issues that we felt have not been appropriately addressed. So I take issue with Your Honor's comment that we are walking away from this. We have never walked away from this. We've been involved with this very seriously every single day from the very beginning, including me personally.

As Your Honor noted, I was involved in the negotiation of this Decree, and I have been involved with this case ever since.

THE COURT: All right. Is that it?

MS. O'BEIRNE: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Cherkasky, do you have any final comments?

MR. CHERKASKY: Just one, Your Honor.

A little over five years ago you called me into your office and you asked me to commit to this Consent Decree, and you said to me that you wanted me to commit the way the parties have committed, that I would be here for five years or whatever it took, and that we would commit to obtain the objectives of the Consent Decree, which you

expressed in personal terms to be important.

I made that commitment to you and I think that was appropriate, and I think at the time the parties made that commitment, and I'm not suggesting they're not committed now, but I think that commitment has to be reaffirmed.

Simply, we haven't finished the job. It is critically important. It is one Consent Decree. You can't start to carve out pieces of this and get the full intent of what we're trying to do, which is remediate a long-term problem with LA. We need to, in fact, finish this job so it won't happen again, so I'd ask the Court to do that.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Cherkasky.

All right. The -- my view of this motion is that by making the motion under Section 180, I do think that there's an effort to go around Section 179, and I'm not going to allow that to happen. Section 179 is what I think is controlling, and Section 179 says that the Decree continues unless and until there's substantial compliance with all material provisions. The parties have conceded in submissions to this Court that there are material provisions of this agreement with which they're not in substantial compliance.

TEAMS II, aspects of categorical use of force, aspects of the discrimination provisions of the Consent Decree are areas where there is not substantial compliance.

As I've said in the course of this discussion, I agree that the department has made progress, progress in many ways that have never been done before, but I think I may have said this before. I do not believe that in my working life there will be any other case that is remotely close to as important as this case for this department and this community.

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Decree in this case, we will have a better police department and we will have a better City in which to live. It will be to everybody's benefit. Those who participate in the department, as well as those who are subject to the police department in their everyday lives, for the people who live here, who work here, who travel here, it will be a better place, and I expect that that is going to happen. And I expect that we are going to achieve that objective, but we are not going to achieve that, in my view, by starting to carve pieces out. The motion to modify the Consent Decree is, therefore, denied.

The Consent Decree based upon the concession of the parties that there's not substantial compliance, as well as the series of quarterly reports which have been submitted to me by the Monitor since this matter has been committed to my jurisdiction is extended; and it's extended for a period of three years, through June 15th, 2009.

I do not see any point in extending it for two years when the first question I asked was answered in a way that we know it cannot be complied with. There cannot be substantial compliance with the core term, what I believe to be the core term of this Decree, TEAMS II. There cannot be substantial compliance for a period of two years as of June 15th, 2008, so continuing it to that date simply invites further motion practice. That is the Court's ruling and that is how we're going to proceed with this matter. The Court will be in recess. (At 11:52 a.m., proceedings adjourned.)

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CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code, the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. February XX, 2006 Date: LISA M. GONZALEZ, U.S. COUR CSR NO. 5920