

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI**

ALISON (ALI) GRAEFF,

519 N. 6TH Street

St. Charles, MO 63301

individually and as a

Candidate for Missouri State

Representative

Plaintiff, *pro se*,

v.

CIVIL ACTION

NO.: 4:22-cv-00682 SEP

UNITED STATES ELECTION ASSISTANCE

COMMISSION,

633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200

Washington, DC 20001

THOMAS HICKS, Commission Chairman

all in his individual capacity

and in his official

capacity as sole Federal

Election Authority; and

CHRISTY McCORMICK, Vice Chairwoman

all in her individual capacity and

in her capacities as members

of the Election Assistance Commission

BENJAMIN W. HOVLAND, Commissioner

all in his individual capacities and

in their capacities as members

of the Election Assistance Commission

DONALD L. PALMER, Commissioner

all in his individual capacities and

in their capacities as members

of the Election Assistance Commission

MISSOURI SECRETARY OF STATE

JOHN J. ASHCROFT

**600 West Main Street
Jefferson City, Missouri
65101**

in his individual capacity

and in his official

capacity as Chief Elections Official

Defendant(s),

1 **PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**
2 **AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION**
3 **FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

4
5 **INTRODUCTION**

6 The specific federal statutes, federal treaties, and/or provisions of the United States Constitution,
7 including but not limited to, the issues in this case;

8 The Secretary of State, Chief Election Official, as described under **MO 15 CSR 30-10.010**, failed to
9 protect my right to vote in a fair and equal election in the November 3rd, 2020, General election and
10 subsequent elections by allowing electronic voting system machines to be used throughout the state, that
11 did not legally meet, obtain, or maintain Federal laboratory accreditation as codified into Missouri law.
12 This inflicts irreputable harm to myself as well as all Missouri registered Voters by rendering all votes
13 cast by Missouri registered voters null and void. Therefore, no legal Certification of Election Results can
14 be put forth by state election officials.

15
16 **MO 15 CSR 30-10.020 (2020), as a requirement of participation under the Help America**
17 **Vote Act 2002, (HAVA 2002) 52 U.S.C. Subtitle II Chapter 209, Subtitle II, Part 3, Subtitle**
18 **B, § 231(a)(1), (2) and (b) (1) (2) (A), RSMo § 115.225, 2(10), states, “No electronic voting**
19 **system shall be approved unless it: Has been tested and is certified by an independent authority**
20 **that meets the voting system standards developed by the Federal Election Commission or its**
21 **successor agency.” and U.S. Constitution Art. I. § 4.C1.1.1.1.2, Role of Congress in Regulating**
22 **Federal Elections and Missouri Constitution Article I, § 25.**

23
24 **UNACCREDITED VOTING SYSTEMS TEST LABORATORIES**

25 NTS Huntsville Laboratory (*referred to hereafter as NTS*) tested electronic voting systems widely used in
26 Missouri and nationwide. On March 5, 2014, NTS notified the EAC of its acquisition of Wyle
27 Laboratories Inc., a previously accredited VSTL. In fact, Wyle’s Certificate of Accreditation is the only
28 legally EAC accredited VSTL, correctly dated and signed by the Chairman, that I’ve discovered. Wyle’s
29 Certificate of Accreditation was valid from 05/04/2010 through 04/27/2012 and had expired at the time of
30 NTS’s acquisition. NTS Huntsville never received a legal accreditation from the EAC, nor is there a
31 Certificate of Accreditation available on the EAC website as dictated by HAVA. A request was made to

the EAC under the Freedom of Information Act No.22-00066 on June 30, 2022, for NTS Huntsville Certificate of Accreditation. The EAC's response states: "The EAC does not have records responsive to your request." (Exhibit W)



U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001

VIA EMAIL

June 30, 2022

Ali Graeff
alimariegraeff@gmail.com

Greetings:


This acknowledges the U.S. Election Assistance Commission's receipt of your Freedom of Information Act request (No. 22-00066):

"Please provide an electronic copy of the NTS Huntsville Laboratory Certificate of Accreditation from the EAC for the dates of 2015-2017."

The EAC does not possess records responsive to your request.

This letter completes the response to your request. If you interpret any portion of this response as an adverse action, you may appeal this action to the Election Assistance Commission. Your appeal must be in writing and sent to the address set forth below. Your appeal must be

Sixty-Six (66) Missouri counties used Unisyn OpenElect software 1.3 in the November 3, 2020 General election. This software was updated and tested on 01/2015 by NTS Huntsville. See NTS Test Report No. PR030407-027. NTS never received EAC accreditation, therefore, no authority to test our voting machines. This is in direct violation of the Election Assistance Commission's own policies and the HAVA ACT 2002. In response to a request for laboratory accreditation of voting machines in these sixty-six Missouri counties, the Secretary of State's office produced an expired 2010-2012 Certificate of Accreditation for Wyle Laboratories Inc. (Exhibit B, C, D, E)



44
45
46 Ten (10) Counties in Missouri reported using SLI Compliance Division of Gaming Laboratories to test
47 the software election machines.⁸ Per the EAC's own "Voting System Testing and Certification Program
48 Manual, Version 2.0" any modifications made to Missouri electronic voting machine software requires
49 testing by accredited laboratories.

50 EAC claims SLI Compliance's original Certificate of Accreditation was given 2/28/2007. However, no
51 previous accreditations are posted on EAC's website. Should this be fact, then SLI Compliance should
52 have also received subsequent renewal accreditations in 2009, 2015, 2017, and 2019 to stay in compliance
53 per law (EAC had no quorum from 2011-2014). Oddly, in 2018, a Certificate of Accreditation was given
54 for a three-year period, even though law states the effective date of certification shall not exceed a period
55 of two years. It was signed by Brian Newby, Executive Director, not signed by the Chairman as law
56 requires. SLI Compliance's current published accreditation is dated 2/1/21, and signed not by the
57 Chairman as law requires, but by EAC Director Mona Harrington. It is not possible to have an
58 accreditation which is indefinite when one of the requirements for accreditation has an expiration and
59 renewal requirement. (Exhibit F)

VSTL Program Manual v 2.0 page 37

3.6. Grant of Accreditation: Upon a vote of the EAC Commissioners to accredit a laboratory, the Testing and Certification Program Director shall inform the laboratory of the decision, issue a Certificate of Accreditation and post information regarding the laboratory on the EAC Web site.



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Accreditation ✓

Certificate for the Lab

SLI Compliance
Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC
Wheat Ridge, Colorado

is recognized by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for the testing of voting systems to the 2005 and 2015 Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVS 1.0 & 1.1) under the criteria set forth in the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program and Laboratory Accreditation Program. SLI Compliance is also recognized as having successfully completed assessments by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for conformance to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 and the criteria set forth in NIST Handbooks 150 and 150-22.

VSTL Program Manual v 2.0 page 38

3.6.1. Certificate of Accreditation: ... The certificate shall be signed by the Chair of the Commission and state

3.6.1.3. The effective date of the certification, which shall not exceed a period of two (2) years, and

Original Accreditation Issued on: 2/28/2007

Accreditation remains effective until revoked by a vote of the EAC pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 20571(c)(2).

(c) Continuing review by National Institute of Standards and Technology

(2) Approval by Commission required for revocation

The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this section may not be revoked unless the revocation is approved by a vote of the Commission.

Should be signed by EAC Chairman
NOT Executive Dir.

Mona Harrington

Date: 2/1/21

Mona Harrington
Executive Director, U.S. Election Assistance Commission

EAC Lab Code: 0701

60



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate for the Lab

Certificate of Accreditation ✓

SLI Compliance,
Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC
Wheat Ridge, Colorado

is recognized by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for the testing of voting systems to the 2002 Voting Systems Standards, the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines versions 1.0 and 1.1 under the criteria set forth in the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program and Laboratory Accreditation Program. SLI Compliance is also recognized as having successfully completed assessments by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for conformance to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 and the criteria set forth in NIST Handbooks 150 and 150-22.

Effective Through

January 10, 2021

Should be signed by EAC Chairman
NOT Executive Dir.

B. D. L.

Date: 1/10/21

Brian Keady,
Executive Director, U.S. Election Assistance Commission

EAC Lab Code: 0701

61

9. SLI Compliance also did the testing for the electronic voting system Hart InterCivic Verity Voting. It is unclear how Hart InterCivic could implement a major update to their Verity software (version 2.3) in 2019 without having been tested by an accredited laboratory. (Exhibit G)

10. EAC claims Pro V&V's original Certificate of Accreditation was given 2/24/2015 expiring on February 24, 2017. And, to the extent that proposed statement is a verifiable fact, then Pro V&V should have also received a subsequent renewal accreditation in 2019 to stay in compliance per law. It was signed by Alice Miller, Executive Director, not signed by the Chairman as law requires. Pro V&V's current published accreditation is dated 2/1/21, and also not signed by the Chairman as law requires, but by EAC Director Mona Harrington. (Exhibit M)

 United States Election Assistance Commission Certificate for the Lab

Certificate of Accreditation

Pro V&V, Inc.
Huntsville, Alabama

VSTL Program Manual v 2.0 page 37
1.6 Grant of Accreditation. Upon a vote of the EAC Commissioners to accredit a laboratory the Testing and Certification Program Director shall inform the laboratory of the decision, issue a Certificate of Accreditation and post information regarding the laboratory on the EAC Web site.

is recognized by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for the testing of voting systems to the 2005 and 2015 Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVG 1.0 & 1.1) under the criteria set forth in the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program and Laboratory Accreditation Program. Pro V&V is also recognized as having successfully completed assessments by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for conformance to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 and the criteria set forth in NIST Handbooks 150 and 150-22.

VSTL Program Manual v 2.0 page 38
1.6.1 Certificate of Accreditation. The certificate shall be signed by the Chair of the Commission and state:
§ 10101 The EAC shall issue the certificate which shall not expire for a period of two (2) years.

Original Accreditation Issued on: 2/24/2015
Accreditation remains effective until revoked by a vote of the EAC pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 20911(c)(2).

(c) Continuing review by National Institute of Standards and Technology
(2) Approval by Commission required for revocation
The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this section may not be revoked unless the revocation is approved by a vote of the Commission

Should be signed by EAC Chairman
NOT Executive Dir

Mona Harrington Date: 2/1/21
Mona Harrington
Executive Director, U.S. Election Assistance Commission
EAC Lab Code: 1501

EXHIBIT H

EXHIBIT H



SIGNIFICANCE OF VOTING SYSTEM TESTING LABORATORIES

VSTLs are responsible for the examination of the use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components as well as the examination of other applications, software, and components deemed to be proprietary. Like established security vulnerabilities, and the increase threats of hacks and manipulations by bad actors, the significance of accredited VSTLs to the certification process is not a novel concept to those in the election infrastructure industry. The critical role of VSTLs has long been established, acknowledged and conveyed amongst the EAC, election technology manufacturers/vendors, politicians, state and county officials, and many experts in the field. In a letter dated March 13, 2008, Brian J Hancock, Director of Testing and Certification to Mary Saunders, Chief of Standards Services and Division of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) stated, "As you know, the credibility of the EAC Testing and Certification Program depends largely on having competent VSTLs to thoroughly test voting systems to the applicable Federal Standards. National Voluntary Lab Accreditation Program (NVLAP) review of the technical competency of the laboratories is a critical prerequisite to EAC accreditation of the VSTLs to provide assurance that the labs will function in accordance with internationally accepted standards for testing bodies."

91 Following the elections of 2017, Oregon [Senator Ron Wyden](#), sent a letter to [Traci Mapps](#), Director of
 92 Operations for SLI Compliance, specifically asking if the company had implemented the best practices
 93 described in the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) 2015 VVSG 1.1. The adherence
 94 to the VVSG standards was a hallmark in the Bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee Intelligence
 95 Committee report.

RON WYDEN
 SENATOR
 UNITED STATES SENATE
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3703
 202-224-5244
 202-224-5244

United States Senate
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-3703

October 3, 2017

Ms. Traci Mapps
 Director of Operations
 SLI Compliance
 4720 Independence Street
 Wheat Ridge, CO 80033

Dear Ms. Mapps:

I write to seek public answers about cybersecurity threats to our election infrastructure and whether the election technology and election technology testing industries have taken steps to defend against hackers, including those working for foreign governments.

As our election systems have come under unprecedented scrutiny, public faith in the security of our electoral process at every level is more important than ever before. Ensuring that Americans can trust that election systems and infrastructure are secure is necessary to protecting confidence in our electoral process and democratic government. This effort must include not only the manufacturers and government consumers of election systems but also the Voting System Test Laboratories accredited by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

In order for Congress and the American people to better understand the threats that your company faces and the steps you have taken to protect against them, I would appreciate complete answers to the following questions by October 31, 2017.

1. Does your company employ a Chief Information Security Officer? If yes, to whom do they directly report? If not, why not?
2. How many employees work solely on information security?
3. In the last five years, how many times has your company utilized an outside cybersecurity firm to audit the security of your testing equipment and systems and to conduct penetration tests of your corporate information technology infrastructure?
4. Has your company addressed all of the issues discovered by these cybersecurity experts and implemented all of their recommendations? If not, why not?
5. What is the process for when your laboratory determines that a product undergoing testing has potential security vulnerabilities? Do all security vulnerabilities result in non-certification of a product undergoing testing? Are all product security vulnerabilities reported to the manufacturer and to the Election Assistance Commission?

6. Are you aware of any data breaches or other cybersecurity incidents in which an attacker gained unauthorized access to your internal systems, corporate data or customer data? If your company has suffered one or more data breaches or other cybersecurity incidents, have you reported these incidents to federal, state and local authorities? If not, why not?
7. Has your firm implemented the best practices described in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 1.0? If not, why not?

If you have any questions about this request, please contact Chris Seghoian on my staff at (202) 224-5244.

Sincerely,


 Ron Wyden
 United States Senator

713 MR. STEVE MURPHY
 202-224-5244
 202-224-5244

405 SAEI 471-104
 202-224-5244
 202-224-5244

541 ANDREW B. JONES
 202-224-5244
 202-224-5244

U.S. SENATOR
 202-224-5244
 202-224-5244


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Active
 30 to 35

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 101 See Traci Mapps response...



October 30, 2017

Honorable Ron Wyden
United States Senator
221 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Re: Response to Letter Pertaining to Cybersecurity

Dear Senator Wyden,

SLI Compliance (SLI), a Division of Gaming Laboratories International LLC (GLI), received an email from Mr. Chris Soghoian, TechCongress Innovation Fellow, on October 2, 2017 seeking public information regarding election security and asked that we respond by October 31, 2017. Some of the information requested may have appropriately be obtained from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC).

As an accredited Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) under the National Voluntary Accreditation Program (NVLAP) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (NVLAP Lab Code 200733-0: TESTING) and the EAC, SLI conforms to the ISO 17025 and ISO 9001:2008 standards excluding the NIST Handbook 150 and 150-22. In addition, SLI adheres to all mandatory procedural requirements under the EAC as written in the EAC Voting System Test Laboratory Accreditation Program Manual and EAC's Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual.

SLI and GLI as a company would like to assure you that our organization takes cybersecurity and the protection of our systems very seriously. We have taken stringent measures to identify, mitigate and contain threats to our company's digital infrastructure, including but not limited to companywide security awareness training, ongoing vulnerability assessments and continuous system monitoring and auditing. SLI is subject to regular audits, compliance disclosures and other regulatory and certification requirements as part of its ongoing obligation to remain accredited by the aforementioned oversight bodies.

We would like to encourage you, and/or Mr. Chris Soghoian, to contact the EAC directly for any further questions in regards to the accreditation and requirements of a VSTL under the EAC's Testing and Certification program.

Sincerely,

Traci Mapps
Director of Operations
SLI Compliance, a Division of GLI LLC

ARGUMENT

Missouri Secretary of State and 34 Missouri representatives both elected and appointed, in addition to three United States EAC Commissioners and one EAC Executive Director, were served in March of 2022, via certified mail a legal "Notice and Demand Affidavit of Maladministration, Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud" informing Defendants of the lack of legal accreditation of VSTL's used in the November 3rd, 2020, General Election. This notified every recipient of all the information and evidence provided to the Court today. There have been no responses, answers or refute of any manner from any of the 39 Respondent's to date.

