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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

2 Docket No. 80 C 5124 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 3 Plaintiff, 4 Chicago, Illinois v. September 26, 1983 5 8:00 a.m. CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, etc., 6 Defendant. 7 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 8 BEFORE HONORABLE MILTON I. SHADUR 9 TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: 10 APPEARANCES: 11 For the Plaintiff: ALEXANDER ROSS and 12 PEGGY GORDON, Assistant United States Attorneys; 13 14 For the Defendant: ROBERT HOWARD C. RICHARD JOHNSON 15 HUGH MC COMBS ROBERT WEISSBOURD 16 Dolores Brennan Court Reporter 17 219 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 18 19 20 21 22

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THE CLERK: 80 C 5124, United States against Board of Education.

MR. HOWARD: Good morning, your Honor. Robert Howard,
C. Richard Johnson, Hugh McCombs and Robert Weissbourd for
the Board of Education.

MR. ROSS: Alexander Ross and Margaret Gordon for the United States.

THE COURT: Counsel, is the motion for leave to intervene on behalf of the Desegregation Assistance Centers, and also I suppose alternatively, to file a brief amici, is that set for now? I didn't see the notice date in connection with it.

MR. HOWARD: I don't recall that there was any notice.

It came with a cover letter to the clerk, which I think said,

Please accept for filing, but I don't recall the date.

I am sorry, I told Miss McNamara, who represents the Women's Equity People that we would be here today, but I don't think I talked to anyone in Mr. Brown's office. There is no notice date established with respect --

THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that is something that it would have been more convenient, of course, to have had it dealt with this morning since we have this time set aside, but we will talk about that then subsequently in terms of scheduling

Let us address then the current motion of the Board to extend the Court's order of June 30th as previously

modified by this Court's order of July 26, orders more accurately, and also as impacted by the Court of Appeals decision of September 9.

First of all, Mr. Ross, there is no problem, I assume or Miss Gordon, there is no problem with any notice aspects of this.

MR. ROSS: None, your Honor.

THE COURT: Would you like to address the position of the Board, which I think is spelled out pretty well in its motion?

MR. ROSS: Yes, I would, your Honor.

ask also as a preliminary question, is there any issue of power here? That is, are you satisfied that the decisions as exemplified by a series of Court of Appeals decisions, most recently that State of Connecticut v. Schweiker, and also at least the inferential dictum in our own Court of Appeals decision in a slightly different context, in that Simer agains Rios case, would apply to authorize such an order if it were appropriate.

MR. ROSS: Yes, your Honor. I do think that the Court has such power. As you might well imagine, the DC Circui is filled with cases of that kind, and I am convinced that it is very clear that you do have the power.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. ROSS: The United States and the Board of Education are fairly well in agreement on the need to escrow the funds. We are a little bit, not in agreement on the way to do that.

I am told by the people at the Department of Education that it is necessary to make the people who would have gotten these grants conditional obligees before the end of the fiscal year, to be safest about whether the money is adequately prevented from lapse, and you have a proposed order attached to the Board's motion that is a little bit different from a proposed order that counsel and I have worked out on Friday.

I also have a proposed order which addresses some of the other issues, and for the convenience of the Court we have separated the escrow portion that we agreed upon into a third document so that we will give all three to you, and you will see where the differences lie. But, as far as preventing the funds from lapsing, I think it is necessary for the Court to take some action and that the Court has that power.

Now, would you like me to address the other part of the Board's motion?

THE COURT: Yes, please, if you would.

MR. ROSS: The Board has mentioned the proposed legislation, and at this point no one has any idea of what kind of legislation, and when, and if, and I think we need

to come back to court as soon as some action is taken in that regard.

I hope that -- If your Honor will recall, the recent history of appropriation by continuing resolution, there have been midnight on the 30th fights, and threats of vetoes over any number of issues, and I would imagine with the fiscal year ending on a Friday, that that would give both the White House and the Congress a whole weekend to jockey back and forth on what the continuing resolution will look like.

So I would guess it will be at least Monday, if not possibly later before that legislation is passed, and with or without some legislation having to do with the Chicago School Board.

So I think that I would, as far as that is concerned I would think we just can't speculate as to what is going to happen, and a lot of things in this case and what happens next really depend on the outcome of that legislative proposal, and I think we should put things in abeyance until that time.

