IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

2	EASTERN DIVISION -
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
4	Plaintiff,
5	vs.) Docket No. 80 C 5124
6	BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE) Chicago, Illinois CITY OF CHICAGO,) July 13, 1984
7) 2:00 p.m. Defendant.)
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9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE MILTON I. SHADUR
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12	APPEARANCES:
13	For the Plaintiff: MR. ALEXANDER ROSS MS. PEGGY GORDON
14	Asst. U. S. Attorneys
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16	For the Defendant: MR. ROBERT HOWARD MR. HUGH McCOMBS
17	MR. ROBERT WEISSBOURD
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THE CLERK: 80 C 5124, United States of America versus

Board of Education of the City of Chicago.

HR. HOWARD: Robert Howard, Hugh McCombs and Robert Weissbourd for the Board.

MR. ROSS: AlexanderRoss and Peggy Gordon for the United States.

THE COURT: Good afternoon. At 11:30 I ended up with an unanticipated TRO hearing in what I am advised our chance assignment system in this court delivered to me as the second case involving the Olympic Committee, and I disposed of that TRO motion this morning. So I guess this is really sort of a red letter day, because the other one is coming immediately after yours, so I have two Olympics team cases sandwiching a battle between the Olympians and I guess that is what this one falls into.

MR. HOWARD: At least, your Honor, soon the Olympics will come and go, and that flow of litigation will end.

THE COURT: Ah, yes.

MR. ROSS And the United States is not boycotting this Olympics.

THE COURT: But this goes on forever.

Anyway, as far as I know, and you better correct me if I am wrong aBout this, what I have in hand is the Board's motion for partial release of restrained funds, and to modify the Schedule for submission of proposed orders, which was filed

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a week ago, and then something that is stamped "Received" this morning, called The United States Response to the Board's Motion, which I understand Mr. Ross, you filed.

One problem that I have is that the copy that was delivered to me, although it referred to an attached form of order, didn't have one.

MR. ROSS: I know. Your Honor, I simply neglected to file it, and I have it available should we get into that, but I think that it would be putting the cart before the horse, and perhaps we should discuss it.

THE COURT: No, I just wanted to make sure there wasn't a piece of paper that hadn't gotten to me that was supposed to.

MR. ROSS: No, it was simply the time schedule for reporting to each other.

THE COURT: All right. Because I had in writing the Board's motion, and now the United States' response; maybe I ought to hear very briefly, and I have to stress, very, from the Board as to any issues that they think are posed by the United States' response that really were not addressed the first time around by the Board.

MR. HOWARD: I can be very brief.

We believe that the second full sentence on page 3, of the United States' document tells the tale as to both the release of funds and the deferral of the schedule. To para-

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phrase, partial release of funds makes the appellate process less urgent.

So that the United States, I think, is indicating that the deferral of the schedule is not so urgent a problem if accompanied by the release of funds, and therefore, we think the Court should do both.

As to new matters raised by the United States' respons there is, what we regard as the rescissionist history proposal, that we now address reformation or rescission of the Consent Decree.

We think that is clearly inappropriate because the enforcibility of the decree has already been decided, not only by this this court, but also at least in part by the Court of Appeals, and so there is no need to deal with the hypothetical unenforcibility of the decree.

Finally, the last section of the United States' document as to the release of frozen funds, really says nothing new but we have two comments about it.

One is the United States says again, that if ultimatel it loses on appeal it will comply. We still don't understand what that means. If the frozen funds have been disposed of, how would the government propose to replace them? We have never heard anything about that.

And, secondly, insofar as the United States speculates on the last page of its document about what the Secretary might

MR. ROSS: Yes.

do if he had the funds back in his hands, we certainly don't see that speculation as any reason for the release of the funds, but we would be very interested to hear from the government, either in court or between counsel, if they have anything more concrete about that.

Again, we don't think that has any bearing on the present issue before the Court, which is a partial release of funds and the deferral of the schedule.