Due to the disregard in response to the information provided in the "Notice and Demand Affidavit of Maladministration, Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud" served to the Defendants in March of 2022, they have left little option for remedy in regard to addressing the gross negligence they have created. With an upcoming election, less than 30 days away, EAC policy states a renewal of a laboratory's accreditation must be "no earlier than 60 days before the accreditation expiration date and no later than 30

days before that date.” Therefore, rendering any attempt at laboratory re-accreditation at this late stage, an unfeasible option. Additionally, the public’s trust in the EAC has been irrevocably broken. This shows, for years the EAC has neglected the law. They’ve failed to perform their duties to The People in safeguarding and securing our electronic voting systems, our critical infrastructure, and our voices. For nearly a decade, over half of the State of Missouri has used uncertified electronic voting systems due to the lack of accreditation of the VSTL, NTS Huntsville Laboratory. Rendering any votes cast through an uncertified electronic voting machine, null and void.

As a candidate, a citizen, and a voter, the evidence that unaccredited laboratories tested the electronic voting systems software for legal use in the Missouri’s November 3rd, 2020, General Election, and continuing to be used currently, nullifies any vote cast through electronic voting systems that underwent testing/certification by these unaccredited laboratories. This violates my rights as a citizen, silences my voice as a voter, eliminating my right to express my political opinion on who governs my state and my fundamental right to vote.

The phrase “right to vote” appears for the first time in the Fourteenth Amendment, which declares States shall lose congressional representation “when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime.” The allowance of the EAC and the Missouri Secretary of State to continue to neglect law in respect to the certification and legality of our electronic voting system machines, my vote, and any electorate’s vote for me in the next election, are nullified. Rendering the violation of my U. S. Constitution 14th Amendment right.

The act of voting is exercising our power to preserve our Republic and make our voices heard. Our right to vote, our right to select those who represent and make decisions for us affecting every aspect of our lives, is among the most sacred that we have and must safeguard the process against fraud and manipulation.

Supreme Court case law supports a theory of First Amendment protection for voters. The Court has repeatedly characterized the fundamental right to vote in terms of “voice” and expression. In *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964), the Court explained: “No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws.” In *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964), the Court held: “Each citizen must have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.” In *Norman v. Reed*, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992), the Court noted that voting gives “opportunities of all voters to express their own political preferences.” Finally, in *Anderson v. Celebrezze*,

149 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983), the source of the current balancing test, the Court held that the interest at stake
150 was the “interests of voters who chose to associate together to express their support for Anderson’s
151 candidacy and the views he expressed.” This list goes on at length¹.

152 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in (quoting *Republican Party of Minn. v. White*, 536 U.S. 765,
153 788 (2002)), stated:

154 “An individual expresses a view on a political matter when he signs a petition under
155 Washington’s referendum procedure [T]he expression of a political view implicates a First
156 Amendment right. The State, having “cho[sen] to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the
157 democratic process, . . . must accord the participants in that process the First Amendment rights
158 that attach to their roles.”

159 The Chief Justice’s opinion acknowledged that signing a petition was part of a process leading to legal
160 consequences under state law, and that “to the extent a regulation concerns the legal effect of a particular
161 activity in [the electoral] process, the government will be afforded substantial latitude to enforce that
162 regulation.” That regulatory necessity, however, does not negate the First Amendment’s protection:

163 “Voting and petition-signing plainly express a point of view and represent a decision to sign on
164 to a particular idea in the marketplace of ideas or support a particular candidate who best
165 represents the voters’ political beliefs.”

166 The expressive interests implicated by voting are strong. By voting, citizens declare their choice to
167 participate. This is expressed in front of their neighbors, poll officials, and allow a public record of their

¹ In the following, virtually endless, list of voting rights Supreme Court voting cases since *Baker v. Carr*, voting is characterized as providing citizens with a “voice” in their democracy: *Clingman v. Beaver*, 544 U.S. 581, 599 (2005); *Miller v. Johnson*, 515 U.S. 900, 932, 937 (1995); *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630, 675 (1993); *U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana*, 503 U.S. 442, 460 (1992); *Burdick v. Takushi*, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992); *Burson v. Freeman*, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992); *Chisom v. Roemer*, 501 U.S. 380, 398 n.25 (1991); *Bd. of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris*, 489 U.S. 688, 693 (1989); *Davis v. Bandemer*, 478 U.S. 109, 166 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); *Rogers v. Lodge*, 458 U.S. 613, 649 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting); *Ball v. James*, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981); *Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette*, 450 U.S. 107, 127, 134 (1981); *City of Rome v. United States*, 446 U.S. 156, 176 n.12 (1980); *City of Mobile v. Bolden*, 446 U.S. 55, 78 (1980); *Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa*, 439 U.S. 60, 76 (1978); *United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey*, 430 U.S. 144, 177 n.5 (1977); *City of Richmond v. United States*, 422 U.S. 358, 387 (1975); *Am. Party of Texas v. White*, 415 U.S. 767, 799 (1974); *Lubin v. Panish*, 415 U.S. 709, 721 n.* (1974); *Kusper v. Pontikes*, 414 U.S. 51, 58 (1973); *Rosario v. Rockefeller*, 410 U.S. 752, 764 (1973); *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U.S. 315, 321, 323 (1973); *Jenness v. Forston*, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); *Whitcomb v. Chavis*, 403 U.S. 124, 141 (1971); *Oregon v. Mitchell*, 400 U.S. 112, 134 (1970); *Evans v. Cornman*, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); *Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15*, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); *Hadnott v. Amos*, 393 U.S. 904, 906 (1968); *Williams v. Rhodes*, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968); *Avery v. Midland County, Tex.*, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968); *Carrington v. Rash*, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); *Fortson v. Toombs*, 379 U.S. 621, 626 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); *Roman v. Sincok*, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); *WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo*, 377 U.S. 633, 655 (1964); *Reynolds*, 377 U.S. at 576; *Wesberry*, 376 U.S. at 10, 17; *Gray v. Sanders*, 372 U.S. 368, 386 (1963).

choice. The expressive nature of the vote is present whether the vote is for a candidate in a primary or general election or for a ballot proposition, recall, referendum or anything else called a vote. Likewise, a vote is expressive regardless of whether it is decisive.

The decision not to vote may also serve an expressive purpose and be intended to protest the unresponsiveness of the government or deny the legitimacy of the process or of a particular outcome.

Voting is therefore both a means of achieving a particular end and of expressing an opinion as to both the process and the desired end.

It is well-established that “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547(1976)

Applying a strict scrutiny analysis to the instant facts, **RSMo § 115.631 (7)** serves a "compelling interest" “.....knowingly practicing any fraud upon a voter to induce him or her to cast a vote which will be rejected, or otherwise defrauding him or her of his or her vote;”

Relevant to “public interest”, this affects the population of Missouri as a whole should Missouri voters continue to be required to cast their votes on illegal voting machines, resulting in the installation of a fraudulent government body.

Our vote is our voice in government, and without this, we are not free people. The First Amendment protects our voice which we demonstrate through our vote. If the EAC and Missouri Secretary of State fail to safeguard our elections and uphold the rule of law, then my First Amendment rights, as well as all other Missouri citizen’s rights have been violated. This not only effects Missouri registered voters, but the Missouri population as a whole. We collectively inherit a fraudulent government.

In weighing injury and risk, The People of Missouri bear the injury and are the beneficiaries of the problems caused by lack of compliance by the EAC and Missouri Secretary of State. Safety of critical infrastructure and public trust were both violated by Defendants who took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution which guarantees our right to vote and be heard in elections. Lack of compliance and contract renders the respective elections unlawful bearing the weight of injury on voters forced to use any uncertified electronic voting equipment system nullifying their vote and First Amendment right.

There is a burden on the Missouri Secretary of State to logically prepare the state election process without the use of electronic voting equipment systems. However, this burden does not outweigh the loss of the Peoples constitutionally protected right to free and fair elections.

199 The people of Missouri have been forced into contract with representatives through deceptive practices
200 and fraudulent certifications; thereby, rendering the elections false as "fraud vitiates everything," (*United*
201 *States v. Throckmorton*, 98 U.S. 61). This is clear injury to The People as a result of Respondents'
202 actions.

203 It is interesting to note the repeated references to fraud in the above quotes. Therefore, the meaning of
204 fraud should be noted: Fraud. "An intentional perversion of truth for the purpose of inducing another in
205 reliance upon it to part with some valuable thing belonging to him or to surrender a legal right. A false
206 representation of a matter of fact... which deceives and is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
207 upon it to his legal injury. ... It consists of some deceitful practice or willful device, resorted to with intent
208 to deprive another of his right, or in some manner to do him injury... "(*Emphasis added*) –*Black's Law*
209 *Dictionary Fifth Edition (1989)*, page 594.

210 Consider the case of *McNally v. U.S.*, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) 371-72, *Quoting U.S. v Holzer*, 816 F.2d. 304,
211 307 (1987). Fraud in its elementary common law sense of deceit... includes the deliberate concealment of
212 material information in a setting of fiduciary obligation. A public official is a fiduciary toward the
213 public... and if he deliberately conceals material information from them, he is guilty of fraud.

214 These usurpations against The People of Missouri and the tyrannical measures are a clear, apparent
215 violations of **Article I, § 1, § 2, § 3, § 4 and § 25** of the Missouri Constitution - as well as, **18 U.S. Code**
216 **§§ 241 and 242** - and must be halted, atoned for, and rectified. Missourians are living in immediate
217 imminent danger (with no remedy other than the Court's honorable intervention) under the threat of
218 continuing to have their constitutional rights and liberties stripped, which necessitates emergent action
219 from the Court. *LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co.*, 352 U.S. 249 (1957); *United States v. McGarr*, 461 F.2d 1
220 (7th Cir. 1972).

223 **U.S. Constitution Art I. § 4.C1.1.1.1.2**, Role of Congress in Regulating Federal Elections As noted,
224 although § 2, cl.1, of this Article vests in the states the responsibility, now limited, to establish voter
225 qualifications for congressional elections, the Court has held that the right to vote for Members
226 of Congress is derived from the Federal Constitution, and that Congress therefore may legislate
227 under this section of the Article to protect the integrity of this right. Congress may protect the
228 right of suffrage against both official and private abridgment. Where a primary election is an
229 integral part of the procedure of choice, the right to vote in that primary election is subject to Congressional
230 protection. The right embraces, of course, the opportunity to cast a ballot and to
231 have it counted honestly. What amount of monetary damages can adequately compensate a
232 stolen or nullified vote?

MEMORANDUM FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

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RELIEF OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION REQUESTED

1. That this Honorable Court GRANT Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief to halt the Defendants' illegal and unlawful conduct;

(a) Temporarily restrain, as well as preliminarily enjoin Defendants, their agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all persons in active concert or participation with any of them, from implementing or enforcing the use of electronic voting machines, equipment, and electronic poll pads in the August 2nd 2022 Missouri Primaries and November 8th 2022 Missouri General Election and from taking any other action to implement the use of electronic voting equipment; in all future Missouri elections should the Court grant Plaintiff permanent injunctive relief.

(b). Prohibit the Missouri Secretary of State, and all election officials in the state of Missouri from deletion, destruction, disposal, or altering of all election data pertaining to the November 3rd, 2020 General election in the State of Missouri;

(c). Plaintiff requests this Honorable Court to grant a hearing on Plaintiff's Preliminary Injunctive Relief on or before July 27, 2022;

(d) Grant such other and further relief the Court sees just, equitable, and proper including without limitation, an award of attorneys' fees and costs to Plaintiffs.

Verification

I hereby declare, certify, and state, pursuant to the penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, and by the provisions of 28 USC § 1746 that all the above and foregoing representations are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Verification

I hereby declare, certify, and state, pursuant to the penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, and by the provisions of 28 USC § 1746 that all the above and foregoing representations are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Executed in St Charles County, Missouri on this 13th day of July in the year of Our Lord Two Thousand and Twenty-Two.

Autograph of Affiant:

Alison Grueff

Notary as JURAT CERTIFICATE:

Missouri State
St Charles County

On this 13 day of July 2022, before me,

John Robinson

, a Notary Public, personally appeared

Alison Grueff


Name of Affiant, who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same in their authorized capacity, and that by their autograph(s) on the instrument the person executed, the instrument.

I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the lawful laws of the State of Missouri and that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official seal

Signature of Notary / Jurat

John Robinson



MISSOURI

- State Participation:* **Requires testing to federal standards/Requires testing by a federally accredited laboratory. MO requires that voting systems are certified by independent testing authorities according to the voting system standards adopted by a federal election authority, and ultimately approved by the secretary of state.**
- Applicable Statute(s):* **"No electronic voting system shall be approved unless it: (10) Has been tested and is certified by an independent authority that meets the voting system standards developed by the Federal Election Commission or its successor agency. The provisions of this subdivision shall not be required for any system purchased prior to August 28, 2002." MO Rev Stat. § 115.225 (2019)**
- Applicable Regulation(s):* **"As a prerequisite to approval from the secretary of state, each manufacturer or supplier of electronic voting systems or equipment shall have completed and submitted to the secretary of state...and shall have received certification from an independent testing authority approved by the secretary of state." MO Code Regs. 15 CSR 30-10.020 (2020)**
- State Certification Process:* **The Secretary of State accepts applications from voting system manufacturers. Prior to approval from the Secretary of State, each manufacturer must receive certification from an independent testing authority approved by the Secretary of State. Voting manufacturers must file two affidavits stating that (1) the voting machine complies with all state rules and (2) if any changes are made in the system the ability to comply with state rules will not be affected. An electronic voting system may be used if it has been approved by the Secretary of State and complies with state law. MO. Rev. Stat. § 115.225 (2019) and MO Code Regs. 15 CSR 30-10.020 (2020)**



United States Election Assistance Commission

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

VSTL

Certificate of Accreditation

**Wyle Laboratories, Inc.
Huntsville, Alabama**

is recognized by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for the testing of voting systems to the 2005 Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines under the criteria set forth in the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program and Laboratory Accreditation Program. Wyle is also recognized as having successfully completed assessments by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for conformance to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 and the criteria set forth in NIST Handbooks 150 and 150-22.

Effective Through

April 27, 2012

Donetta Davidson Date: 5/04/10

Chair, U.S. Election Assistance Commission

EAC Lab Code: 0704

Exhibit B



March 5, 2014

**US Election Assistance Commission
Voting System Testing & Certification Program
1201 New York Ave., NW, Suite 300
Washington, DC 2005**

Attention: Mr. Brian Hancock

**Subject: National Technical Systems (NTS) Completes Acquisition of
Wyle Laboratories, Inc.**

Dear Mr. Hancock:

We are pleased to announce that NTS, the leading independent test, inspection, and certification company in the United States, has acquired the testing business of Wyle Laboratories. This acquisition is an exciting part of the significant investments we are making in the capabilities we are able to deliver customers, all in support of our mission to be the natural first choice for the world class companies we serve.

Wyle's three testing laboratories – located in Huntsville, Alabama; El Segundo, California; and San Bernardino, California – will be renamed, joining NTS' national network of over 25 labs. In particular, this combination, and the significant technological, personnel, and capital investments we are making in support of it, will create extraordinary centers of excellence in Alabama and Southern California with truly exceptional capabilities to serve your team's needs.

The NTS management team is, of course, fully committed to not only providing, but also enhancing, the high quality performance and superior customer service you have become accustomed to over the past 60 years. You will continue to interface with the same people as you have in the past, but you will also notice upgraded technologies and capabilities and be provided access to our growing network of NTS facilities across the United States. We expect the transition to be seamless, and – most importantly – note that all of your projects will continue as planned without interruption.

We are enthusiastic about the investments we are making in being your natural first choice for test, inspection, and certification services and look forward to sharing the exciting things we're doing to further enhance the leading network of capabilities we'll be making available to the

NTS Huntsville (formerly Wyle Laboratories) 7800 Highway 20 W (Str. Zip 35806) P.O. Box 077777 Huntsville, AL 35807-7777
Main Tel: (256) 837-4411 FAX No.: (256) 830-2109

Exhibit C



www.nts.com

leading customers we serve. We sincerely appreciate your business and are always here in support of your team; if you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact me, Keith Wilson, at 256/719-4227 or your Contracts representative (Neil Bunn at 256/716-4120, Megan Toomey at 256/716-4276, Shannon Roden at 256/716-4361, or Dawn Bates at 256/716-4590).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Keith Wilson".

Keith Wilson
Vice President & General Manager
NTS Huntsville, formerly Wyle Laboratories

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Bill McGinnis".