THE COURT: Just as a matter of information, and

I hesitate to use the term last act because I suspect that

last scene is more appropriate if we are going to be using

some figure of speech, my information on that, of course, is

I assume less current than yours because it consists of the

Will Roger's approach, what I read in the papers. And, the

last thing that I had seen in that respect was a reference to

Congressman O'Neil having succeeded in getting a No Amendment provision that was not particularly focused at all, indeed, on what Congressman Yates had done, but rather, focused on some other effort to include what he viewed as encumbering amendments to the appropriation bill. And, past that I saw nothing at all. So it may be if anybody can fill me in just as a matter of information, if you have more current material, it would be useful.

MR. HOWARD: I don't have any further information, your Honor. The only comment I would make about that is that there is some possibility, perhaps remote or maybe non-existent, of bipartisanship with respect to the particular provision we are concerned about.

Maybe I should say multi-partisanship rather than bipartisanship. So that might overcome that particular obstacle.

THE COURT: In any case, nobody has anything more current than that. Fine.

Go ahead, Mr. Ross.

MR. ROSS: Well, briefly, your Honor, with respect to the extension of the freeze against the funds, the United States would argue that the findings of this Court that were affirmed and relied upon by the Seventh Circuit, the page I guess it is 9 of the slip opinion, 8 or 9, refers to your specific findings about the funds that the Secretary had and

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did not make available to the Chicago Board, and citing findings to deal with Title IV and the Secretary's discretionary fund.

Anyway, it is my position that the Court appears to have narrowed the scope of the need for the freeze order, and we would ask this Court not to continue the freeze with respect to those Special Programs and Population Accounts, are funds that don't have anything to do with Title IV and the Secretary's discretionary fund.

Assistance, the Women's Equity Program, and ——
but, with respect to Title IV and the discretionary funds,
we believe that the Court of Appeals opinion justifies continuing that freeze, and that obviously makes it necessary
from our point of view that some amount of money continue to
be payable to these grantees so that they can continue to
operate at their previous levels.

The Board in its proposed order has suggested until October 15, which is two weeks into the fiscal year, and the United States has in its proposed order, asked for a two-month extension of that.

Other than arbitrary time-picking, I suppose that short extensions on the assumption that we will be back in court looking to see whether a further extension is necessary makes sense, but I am told that it is extremely difficult

amount of paperwork to have such a short extension, and with the prospect of another one. I would ask --

THE COURT: Two factors bear on that. One practical from my own point of view, and the other one practical from the point of view of other grantees dependent upon the funds.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Howard.

MR. HOWARD: I do have something to add, which is not in the motion on that point.

THE COURT: All right, go ahead. I wasn't about to rule. I just wanted to tell you two factors that I wanted to deal with, but go ahead, let us hear your input.

MR. HOWARD: Well, Dr. Love met on Friday in Washington with representatives of the Council of Chief State School Officers. That council includes, basically, all the Title IV grantees who are state educational agencies, as well as representing grantees of some of the other programs which are operated through state departments of education.

of Chief States School Officers, that the proper extension was to the 15th of October. That we should come back immediately after the fiscal year, or rather, after the end of the current fiscal year and see what Congress has done, and then consider further action, but that both the Board and a large group of potential grantees believed, and do believe

that the proper extension is two weeks rather than some much longer period of time which might take this issue off the burner.

MR. ROSS: Well, your Honor, to the extent that this non-record evidence of agreement between the Board and the Chief State School Officers is relevant, it is inconsistent with what I have been hearing from the people at the Title IV Centers. Every little bit of indefiniteness piles up on them, and people are leaving, and they have had to have been let go, and as I am sure documents filed by the proposed intervenors will tell the Court.

THE COURT: There is one item of which I will take judicial notice. I am going to be away from October 6th to the 27th, so that that clearly bears upon whether we are going to be looking at an October 15th date that would create the potential of the well drying up while I am elsewhere.

MR. HOWARD: That is why we suggested, your Honor, that we come back on the 5th. The date is to the 15th, but we come back on the 5th.

THE COURT: I noticed that. The other problem which is the second one that I was going to address in that regard, is precisely the kind of consideration I see mentioned by the proposed intervenor cum amici in their presentation, and that is that it is a very difficult matter for them to function in real-world terms, if they are living from payday

to payday without the ability to do any kind of planning at all, and I have a lot of sympathy for their point of view. It is, after all, not this Court that has pitted as adversaries, people that should not be. It is really not this Court's determination that creates a confrontation between the Board of Education and its desegregation plan on the one hand, and the needs of such grantees as these universityaffiliated RVAC's on the other.

So it seems to me that precisely the same purpose that you are talking about, Mr. Howard, could better be served by a somewhat longer date that would -- Well, wait a minute -- that would bridge until my return, and at the same time keep the October 5th date as the real date for us to take a fresh look so that nobody is going to operate under the assumption -- What is the point of entering a date:that we know must be changed from the realities of my own availability

MR. HOWARD: Let me give you an example, your Honor.