THE COURT: Mr. Ross, I don't know if you are able to take notes on all those items at once or not. Was there anything else, Mr. Howard

MR. HOWARD: No.

MR. ROSS: A brief response. First of all, your Honor, on that same page of our document, I would like to --

THE COURT: Page ,3?

MR. ROSS: Yes -- to correct the language in the next paragraph down.

THE COURT: You are going to put in a "not" where you didn't have one.

MR. ROSS: No. For clarity, to take out the word "either" in the second line and the word "alternatively" in the third line, I think makes more sense read that way.

THE COURT: This is the paragraph beginning "we", is that right?

THE COURT: You want to do what, now?

MR. ROSS: Strike "either" from there in line 2, and "alternatively" from line 3. In that regard I would stress ---

THE COURT: But isn't that something that you already lost, at least in my June 8th opinion. That is, the question whether we ought to have something that is only declaratory.

Unless I missed something.

MR. ROSS: Well, I think that the issue of a judgment and the timing of an order are several --

THE COURT: No. My limited question --

MR. ROSS: I understand what the Court is saying.

THE COURT: My limited question had to do with your comments about the judgment being wholly declaratory.

MR. ROSS: What I am saying, a judgment now that is of a declaratory nature to get the appeal, the appellate process going, does not preclude an order with respect to the funds, or a more specific order against the United States later. I think that a declaratory judgment could get the process going.

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I think --

THE COURT: Wait just a minute. I want to make a note of this.

Go ahead, Mr. Ross. You said that there were a couple of other comments you wanted to make.

MR. ROSS: Yes. I think that, as we have been saying here, that our motion to release the funds has been pending sinc

rebruary 8, and the Court has said it would rule on that, and it seems to me that the Court could rule on that motion.

While we think that all of the funds in Special Programs in Title IV, and the Discretionary Fund should be released to the Secretary, if the Court is not inclined to do so, we are prepared to discuss several alternatives that are more rational and practical than the ones suggested by the Board.

The first of those would be that all Special Programs in Title IV funds above the 12 million dollar level, plus one-fourth of the Discretionary Fund, be released now, and I say one fourth because that would take us to September 30, which seems to me is a more rational date to have a partial release of funds because it does coincide with the end of the fiscal year, and if we don't do that we will have to come back here again in any event.

to me, that response with the response of Mr. Howard's question about how does the United States propose to, what it characterizes as comply, if funds are released, because the essence of the position here has been--and this is one on which I think there is no difference between the parties--is that if these defined funds are not available then we can't magically create availability, and that, I guess, is the thrust, is it not, of Mr. Howard's question.

MR. HOWARD: Yes, sir.

MR. ROSS: If all the funds are released?

THE COURT: No. Let us just say for the sake of hypothesis, if a million dollars is released, that makes one million dollars less available. How does the United States' "compliance" enter into that? How does the Board get, and the Court get the assurance that the release doesn't carry with it the consequence of less available relief to the Board?

MR. ROSS: I think the only answer to that is, aside from the argument that with respect to Title IV, the Board has shown a maximum of 12 million that would be used in this fiscal year for Title IV purposes, which is a separate argument.

But apart from that argument I think the answer simply is that in the long run the Board has to rely on the duty that the Court has found --

THE COURT: On full faith and credit of the United States.

MR. ROSS: No, to seek funds and ultimately if the United States must seek funds through legislation, which I think we all recognize is the only way that the Board will substantially come close to the funds that it claims, then it should rely --

THE COURT: So you are saying they should make the gamble on futures.

MR. ROSS: That's right because I think there is some doubt as to whether all of the money that is frozen would go to

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them in any event, and I think you balance those two doubts, .
it is reasonable to let 25 percent of the funds go.

THE COURT: Okay. Was there anything else that you wanted to deal with in response to the few points that Mr. Howard had made?

MR. ROSS: I think that if the Court were not inclined to release the Title IV and Special Programs funds above the 12 million, that an overall reasonable formula would be 25 percent across the board release, it would take them all to September 30, but as a last fall-back position, the United States would argue that --

THE COURT: When yousay across the board, you use that term advisedly, I trust. That is across the, capital B, Board.