Bill McGinnis
President and CEO
NTS

wyle
laboratories



Exhibit C

STATE	COUNTY	MANUFACTURER	PRODUCT 2020	VERSION	LAB	ISSUE	LAST CERTFD	PRODUCT UPDT 2022	VERSION
Missouri	Jackson County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Barry County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Carroll County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Cass County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Cedar County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Clay County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Harrison County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Lafayette County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Mississippi County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Pettis County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Saline County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Calloway County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.2	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Moniteau County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.2	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Butler County	Dominion	D-Suite	5.5	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Livingston County	Dominion	D-Suite	5.5	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Pemiscot County	Dominion	D-Suite	5.5	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Polk County	Dominion	D-Suite	5.5	ProV&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017		
Missouri	Andrew County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification			
Missouri	Atchison County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification			
Missouri	Audrain County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification			
Missouri	Barton County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification			
Missouri	Bates County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification			
Missouri	Benton County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification			

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Missouri	Bollinger County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Buchanan County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	OpenElect Pro V&V	2.1
Missouri	Caldwell County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Camden County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Cape Girardeau County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Chariton County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Christian County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Clark County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Clinton County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Cole County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Dade County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Dallas County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Daviness County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	OpenElect Pro V&V	2.1
Missouri	DeKalb County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Dent County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Douglas County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Dunklin County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Franklin County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Gentry County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Hickory County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Holt County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Howard County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Howell County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Iron County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Jefferson County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Knox County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Lawrence County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	OpenElect Pro V&V	2.1
Missouri	Lewis County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Linn County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Madison County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Marion County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	OpenElect Pro V&V	2.1

Exhibit D

Missouri	Miller County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Monroe County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Morgan County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	New Madrid County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	OpenElect Pro V&V	2.1
Missouri	Oregon County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Ozark County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Perry County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Pulaski County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Putnam County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Ralls County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Randolph County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Ray County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Reynolds County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Ripley County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Schuyler County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Scotland County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Scott County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Shannon County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Shelby County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	St. Charles County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	St. Francois County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Ste. Genevieve County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Stoddard County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Stone County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Taney County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Texas County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Washington County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Wayne County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Webster County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Macon County	ES&S	Unity	3.4.1.0 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	EVS Pro V&V	6.1.1.0

Missouri	Greene County	ES&S	EVS	5.2.2.0	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	EVS Pro V&V	6.1.1.0
Missouri	Johnson County	ES&S	EVS	5.2.2.0	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	EVS Pro V&V	6.1.1.0
Missouri	Laclede County	ES&S	EVS	5.2.2.0	Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	Vernon County	ES&S	EVS	5.2.2.0	Wyle / NTS	No Certification		
Missouri	St. Louis County	Hart	Verity	2.3	SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018	
Missouri	Boone County	ES&S	EVS	6.0.2.0	SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018	
Missouri	Cooper County	ES&S	EVS	6.0.2.0	SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018	EVS Pro V&V 6.1.1.0
Missouri	Lincoln County	ES&S	EVS	6.0.2.0	SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018	
Missouri	Platte County	ES&S	EVS	6.0.2.0	SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018	Unison OpenElect Wyle/NTS 1.3
		Manufacturer	Make/Model	Scanner/Tabulator				
Missouri	Adair County	Dominion	ImageCast X/CX BMD	ImageCast Central/MCC				
Missouri	Gasconade County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	Grundy County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	Jasper County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	Maries County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	McDonald County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	Newton County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	Nodaway County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	Osage County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	Phelps County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	Pike County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
Missouri	Warren County	Dominion	ImageCast Precinct w/Integrated BMD	ImageCast Precinct/ICP				
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Exhibit D

<https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment>



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Conformance

Unisyn OpenElect 1.3
(Modification)



The voting system identified on this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited voting system testing laboratory for conformance to the 2005 *Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (2005 VVSG)*. Components evaluated for this certification are detailed in the attached Scope of Certification document. This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation has been verified by the EAC in accordance with the provisions of the *EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual* and the conclusions of the testing laboratory in the test report are consistent with the evidence adduced. This certificate is not an endorsement of the product by any agency of the U.S. Government and no warranty of the product is either expressed or implied.

Product Name: OpenElect

Model or Version: Version 1.3 (Modification)

Name of VSTL: NTS Huntsville

EAC Certification Number: 04211950-1.3

Date Issued: 01/12/2015

Chief Operating Officer & Acting Executive Director
U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Scope of Certification Attached

Exhibit E



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Accreditation

**SLI Compliance,
Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC
Wheat Ridge, Colorado**

is recognized by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for the testing of voting systems to the 2002 Voting Systems Standards, the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines versions 1.0 and 1.1 under the criteria set forth in the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program and Laboratory Accreditation Program. SLI Compliance is also recognized as having successfully completed assessments by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for conformance to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 and the criteria set forth in NIST Handbooks 150 and 150-22.

Effective Through

January 10, 2021

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "B. Newby", is written over a horizontal line.

Date: 1/10/18

*Brian Newby,
Executive Director, U.S. Election Assistance Commission*

EAC Lab Code: 0701

Exhibit F



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Accreditation

SLI Compliance
Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC
Wheat Ridge, Colorado

is recognized by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for the testing of voting systems to the 2005 and 2015 Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VWSG 1.0 & 1.1) under the criteria set forth in the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program and Laboratory Accreditation Program. SLI Compliance is also recognized as having successfully completed assessments by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for conformance to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 and the criteria set forth in NIST Handbooks 150 and 150-22.

Original Accreditation Issued on: 2/28/2007

Accreditation remains effective until revoked by a vote of the EAC pursuant to 52 U.S.C. § 20971(c)(2).

Mona Harrington

Date: 2/1/21

Mona Harrington
Executive Director, U.S. Election Assistance Commission

EAC Lab Code: 0701

Exhibit F



*Hart InterCivic
Verity 2.3
Modification Certification Test Report*

Certification Test Report - Modification

Report Number *HRT-18002-CTR-01*

Hart InterCivic Verity Voting 2.3

Modification Certification Test Report version 1.3

February 26th, 2019

Prepared for:

Vendor Name	<i>Hart InterCivic Inc. (Hart)</i>
Vendor System	<i>Verity Voting 2.3</i>
EAC Application No.	<i>HRT-Verity-2.3</i>
Vendor Address	<i>15500 Wells Port Drive Austin, TX 78728</i>

Prepared by:



SLI ComplianceSM
4720 Independence St.
Wheat Ridge, CO 80033
303-422-1566
www.SLICompliance.com



Accredited by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Voluntary Lab Accreditation Program (NVLAP), and accredited by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) for VSTL status.



Hart InterCivic
Verity 2.3
Modification Certification Test Report

Revision History

Release	Author	Revisions
v1.0	M. Santos	Initial Release; submitted to EAC for approval
v1.1	M. Santos	Updates for EAC comments
v1.2	M. Santos	Updates for additional EAC comments
v1.3	M. Santos	Updated for Hardware test report listing in "Attachments"

Disclaimer

The Certification Test results reported herein must not be used by the client to claim product certification, approval, or endorsement by NVLAP, NIST, or any agency of the Federal Government. Results herein relate only to the items tested.

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- Verity is a trademark of Hart InterCivic Inc.
- All other products and company names are used for identification purposes only and may be trademarks of their respective owners.

The tests referenced in this document were performed in a controlled environment using specific systems and data sets, and results are related to the specific items tested. Actual results in other environments may vary.

Opinions and Interpretations

There are no SLI opinions or interpretations included in this report beyond the final recommendation.



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1 Introduction

SLI Compliance is submitting this test report as a summary of the certification testing efforts for the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** system, a modified system from **Verity Voting 2.0**, as detailed in the section System Identification. The purpose of this document is to provide an overview of the certification testing effort and the findings of the testing effort for the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** system.

This effort included documentation review of the Technical Data Package, source code review, and testing of the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system. Testing consisted of the development of a test plan, managing system configurations, hardware testing, component and system level tests prepared by SLI, and analysis of results. The review and testing was performed at SLI's Denver, Colorado facility.

1.1 References

1. Election Assistance Commission Voluntary Voting System Guidelines version 1.0 (EAC VVSG 1.0), Volumes I & II
2. NIST NVLAP Handbook 150: 2016
3. NIST NVLAP Handbook 150-22: 2008
4. EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual, United States Election Assistance Commission, v 2.0, May 2015
5. EAC Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual, United States Election Assistance Commission, v 2.0, May 2015
6. SLI VSTL Quality System Manual, v 2.6, prepared by SLI, March 28, 2018

1.2 Document Overview

This document contains:

- The "Introduction", which discusses the applications tested/reviewed.
- The "Certification Test Background", which discusses the testing process.
- The "System Identification", which identifies hardware and software for the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** system.
- The "System Overview", which discusses the functionality of **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** system software and firmware.
- The "Certification Tests Results and Summary", which is a summary of the testing effort.
- The "Recommendations" section, which contains the final analysis of the testing effort.
- Attachments as follows:
 - Attachment A – Warrant of Change Control for Verity Voting 2.3
 - Attachment B - Attestation of Durability for Verity Voting 2.3
 - Attachment C - Attestation of Integrity for Verity Voting 2.3
 - Attachment D - Attestation of Production Hardware and Software for Verity Voting 2.3
 - Attachment E1 - Record of Trusted Build for Verity Voting 2.3.1



- Attachment E2 - Record of Trusted Build for Verity Voting 2.3.2
- Attachment F - Modification of Certified System Analysis Summary Verity 2.3
- Attachment G – As Run Hart Verity 2.3 EAC Modification Test Plan v1.1
- Attachment G1 - As Run Hart Verity 2.3 EAC Electrical Hardware Test Plan v2.0
- Attachment G2 – As Run Hart Verity 2.3 EAC Environmental Hardware Test Plan v2.0
- Attachment H1 - HRT_C#_MSAllInOneStandard_SCRF
- Attachment H2 - HRT_C_&_C++_MSAllInOneStandard_SCRF
- Attachment I – List of Source Code Reviewed and Results
- Attachment J – Verity Voting 2.0 to 2.3 System Modifications
- Attachment K1 - Immunity Testing for Verity Scan, Controller and TW Duo Rev 1
- Attachment K2 - Immunity Testing for Verity Scan Rev 1
- Attachment K3 -Radiated and Conducted Emissions for Verity Controller and TW Duo Rev 1
- Attachment K4 -Radiated and Conducted Emissions for Verity Scan Rev 1
- Attachment L - Hart Verity 2.3 EAC Environmental Hardware Test Report

2 Certification Test Background

This section provides a brief overview of the EAC Certification Program and the activities involved in order for a voting system to be considered for certification against the VVSG 1.0 and the current EAC program manuals.

2.1 PCA - Document and Source Code Reviews

The Physical Configuration Audit (PCA) review of the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** documentation, submitted in the requisite Technical Data Package (TDP), was performed in order to verify conformance with the VVSG 1.0. Source code was reviewed for each software and firmware application declared within the **Verity Voting 2.3** voting system. As this is a modification test campaign, the source code was compared against the final code base of **Verity Voting 2.0**, and changes were subject to review.

All PCA reviews were conducted in accordance with *Volume II Section 2* of the VVSG 1.0, to demonstrate that the system meets the requirements. Results of the PCA documentation review can be found in section 5.2 of this Certification Test Report.

All PCA source code reviews were conducted in accordance with *Volume I Section 5.2 and Volume II Section 5* of the VVSG 1.0, to demonstrate that the system meets the requirements. Results of the PCA source code reviews can be found in *Attachment I – List of Source Code Reviewed and Results*. Inconsistencies or errors in the source code were identified to Hart for resolution or comment. Additional details of the source code review criteria can be found in *Attachments H1-H2*.



2.2 FCA - Functional & System Testing and Sampling

The Functional Configuration Audit (FCA) review of the test documentation submitted by Hart in the TDP was reviewed in order to verify testing of the voting system.

SLI's standard Test Suites were customized for the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system and conducted in accordance with *Volume II Section 6 of the VVSG 1.0*. Simulations of elections were conducted to demonstrate a beginning-to-end business use case process for the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system.

2.2.1 Test Methods

All test methods employed are within the scope of SLI's VSTL accreditation.

The following validated test methods were employed during this test campaign:

Table 1 – Test Methods

SLI VSTL Test Method Name
TM_Accuracy v1.2
TM_Basic_Election_Components v1.1
TM_Ballot Formatting and Production v1.1
TM_Error Message and Recovery v1.3
TM_HW Integrity v1.2
TM_Maintainability v1.1
TM_Readiness v1.1
TM_Tally_and_Reporting v1.1
TM_Security Access Control v1.1
TM_Security Physical Security Measures v1.1
TM_Security Software v1.1
TM_Security Telecommunications and Data Transmission v1.2
TM_Stress v1.1
TM_System Audit v1.1
TM_Telecommunications v1.1
TM_Volume v1.1
TM_Voting Capabilities v1.3
TM_Voting Straight Party v1.2

The above listed test methods are implemented in a complementary fashion: modules are employed from various methods to form suites. Suites included the logical sequence of functionality that was used to validate the requirements addressed by each module within the suite. Please see Table 3 - Terms and Abbreviations below for additional information about Test Modules and Test Suites.



- **Deviations from, to, or exclusions from the test methods**

The test methods listed in Table 1 above, contain the requirements listed in section 4.6 below. The established and validated test methods did not have any deviations. Test cases utilizing those methods were selected and grouped into test suites to validate the requirements in section 4.6.

2.2.2 Terms and Abbreviations

This section details pertinent terms applicable within this report.

Table 2 – Terms and Abbreviations

Term	Abbreviation	Description
Ballot Marking Device	BMD	An accessible computer-based voting system that produces a marked paper ballot that is the result of voter interaction with visual or audio prompts.
Cast Vote Record	CVR	Record of all selections made by a single voter whether in electronic or paper. Also referred to as a ballot image when used to refer to electronic ballots.
Central Count Scanner	CCS	High Speed Digital Scanner is a ballot scanning device typically located at a central count facility and is operated by an automated multi-sheet feeding capability.
Chevron (Arrows at top of current screen)	No Abbreviation	Verity software applications are organized around easy-to-follow workflows, with specific activities associated with “chevrons” or “arrows” in the application user interface.
Compact Flash card	CF	This is a type of flash memory card in a standardized enclosure often used in voting systems to store ballot and/or vote results data.
Compact Flash AST	CFAST	A compact flash media based on the Serial ATA bus rather than the Parallel ATA bus, used by the original Compact Flash.
Commercial Off the Shelf	COTS	Commercial, readily available hardware devices (such as card readers, printers or personal computers) or software products (such as operating systems, programming language compilers, or database management systems).
Election Assistance Commission	EAC	An independent, bipartisan commission created by the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 that operates the federal government's voting system certification program.



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Term	Abbreviation	Description
Election Management System	EMS	Typically utilizes a database management system to enter jurisdiction information (district, precincts, languages, etc.) as well as election specific information (races, candidates, voter groups (parties), etc.). In addition, the EMS is also used to lay out the ballots, download the election data to the voting devices, upload the results and produce the final results reports.
Electromagnetic Compatibility	EMC	The goal of EMC is to validate the correct functioning of different equipment in the same environment and the avoidance of any interference effects between them.
Functional Configuration Audit	FCA	Exhaustive verification of every system function and combination of functions cited in the vendor's documentation. The FCA verifies the accuracy and completeness of the system's Voter Manual, Operations Procedures, Maintenance Procedures, and Diagnostic Testing Procedures.
National Institute of Standards and Technology	NIST	A non-regulatory federal agency within the U.S. Dept. of Commerce. Its mission is to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life.
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program	NVLAP	A division of NIST that provides third-party accreditation to testing and calibration laboratories.
Physical Configuration Audit	PCA	The testing activities associated with the physical aspects of the system (hardware, documentation, builds, source code, etc.).
Primary – Closed	No Abbreviation	The Closed Primary election segregates each political party onto its own ballot, along with all pertinent non-political contests and referendums.
Primary - Open	No Abbreviation	The Open Primary election combines all political parties' contests onto a single ballot, along with all pertinent non-political contests and referendums.
Precinct Count Scanner	PCS	A precinct-count optical scanner is a mark sense-based ballot and vote counting device located at a precinct and is typically operated by scanning one ballot at a time.
Request For Information	RFI	A form used by testing laboratories to request, from the EAC, interpretation of a technical issue related to testing of voting systems.