First of all, let me say the date of two weeks is chosen rather more for its potential to increase the amount of funds than for trying to conserve those funds for the Board It is not chosen as a device solely to protect the Board's interest, but one that we believe has the greatest chance of maximizing the return for everybody. That is the basis of the choice.

THE COURT: I know that, except that is not realistic

because I'm not going to be here on that date.

MR. HOWARD: With respect to the Special Programs

Fund which Mr. Ross speaks of, that is the non-Title IV, nondiscretionary fund portion, there is the possibility in one
of the pieces of legislation that has been passed out of

House Appropriations, that those funds might be insulated

against reprogramming, and therefore, in effect, may be appropriate to release those funds if that legislation were to pass

That is one reason.

It just seems to me when you are looking at a 45-day continuing extension, that the prospect of court action which would extend funds for the entire period of time which is covered by the continuing resolution which Congress is looking at, the court action extending funds for 45 days might well lead Congress to think that legislative action just isn't necessary at this point, and that Congress could consider this matter in November when the continuing resolution would be expiring.

So what I am concerned about is that an extension of that length will just take this matter off the Congressiona Agenda altogether.

THE COURT: What I had in mind very frankly, was a November 1st date. That would enable us to bridge the time that I would be returning, and at the same time have us keep an October 5th date to see what developments had occurred in

the interim period.

MR. HOWARD: Well, I don't know what else to say,

Judge. I really believe that the prospect of Congressional

action to bring some broader resolution to this issue, is

best enhanced with the October 15th date, and the Council of

Chief States School Officers thought so too.

often the master of reality, I still have some difficulty in understanding how that may be true if we choose a date that we know cannot possibly be one that is going to stay in place. It seems to me the same message can be delivered by choosing a date that is more realistic in terms of the Court's calendar, but on which it is indicated that that is really it because of the fact that unless other alternatives are provide we now have the Court of Appeals having agreed that that is what has to be done with these funds.

So that it seems to me that the editorial comment on what the meaning of a court order is, is something that the parties ought to be relied on for. It is not my intention to create a sort of interrorem propsect with a meaningless date, which is what October 15th would be, unless you would want to be tendering this to some other judge of this court, and I am not sure that that would make any sense at all.

MR. HOWARD: No, I think that would not be a good idea.

THE COURT: All right. Then what I am going to do is to use the November 1st date for that freeze, and what we will have is an October 5 status hearing at 10:00 o'clock, and we will also set aside an October 28th at 10:00 o'clock time. I anticipate that we will be having that date and we ought to set it aside.

Now, Mr. Ross, what other items do you want to point out that will focus the areas of difference that are going to be represented in the orders you are tendering?

MR. ROSS: All right. Your Honor, with respect to the difference between the Board's escrow provision, and the second provision in a separate order, the difference is that the Board's order does not make the other grantees conditional obligees of these funds. I am not sure what --

the Board would have no position. That is, if the funds are not, in fact, going to be used for Board purposes, and as I understand what Mr. Ross is saying, there is a concern legally whether the result will be somewhat the same as real property law, you know, when the reversion falls in, and the funds then go back to the place of origin, which means the public treasury generally, as distinct from the other parties having at least a call on those funds.

MR. HOWARD: I would even say, your Honor, more than not caring, the Board does care. Our first choice is our own

programs, and our second choice is the grantees.

THE COURT: So you would share Mr. Ross' suggestion?

MR. HOWARD: Well, the language of Mr. Ross'

proposed order on that point is language that we have worked on together and we are generally in concert on.

We have two concerns, and I think you would see these expressed in the last paragraph of Mr. Ross' proposed order.

THE COURT: Doe somebody care to provide me with a copy of that? It would be interesting.

MR. HOWARD: I am sorry.

(Document tendered to the Court)

One is a question of standing, and the other is the question of obligation. That is, we don't mind doing something which preserves, or which avoids the evaporation of the possibility of the grantees getting the funds.

We are concerned that what is done have no impact whatsoever to improve their standing in relation to the Board' Either their standing in the legal sense of access to the litigation, or their standing in the substantive sense of access to the funds.

In other words, we are happy to help them not be knocked out of the game by a quirk, but we don't want to give them any advantage in the game in either of those respects.

THE COURT: Well, this really anticipates the

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reaction I was going to express to the motion of the proposed intervenors because at least in my perception, they have not established one important condition of intervention, and that is that their interests are not adequately protected by the provision of the present litigants.

Up to now the United States has been a very vigorous proponent of the position of the other grantees. It has urged their position, indeed, as the predicate for this Court not acting, and has also urged that before the Court of Appeals.