MR. ROSS: The pun was yours and not mine.

THE COURT: No, the pun was yours. Go ahead.

MR. ROSS: That there is no reason to select among grantees and that if we are going to do it piecemeal like a six weeks basis, it ought to be six-fiftyseconds.

THE COURT: Mr. Howard, the one thing that I would appreciate your responding to is the point that was made in the papers by the United States, and also now again by Mr. Ross, on what I characterize as the \$12 million question. Do you wan to deal with that?

MR. HOWARD: Yes. I think there are two principal points, your Honor.

One is that the Court has found in its June 8 opinion, as well as in its June, 1983 opinion, that the United States obligation is a multi year obligation, and that the types of programs which have been found necessary and appropriate for this year, are likely to be necessary in future years, and in similar funding against.

Therefore, even if the funds are limited to Title IV uses, a point which I will address in a second, there is a clear need, I think, for future year funding, and given the government position in the case, and especially Mr. Rosses answer just now as to the total speculative character of any future compliance, even if the United States tries to comply in the future, it seems to me that the continuted preservation of those funds for future years is appropriate.

There is another question, however, which is whether those funds are indeed limited to a Title IV character, or to Fitle IV uses, and I acknowledge that this is a new question that we are raising. That is, it seems to us it is possible that the funds any also be capable of more immediate use under the follow-through authorizing statute; follow-through in general provides fairly broad authorization for programs which are chronologically supplemental to Head Start programs. That is, for programs in the early grades for children who have been in Head Start programs.

There are some 12,000 students in Head Start programs

in the City of Chicago, most of those come into the Board of Education and most of them are in the very same racially isolated schools who are the principal beneficiaries of the educational components for which most of the funding is intended. So there is a possibility of these funds being used more immediately this year under that authorization.

THE COURT: Well that is certainly a new issue, and it is not one that I am about to resolve today, and I am not going to call on Mr. Ross to comment on it today.

MR. ROSS: I think, your Honor, that the issue of some how holding these funds in limbo for other fiscal years, is a newissue also, and I think that --

what you are saying, as I understand it, is that you would prefet that the Board gamble on an all or none basis. That if the Board is right, in terms of what the United States responsibilities, then the Board is going to have plenty of opportunity to be dealing with the United States on a year by year basis, but you are unwilling to address the possibility that you are right in terms of the limited access, in which case the available funds might be a pool and none of us knows, of course, what Congress will or will not do, and therefore, the available funds will be a limited pool, and you are asking that the Board surrender its prospect of access to those.

MR. ROSS: I think I am saying something a little

bit different than that.

If I understand Mr. Howard's argument, he is saying that the pool, that 65 million, whatever it is, is there now. Or let us just look at Special Programs and Title IV together with his 47 million, and change. That if the Board has only shown that 12 million of their programs go to Title IV in the '84-'85 school year, that somehow the remaining 12 from 47, remaining 35 million, will be suspended and in limbo, and used -which is a 1984 appropriation, somehow this Court can change what Congress made into a one year appropriation into a multi-year --

THE COURT: No. It is really a question of whether it ought to be retained as available for Congress to do that, as I understand.

MR. HOWARD: Well, we have not addressed, none of us have really addressed the question of how it is preserved, but -

MR. ROSS: But if it is preserved for Congress,

Congress has an unlimited set of choices that are not confined

by that set of funds.

THE COURT: I understand, but the prospect of going from a B-1 bomber to education funds may be a somewhat different one from the Congressional perspective than going from education funds to education funds.

MR. HOWARD: I should also -- when I say we have not addressed it, I mean we have not all addressed it in court. We

We do believe the funds are capable of preservation either ... administratively or judicially.

THE COURT: That is something I can take a further look at because I don't think that that issue is necessarily posed by what we are dealing with now.

Let me just, if I may, and I understand, I believe I understand what your presentations are, let me just focus what they are and then deal with them.