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Term	Abbreviation	Description
Requirements Matrix	N/A	This is the matrix created by the EAC and maintained by SLI that traces the requirements to the various test modules and test methods.
Standard Lab Procedure	SLP	SLI's quality system documentation is made up of standard lab procedures (SLPs), which are procedures required to ensure a systematic, repeatable and accurate approach to voting systems testing and governing the actual performance of SLI's work.
(Verity) Tab	No Abbreviation	Verity software applications are organized around easy-to-follow workflows and activities; a "Tab" provides specific activities associated with "chevron" workflows in the application user interface.
Voting Center	No Abbreviation	Typically, a convenient voting location that manages multiple ballot styles.
Technical Data Package	TDP	This is the data package that is supplied by the vendor and includes: Functional Requirements, Specifications, End-user documentation, Procedures, System Overview, Configuration Management Plan, Quality Assurance Program, and manuals for each of the required hardware, software, firmware components of each voting system.
Test Method	No Abbreviation	SLI proprietary documents which are designed to group sets of EAC VVSG requirements in a logical manner that can be utilized to efficiently validate where and how requirements, or portions of a requirement, are met.
Test Module	No Abbreviation	An actionable component of a Test Method, that functionally verifies that a requirement is met within a voting system. Test Modules are at a generic level within the Test Method, and are customized for a particular voting system, within a Test Suite.
Test Suite	No Abbreviation	An actionable grouping of test modules designed to test a set of functions of a voting system or component in a specific way.
Validation	No Abbreviation	Confirmation by examination and through provision of objective evidence that the requirements for a specific intended use or application have been fulfilled (ISO 9000).
Verification	No Abbreviation	Confirmation by examination and through provision of objective evidence that specified requirements have been fulfilled (ISO 9000).



Term	Abbreviation	Description
Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines Volumes I & II	VVSG	A set of specifications and requirements against which voting systems can be tested to determine if the systems provide all of the basic functionality, accessibility and security capabilities required of these systems.
Voting System Test Lab	VSTL	The accredited lab where the voting system is being tested.
Voting System Under Test	VSUT	The designation for a voting system that is currently being tested.
Voting Test Specialist	VTs	An SLI Compliance employee who has been qualified to perform EAC voting system certification testing.

3 System Overview

3.1 Scope of the Hart Verity Voting 2.3 Voting System

This section provides a description of the scope of **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system components:

- The **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system represents a set of software applications for pre-voting, voting and post-voting election project activities for jurisdictions of various sizes and political division complexities. **Verity Voting 2.3** functions include:
 - Defining the political divisioning of the jurisdiction and organizing the election with its hierarchical structure, attributes and associations.
 - Defining the election events with their attributes such as the election name, date and type, as well as contests, candidates, referendum questions, voting locations and their attributes.
 - Preparing and producing ballots for polling place and absentee voting or by-mail voting.
 - Preparing media for precinct voting devices and central count devices.
 - Configuring and programming the **Verity Scan** digital scanners for marked paper ballots and Verity Touch Writer printed vote records..
 - Configuring and programming the **Verity Touch Writer** BMD devices.
 - Configuring and programming the **Verity Controller** with **Verity Touch Writer Duo** BMD devices.
 - Configuring and programming the **Verity Controller** with **Verity Touch** and **Touch Writer Duo** DRE devices.
 - Configuring and programming the **Verity Print** on-demand ballot production device.
 - Producing the election definition and auditing reports.



- Providing administrative management functions for user, database, networking and system management.
 - Import of the Cast Vote Records from **Verity Scan** devices and **Verity Central**.
 - Preview and validation of the election results.
 - Producing election results tally according to voting variations and election system rules.
 - Producing a variety of reports of the election results in the desired format.
 - Publishing of the official election results. Auditing of election results including ballot images and log files.
- **Verity Scan** is a digital scan precinct ballot counter (tabulator) that is used in conjunction with an external ballot box. The unit is designed to scan marked paper ballots or Verity Touch Writer Duo printed vote records, interpret and record voter marks on the marked paper ballot or record voter selections on the printed vote records, and deposit into the secure ballot box.
- The **Verity Touch Writer** is a standalone precinct level Ballot Marking Device (BMD) which also includes an Audio Tactile Interface (ATI), which allows voters who cannot complete a paper ballot to generate a machine-readable and human readable paper ballot, based on vote selections made, using the ATI.
- The **Verity Touch Writer Duo** is a daisy chained configuration of a **Verity Controller** device configured with up to twelve **Verity Touch Writer Duo** BMD devices, which allows voters to utilize the touchscreen or optional Audio Tactile Interface to generate a machine-readable and human readable printed vote record, based on vote selections made.
- The **Verity Touch** is a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) device chained configuration of a **Verity Controller** device configured with up to twelve **Verity Touch** devices, which allows voters to cast their vote electronically via a touchscreen.
- The **Verity Touch with Access** is a DRE device chained configuration of a **Verity Controller** device configured with up to twelve **Verity Touch** or **Touch with Access** devices, which allows voters to cast their vote electronically via a touchscreen or Audio Tactile Interface (ATI).
- **Verity Print** is an on-demand ballot production device for unmarked paper ballots.
- **Verity Election Management** allows users with the Administrator role to import and manage election definitions. Imported election definitions are available through the Elections chevron in Build. Users can also delete, archive, and manage the election definitions.
- **Verity User Manager** enables users with the correct role and permissions to create and manage user accounts within the **Verity Voting** system for the local workstation in a standalone configuration, or for the network in a networked configuration.
- **Verity Desktop** enables users, with the correct roles, to set the workstations' date and time, gather **Verity** application hash codes (in order to validate the correctness of the installed applications), and access to Windows desktop.
- **Verity Data** provides the user with controls for entering and proofing data and audio. **Verity Data** also performs validation on the exported information to ensure that it will successfully import into **Verity Build**.



- **Verity Build** opens the election to proof data, view reports, and print ballots, and allows for configuring and programming the **Verity Scan** digital scanners, and **Verity Touch Writer** and **Controller/Touch Writer Duo** BMD devices, **Verity Print**, **Verity Controller/Touch** series devices, as well as producing the election definition and auditing reports.
- **Verity Central** is a high-speed, central digital ballot scanning system used for high-volume processing of ballots (such as vote by mail). The unit is based on COTS scanning hardware coupled with custom **Hart**-developed ballot processing application software which resides on an attached work-station.
- **Verity Count** is an application that tabulates election results and generates reports. **Verity Count** can be used to collect and store all election logs from every **Verity** component/device used in the election, allowing for complete election audit log reviews.

3.1.1 Supported Languages

The **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system supports English, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Khmer, Thai, Vietnamese, Tagalog, Ilocano, Hindi.

3.2 Changes from Verity 2.0 to Verity 2.3

3.2.1 Modifications new to Verity 2.3

Verity Voting 2.3 is a modification of the EAC-certified **Verity Voting 2.0** system.


The modifications to **Verity 2.3** address multiple facets of the system, including state specific features, new features for **Verity Scan**, **Verity Touch Writer**, **Verity Controller**, **Verity Touch**, **Verity Touch with Access**, **Verity Data**, **Verity Build**, **Verity Central**, **Verity Count**, **Verity User**, **Verity Desktop**, as well as associated documentation updates. **Touch Writer Duo** is a newly introduced ballot mark device based off of **Touch Writer** with an output of a print vote record rather than a marked ballot. Specific details on all implemented modifications can be found in Attachment J – Verity Voting 2.0 to 2.3 System Modifications.



4 System Identification

The **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system was submitted for certification testing with the documentation, hardware and software listed below.

4.1 System Topology Diagram



Overview of the diagram:

- The components are displayed as touch points of data access, transfers, and verification.
- Dotted lines show the flow of data and air gaps using vDrives and are also used to separate the deployment models shown within the polling place.



- Verity Print is a ballot production device that provides unmarked printed ballots.
- Verity Touch Writer and Scan may be installed in polling places to support paper-based voting.
- Verity Controller, Touch Writer Duo, and Scan may be installed in polling places to support paper-based voting.
- Verity Controller and Touch may be installed in polling places to support DRE voting.
- Verity Key (not shown) is required for user access into components to load election elections, to use critical features, and to generate reports. Feature access depends on the roles applied to user accounts.
- vDrive Duplicator (not shown) is an optional device, used for populating multiple vDrives simultaneously.

4.2 Documentation

The TDP documentation listed below are deliverables of the certified system delivered as part of the examined system, as follows:

Document Title	Version
All-In-One Code Framework Coding Standards	© 2014 Microsoft Corporation
Verity Voting 2.3 Change Notes: Update from 2.0 to 2.3.0	A.00
Verity Voting 2.3 Change Notes: Update from 2.3.0 to 2.3.1	A.00
Verity Voting 2.3 Change Notes: Verity Controller Update from 2.3.1 to 2.3.2	A.00
Configuration Management Process	D.01
Continual Improvement Process	E.02
Control of Nonconforming Product Procedure	B.02
DEVICE CONFIGURATION PROCESS DOCUMENT	B.00
DEVICE OS CREATION AND CONFIGURATION PROCESS DOCUMENT	A.01
DEVICE WES7 CREATION PROCESS DOCUMENT	A.01
Document Control Procedure	E.05
Factory TUV SUD inspection 2018 June report	N/A
Hardware 2005713-CFAST Door Security Kit Design.pdf	B
Hardware 3005018-ATI Kit Design.pdf	A



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Hardware 3005174-AutoBallot Kit Design.pdf	B
Hardware 3005350-Scan Design.pdf	H
Hardware 3005351-Controller Design.pdf	D
Hardware 3005352-Touch Writer Design.pdf	G
Hardware 3005353-Touch with Access Design.pdf	E
Hardware 3005355-Touch Design.pdf	D
Hardware 3005356-Print Design.pdf	D
Hardware 3005357-Ballot Box Design.pdf	D
Hardware 3005358-Standard Booth Design.pdf	C
Hardware 3005359-Accessible Booth Design.pdf	D
Hardware 3005700-Touch Writer Duo Design.pdf	A
Hardware 3005800-Scan Design.pdf	A
Hardware 3005801-Accessible Booth With ATI Tray Design.pdf	A
Hardware 3005825-Controller Design.pdf	A
Hardware Design and Development Procedure	D.01
Hardware PCB Photos	N/A
Hardware Verification and Validation Process	D.01
Hart NRTL Safety Certificate U8 17 10 90917 004	N/A
Hart Secure Ballot Stock Specification	A.01
Verity 2.3 Test Cases	N/A
Verity Voting 2.3 Notice of Protected Information	A.00
Quality Manual	D.04
Records Retention Matrix	E.02
Software Design and Development Procedure	D.02
Software Production Procedure	E.01
Software Test Design and Development Procedure	D.02
Software Verification and Validation Process	D.02
Software Versioning Procedure	C.04
Hart Requirements Management Requirements Management Process	A.02



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Supplier Qualification and Management Procedure	C.02
THE VERITY ACCESS FIRMWARE BUILD PROCEDURE	A.01
THE VERITY MCU FIRMWARE BUILD PROCEDURE	A.02
THE CREATION AND CONFIGURATION OF THE TRUSTED BUILD ENVIRONMENT	A.03
Verity Voting 2.3 TDP Abstract	A.01
Verity 2.3 VVSG 1.0 TDP Trace	N/A
Verity 2.3.X COTS List	N/A
Airgap Interface for Portable Electronic Media Technical Reference	A.02
Verity Application Framework Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
THE VERITY APPLICATION BUILD PROCESS FOR VERITY 2.3.1	A.01
Verity Application Programming Interface Specification Technical Document	A.04
Verity Ballot Creation Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Base Station Microcontroller Specification	A.01
Verity Build Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Central Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Coding Standard Standards Document	A.14
Verity Controller Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.01
Verity Count Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.01
Verity Data Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Database Attributes	C.02
Verity Device Suite Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Election Definition Data Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.01
Verity Election Management Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity System Design Verity Electronics Specification	A.15
Verity Entity Relationship Diagram Database - Devices	N/A



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Verity Entity Relationship Diagram Database - Servers (Count Only)	N/A
Verity Entity Relationship Diagram Database - Servers (No Count)	N/A
Verity Key Design Technical Document	A.02
Verity Logging Design Technical Document	1.03
Verity Logging Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Voting Verity Operational Environment	C.05
PC Application Framework UI Design Document	5
Verity Voting Performance Characteristics	C.02
Verity Print Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Risk Assessment	B.01
Verity Scan Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Security Requirements Document	A.07
Verity Shared Device User Interface Design Document	7
Verity Software Architecture-Design 4005463 B01	B.01
Usability Test Report of Verity Touch/Touch Writer and Verity Scan	N/A
Verity Voting Summative Usability Test Plan	A.01
Verity – Supply Chain PRD Supply Chain / Operations / Services Planning Document	C.01
Verity Voting 2.3 System Limits	C.01
Verity Touch Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Touch Writer Duo Base Station Microcontroller Specification	A.00
Touch Writer Duo Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Touch Writer Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity User Management Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Vote Counting and Cast Vote Records Technical Requirements Document (TRD)	A.00
Verity Voting 2.3 Implementation Statement	A.00



Application for Certification – Verity Voting 2.3 Usability Impact Statement	N/A
Verity Voting 2.3.1, 2.3.2 Source Documentation.zip	N/A
Verity Voting National Certification Test Specification	B.02
Verity Workstation Manufacturing Process Document	B.01
Administrator's Guide VERSION 2.3 (Build)	A.01
Administrator's Guide VERSION 2.3 (Central)	A.02
Administrator's Guide VERSION 2.3 (Count)	A.03
Administrator's Guide VERSION 2.3 (Data)	A.02
Device Troubleshooting Field Guide VERSION 2.3	A.03
Polling Place Field Guide VERSION 2.3 (CDS)	A.02
Polling Place Field Guide VERSION 2.3 (CT)	A.02
Polling Place Field Guide VERSION 2.3 (SW)	A.01
Support Procedures Guide VERSION 2.3	A.03
System Administrator's Guide VERSION 2.3	A.02
Verity Print Field Guide VERSION 2.3	A.01
VIRTEX ENTERPRISES LP QUALITY SYSTEM MANUAL	R
Voting System Implementation And Maintenance Process Document	C.02
VSTL Product Submission Procedure	D.02
Verity 2.3 Workstation Configuration Process Document	A.01
WORKSTATION WES7 CREATION PROCESS DOCUMENT	A.00

4.3 Software and Firmware

Any and all software/firmware that is to be used by the declared voting system whether directly or indirectly, in a production environment, must be validated during the certification process.

The software and firmware employed by **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** consists of 2 types, custom and commercial off the shelf (COTS). COTS applications were verified to be pristine, or were subjected to source code review for analysis of any modifications and verification of meeting the pertinent standards. The COTS software and firmware was either obtained directly from the 3rd party manufacturer, or was verified against digital signatures obtained from the 3rd party manufacturer. No modified COTS were implemented.

Tables 3 and 4 below detail each application employed by the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system.



Table 3 – Hart Verity Voting 2.3 Custom Software and Firmware

Application	Version
Verity Data	2.3.1
Verity Build	2.3.1
Verity Central	2.3.1
Verity Count	2.3.1
Verity Print	2.3.1
Verity Scan	2.3.1
Verity Touch Writer	2.3.1
Verity Touch Writer Duo	2.3.1
Verity Controller	2.3.2
Verity Touch	2.3.1
Verity Touch with Access	2.3.1

Table 4 – COTS Software

Verity Data/Build	
Description	Version
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 for Embedded Systems License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369
Verity Central	
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 for Embedded Systems License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369
Verity Count	
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 for Embedded Systems License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369
Verity Print	
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601



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Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Express License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369
Verity Scan – Paper Ballot Scanner	
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Express License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369
Nuance Western OCR, Desktop, OEM	V20
Verity Touch Writer – Electronic BMD Device	
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Express License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369
Verity Touch Writer Duo – Electronic BMD Device	
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Express License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369
Verity Controller – Networked Centralized Management Device	
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Express License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369
Verity Touch - Electronic DRE Device	
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Express License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369
Verity Touch with Access - Electronic DRE Device	
Microsoft Windows Embedded Standard 7, Service Pack 1	6.1.7601
Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Express License	11.00.2100
McAfee Application Control for Devices	6.1.1.369



4.4 Equipment (Hardware)

The hardware employed by **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** consists of 2 types, custom and commercial off the shelf (COTS). COTS hardware was verified to be unmodified, or was subjected to review for analysis of any modifications and verification of meeting the pertinent standards.

Tables 5 and 6 below detail each device employed by the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system.