So that I agree, I would not contemplate the entry of an order in which this Court makes a determination that the funds are to be made available to other grantees. really not this Court's function. It is not my function to be adjudicating what the rights of other grantees are or are not. Rather, the issue is whether the Secretary is going to be in a position to exercise the Secretary's discretion, and that is all that has to be preserved past September 30th. That is, the notion that for some finite period of time, after I make my determination that the Secretary has the retained power to exercise discretion in accordance with whatever the provisions are, whether Title IV, or any other, so that it seems to me that language that would do something more than that, and would place other grantees in some kind of a bidding contest, is really inappropriate.

It is not within the scope of this litigation at

at all, and it also misperceives what the role of this Court is. Indeed, I don't suggest this as the motivation for it at all, but it tends to perpetuate this false notion that it is this Court rather than what I have viewed as the stone-walling position of the United States, that has pitted these parties against each other needlessly as contenders.

So, Mr. Ross, I am sympathetic toward the point that you make, but I am not going to do it in the manner that is set up in this proposed order.

MR. ROSS: Your Honor, it seems to me that the disclaimer language on page 3, starting with the paragraph, "The sole purpose," describes exactly what you just said be ought to/understood about these paragraphs.

THE COURT: Yes, but look at the last sentence.

MR. HOWARD: That got added between Friday and today

MR. ROSS: No, it didn't get added between Friday and today. It was worked out with counsel, Mr. Weissbourd and I worked it out, and Mr. Howard is incorrect in saying it was added between Friday and today.

There is no intent anywhere here to do anything to the Board. There is no intent to do anything except if and when this Court should rule that Chicago would not be entitled to these funds, that the ordinary statutory distribution of these funds take place. That is the intent of this language, and Mr. Howard knows that.

THE COURT: Well, again, I am not speaking in terms of any motivations at all. Rather, I think that that language is inartful to do the job that I think is appropriate and that is to make it plain that what is being done is to retain the discretionary power of the Secretary and not for this Court to be determining that funds are to be made available to grantees.

Mr. Howard, I recognize that the Board's preference, but that is a sociological one, would be -- No, seriously, would be for other grantees to get the funds if the Board can't, but I am not in the business of adjudicating that. That is not my lawsuit, and therefore, if what I understand is the point is to make certain that we don't have a lapse that causes these things to fall back automatically, but that rather, they should be subject to the Secretary's exercise of discretion, then that is the language that ought to be in the order.

MR. HOWARD: Let me add this point, your Honor. It is not only the question of the Court making any determination concerning the grantees' rights. That is not the only thing we are concerned about. We are concerned about any departure from the order of June 30th which said the Secretary shall not further obligate these funds.

We are concerned that somewhere in the bureaucratic language, which frankly, as Mr. Ross and I know, came from

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OMB, and DOE, and so on, and we folks in the Midwest aren't quite sure what it all might mean, we are concerned that somewhere in there is the kernel of Executive obligation that will come back later to haunt us.

THE COURT: We in the Midwest know all about kernels.

That is true. We may be willing to MR. HOWARD: live with some such language as this, and indeed we worked on this language with Mr. Ross, if it is absolutely clear that there is nothing here other than preventing the lapsing of funds, that is, preventing the evaporation of the possibility that those grantees could get the funds if the Board doesn't get them.

MR. ROSS: Your Honor, I think we can resolve this by making on the record in this court the same assurance we made to Mr. Howard somewhere between twelve and fifteen times in the last 48 hours. That is, that this proceeding is solely to keep the funds from lapsing, and that these disclaimer provisions in my proposed order, are simply to allow for the possibility that there will come a time when the Secretary, when these funds are to be distributed to the grantees, and we certainly don't want the Court deciding which grantees will get the money, and this leaves that discretion to the Secretary.

That is simply the sum total, I assure you,

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Mr. Howard, of what this is for.

assurances, I am also painfully aware that estoppel doesn't lie against the government, and so what we are going to do is make sure that the order sets out that conclusion very specifically.

MR. ROSS: Well, I think --

THE COURT: We will work on it. I agree at this point you are really dealing with a matter of semantics.

MR. ROSS: I think so.

THE COURT: And it is something I think can be handled in terms of language. Are there any other items?

MR. ROSS: There are some other items here that I would like to address.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. ROSS: The Board of Education has moved that this Court also escrow and keep from lapsing some indefinite amount of funds in other of the Secretary's accounts that might lapse as of the end of the fiscal year.