At this point the Board has asked for a modification of -- for two things. One is a modification of the restraining order for a partial release of funds to cover, basically, A, what amounts to a six week period, out of the Special Programs and Populations Account, and also out of the Discretionary Fund, both of those items being for fiscal year '84 appropriations.

And, second, the Board is aSking to defer the schedule for submission of the proposed judgment order to August 13, for some reasons, but I will just summarize them basically as being intended to enable Congress to make its judgment about what it may deal with in terms of funds availability.

The United States is opposing both aspects of those and it is making several arguments in addition to those that .

Mr. Ross has just identified now.

I am not faulting that because I asked him not to treat with the things that were dealt with on paper, but which I have read.

This puts matters into a sort of, in a sense, extraordinary posture, it seems to me. It is perhaps the height of
irony that the Board of Education, beset as it is by financial
problems, facing not only inadequate funding for meeting its
obligations under the desegregation plan which my June 8 opinion
dealt with at such length, but also facing what all of us read
about in the newspapers as a massive deficit for its general
educational goals, is somehow thrust into the position of
triggering either the release or the retention of funds for othe
agencies elsewhere that are also in desperate circumstances.

My, for lack of a better term, my pen pals around the country who write me, frustrated because the United States has remained obdurate, and their own what appear to be worthwhile educational programs are drying up for lack of funds, continue to proliferate. Mostly people involved in the National Diffusion network, but others as well, But who is really choking them off Make no mistake about it. Cut through all their verbiage if you want, but it is the Secretary of Education and the Executive Branch that are doing that. It is not this Court and this Court's order, the order that has been upheld by our Court of Appeals.

Now what happens is that the United States accuses the Board of trying, and this is on page 2 and page 3 of the United States' response, trying to get this Court to place pressure on Congress by holding restrained funds hostage,

thereby inviting pressure from the intended grantees.

That characterization is, in my view, as bankrupt as the assertions that have marked the United States position since the funding issue arose over a year ago. Maybe we ought to put this whole matter into words of one syllable for total understanding.

There is really one very fundamental point on which all of us, I think, agree, the United States, the Board and this Court, and that is that it is Congress' ultimate decision, subject of course, to the President's role in the legislative process, that controls the United States financial responsibilit In the words of Paragraph 15.1 of the Consent Decree, that determines what "financial resources" of the United States are "available."

That seems to me to be the one unexceptionable proposition that nobody quarrels with. I take silence as being acquiescence on that score.

Now, where the parties really differ though very fundamentally, and I recognize that what I am going to say on this is overly simplistic because, except in a very long, very bad joke which I won't trouble the record with, you can't possibly distill 260 pages of this June 8 opinion into a simple statement of principle, but I think in essence, it is that the Board, whose position I found legally sound, under the Consent Decree, and under the Constitution and under case law, contend

that the Executive Branch has committed itself to take affirmative steps to be positive, to encourage Congress to make financial resources available.

Now, conversely, the United States says that the Executive Branch, despite the commitment that is represented by Paragraph 15.1 of the Consent Decree, should be entitled to go to Congress to make funds unavailable rather than available.

what it says in its two most recent findings is that a change in administration permits the United States to reneg on its contractural commitments, just as if one Secretary of the Treasury's signature on a ten dollar bill should not bind the next one to honor it when somebody tenders it to the bank.

Now the United States is saying, as a fall back position, that the Consent Decree, that the contract that the United States signed, ought to be reformed, a fancy word for rewritten, because the United States now doesn't like the contract that it made four years ago.

Maybe the ten dollars ought to be reformed to a one, or maybe nothing at all. As you can see, I used the term bankruptcy a little earlier advisedly when I characterized that kind of argument, at least in my perception.

Now on this present motion, what I find is the responsible approach to take is to, in fact, give Congress the maximum opportunity, especially because everybody agrees that ultimate power of the purse resides there, to make financial

resources available to the Board so that the United States can indeed live by and not flout this solemnly undertaken contractural commitment. So the United States can maintain credibility by keeping its word just as every other promissor is expected to keep his or her word.