Table 5 – Hart Verity Voting 2.3 Custom Voting Equipment

Description	Version
Verity Print – Ballot Printer	3005356 Rev D
Verity Scan – Paper Ballot Scanner	3005350 Rev H
Verity Scan – Paper Ballot Scanner – Update for scanner mechanism and tablet electronics obsolescence.	3005800 Rev A
Verity Touch Writer – Electronic BMD Device	3005352 Rev G
Verity Touch Writer Duo – Electronic BMD Device	3005700 Rev A
Verity Controller – Networked Centralized Management Device	3005351 Rev D
Verity Controller – Networked Centralized Management Device – Update for tablet electronics obsolescence.	3005825 Rev A
Verity Touch - Electronic DRE Device	3005355 Rev D
Verity Touch with Access - Electronic DRE Device	3005353 Rev E

Table 6 – Hart Verity Voting 2.3 COTS Equipment

Verity Data/Bulldo	
Description	Version
Verity Central Applications and Workstation Kit - HP Z240 Workstation - HPZ230 Workstation supported for existing customers only - Verity Central Software (see below)	C
Canon DR G1100 High-Speed Scanner	M111181
Canon DR G1130 High-Speed Scanner	M111171
OKI Data B432dn Mono Printer Report printer	N22500A
OKI Data B431d Mono Printer for existing customers only Report printer	N22202A



8-port Ethernet Switch	1405-8GV3
Vinpower Digital USB Duplicator 7-targets	USBShark-7T-BK
Vinpower Digital USB Duplicator 23-targets	USBShark-23T-BK
Verity Central	
Verity Central Applications and Workstation Kit • HP Z240 Workstation • HPZ230 Workstation supported for existing customers only • Verity Central Software (see below)	C
Canon DR G1100 High-Speed Scanner	M111181
Canon DR G1130 High-Speed Scanner	M111171
OKI Data B432dn Mono Printer Report printer	N22500A
OKI Data B431d Mono Printer for existing customers only Report printer	N22202A
8-port Ethernet Switch	1405-8GV3
Verity Count	
Verity Count Applications and Workstation Kit • HP Z240 Workstation or HP Z230 Workstation • HPZ230 Workstation supported for existing customers only • Verity Count Software (see below)	C
OKI Data B432dn Mono Report printer	N22500A
OKI Data B431d Mono Report Printer for existing customers only.	N22202A
8-port Ethernet Switch	1405-8GV3
Verity Print	
OKI Data C831dn Color Printer	N35100A
OKI Data B432dn Mono Blank Ballot Printer	N22500A
OKI Data B431d Mono Printer for existing customers only	N22202A
Verity Scan – Paper Ballot Scanner	
Verity Ballot Box	B
Verity Touch Writer – Electronic BMD Device	
OKI Data B432dn Mono Marked Ballot Printer	N22500A
OKI Data B431d Mono Printer for existing customers only Report printer	N22202A



Accessible Voting Booth	D
Verity Touch Writer Duo – Electronic BMD Device	
Brother PJ700 Series Thermal Printer	PJ723
Accessible Voting Booth	D
Standard Voting Booth	D
Verity Touch - Electronic DRE Device	
Standard Voting Booth	D
Verity Touch with Access - Electronic DRE Device	
Accessible Voting Booth	D

4.5 Test Materials

The following test materials are required for the performance of testing including, as applicable, test ballot layout and generation materials, test ballot sheets, and any other materials used in testing.

- Ballots & Blank Ballot grade paper
- Thumb Drives
- USB Dongle
- Ballot marking pens
- Printer paper rolls

4.6 Requirements

4.6.1 VVSG Requirements

The **Verity Voting 2.3** modifications were tested to applicable 2005 VVSG 1.0 requirements. This section details the requirements reviewed for **Verity Voting 2.3**.

The **Verity Voting 2.3** modification will be tested to the 2005 VVSG 1.0 requirements listed below:

Volume I:

- 2.1.2.a,b,c Accuracy
- 2.1.7.1.c Functions
- 2.2.1.2.b Ballot Formatting
- 2.2.2.d Election Programming
- 2.2.4.a-e Readiness Testing
- 2.3.3.1.c,d Common Requirements
- 2.3.3.2.b,e,h Paper based System Requirements
- 2.3.3.3.c,d,e,h,j,k,o DRE System Requirements
- 4.1.5.2 Ballot Reading Accuracy



Volume II

- 3.2.3 Testing to Reflect Additional Capabilities
- 3.2.4 Testing to Reflect Previously Tested Capabilities
- 6.2.2 System Baseline for Testing
- 6.2.3 Testing Volume

4.6.2 Hardware Requirements

Volume I:

- 2.1.4 (b,c,d) Integrity
- 4.1.2.5-12 Environmental Requirements
- 4.1.7.1 Removable Storage Media
- 4.3.3 Reliability

Volume II:

- 4.6.2-6 Non-operating Environmental
- 4.7.1&3 Environmental Tests, Operating
- 4.8 Other Environmental Tests

4.7 Hart State Specific Modification Requirements

The modifications addressed represent Hart internally developed features designed to satisfy these jurisdictional requests.

Pertinent Hart requirements are listed in Attachment J – Verity Voting 2.0 to 2.3 System Modifications.

5 Certification Test Results Summary

5.1 Source Code Review Summary

SLI reviewed the software source code for each application in the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system to determine the code's compliance with Volume I Sections 5, 9 and Volume II Section 5.4 of the VVSG 1.0 and for compliance with **Hart's** internally developed coding standards. **Verity Voting 2.3** is implemented with the C, C++ and C# languages. Results of the source code review are detailed in *Attachment I – List of Source Code Reviewed and Results*.

5.1.1 Evaluation of Source Code

The source code was reviewed for compliance per the guidelines defined in *Volume II, Section 5.4* of the VVSG 1.0. As a modification project, the **Verity Voting 2.3** code base was reviewed using the final **Verity Voting 2.0** code base as the baseline, to which the initial **Verity Voting 2.3** code base was compared. The differences found between those



two code bases served as the starting point of the code review. The source code was found to be in compliance with the terms of the VVSG 1.0, and Hart declared industry standards.

5.2 Technical Data Package Review Summary

SLI reviewed the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** TDP, as detailed in sections 3.1 and 3.4, for compliance according to *Volume II Section 2* of the VVSG 1.0.

The review was conducted for the required content and format of:

- **System Change Notes:** Changes to certified system **Verity Voting 2.3**.
- **System Test and Verification Specifications:** Development and certification test specifications that **Hart** applied to their testing efforts. **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **Application Usability Impact statement:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **Performance Characteristics:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **System Description:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **Verity System Limits:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **Verity Operational Environment:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **Verity COTS List:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **Verity Data Technical Reference:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**.
- **Verity Build Technical Reference Manual:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **Verity Central Technical Reference Manual:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **Verity Count Technical Reference Manual:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**
- **Verity Service and Maintenance Operations Technical Reference Manual:** Updated for **Verity Voting 2.3**

5.2.1 Evaluation of TDP

The Technical Data Package for the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system was found to comply with the standards. A jurisdiction would be able to deploy the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system using the TDP.

5.3 Hardware Testing

Hardware testing was performed on **Verity Scan** and **Verity Controller/Touch Writer Duo**. Each device was subjected to: Electrical Power Disturbance, Electrical Fast Transient, Lightning Surge, Electrostatic Disruption, Electromagnetic Emissions, Electromagnetic Susceptibility, Conducted RF Immunity, Magnetic Fields Immunity, Bench Handling, Vibration, Low Temperature, High Temperature Test, Humidity Test, Temperature and Power Variation and Maintainability testing. Both devices successfully completed hardware testing.



5.4 Functional Testing Summary

Functionality was tested as identified below for the **Verity Voting 2.3** system.

5.4.1 Test Suites Utilized

The following test suites were executed:

Verity Data/Build test suite – The **Verity Data/Build** component was re-tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the software, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue.

Verity Desktop test suite – The **Verity Desktop** component was re-tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the software, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue.

Verity User Management test suite – The **Verity User Management** component was re-tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the software, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue.

Verity Touch Writer test suite – The **Verity Touch Writer** component was re-tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the firmware, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue.

Verity Touch Writer Duo test suite – The **Verity Touch Writer Duo** component was tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the firmware, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue. Note that basic functionality of this device mirrors that of **Verity Touch Writer**.

Verity Touch test suite – The **Verity Touch** component was re-tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the firmware, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue.

Verity Print test suite – The **Verity Print** component was re-tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the firmware, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue.

Verity Scan test suite – The **Verity Scan** component was re-tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the firmware, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue.

Verity Central test suite – The **Verity Central** application component was re-tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the software, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue.



Verity Count test suite – The **Verity Count** application component was re-tested in depth in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the software, did not adversely affect operations within this application. This testing was completed without issue.

Modifications test suite – The **Modification** test suite explicitly examined each modification introduced into **Verity Voting 2.3** in order to verify that the modifications implemented, and the subsequent Trusted Build of the firmware, did not adversely affect operations. This testing was completed without issue.

General Election test suite – The full **Verity Voting 2.3** voting system was reviewed in order to verify continued integration of the voting system and that all components continue to work as expected. This test was completed without issue.

Closed Primary Election test suite – The full **Verity Voting 2.3** voting system was reviewed in order to verify continued integration of the voting system and that all components continue to work as expected. This test was completed without issue.

Open Primary Election test suite – The full **Verity Voting 2.3** voting system was reviewed in order to verify continued integration of the voting system and that all components continue to work as expected. This test was completed without issue.

Language test suite – Testing was conducted to ensure the voting system is capable of presenting the ballot, ballot selections, review screens and instructions in the required languages. The system's ability to handle the prescribed foreign languages that have been declared to be supported, English, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Khmer, Thai, Vietnamese, Tagalog, Ilocano, and Hindi were validated. This test was completed without issue.

Accuracy test suite – **Verity Scan** was tested for accuracy of ballot marks reading in association with updated hardware. **Verity Central** was also tested to verify ability to read 8.5"x20" ballots accurately. This test was completed without issue.

Volume test suite – The full **Verity Voting 2.3** voting system was reviewed in order to verify compliance with the updated stated system limits. This test was completed without issue.

Stress test suite - The full **Verity Voting 2.3** voting system was reviewed in order to verify appropriate responses. This test was completed without issue.

5.5 Evaluation of Testing

The above tests were successfully conducted using the executables created in the Trusted Build, in association with the appropriate hardware versions as declared in this Test Report for the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system.

5.6 Quality Assurance and Configuration Management Audits

The review process verified that the manufacturer has written processes and procedures for Quality Assurance and Configuration Management. The processes and procedures were implemented within the software development life cycle used to produce the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** system.



Coverage of tests employed by **Hart** was deemed satisfactory for meeting the requirements of the VVSG 1.0, as well as Hart internal requirements for state specific feature implementations. The CM portion of the review focused on the organization's understanding and implementation of the declared configuration management processes, procedures and policies. Deliverables were reviewed against all pertinent CM processes employed by **Hart**. Implementation of the **Hart** configuration processes was adequately documented and followed throughout the course of the **Verity Voting 2.3** project, and no issues were encountered.

5.7 Discrepancies Found During Testing

Discrepancies found fall into 4 major categories, Hardware, Documentation, Source Code, and Functional.

Hardware discrepancies are issues that occur specifically in the hardware arena, and are usually found during the hardware testing phase.

Documentation discrepancies are issues that occur during the PCA documentation (TDP) review phase and are issues that are resolved by updates to the documentation.

Source Code discrepancies are issues that occur during source code review and are issues that must be fixed in the source code prior to the Trusted Build.

Functional discrepancies are issues that occur during functional testing and can be related to any software or firmware within the system. Functional discrepancies often lead to source code modifications, additional source code review and an additional Trusted Build.

5.7.1 Documentation Discrepancies

Twenty-nine documentation discrepancies were written during this campaign, all were satisfactorily resolved

5.7.2 Source Code Discrepancies

Six source code discrepancies were written during this campaign, all were satisfactorily resolved.

5.7.3 Hardware Discrepancies

Four hardware discrepancies were written during this campaign, all were satisfactorily resolved.

- Verity Scan Failed ESD Causing Display Screen to Freeze
 - Resolved by:
 - Debug/Development components that were inadvertently left on the assembly were removed. These components serve no purpose in the product functionality and were present only for the development portion of the project.
 - Shielding of sensitive signals on the PCB was implemented through additional metal shields and conductive metal shielding tape.
 - Insulating the LCD metal frame from the seam between the LCD and the plastic enclosure.

- Verity Controller / TW Duo Failed ESD Causing Display Screen to Freeze

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- Resolved by:
 - Debug/Development components that were inadvertently left on the assembly were removed. These components serve no purpose in the product functionality and were present only for the development portion of the project.
 - Shielding of sensitive signals on the PCB was implemented through additional metal shields and conductive metal shielding tape.
 - Insulating the LCD metal frame from the seam between the LCD and the plastic enclosure.
- Verity Scan Failed ESD, Scanner Diag Test Utility Lost Connection
 - Resolved by:
 - The test utility provided the scanning function for automation purposes during ESD testing. When the utility lost connection, it was able to be restarted. ESD testing was completed successfully with the anomaly noted, and all other applications and functions on the Verity Scan continued to operate without disruption. For future endeavors, however, Hart will develop an automated test utility in order to remove this occurrence.
- Verity Scan S1801828110 Fail Temperature and Power Variation Tests
 - Resolved by:
 - The scanner mechanism was determined to be part of an initial production run of the PageScan V scanner mechanism, in which the MSD boards were hand soldered. The less precise hand soldering method resulted in a cold solder joint on the MSD board, causing it to lose communication and cause the anomaly. All MSD boards after the initial production run are manufactured with a uniform and automated wave soldering process.

5.7.4 Functional Discrepancies

Four functional discrepancies were encountered during this campaign, all were satisfactorily resolved.

- In Data, Help incorrectly describes Add Party Selection
 - The Help menu now accurately describes the button that is available to the user. The "Add Party Selector" button is described as, "Click the Add Party Selector button to add a straight party selection contest."
- In Controller & Duo, Robustness Error does not accurately describe device
 - The warning message now displays the following: "WARNING: A **device** with an active voting session was disconnected and never reconnected. There may be a stranded ballot or unreported session on that device. This situation can be resolved by reconnecting the device while polls are still open. The polls cannot be reopened once they are closed."
- In Controller, Reset Booth numbering Incorrectly describes device
 - The controller screen was updated to no longer display the 'Touch' device and now states, "If you reset your booth numbers, you will need to reassign a booth number to each connected device before voting can continue. "



- In Controller, Incorrectly Displayed ballot Cast on Message
 - The controller now allows the user to deactivate an access code that has not been used.

6 Recommendations

SLI has successfully completed the testing of the **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system. It has been determined that the **Verity Voting 2.3** voting system meets the required acceptance criteria of the Election Assistance Commission Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 1.0 (2005).

It is SLI's recommendation that the EAC grant certification of **Hart Verity Voting 2.3** voting system. This recommendation reflects the opinion of SLI Compliance based on the testing scope and results.

SLI:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Traci Mapps".

Traci Mapps

Director

February 26th, 2019



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Verity 2.3
Attachment J – Verity Voting 20.to
2.3 Voting Modifications

Attachment J – Verity Voting 2.0 to 2.3 Voting Modifications

General Features

- Support for additional languages. The following languages are supported: English, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Khmer, Thai, Vietnamese, Tagalog, Ilocano, Hindi (11 total)
- Higher system limits
- Digitally signed reports and exports
- Support for three additional symbols:
 - ¢ ("Cents sign": ALT + 0 + 162);
 - § ("Section": ALT + 0 + 167);
 - ° ("Degree sign": ALT + 0 + 176)
- Support for dependent contests
- Support vote capture and recording for contests tagged as fractional cumulative. Tabulation is completed manually by using the CVR export or report from the Count Auditing Dashboard.
- Support for 8.5" x 20" ballots
- Increased physical security with a serialized security seal that fully secures the Smart Panel CFast door compartment on devices and on all workstation chassis.

Pennsylvania-specific features

- Support Cross-filing
- Support Pennsylvania method for electronic interface voting with straight party
- Support Pennsylvania preferences for electronic ballot displays, esp. with many choices in a single contest

Oregon-specific features

- Support "No Party Preference (NPP)" ballot styles for modified closed primaries

Indiana-specific features

- Straight party overvote invalidates partisan contests
- Retrieval codes can be inserted into Cast Vote Records, to support retrieval of Early Voting ballots, if necessary.