In my proposed order I have suggested that there are two reasons why those funds should not be escrowed. One is that I think it is clear from the Seventh Circuit opinion that the Board has no more interest in funds that haven't been appropriated for anything, and these funds here.

In order to get its hands on these funds that might

lapse at the end of the end of the year, it would require legislation in no way different from new legislation involving any dollars in the U.S. Treasury.

Other than that, there are good practical reasons for not escrowing those funds. There are some twelve to fifteen different accounts that those funds are in, and the reasons why there is extra money left at the end of the year vary quite a bit from program-to-program. In many of them Congress appropriates somewhat more than it is believed the Secretary needs for that program just in case it is necessary, and then the funds lapse if they are not used, and they are essentially reappropriated and reauthorized the following year. It is more a bookkeeping transaction than anything else.

But mostly, for the reasons that there is no difference between those funds and any other dollars in the Treasury that the United States would think that that part of the Board's request should be denied.

THE COURT: How do you read Footnote 10 of the Court of Appeals' opinion and the corresponding text, and then turning over to page 13 which describes what the Court of Appeals affirmed in terms of a freeze.

MR. ROSS: Well, I don't think there is any doubt that there is an inconsistency between page 9 and the freeze.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I think that it may be a

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question of what is the status quo in this instance. we agree that some act to reappropriate those funds would be necessary, that is, some Congressional action would be necessary for these funds to flow to the Board, still they are at present, legislatively set aside for the Department of Education, and it is that which we want to preserve.

THE COURT: Does somebody want to answer my question though because really, after all, what I have is -- By the way, the mandate's returned, isn't it? They were supposed to have an immediate mandate. So what I am supposed to do is function in terms of what the Court of Appeals said.

What the Court of Appeals said was that the provisions that temporarily freeze certain federal funds, but exempt additional funds are affirmed, and they refer back to Note 10.

Note 10 and its corresponding text, includes as I read it at least in the frozen funds, the Special Programs and Populations Accounts Fund.

If that is true, then hasn't that been affirmed? There is no doubt about that, and MR. HOWARD: that is absolutely correct. What we are talking about now is something other than Special Programs' Funds. That is excess funds that may be in the Aid to the Handicapped Act, That is, funds that are outside the scope of for example. the Court's original order, which would lapse on September 30

if nothing is done.

Now, I think there is no question at all that the Special Programs Fund, that the freeze of those funds is affirmed by the Court of Appeals' order, and therefore, that aspect of Mr. Ross' comments, there is no doubt in my mind that those funds should continue to be frozen, especially sinc he relies on the Court of Appeals' opinion, that as you point out, they affirmed the freeze order that covers those funds.

So, I think there is no doubt about that.

What we are talking about here is funds in unrelated appropriations accounts, which are in the Department of Education which would lapse on the 30th of September unless some action is taken.

In our view the fact that those funds have been set aside by Congress, and will be excess at the end of the year, creates, if you will, a windfall. All we want to do, we don't want any leverage on the windfall. We just don't want it to go away.

THE COURT: Is to have potential access to the funds

Is that what you are saying?

MR. HOWARD: Yes.

THE COURT: Are you including, are you talking about guaranteed student loans?

MR. HOWARD: We are not including that because that is not going to lapse at the end of the year.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HOWARD: In other words, we are saying anything which would carry over we are not going to touch.

THE COURT: Mr. Ross, I fail to understand. What is the problem with that?

MR. ROSS: The problem, essentially, is why do it because there is no difference between that money and unappropriated money in the Treasury. There simply is no practical difference as far as the Board is concerned between --

THE COURT: Well, there may well be in terms of what you might characterize as Congressional equity. That is, the fact that funds -- I recognize that all money is green and we are taught in law school about the fungility, but the fact is that dollars are viewed as having been once committed to education purposes, and are now left in a position in which they remain accessible for that purpose, stand in a very different posture from the notion of free funds in which everyone is competing afresh for Congressional funding.

You are right in the sense that so long as

Congressional action is required, conceptually perhaps, like

Gertrude Stein, Congressional action is Congressional action

is Congressional action, but it seems to me there is an

appropriate distinction to be made between funds that have

once been placed into the concept of use for educational

purposes and are then retained for that purpose, so that

determination may be made.

that those should not be included there.

Now, that is one on which I really don't understand any purpose to be served by the United States' position. You are simply saying that in the interest of precision you think

MR. ROSS: Well, let me say two things, your Honor. In many respects there is a great deal of sex appeal to Mr. Howard's argument. This is the Secretary's loose change, and he would like to get his hands in the Secretary's pockets.

MR. HOWARD: Oh, no. I just don't want him to throw it away.