I also find that the Board has acted responsibly in being mindful of the interests of these other parties that may be innocent victims of the United States intransigence in this area.

My own question, frankly, is whether the six week period of release that is represented by the Board's tendered motion, and order, are enough to cover the time period for Congressional action because one thing that I think would not make a lot of sense, if we are looking at the moderate modification of that, is to pick a date that could have a short fall in terms of the time table that we are looking at, both for Congressional action and for the parties to return with the proposed judment order.

Mr. Howard, I guess I ought to ask you, or Mr. McCombs about that.

MR. HOWARD: I think there are two points in that respect. One is we think we have provided sufficient time already, in part because as we understand the congressional schedule the House is scheduled to recess again approximately August 6. So that we have already allowed, in effect, an extra

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week beyond what we perceive as the point at which the prospects for Congressional action will be definitively known.

THE COURT: That is, six weeks would end, roughly, August 10 or 11th, is what you are saying.

MR. HOWARD: The 13th I think.

THE COURT: Well, six weeks beginning with July 1
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would end, I guess, August 11.

MR. HOWARD: Okay. But even that day is some several days after the prospects of Congressional action will certainly be known.

I also want to emphasize that we have, with some emphasis, proposed that the schedule be Aguust 13, or before.

THE COURT: Yes, I know that.

MR. HOWARD: And if there is any development that makes it clear to us that we should all deal with this matter before the 13th, we will certainly do that.

The final thing I would say is that I think as this process goes forward we may be able to make some progress in shortening the schedule for consideration of an order when we reach that point by having some exchange among counsel concerning the form of possible order, and I think that we can try to accomplish that without a formal submission schedule, so that when we get to the end of this current period of time the guestion of the order could be addressed very rapidly, as far as the parties are concerned.

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MR. ROSS: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Ross?

MR. ROSS: If I understand Mr. HOward, he is arguing for the six week release of funds on the 100 percent expectation that Congress will have acted by the time it recesses, one way or the other.

THE COURT: No, that it will have acted or not have acted.

MR. ROSS: I am sorry -- acted or not acted by the 6th of August, and based on past experience --

THE COURT: That is a universe, is it not?

MR. ROSS: Well, it is but I don't think it is accurate because the session resumes again in September, and I hope that he is not going to come inhere again on August 11. In other words I am trying to extract a promise from Mr. HOward that if the Court grants this order that we are not going to come back a month from how and say, let's wait until the end of September.

MR. MC COMBS: From a practical standpoint, it is obvious the Board needs 20 million long before the First of September to continue the ESP program. If Congress has not act we will go to the judicial process to try and get that money.

THE COURT: Ifind that under the circumstances then, the six week period is adequate and I expect that the proposed judgment order will indeed be provided on or before the

August 13 date.

On the second aspect, which is whether an order, a declaratory judgment ought to be entered now, that really carves out impermissibly, it seems to me, from the way I had resolved the matter in terms of the June 8, opinion, a portion of the controversy in a way that might not fairly characterize the balance of it. It is, in a sense, like asking that a question be decided rather than that a case be decided, and that is inappropriate given all of the things, and here I am not even going to attempt to begin summarizing all of the interrelated aspects that forced this opinion to be much longer than any of us would have hoped, so that it seems to me that it is really inappropriate to consider the possibility of a piece of an order which is what, essentially, declaratory judgment would call for, so that I am going to do both those things. I am going to modify the entire restraining order for the release that has been requested in the Board's submission. am changing the schedule for submission of the proposed order to permit the Board to come in on or before August 13.

That, Mr. Ross, really poses the question to you.

If, in a worst case position you got it on the 13th, when would you be in a position to respond?

MR. ROSS: You mean the worst case being I didn't see anything before the 13th?

THE COURT: Exactly. What I would like to do, .

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incidentally, rather than pick a date is to say some period of time after you have received the proposed order.