Ohio-specific features

- Support multiple write-in lines associated with a single target area for choices in a contest (e.g., Governor/Lieutenant Governor)

Features for Verity Touch Writer series

- Verity Touch Writer Duo
 - Support for Verity Controller management and daisy-chain configuration.
 - Additional ballot template: summary layout
 - Alternative to attached laser printer: integrated thermal printer



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Attachment J – Verity Voting 20.to
2.3 Voting Modifications

- Standalone Verity Touch Writer
 - Removal of Access Codes
 - Enter Access code screen is removed
 - Deactivate Code screen is removed
 - Poll worker screen to “Confirm Access Code” screen (ballot style, etc.) is renamed “Confirm Selections”
 - Poll worker screen to “Create ballot access code” is renamed “Activate ballot”
 - “Access Code Summary Report” is renamed “Ballot Marking Session Report”
 - In all log entries, the term “Access Code” is replaced with “Session ID”
 - Support for AutoBallot (previously available on Verity Print and Verity Controller)
- Software alternative for Poll Worker button on rear of device (touch “Ready to Use,” on the idle screen)
- Support for customized instructions at the end of voting session, to include references to casting the ballot at Verity Scan, or anything else specific to the polling place that the jurisdiction may wish to mention; customized instruction is entered in user-defined preferences in Data (Preferred Wording)
- Support users’ ability to set time zone
- Screens indicate if devices do not have AC power (“Batteries last a limited time only”)
 - Displayed on Power On Self-Test (POST) screen, or during normal operations
 - Does not interrupt a voting session
- “Battery low” warning is displayed when AC power is disconnected, and battery is critically low
 - Prevents further action until AC power is restored
 - Recoverable when AC power is applied; reboot is no longer required unless the battery is below 5% alert threshold.
- System displays a system alert if the available space on the vDrive is 50 MB or less
- After polls are suspended or closed (applies to Verity Controller, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, and Verity Touch Writer Duo), screen alerts users to re-dock and power down device if they attempt to store a tablet that has not been powered down
- Now feature a metal serialized security seal that fully secures the Smart Panel CFast door compartment.
- Enhancements to idle screens
 - Identifies what the device is
 - Indicates “Ready for use,” in English, for poll workers
 - Displays voter instructions in same languages as the election



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Attachment J – Verity Voting 20.to
2.3 Voting Modifications

- Warning is displayed if a voter attempts to deselect a write-in name previously entered
- Warning is displayed if voter makes substitution in <n of m> contest
 - If all selections are made, and if the voter selects an additional choice, the screen indicates which selection is being removed, and which selection is being added
- Voting session idle timeout
 - If the idle timer on an electronic ballot reaches 5 minutes, the device asks, "Are you still voting?"
 - If the voter responds within 45 seconds, it returns to voting and restarts the timer (the timer changes in real-time)
 - If the voter does not respond within 45 seconds, the device goes to a "Session Locked" voter screen, and the poll worker can either unlock the screen, or spoil the ballot. The poll worker must enter the poll worker passcode, and then it goes to the "Session Locked" poll worker screen to unlock or spoil
 - Enable/disable in Verity Build
- Optional orientation wizard, with guidance for audio and screen settings, and additional voter instructions.

Features for Verity Scan

- Second-chance voting check for marginal marks
- Second-chance voting check for blank page (in addition to existing check for blank sheet)
- Support for scanning summary vote records
- If a user elects to save ballot images (based on Build settings), when saving the image on the vDrive, in PNG format, the image filename includes the GUID that links to the GUID in the CVR (this is to provide support for RLAs)
- Support users' ability to set time zone
- Screens indicate if devices do not have AC power ("Batteries last a limited time only")
 - Displayed on Power On Self-Test (POST) screen, or during normal operations
 - Does not interrupt a voting session
- "Battery low" warning is displayed when AC power is disconnected, and battery is critically low
 - Prevents further action until AC power is restored
 - Recoverable when AC power is applied; reboot is no longer required unless the battery is below 5% alert threshold.
- System displays a system alert if the available space on the vDrive is 50 MB or less
- After polls are suspended or closed (applies to Verity Controller, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, and Verity Touch Writer Duo), screen alerts users to re-



Hart InterCivic
Verity 2.3
*Attachment J – Verity Voting 20.to
2.3 Voting Modifications*

dock and power down device if they attempt to store a tablet that has not been powered down

- Now feature a metal serialized security seal that fully secures the Smart Panel CFast door compartment.
- Enhancements to idle screens
 - Identifies what the device is
 - Indicates "Ready for use," in English, for poll workers
 - Displays voter instructions in same languages as the election

Features for Verity Controller

- Dashboard icons indicate power and battery status of all connected units
- Dashboard icons indicate when a ballot has been cast on a connected Touch DRE unit
- Support for Touch Writer Duo BMD
- Support users' ability to set time zone
- Screens indicate if devices do not have AC power ("Batteries last a limited time only")
 - Displayed on Power On Self-Test (POST) screen, or during normal operations
 - Does not interrupt a voting session
- "Battery low" warning is displayed when AC power is disconnected, and battery is critically low
 - Prevents further action until AC power is restored
 - Recoverable when AC power is applied; reboot is no longer required unless the battery is below 5% alert threshold.
- System displays a system alert if the available space on the vDrive is 50 MB or less
- After polls are suspended or closed (applies to Verity Controller, Verity Scan, Verity Touch Writer, and Verity Touch Writer Duo), screen alerts users to re-dock and power down device if they attempt to store a tablet that has not been powered down
- Now feature a metal serialized security seal that fully secures the Smart Panel CFast door compartment.

Verity Touch

- Warning is displayed if a voter attempts to deselect a write-in name previously entered
- Warning is displayed if voter makes substitution in <n of m> contest



- If all selections are made, and if the voter selects an additional choice, the screen indicates which selection is being removed, and which selection is being added
- Voting session idle timeout
 - If the idle timer on an electronic ballot reaches 5 minutes, the device asks, "Are you still voting?"
 - If the voter responds within 45 seconds, it returns to voting and restarts the timer (the timer changes in real-time)
 - If the voter does not respond within 45 seconds, the device goes to a "Session Locked" voter screen, and the poll worker can either unlock the screen, or spoil the ballot. The poll worker must enter the poll worker passcode, and then it goes to the "Session Locked" poll worker screen to unlock or spoil
 - Enable/disable in Verity Build
- Optional orientation wizard, with guidance for audio and screen settings, and additional voter instructions.

Verity User Management

- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
 - Allow user to create & delete custom roles & assign or remove permissions
- Configurable password options
 - Require password changes to be different than the last <n> previous passwords
 - Minimum password length is configurable
 - Require that passwords not contain the username
- For each user listed, adds a field indicating whether the user is currently logged in (yes/no)

Verity Desktop

- Support for setting time zone

Features for Verity Data

- Add fields for preferred wording:
 - Define custom wording for "This page left blank" (40 char limit)
 - Define custom wording for "Read both sides" on paper ballots (40 char limit)
 - Define custom instructions for ballot marking device paper handling
- Add "Notes" field for Additional Text



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2.3 Voting Modifications

- Add "Notes" field for Ballot Order Screen
- Additional Text screen allows user to associate one or more parties to each Additional Text in an Open Primary
- For Rotation, add confirmation if "Generate Indices" button is selected, as selecting the button will overwrite any existing indices that have already been entered.
- Warning message added if a user validates a language, and then attempts to navigate away from the screen before locking the language
- Validation to ensure that every precinct is assigned to at least one polling place
- Validation to ensure that every polling place has at least one precinct assigned to it
- Support for multiple paper sizes in a single election: allow up to two different ballot size templates: one 8.5" wide template for in Central or in-person scanning on Verity Scan, and option to add 11"x17" for Central only
- Support for condensed format summary vote records: short election title; short jurisdiction name; short contest title; custom header; title; English & bilingual portrait and landscape templates; preview layout
- Staging features
 - Generate English-only paper ballots before entering any translations or audio for election data
 - Accommodate selective edits to certain ballot styles without having to reprint all ballots in the election; includes Version Compatibility Report
- WMA audio format in Data/Build.
- Audit log reports are digitally-signed
- All PC workstation chassis now feature a metal serialized security seal that fully secures the chassis from physical access to interior components

Features for Verity Build

- Elimination of pre-determined vDrive IDs in Verity Build, to allow batch writing of vDrives with vDrive duplicator
- Validation to ensure that every precinct is assigned to at least one polling place
- Validation to ensure that every polling place has at least one precinct assigned to it
- Support for multiple paper sizes in a single election: allow up to two different ballot size templates: one 8.5" wide template for in Central or in-person scanning on Verity Scan, and option to add 11"x17" for Central only



- Device settings:
 - Allow/reject “Blank page” on Scan (as distinct from “Blank ballot”)
 - Allow/reject “Marginal mark” on Scan
 - Voter idle timeout feature – enable/disable
 - Default voting session volume setting for accessible devices
 - Enable/disable human-readable unique ID for Touch Writer Duo
- Read vDrives screen:
 - Removes vDrive ID
 - Adds Device Type, Polling Place, and Election Version
- Print queue import includes field to define the Starting Ballot Number for each row in the import (can be used to support integration with third-party systems, including remote accessible vote- by-mail)
- Ballot Style Report includes the same ballot style numbers as shown on the ballot preview window
- Data validation window displays a “Start Validation” button, rather than automatically starting the validation when entering the workspace
- Modified barcode format for ballot unique IDs (human-readable unique IDs are shorter than barcode versions)
- The device password for Verity Key is now required to be 8-10 alphanumeric characters (0-9, Uppercase A-Z).
- Staging features
 - Generate English-only paper ballots before entering any translations or audio for election data
 - Accommodate selective edits to certain ballot styles without having to reprint all ballots in the election; includes Version Compatibility Report
- WMA audio format in Data/Build.
- Audit log reports are digitally-signed
- All PC workstation chassis now feature a metal serialized security seal that fully secures the chassis from physical access to interior components

Features for Verity Central

- Support for scanning 8.5” wide and 11”x17” ballots in the same election



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2.3 Voting Modifications

- Allow administrators to set conditions that will be automatically accepted in all batches during the scanning process (e.g. accept all undervotes during scanning, in lieu of manual review and adjudication)
- Allow administrators to control/limit the conditions included in "Accept" feature, for all users (i.e. ability to place limitations on adjudicators' ability to accept undervotes, overvotes, etc.)
- Support adjudicators' ability to accept (i.e. auto—resolve) specific types of conditions by batch, on a selective basis (e.g., for selected batches, accept all undervotes)
- If a user selects "Accept" for one or more entire batches, Verity Central prompts the user with a confirmation message
- If a user selects "Revert" for one or more entire batches, Verity Central prompts the user with a confirmation message
- Allow users to adjudicate damaged contests, where an option box is unrecognizable, through the Ballot Review window (instead of requiring users to locate the rejected ballot during scanning)
- In the Ballot Review window, add button to Accept page (without additional keystrokes required for "Actions" button)
- In the Ballot Review window, "Previous" and "Next" buttons will take users to the previous or next unresolved contest
- UI wording changes to clarify the Boolean and—or relationship of how combinations of filters will work
- Filter for specific marked contest choices
- Import/export certified write—in names (in same format as Verity Count import/export)
- Precinct Summary Report
- Batch Summary Report
- Batch Summary by Precinct Report
- Scanned Batch report includes Batch Notes
- Increase character limits in Batch Notes field to 500
- vDrive Recovery Screen indicates batches included on original vDrive
- Features to support risk-limiting audits (RLAs)
 - In Central, when a CVR is written to vDrive, the GUID used in the CVR filename is associated with the ballot in Central



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2.3 Voting Modifications

- In Central's Scanned Ballot Information Export, there is now a column for the GUID
- In Central's Ballot Review window, for any image, the GUID for the ballot sheet is displayed on the left-hand side of the screen, along with Batch and Sequence information.
- In Central, exported ballot images default to a naming convention that includes page number and GUID
- In Central, provide the capability to search for a specific ballot (i.e. its images) by GUID.
- Verity Count tracks CVRs by GUID
- Audit log reports are digitally-signed
- All PC workstation chassis now feature a metal serialized security seal that fully secures the chassis from physical access to interior components

Features for Verity Count

- Remove "of Y" vDrives from the vDrives Tabulated graph in the Dashboard
- Remove percentage of vDrives Tabulated from the graph in the Dashboard
- Support "freeform write-in resolution," so that users can enter additional write-in candidate names without leaving the write-in assignment interface.
- Option to sign data exports and reports (and include the public key information as part of each export).
 - Note: if this option is disabled, Count will still sign audit log reports.
- Option to include turnout boxes for each contest on Cumulative Report
- Option to include turnout subtotals in each precinct on the Precinct Results Report
- Percentages removed from residual vote sections (Overvotes, Undervotes, Invalid Votes) on Cumulative and Precinct Reports
- Filters
 - For choices, include/exclude write-ins
 - Filter by "Included Provisionals," or "Non-Provisionals"
- Import/export certified write-in names. Export is through the Detailed Vote Totals report.
- Export the status of the provisional ballots in the currently open Task.
- Import provisional ballot status for ballots in the currently open Task
- Option to show/hide sheet count totals in report headers that include results from paper ballots
- District Results report
- Support import of additional district definitions
- Support for Calvoter import/export
- When reading vDrives, the display:



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2.3 Voting Modifications*

- Removes vDrive ID
- Adds Device ID and associated polling place (or Verity Central)
- In CVR reports, the GUID for each CVR is now in the header of the report.
- Audit log reports are digitally-signed
- All PC workstation chassis now feature a metal serialized security seal that fully secures the chassis from physical access to interior components

Corrected Defects

The following defect found in Verity 2.0 has been corrected in the Verity Voting 2.3 modification

Product	Description of Verity Voting 2.0 Defect	Resolution/Results In Verity Voting 2.3
Verity Count	Different messages seen for vDrives from Verity Central and Verity Scan, when rejection reason is 'vDrive has already been counted'	Corrected. Message from Verity Count has been aligned for consistency.

Updated System Limits¹

Element	Limit	Comments
Precincts	3,000	Increased from 2,000
Splits per precinct	20	Unchanged
Total precincts + splits in an election	3,000	Increased from 2,000
Districts for voting devices and applications	400	Up from 75
Parties in a General Election	24	Unchanged
Parties in a Primary Election	10	Unchanged
Contests in an election	2,000	Increased from 200
Total contest choices (voting positions) in an election	5,000	Increased from 600
Maximum length of choice name	100 characters	Unchanged
Choices in a single contest	300	Up from 75
Maximum write-in length	25 characters	Unchanged
Ballot styles	N/A	Unchanged
Voting types	5	Unchanged
Maximum polling places per election	3,050	Increased from 1200
Maximum devices per election	N/A	Unchanged
Maximum number of central count scanners in a single network	4	Unchanged



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2.3 Voting Modifications*

vDrive capacity – Scan voting device	9,999 sheets per vDrive	Unchanged
vDrive capacity – Verity Central	80,000 sheets per vDrive	Unchanged
Number of voters definable per election	2,500,000	Increased from 1,000,000
Number of total ballots cast per election	1,750,000	Increased from 1,000,000
Maximum number of sheets per ballot	4 sheets	Unchanged
Maximum number of sheets – Verity Scan	9,999	Unchanged
Maximum number of CVRs – Verity Count	7,000,000 CVRs	4,000,000 CVRs
Ballot sizes	8.5x11, 8.5x14, 8.5x17, 8.5x20, 11x17 (Central only)	Addition of 8.5x20
Number of languages in a single election (including English)	11	Increased from 2

¹ Verity Voting 2.3 system limits are applicable to all HP Z240 workstations with 64 GB memory deployments, except for the combined Data/Build/Count deployment. Verity Voting 2.3 also supports upgrades to the previous generation HP Z230 workstations with 32 GB memory, at system limits documented for Verity Voting 2.0.



U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
633 3rd St. NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001

Notice of Clarification

NOC 21-01: VSTL Accreditation Status

Issued by Program Director on July 23, 2021

Section of Manual to Be Clarified:

Voting System Test Laboratory Manual, version 2.0:

3.8. Expiration and Renewal of Accreditation. A grant of accreditation is valid for a period not to exceed two years. A VSTL's accreditation expires on the date annotated on the Certificate of Accreditation. VSTLs in good standing shall renew their accreditation by submitting an application package to the Program Director, consistent with the procedures of Section 3.4 of this Chapter, no earlier than 60 days before the accreditation expiration date and no later than 30 days before that date. Laboratories that timely file the renewal application package shall retain their accreditation while the review and processing of their application is pending. VSTLs in good standing shall also retain their accreditation should circumstances leave the EAC without a quorum to conduct the vote required under Section 3.5.5.

Purpose:

The Voting System Test Lab (VSTL) accreditation process is an essential component of the EAC's testing and certification program. It consists of two assessments: one by the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and one by the EAC.

NVLAP accreditation is the primary means by which the EAC ensures that each VSTL meets and continues to meet the technical requirements of the EAC program. It sets the standards for each VSTL's technical, physical, and personnel resources, as well as its testing, management, and quality assurance policies and protocols. NVLAP reviews VSTLs one year after their initial accreditation and biennially thereafter.