MR. ROSS: I understand that, and it is not Mr. Howard's proverbial MX Missile Funds running out at the end of the year because it says Education on it.

On the surface I don't think it would do much harm if an injunction against that lapse didn't last long, but it will interfere with planning and budgeting for other years if it lasts very long.

THE COURT: I don't contemplate that any of this,

I hope, is going to last very long.

MR. ROSS: I would hope not, but I would like -Your Honor, there are still some funds --

THE COURT: Certainly not as long as it takes to build an MX missile.

MR. ROSS: There are still some funds from the

ESA Program in 1975 that are in escrow in some cases where they are still scrapping over that.

THE COURT: I can count on the litigants to remind me about this, and I am not planning to set up any long-term deep freeze for these dollars.

MR. ROSS: And in some cases, for example, your Honor, there are statutory scholarship funds where Congress appropriates more than it thinks are necessary, and at the end of the year it lapses, and then they reappropriate it.

to deal with this, and that is, you know court is around and you can always come back. There is no desire, certainly on my part, to create some kind of long-term residual funding that is off in some dust-swept corner.

MR. ROSS: Fine. I think we are all on the right track then.

THE COURT: Then I think that inclusion of those mounts is quite appropriate.

MR. ROSS: Your Honor, before I finish, there is one last item that I would like to raise.

I have been asked by the Department of Education to ask the Court to free up some of the Secretary's discretionary funds, which as you may recall no moneys have been spent since June because the previous order was to give out some money to these continuing grantees from last year.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSS: The Secretary has requested that with respect to the March 31, 1983 advertisement for competition for grants, that he be allowed to award the top-rated grant in each of the categories in there, plus the top-rated technology grants, and I am informed by the Department of Education that these are programs that are tied into the school year and if they don't get going soon they are going to completely be missed, and some of them are extremely important, as again as I have said this to the Court before, have to do with the National Commission on Excellence, and distributing techniques around the country, and I am informed that the Secretary, that 1.2 million could make the grants that I have requested.

Now, other than that, they can wait, but he really would like to get some grants going, and that overall would be a lower proportion of the discretionary fund than has been spent of the other programs that have been frozen.

MR. HOWARD: We are absolutely against any release of funds from the discretionary fund.

In the case of the Title IV and Special Programs

Accounts, you have ongoing programs funded for several years

which have people on the payroll. That is the whole basis

of the allowance of funds to those grantees, even though they

are not grantees, and even though there is a freeze order.

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When you start talking about doing the same thing with new grant awards, and indeed, when you start talking about picking one in each category, it is meaningless to the achievement of any of the goals that those programs may have been aimed at, but it is very meaningful to us.

THE COURT: Mr. Ross, you know again, and I don't say this to fault you, you are relaying a message, but what this bears a strong resemblance to is the same notion that it is something that this Court did that juxtaposes the Board of Education of the City of Chicago in opposition to other worthy educational causes.

That is not true at all. There is \$20 million that would have been available to the Board of Education that is, according to my calculations, what, 16-2/3's times your \$1.2 million that you are talking about here.

So the notion that somehow what ought to be done is to open up the screw by a quarter-of-a-turn, is really in all candor, one that doesn't sit well given the purposes of this Court's order, am the fact that it is really a false perception to think about the Board of Education as somehow having made an effort to deprive other appropriate grantees of funds to which they are entitled.

You know, this is not a floodgates kind of problem.

I recognize the limited kind of request that you are making,
but in principle, it is simply not appropriate. I don't know

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why we should distinguish one source of a new request for funding from others. I am sure that out there in these requests there are a great many more than what you characterize as the top-rated grants, and I have read with a great deal of sympathy the statement of the several Race Desegregation Assistance Centers, all of which have an appropriate kind of claim, it seems to me, on the public treasury, but this Court only deals with its piece of litigation and that is the only one I can treat with.

So I cannot, under the present circumstances, deal with that kind of request favorably as creating a sort of added escape hatch for what is presently involved.

Let us see whether the information that we get during this next uncertain week is something that is going to give us a better shot so that all of the worthy grantees are going to be in a position to have access to funds, as I suspect they should.

MR. ROSS: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am not going to include that.

Now, is there anything else in terms of the difference between the Board's proposed order?

MR. HOWARD: No.

THE COURT: Then what I will need is a recast version to deal with what we have talked about this morning.

I am not going to be on trial today because our

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ROSS: And the same -- Of course, there aren't

trial finished up last week and I have got a jury instruction conference beginning at 10:15, but I suspect that I should have, I don't know how long that is going to take, but I should have some time this afternoon so if you can get a copy of the ordered delivered maybe by the noon hour, I will make it a point to take a look at it over the noon hour.