MR. ROSS: Let us make it a week.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROSS: Do I understand, your Honor to be rejecting my suggestion that the six-fiftyseconds be for all the --

modify the order in the way that the Board has presented it by providing that the United States will respond within seven days after the time of actual delivery of the proposed order to Mr. Ross, so that they have a full week's opportunity, and then what I am going to do, the one thing that is not included here and you ought to recast this order and put it together, is to set a next status date to deal with that, the order as entered, and on that one I am going to set a specific date but with the understanding that if you get the papers in earlier I will accelerate that and I will have my minute clerk get in touch with both sides for that purpose.

That will put it right during the period that I am emergency judge so I suppose I can treat this one like any othe emergency, and I will do that for August 23, on the assumption that I am going to -- that we are dealing with the worst time table, which would mean the August 13 date and August 20. I am going to set the status date for August 23 at 1:30.

Is that a problem?

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MR. ROSS: Your Honor, while they are conferring,

I may be repeating myself, but I understand Mr. Howard's proposal to be that the Secretary funds one set of grantees under
the discretionary program for six weeks, but not others.

I mean, the Board apparently has chosen grantees it wants the Secretary --

THE COURT: How do you respond to that issue?

MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, we are not selecting -- we are not telling the Secretary what to do. What we are proposing is that the Court identify certain funds to be released. What the Secretary does with those funds is up to him. The funds are identified in the following way.

The Secretary has already conditionally reserved certain funds within the Discretionary Fund for the National Difusion Network, an organization which your Honor refers to as constituting many of your pen pals, as well as my telephone buddies. They have programs --

THE COURT: It seems to me the entire State of New Hampshire is corresponding with me.

MR. ROSS: I understand what he is saying, but I understand him to be saying that the Secretary has the discreti to partially fund a certain program or not partially fund a certain program, and that if he funded twice as many grantees with three weeks of funds that he would be in violation of the Court's order.

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MR. HOWARD: Absolutely not. In fact, as far as I am concerned, the Secretary can rescind his earlier notice and give the money to somebody else if he wants to.

THE COURT: I didn't understand that to be the intention. My understadning was this was a definition of the amount to be released, but it was not intended to limit the Secretary's discretion in terms of allocation of funds. But the basis on which the amount was defined was because the Secretary himself had set up certain allocations, and that was the predicate for calculation.

Now if you are concerned about the language on that, what I would suggest that you ought to do is get together while you are here, and tender proposed order with modified language to make it plain that it is not intended to limit how the Secretary spends the dollars that are released. It is only a matter of --

MR. ROSS: I understand what the Court is saying, but it is the way that it comes out is that for the entire discretionary program it only has three weeks worth of funds.

THE COURT: Mr. Ross, I don't know how to state it more clearly than that the Secretary's determination of the funds that are released is going to be the Secretary's determination.

MR. ROSS: That is exactly right, your Honor, but he does not have enough money released to fund all the grantees for more than three weeks because of an arbitrary number that

Mr. Howard has picked out.

MR. HOWARD: It is not arbitrary. It is based on which programs have funding problems.

MR. ROSS: That's right, and so therefore, the Board is indirectly suggesting how the Secretary should spend his funds, and --

THE COURT: The Secretary's job is to decide, and if he retains that job, and again, if you are concerned about how the order functions in that respect, what I would suggest is that you get together --

MR. ROSS: I don't think that is necessary because I understand. The record is clear as to what --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ROSS: -- what the number is.

THE COURT: I will await the modified form or order, and I will enter it.

MR. HOWARD: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. MC COMBS: Judge, one other thing. We have a motion to supplement the record.

THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Ross?

MR. ROSS: We don't know why the things are missing, and we certainly don't object.

THE COURT: I don't know either except for the possibility that they may have been delivered as part of the mass of materials that were given to me, and maybe that include

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what was supposed to be the file copies as well, because you know, I have got a carload. I need a second chambers for this case.

MR. MC COMBS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Leave is granted.

CERTIFICATE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript is a true and correct transcript of my shorthand notes.

heland frances

7-17-19