The EAC VSTL assessment takes additional steps to ensure that laboratory policies are in place regarding compliance management and issues like conflict of interest, record maintenance, and financial stability. It also ensures that the VSTL is willing and capable to work with EAC in its Testing and Certification Program. This is performed by regularly working closely with the labs and performing audits biennially and generating certificates.



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The EAC is the sole Federal authority for the accreditation and revocation of accreditation of VSTLs.

Clarification:

The intent of section 3.8 in the Voting System Test Laboratory Manual, version 2.0 is to make clear that the VSTL accreditation is subject to reassessment by NVLAP and the EAC with a period of approximately two years, at the discretion of the EAC. It is not intended to describe the EAC VSTL accreditation revocation process, which is described in chapter 5 of the Voting System Test Laboratory Manual, version 2.0.

Federal law (HAVA) provides that EAC accreditation of a voting system test laboratory may not be revoked unless the EAC Commissioners vote to revoke the accreditation.

52 U.S. Code § 20971(c)(2). APPROVAL BY COMMISSION REQUIRED FOR REVOCATION - The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this section may not be revoked unless the revocation is approved by a vote of the Commission.

The VSTL Certificate of Accreditation that is issued after the EAC performs the audit, and the expiration date listed on the certificate relates to the EAC program requirement to reassess VSTLs periodically to ensure conformance to the requirements of the testing and certification program for a VSTL. For that reason, the EAC has removed the expiration date from the certificate and instead will track the reassessment period separately.

Conclusion:

As of the date of this document, section 3.8 in the Voting System Test Laboratory Manual, version 2.0 is replaced with the following:

3.8. VSTL Accreditation Reassessment. The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this section may not be revoked unless the revocation is approved by a vote of the Commission consistent with Chapter 5 of this manual. Reassessment of VSTLs shall occur two years from the date their most recent Certificate of Accreditation was issued, or at the discretion of the EAC. VSTLs in good standing shall request reassessment their accreditation by submitting an application package to the Program Director, consistent with the procedures of Section 3.4 of this Chapter, no earlier than 60 days before and no later than 30 days prior to the reassessment date, or a date chosen at the discretion of the EAC. VSTLs in good standing shall retain their accreditation while the review and processing of their application is pending and should circumstances leave the EAC without a quorum to conduct the vote as specified under Section 3.5.5.



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The Voting System Test Laboratory (VSTL) accreditation program is an essential component of the EAC's Voting System Testing and Certification Program. The EAC has made National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accreditation a requirement as part of its VSTL accreditation program. **NVLAP accreditation is the primary means by which the EAC ensures that each VSTL meets and continues to meet the technical requirements of the EAC program.** It sets the standards for each VSTL's technical, physical and personnel resources, as well as its testing, management, and quality assurance policies and protocols. NVLAP reviews VSTLs one year after their initial accreditation and biennially thereafter.

The EAC takes additional steps to ensure that laboratory policies are in place regarding compliance management and issues like conflict of interest, record maintenance, and financial stability. It also ensures that the VSTL is willing and capable to work with EAC in its Testing and Certification Program. This is performed by regularly working closely with the labs and performing audits biannually and generating certificates. ¹The VSTL accreditation does not get revoked unless the commission votes to revoke accreditation; and by that same token, EAC generated certificates or lack thereof do not determine the validity of a VSTL's accreditation status.

Due to administrative error during 2017-2019, the EAC did not issue an updated certificate to Pro V&V causing confusion with some people concerning their good standing status. Even though the EAC failed to reissue the certificate, Pro V&V's audit was completed in 2018 and again in early 2021 as the scheduled audit of Pro V&V in 2020 was postponed due to COVID-19 travel restrictions. Despite the challenges outlined above, throughout this period, Pro V&V and SLI Compliance remained in good standing with the requirements of our program and retained their accreditation. **In addition, the EAC has placed appropriate procedures and qualified staff to oversee this aspect of the program ensuring the continued quality monitoring of the Testing and Certification program is robust and in place.**

The Testing and Certification program has been fully staffed since May 2019, and we are confident that the integrity of the labs and our voting system certification program has remained strong throughout. The lack of generating a new certificate does not indicate that the labs were out of compliance. All certifications during this period remain valid as does the lab accreditation. The quality of our labs' work is closely monitored during certification campaigns. Both Pro V&V and SLI Compliance are NAVLAP accredited laboratories that are assessed against the management and technical requirements published in the International Standard, ISO/IEC 17025:2017.

¹ Pro V&V was accredited by the EAC on February 24, 2015, and SLI Compliance was accredited by the EAC on February 28, 2007. Federal law provides that EAC accreditation of a voting system test **laboratory cannot be revoked unless the EAC Commissioners vote to revoke the accreditation:** "The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this section may not be revoked unless the revocation is approved by a vote of the Commission." 52 U.S. Code § 20971(c)(2). The EAC has never voted to revoke the accreditation of Pro V&V. Pro V&V has undergone continuing accreditation assessments and had new accreditation certificate issued on February 1, 2021.

United States Department of Commerce
National Institute of Standards and Technology



Certificate of Accreditation to ISO/IEC 17025:2017

NVLAP LAB CODE: 200978-0

Pro V&V
Huntsville, AL

*is accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for specific services
listed on the Scope of Accreditation, for:*


Voting System Testing

*This laboratory is accredited in accordance with the recognized International Standard ISO/IEC 17025:2017.
This accreditation demonstrates technical competence for a defined scope and the operation of a laboratory quality
management system (refer to joint ISO-ILAC-IAF Communique dated January 2009).*

2020-03-26 through 2021-03-31

Effective Dates




For the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program



Weekly / June 19, 2020 / 69(24);759-765

On June 15, 2020, this report was posted online as an MMWR Early Release.

Erin K. Stokes, MPH^{1,*}; Laura D. Zambrano, PhD^{1,*}; Kayla N. Anderson, PhD¹; Elyn P. Marder, DrPH¹; Kala M. Raz, MPH¹; Suad El Burai Felix, MPH¹; Yunfeng Tie, PhD¹; Kathleen E. Fullerton, MPH¹ (View author affiliations)

View suggested citation

Summary

What is already known about this topic?


Surveillance data reported to CDC through April 2020 indicated that COVID-19 leads to severe outcomes in older adults and those with underlying health conditions.

What is added by this report?

As of May 30, 2020, among COVID-19 cases, the most common underlying health conditions were cardiovascular disease (32%), diabetes (30%), and chronic lung disease (18%). Hospitalizations were six times higher and deaths 12 times higher among those with reported underlying conditions compared with those with none reported.

What are the implications for public health practice?


Surveillance at all levels of government, and its continued modernization, is critical for monitoring COVID-19 trends and identifying groups at risk for infection and severe outcomes. These findings highlight the continued need for community mitigation strategies, especially for vulnerable populations, to slow COVID-19 transmission.



The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic resulted in 5,817,385 reported cases and 362,705 deaths worldwide through May, 30, 2020,¹ including 1,761,503 aggregated reported cases and 103,700 deaths in the United States.² Previous analyses during February–early April 2020 indicated that age ≥ 65 years and underlying health conditions were associated with a higher risk for severe outcomes, which were less common among children aged <18 years (1–3). This report describes demographic characteristics, underlying health conditions, symptoms, and outcomes among 1,320,488 laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 cases individually reported to CDC during January

Article Metrics

Altmetric:



Citations: 487

Views: 346,253

Views equals page views plus PDF downloads

Metric Details

Figure

Tables

Table 1

Table 2

Table 3

References

Related Materials

PDF [180K]

22–May 30, 2020. Cumulative incidence, 403.6 cases per 100,000 persons,¹ was similar among males (401.1) and females (406.0) and highest among persons aged ≥80 years (902.0). Among 599,636 (45%) cases with known information, 33% of persons were Hispanic or Latino of any race (Hispanic), 22% were non-Hispanic black (black), and 1.3% were non-Hispanic American Indian or Alaska Native (AI/AN). Among 287,320 (22%) cases with sufficient data on underlying health conditions, the most common were cardiovascular disease (32%), diabetes (30%), and chronic lung disease (18%). Overall, 184,673 (14%) patients were hospitalized, 29,837 (2%) were admitted to an intensive care unit (ICU), and 71,116 (5%) died. Hospitalizations were six times higher among patients with a reported underlying condition (45.4%) than those without reported underlying conditions (7.6%). Deaths were 12 times higher among patients with reported underlying conditions (19.5%) compared with those without reported underlying conditions (1.6%). The COVID-19 pandemic continues to be severe, particularly in certain population groups. These preliminary findings underscore the need to build on current efforts to collect and analyze case data, especially among those with underlying health conditions. These data are used to monitor trends in COVID-19 illness, identify and respond to localized incidence increase, and inform policies and practices designed to reduce transmission in the United States.

State and territorial health departments report daily aggregate counts of COVID-19 cases and deaths to CDC; these were tabulated according to date of report to examine reporting trends during January 22–May 30. In addition to aggregate counts, individual COVID-19 case reports were submitted via a CDC COVID-19 case report form²² and the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS).²³ Jurisdictions voluntarily report confirmed and probable²⁴ cases from reports submitted by health care providers and laboratories. A laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case was defined as a person with a positive test result for SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, from a respiratory specimen, using real-time reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction testing. COVID-19 case data reported from 50 states, New York City, and the District of Columbia²⁵ were analyzed to examine reported demographic characteristics, underlying health conditions, clinical signs and symptoms, and severe outcomes, including hospitalization, ICU admission, and death. Data were missing for age, sex, and race or ethnicity in <1%, 1%, and 55% of reports, respectively.^{26,27} Cases reported without sex or age data were excluded from this analysis as were cases meeting only the probable case definition, along with persons repatriated to the United States from Wuhan, China, or the Diamond Princess cruise ship. Cumulative incidence was estimated using 2018 population estimates. Because of the high prevalence of missing race and ethnicity data, estimates of incidence and proportions of underlying health conditions, symptoms, and severe outcomes by race and ethnicity were not described. Analyses are descriptive and statistical comparisons were not performed.

CDC received notification of the first case of laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 in the United States on January 22, 2020.²⁸ As of May 30, an aggregate 1,761,503 U.S. COVID-19 cases and 103,700 deaths had been reported (Figure).²⁹ The 7-day moving average number³⁰ of new daily cases peaked on April 12 (31,994) and deaths peaked on April 21 (2,856). As of May 30, the 7-day moving average numbers of new cases were 19,913 per day and deaths were 950 per day.

Among the 1,761,503 aggregate cases reported to CDC during January 22–May 30, individual case reports for 1,406,098 were submitted to CDC case surveillance. After exclusions, data for 1,320,488 (94%) cases were analyzed. Median age was 48 years (interquartile range = 33–63 years). Incidence was 403.6 cases per 100,000 population (Table 1) and was similar among females (406.0) and males (401.1).^{31,32} Incidence was higher among persons aged 40–49 years (541.6) and 50–59 years (550.5) than among those aged 60–69 years (478.4) and 70–79 years (464.2). Incidence was highest among persons aged ≥80 years (902.0)³³ and lowest among children aged ≤9 years (51.1). Among the 599,636 (45%) cases with information on both race and ethnicity, 36% of persons were non-Hispanic white, 33% were Hispanic, 22% were black, 4% were non-Hispanic Asian, 4% were non-Hispanic, other or multiple race, 1.3% were AI/AN, and <1% were non-Hispanic Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander.

Symptom status (symptomatic versus asymptomatic) was reported for 616,541 (47%) cases; among these, 22,007 (4%) were asymptomatic. Among 373,883 (28%) cases with data on individual symptoms, 70% noted fever, cough, or shortness of breath; 36% reported muscle aches, and 34% reported headache (Table 2). Overall, 31,191 (8%) persons reported loss of smell or taste.³⁴ Among patients aged ≥80 years, 60% reported fever, cough, or shortness of breath. No other symptoms were reported by >10% of persons in this age group.

Among 287,320 (22%) cases with data on individual underlying health conditions, those most frequently reported were cardiovascular disease (32%), diabetes (30%), and chronic lung disease (18%) (Table 2); the reported proportions were similar among males and females. The frequency of conditions reported varied by age group: cardiovascular disease was uncommon among those aged ≤39 years but was reported in approximately half of the cases among persons aged ≥70 years. Among 63,896 females aged 15–44 years with known pregnancy status, 6,708 (11%) were reported to be pregnant.



U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
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FROM: Jerome Lovato, Voting System Testing and Certification Director
SUBJECT: Pro V&V EAC VSTL Accreditation
DATE: 1/27/2021

Pro V&V has completed all requirements to remain in good standing with the EAC's Testing and Certification program per section 3.8 of the Voting System Test Laboratory Manual, version 2.0:

***Expiration and Renewal of Accreditation.** A grant of accreditation is valid for a period not to exceed two years. A VSTL's accreditation expires on the date annotated on the Certificate of Accreditation. VSTLs in good standing shall renew their accreditation by submitting an application package to the Program Director, consistent with the procedures of Section 3.4 of this Chapter, no earlier than 60 days before the accreditation expiration date and no later than 30 days before that date. Laboratories that timely file the renewal application package shall retain their accreditation while the review and processing of their application is pending. VSTLs in good standing shall also retain their accreditation should circumstances leave the EAC without a quorum to conduct the vote required under Section 3.5.5.*

Due to the outstanding circumstances posed by COVID-19, the renewal process for EAC laboratories has been delayed for an extended period. While this process continues, Pro V&V retains its EAC VSTL accreditation.



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Accreditation

Pro V&V, Inc.
Huntsville, Alabama

is recognized by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for the testing of voting systems to the 2005 Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines under the criteria set forth in the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program and Laboratory Accreditation Program. Pro V&V is also recognized as having successfully completed assessments by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for conformance to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 and the criteria set forth in NIST Handbooks 150 and 150-22.

Effective Through

February 24, 2017

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Deanne".

Date: 2/24/15

Acting Executive Director, U.S. Election Assistance Commission

EAC Lab Code: 1501



United States Election Assistance Commission

Certificate of Accreditation

**Pro V&V, Inc.
Huntsville, Alabama**

is recognized by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission for the testing of voting systems to the 2005 and 2015 Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VWSG 1.0 & 1.1) under the criteria set forth in the EAC Voting System Testing and Certification Program and Laboratory Accreditation Program. Pro V&V is also recognized as having successfully completed assessments by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program for conformance to the requirements of ISO/IEC 17025 and the criteria set forth in NIST Handbooks 150 and 150-22.

Original Accreditation Issued on: 2/24/2015

Accreditation remains effective until revoked
by a vote of the EAC pursuant to 52 U.S.C. §
20971(c)(2).

Mona Harrington

Date: 2/1/21

Mona Harrington
Executive Director, U.S. Election Assistance Commission

EAC Lab Code: 1501

Exhibit M



U.S. ELECTION
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Media

NEWS COMMISSIONERS HOVLAND, PALMER SWORN IN TO RESTORE QUORUM AT EAC

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

Wednesday, February 6, 2019

Washington, DC – Today, U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Chairman EAC administered the oath of office to newly appointed EAC Commissioners Benjamin Hovland and Donald Palmer. Hovland and Palmer join current Chairman Hicks and Vice Chair Christy McCormick, marking the first time in a decade that the commission has had a full quorum of Commissioners. Senator Roy Blunt (R-MO), Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, attended the event and offered remarks to mark the occasion.

Hovland and Palmer were confirmed by the U.S. Senate on January 2, 2019. Today's private ceremony was co-hosted by Senator Blunt and Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ranking Member of the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration. It took place in the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration Committee Room in the Russell Senate Office Building.

"The EAC and the Help America Vote Act are of as much value to voters and election officials today as it has been at any other time since its inception," said Chairman Hicks. "We are thrilled to welcome Commissioners Hovland and Palmer to the EAC, and we look forward to working with them to address vital election administration issues, including system guidelines, security, and accessibility."

Vice Chair McCormick added, "There have been huge changes to the way elections are administered in the U.S. since the Commission was created, and those changes have only accelerated. While we each come from different backgrounds and experiences, and may hold different opinions on some issues, I am confident that those differences will help us be smarter and stronger as we collaborate together to make the best possible choices to impact and improve elections in America and to help Americans vote."

Hovland came to the EAC after serving as an election attorney for the U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, where he spent much of his time focused on improving access to registration and voting. Previously, he served as the Deputy General Counsel for the Missouri Secretary of State's office, where he focused on legal issues related to the administration of state and federal elections, including recounts, poll worker training, voter registration list maintenance, statewide database matching, voter education resources, and ballot initiative litigation.