MR. HOWARD: Yes, we will deliver an order which your Honor, I think, will represent an amalgamation of the government's position and ours on the lapse question, and generally the balance of the rest of our order.

MR. ROSS: For clarity sake, you are going to extend the temporary funding until the 1st of November?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSS: You are not going to release --

THE COURT: Make it October 31st. I suppose the month end is an appropriate time.

MR. ROSS: And so that and the extension of the entire freeze otherwise, and the lapse of the three things which should be included.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ROSS: And with respect to the funds that are going to be left over in the Secretary's other accounts, the Court is inclined to include those.

any conditional obligees. All right, your Honor.

MR. HOWARD: There are a couple of other matters, your Honor.

One is that today was to be a day for us to hear something about the general position of the United States on this matter as to at least what direction they are going in in response to the Court of Appeals suggestion or mandate that the government be allowed to develop its own remedial plan.

The clock is running on that. It has been three weeks. We don't want to wind up at a point later where there has been a further determination by this Court, and then the government says, Well, now, we have to think about it.

THE COURT: I assume one part of the government's plan in remedial terms is promoting this legislation.

MR. ROSS: Your Honor, Mr. Howard is shaking his hea and he doesn't really know as much as I do, or I don't know as much as he does about his promoters of the legislation.

I think we just have to wait and see. I think the 5th of October will be plenty soon enough.

THE COURT: I trust the government is not waiting.

That is, your branch of the government may be, and appropriately because you are litigating this one, but I trust that the Executive Branch has read the opinion too.

MR. ROSS: It has, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Howard, I think that October 5th is

the most appropriate time, although I want Mr. Ross to understand that at that point we should expect to have a formulated position on the part of the United States.

MR. ROSS: I think that is reasonable, your Honor, and I would point out that it is unlikely that any kind of legislation by Congress would resolve this entirely.

THE COURT: That's right. I understand.

MR. ROSS: Because the Board has served me with its plan for its top-of-the-line desegretation plan, and --

MR. HOWARD: No, that was the Pontiac version, Mr. Ross, not the Cadillac.

MR. ROSS: I have been reading that, and we will be back in one form or the other, so that I think it in many respects, really doesn't matter what the legislation, how it comes out. I believe we will probably have to have a remand hearing of some kind at which time we take care of the matters that have been outlined by the Seventh Circuit.

But I would say this, your Honor. I would like to be able to settle with some specificity, the question of what is available for Chicago before we get into what could be an endless hearing of how much it needs because I have been serve with an incredible stack of documents, and I assure you that unless and until the gap between what is potentially available from the federal government for the Chicago Board, and the unending appetite of the Chicago Board for funds, somehow

meet we are going to have a long and difficult time in this court.

But, that is in the future, and I hope that doesn't happen.

MR. HOWARD: I am not going to extend this analogy about starvation and so on, because that is the direction I would go in since the Board received virtually no funds.

Your Honor, what I think is implicit, if not more in Mr. Ross' comments, is that we are going to go through another trench war on the question of availability. There doesn't seem to be any inclination to take a broader view to go to work on the question of providing funds to try to eliminate the conflict between the Board and other grantees. Just nothing of that sort from the government, and it appears to me when Mr. Ross says we want to find out what is available, what he means is he wants more briefs on the question of whether the Title IV fundscan go to the Board, whether the Discretionary Fund can go to the Board.

So, if we have to do that, I would hope we don't,
I would have hoped those issues were resolved, but if we have
to do that let's get it over with because it seems to me that
we need to be addressing the questions of what are the Board's
needs, and what can the government do other than negative,
other than resistance, to try and help fulfil those needs.

THE COURT: Mr. Howard, you know the Court of Appeal

specifically said that it was not facing another more difficult question that was before it, choosing in its infinite wisdom to leave that to the district courts to treat with in the first instance. But, you know, I would assume that that question may well be affected by the factor that the Court of Appeals did not address, and that is the history, the so-far aborted history of this other legislation because that does seem to me to bear on questions of availability if I have to confront those.

I think that the point that you are making is really premature because of the fact that we are dealing with so much more uncertainty now than I hope will be the case, let us say, a little over a weekhence and that is the reason it seems to me, it is more appropriate to defer that issue until the October 5th date.

Miss Fritzsche, I know you have been anxious to talk about something. You just stepped up.

MS. FRITZSCHE: Your Honor, I for once would like to change the topic of conversation from money to something else.

I am here on behalf of the Community Organizations, and I think I ought to speak for the Urban League. We all would like to have time to respond to the filing of the educational components by the Board of Education on August 29.

As you may recall --

THE COURT: I had gotten a request for an extension to September 27th, as I understand it.

MS. FRITZSCHE: Those are two different things.

Those are our comments made on the original desegregation,

the first part of the desegregation review filed on April 15,

as far as student transfer and designation was concerned.

Five months later the Board filed on August 29, educational components, which you may recall is a rather weighty document just looking at it, and I am sure it is just as weighty if one would open it and read it. None of us have had time yet.

THE COURT: You mean it is big. You are not sure it is weighty.

MS. FRITZSCHE: That's right.

We would like time to respond to it and since it seems to us for this current school year, whatever comments we make are too late anyway, the school year has started, and we are thinking now about '84-85, that we would like to have some time to really give the subject the necessary attention it needs.

THE COURT: How long would you --

MS. FRITZSCHE: December 15.

THE COURT: When?

MS. FRITZSCHE: December 15.

THE COURT: December 15?

MS. FRITZSCHE: Yes. As you will recall, it came five months late, and it is partly for the reason as Mr. Howard pointed out, it took the School Board a long time to really put the material in any form and shape that it would be digestible by those who have to read it, it seems to me if it takes the originator of the document a long time to originate the document, it may take the purveyors, the readers quite some time to follow the intricacies of what I assume are statistical analyses.

THE COURT: I understand, and I appreciate that problem. It seems to me what we have to do is work backward in a meaningful way from when any changes might have to be put into place in order to take effect, even in the 1984-85 school year.

That is, if you put a December 15th date for comment and then I have to review those in the sequence dealing with other litigation as well, and I may have some input as a result of my determination, then the question comes whether the Board, if any changes have to be made and I am not assuming that, I haven't after all seen the comments, whether it will be realistic for the Board to put them in place even for the following year. That is a question I don't know the answer to.

MR. HOWARD: Well, I am not sure I know the answer to it either, your Honor, but I am troubled at another level.

I don't want to say that the Board thinks that these folks should not say something, read the document and say something about it, but it seems to me that we had enough trouble, and it seems as if we continue to have trouble with respect to the student assignment question because there, although the Court established guidelines for the nature of the comments, that is they should address constitutional questions, the comments didn't bear much relation to the guidelines.

THE COURT: The same principle, of course, has to operate with respect to educational components. I will only add that it should be very obvious that it is, at least in my perception, much more difficult for a court to be making a judgment about whether educational components impinge adversel on the constitutional rights of the consumers of the product than with respect to student assignment programs that would permit, I won't say more simplistic response, but at least we have some criteria that are established in existing case law.

Now, at the same time I certainly can't foreclose comment. That is not appropriate, and all that you pointed out is that it is more of an uphill burden for people who are commenting on the plan in this respect to demonstrate constitutional infirmity, than the burden that relates to student assignment.

MR. HOWARD: I think a burden that needs more to be met than merely to say that the whole plan is a constitutional enterprise.

THE COURT: But you know, Mr. Howard, I don't know what you are dealing with. All that is being asked for is some time to frame those comments.

The very fact that you are emphasizing, properly,
the difficulty of doing it is a best indication that the peopl
who are going to try to cope with that issue in constitutional
terms are going to need some time to try to shape that.

MR. JOHNSON: I think the problem is brought out
by the request for a December 15th date, which implies an
analysis and review of the plan, which gets more into its
educational aspects rather than into its constitutional. It
implies, I think, that various statistical analysis, review
of alternative educational policies are what are at issue here
and that constitutional analysis can surely be done before
December 15.

THE COURT: If they are going to deal with it constitutionally, they are going to have to comment on its substance, which is about educational components. I don't know how you can separate those.

I will take the commenting organizations at their word, but they have to recognize that if they come in with something like that on December 15, and then I give the Board

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the kind of time that it is going to require to deal with that, and then look at the amount of time it is going to take me to consider it, that you may well find that if any relief is appropriate, and I don't suggest that to be true, that it is very unlikely, given the fact that it has to do with educational policies and programs, that it could make even the '84-85 school year.

So if that is your request, I will give interested parties until December 15 to comment, and then the Board until February 15 for any response.

MR. HOWARD: And may we just reserve and revisit the question of response?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. HOWARD: After we have seen what it is, because we may well think that it is material we have no obligation to respond to.

THE COURT: But if you are going to do that, I would expect you to come in on motion so that I will know at the earliest possible date what I am going to have to deal with on the issues.

MR. HOWARD: Yes, absolutely.

THE COURT: All right, I shall see you then on October 5th at ten o'clock.

MR. ROSS: Thank you.

CERTIFICATE

I CERTIFY that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Dolores Brennan

10-12-83