Palmer previously served as a Bipartisan Policy Center fellow focusing on the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. He formerly served as elections director in both Florida and Virginia, as well as a member of the EAC's Standards Board Executive Board and its Technical Guidelines Development Committee. Prior to his work in elections, he served as a trial attorney with the Voting Section of the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division, where he enforced federal voting laws and provided guidance to states on compliance. Palmer began his career as a U.S. Navy intelligence officer and judge advocate general deployed overseas onboard the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy and tours of duty in Italy, Florida and Washington, D.C.

For more information about today's ceremony, please contact Brenda Bowser Soder at **bsoder@eac.gov** (**<mailto:bsoder@eac.gov>**) or 202-897-9285.

Phone: (202) 897-9285

Email: bsoder@eac.gov (<mailto:bsoder@eac.gov>)

Tags

commissioners, hicks, hovland, mccormick, media, palmer

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Media

NEWS

MCCORMICK ELECTED NEW EAC CHAIRWOMAN

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
Monday, February 25, 2019

Silver Spring, Md. – Commissioner Christy McCormick has been elected the new Chairwoman of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), a position she will hold for one year. McCormick will continue to serve alongside newly-elected EAC Vice Chairman Ben Hovland, and EAC Commissioners Thomas Hicks and Donald Palmer.

"The EAC is as important today as at any other time since the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was enacted. With a full slate of commissioners for the first time in nearly a decade, the Commission's main focus this year is on helping election administrators prepare for the 2020 Presidential Election," said Chairwoman McCormick. "We are also dedicated to providing voters with the resources they need to fully participate in our nation's elections, as well as providing the information they need to have faith that their votes will be cast securely and counted accurately. It is an honor to serve as Chairwoman during this important time, and I look forward to working alongside my fellow Commissioners and the entire EAC team."

Chairwoman McCormick has identified the following areas of focus that will inform her agenda for the coming year, including:

- **Preparation for 2020 Presidential Election** – Chairwoman McCormick said that the EAC will prioritize work to support election administrators as they prepare for the upcoming Presidential Election, including efforts to enhance

election security, address aging election equipment, share election best practices, and support other key areas of election administration. For example, the EAC is poised to launch a new effort to assist election officials who must administer elections in the face of unanticipated disasters, both natural and manmade.

- **Replacing Aging Election Equipment** – Nearly only year after Congress allocated \$380 million in new HAVA funds for states to improve their election systems, Chairwoman McCormick and the EAC will continue to work with states as they invest those funds, including the purchase of new election equipment to replace the nation's aging election systems. The EAC will also work toward final consideration and adoption of the next generation of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) that the EAC will use to test and certify election equipment.
- **Ensuring Voter Accessibility** – Chairwoman McCormick will lead the agency in efforts to protect the right of all Americans, including those with disabilities, to vote privately and independently. She will also prioritize election access for U.S. military personnel and other Americans living overseas, as well as help election administrators fulfill their obligations to provide access for those who speak English as a second language.

This is Chairwoman McCormick's second time at the helm of the agency. After the EAC was reinstated in 2015, she was quickly elected by her fellow Commissioners as Chairwoman of the for the 2015-2016 term. As the agency's first chairperson in four years, she re-established the operation of the Commission itself, as well as the Commission's three advisory boards: the EAC Standards Board, Board of Advisors, and Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC). Chairwoman McCormick executed a new management policy, secured a long-overdue update to the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG), obtained the accreditation of a new Voting System Testing Laboratory (VSTL), oversaw the hiring of the Executive Director and General Counsel, and led the reaffirmation of accessibility in voting as a top priority for the Commission. She instituted the EAC's first Language Access for Voters Summit, first Election Data Summit, and established a working relationship with the United States Postal Service (USPS) to address postal issues in elections. As Chairwoman, she also launched a continuing effort with the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) and the Council of State Governments (CSG) to improve the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS), and diligently and successfully worked to restore the Commission's standing with Members of

Congress, the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), local election officials, and other stakeholders in the election community.

Chairwoman McCormick was nominated by President Barack H. Obama and confirmed by unanimous consent of the United States Senate on December 16, 2014 to serve on the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Prior to her appointment with the EAC, Commissioner McCormick served as a Senior Trial Attorney in the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division at the Department of Justice, a position she held from 2006 until joining the Commission. In that role, Chairwoman McCormick was responsible for investigating and prosecuting violations of federal voting statutes, including the Voting Rights Act, the National Voter Registration Act, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) and the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE). Additionally, she worked with election officials to monitor compliance with federal voting statutes, especially the Voting Rights Act and its minority language requirements, and fair administration of elections. She has observed numerous elections, and worked with election officials all across America.

Chairwoman McCormick was detailed by the Deputy Attorney General to be Senior Attorney Advisor and Acting Deputy Rule of Law Coordinator in the Office of the Rule of Law Coordinator at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq from 2009 to 2010, where she worked as the U.S. elections expert overseeing the Iraq national elections (including an extensive election re-count), as well as on numerous U.S. and coalition Rule of Law efforts. She was the Rule of Law liaison to the Kurdish Regional Government as well as liaison to rule of law advisors at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Prior to joining the Department of Justice, Chairwoman McCormick served as a Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Elizabeth A. McClanahan in the Court of Appeals of Virginia from 2003 to 2006. Ms. McCormick was an Assistant Attorney General and Assistant to the Solicitor General in the Office of the Attorney General of Virginia from 2001 to 2003. She was a member of the U.S. Supreme Court legal teams for *Black v. Virginia* (defending the Commonwealth's criminal statute against cross-burning) and *Hicks v. Virginia* (defending a 1st amendment challenge to a state trespassing policy), as well as in cases on appeal to the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals. She was a Judicial Law Clerk in Virginia's Seventh Judicial Circuit Court from 1999 to 2001.

Chairwoman McCormick received her B.A. from the University of Buffalo, a J.D. with honors from the George Mason University School of Law (now Antonin Scalia Law School), and also attended the William & Mary School of Law.

Phone: (202) 897-9285

Email: bsoder@eac.gov (mailto:bsoder@eac.gov)

Tags

commissioners, hovland, mccormick, media

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


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Clearinghouse Resources for Election Officials

CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19) RESOURCES



Election officials are contingency planners by nature and are continually working to make sure elections are accessible, secure, and accurate, and that voters are safe. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) understands election officials and voters may have questions and concerns regarding the novel coronavirus and COVID-19. As part of our clearinghouse function, we are working with federal partners and election officials to compile and offer resources.

The EAC recommends regularly visiting state and local election websites for the most up-to-date election information.

We plan to update information and add examples of resources to this page as they become available.

If you are an election official, voting system manufacturer, or other election stakeholder, and would like to submit resources to be considered for this page, please email clearinghouse@eac.gov (<mailto:clearinghouse@eac.gov>).

State-Specific Resources

Arizona

Arizona Secretary of State

- Press Release: **SOS recommends requesting an early ballot by today's deadline (3.6.2020) (<https://azsos.gov/about-office/media-center/press-releases/1112>)** – This press release includes recommendations to voters about the upcoming primary with information about requesting a ballot by mail, and how the Secretary of State and other state offices are coordinating to ensure COVID-19 does not interrupt the election.
- Press Release: **Arizona election officials update response to COVID-19 (3.11.2020) (<https://azsos.gov/about-office/media-center/press-releases/1116>)** - This follow-up release explains the Secretary of State's additional guidance to counties as a result of new developments in the state response to COVID-19 including additional precautions for voting locations at senior centers and other facilities frequented by seniors.

North Carolina

North Carolina State Board of Elections

- Press Release: **Statement on COVID-19 Response (3.12.2020) (https://www.ncsbe.gov/Press-Releases?udt_2226_param_detail=2037)** - This release includes information on how the State Board is monitoring developments of COVID-19 and preparing for upcoming elections, including coordinating with federal and state partners. It also reminds voters of their options to cast a ballot.

Ohio

Ohio Secretary of State

- **Corona Facts (<https://www.ohiosos.gov/coronafacts/>)** – This page provides on how the Secretary of State's office is coordinating with county boards of elections and how they are preparing and protecting voters leading up to Election Day.
- **Actions Taken by Secretary LaRose (<https://www.ohiosos.gov/coronafacts/actionstakenbysecretarylarose/>)** – This page outlines the steps the Secretary of State's office has taken to promote a safe and healthy environment for Ohioans as they go to the polls.

South Carolina

South Carolina State Election Commission

- **Coronavirus (COVID-19) Updates (<https://www.scvotes.org/coronavirus-covid-19-updates>)** – This page includes updates on the coronavirus (COVID-19) from the South Carolina Election Commission includes the announcement that **March and April elections will be postponed due to coronavirus (<https://www.scvotes.org/march-april-elections-postponed-due-coronavirus>)**, a **statement on coronavirus and March candidate filing (<https://www.scvotes.org/statement-coronavirus-and-march-candidate-filing>)**, and a **general statement from the Election Commission on coronavirus (<https://www.scvotes.org/statement-coronavirus-covid-19>)**.

Federal Resources

GCC and SCC

Lessons Learned from the 2020 Primary – This document combines the lessons learned documents broken out by topic available **here** (<https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/gcc-and-scc-resources>). It covers resource allocation, building requirements, preparing for increased absentee or mail ballots, crisis plans, and communicating with the public through public relations and the media.

In-Person Voting

- **Innovative Practices and New Solutions Guide**
- **Finding Voting Locations and Poll Workers**
- **Considerations for Modifying the Scale of In-Person Voting**
- **Health and Safety at the Polling Place**
- **Safeguarding Staff and Work Environment from COVID-19**

Voting By Mail/Absentee Voting

- **The Importance of Accurate Voter Data When Expanding Absentee or Mail Ballot Voting**
- **Election Education and Outreach for Increased Absentee or Mail Voting**
- **Electronic Ballot Delivery and Marking**
- **Helping Voters to Request a Mail-in Ballot**
- **Managing an Increase in Outbound Ballots**
- **Inbound Ballot Process**
- **Ballot Drop Box**
- **Signature Verification and Cure Process**
- **Vote By Mail/ Absentee Voting Timeline**
(</sites/default/files/electionofficials/vbm/VBMProjectTimeline.xlsx>) – Excel
(</sites/default/files/electionofficials/vbm/VBMProjectTimeline.xlsx>) and PDF

Center for Disease Control (CDC)

- **CDC Considerations for Election Polling Locations and Voters CDC and EAC** (pdf)- This CDC guidance includes recommendations for election officials and poll workers, recommendations on maintaining healthy environments and operations, and recommendations for voters. This information is also available on the **CDC's website** (<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html>). Note: election officials should consult their vendors regarding recommendations on cleaning and other matters specific to election technology used in their polling locations. Some vendor-provided guidance is below.
- **CDC Situation Summary webpage** (<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/summary.html>) – This page provides updated information and guidance on the novel coronavirus and COVID-19.
- **CDC Coronavirus index webpage** (<https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html>) – This page provides links to all CDC resources on the novel coronavirus and COVID-19.
- **CDC List of State and Territorial Health Department Websites** (<https://www.cdc.gov/publichealthgateway/healthdirectories/healthdepartments.html>) – This page provides links to all websites of state and territory health departments, which the CDC recommends consulting for state-specific information on the novel coronavirus and COVID-19.
- **CDC Interim Guidance for Businesses and Employers to Plan and Respond to Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), February 2020** (<https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/85488>) - This interim guidance for businesses may be relevant to election offices. It seeks to help prevent workplace exposures to acute respiratory illnesses, including COVID-19, in non-healthcare settings. The guidance also provides planning considerations if there are more widespread, community outbreaks of COVID-19.

Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS CISA)

- **CISA Coronavirus webpage (<https://www.cisa.gov/coronavirus>)** - This page provides information on CISA's efforts with federal partners concerning coronavirus and COVID-19 and links to other federal resources.
- **CISA Insights: Risk Management for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19)** – This brief provides recommendations on how to address physical supply chain and cyber security issues that may arise from the spread of the novel coronavirus. This resource is helpful for election officials to prepare for possible impacts of the novel coronavirus. Below is an excerpt from this CISA Insights brief.
 - Cybersecurity for Organizations
 - As organizations explore various alternate workplace options in response to COVID-19, CISA recommends examining the security of information technology systems by taking the following steps:
 - Secure systems that enable remote access.
 - Ensure Virtual Private Network and other remote access systems are fully patched.
 - Enhance system monitoring to receive early detection and alerts on abnormal activity.
 - Implement multi-factor authentication
 - Ensure all machines have properly configured firewalls as well as anti-malware and intrusion prevention installed.
 - Test remote access solutions capacity or increase capacity
 - Ensure continuity of operations plans or business continuity plans are up-to-date.
 - Increase awareness of information technology support mechanisms for employees who work remotely.
 - Update incident response plans to consider workforce changes in a distributed environment.

- **USPS Statement on Coronavirus**

(<https://about.usps.com/newsroom/statements/usps-statement-on-coronavirus.htm>)

- This statement from the U.S. Postal Service released March 4, 2020 may be helpful to voters who participate by mail, including military and overseas voters.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

- **Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations Annex Template** - This template from FEMA provides guidance to assist organizations in developing a Pandemic Influenza Continuity of Operations plan or, if the organization already has a continuity plan, a Pandemic Influenza Annex. General guidance and sample information is provided for reference and organizations are encouraged to tailor Pandemic Influenza Continuity plans to meet specific organizational needs and requirements. The template contains elements of a viable continuity plan and allows organizations to insert information as deemed appropriate.
- Note: The EAC is planning to establish a working group with election officials to help populate this template to better assist state election officials and others.

Election Assistance Commission (EAC)

- **Tips for Empowering Voters with Disabilities in the 2020 General Election and COVID-19 Crisis (/voters/tips-empowering-voters-disabilities-2020-general-election-and-covid-19-crisis) (HTML)** – As new election procedures are implemented in the states and localities, this document provides recommendations to election officials on meeting accessibility requirements. **PDF version**
- **Preliminary Planning for Increased Vote By Mail**
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GSvJX0_In-A) – Video

- **Presentation** – Preliminary Planning for for Increase Vote By Mail, Interview 1: COVID 19 potential response
- **EAC Disaster Preparedness and Recovery webpage** (<https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/disaster-preparedness-and-recovery>) – This page features presentations from election administrators about how they conducted elections in the face of a variety of natural disasters. Their examples of preparedness and recovery could be helpful for election officials as they address the novel coronavirus and COVID-19.
- **EAC Contingency Plans Webpage** (<https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/contingency-plans>) – In preparation for the 2016 elections, the EAC collected continuity of operations plans (COOPs) and resources from election officials at the state and local levels. This includes state-specific examples for H1N1 flu preparedness.
- **EAC Election Management Guidelines Chapter 11: Contingency Planning and Change Management** – This 2008 resource was created to assist state and local election officials in effectively managing and administering elections. Each chapter explores a different aspect of election administration and provides examples and recommendations.

Other Resources

National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS)

- **Issue Briefing – Election Emergencies and COVID-19** (<https://www.nass.org/resources/issue-briefing-election-emergencies-covid-19>) – NASS developed this page to provide a general overview of state policies on this topic, as well as an update on efforts by election officials to deal with potential issues posed specifically by COVID-19. The briefing page includes answers to questions about election administration in emergency situations overall, information on current COVID-19 monitoring and

measures by election officials, state press releases regarding COVID-19 responses, additional COVID-19 related resource webpages, and other information.

National Association of State Election Directors

- **COVID-19 Resources (<https://www.nased.org/covid19>)** – NASED has collected resources that may be helpful for election officials as they contemplate changes to their election processes in light of the COVID-19 health emergency.

National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)

- **COVID-19 and Elections (<https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/state-action-on-covid-19-and-elections.aspx>)** – NCSL does not recommend legislative changes or provide opinions on policy options, but instead gathered policy option ideas that have been considered in response to the COVID-19 pandemic on this page. The page includes information and links on election emergency statutes, contingency planning, options to cast a ballot in addition to polling places, provisional ballot laws, and other information.
- **Election Emergencies (<https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-emergencies.aspx>)** — Statutes relating to election emergencies vary by state, and this NCSL resource offers a summary and further details on these state-specific statutes.



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Clearinghouse Resources for Election Officials

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND RECOVERY

Natural and man-made disasters have the potential to throw elections into chaos, destroying infrastructure, displacing voters and potentially rendering the impacted system more vulnerable to security threats. Recent catastrophic hurricanes, wildfires, floods, volcanic eruptions, terrorist attacks and other disasters have unfortunately made election stabilization and recovery in the aftermath of such events a timely topic for election officials across the country.

When a disaster strikes close to Election Day, election administrators must ensure that elections are still conducted without any margin for error, and often, without any budgetary or scheduling adjustments. The following are interviews and resources from election officials who have succeeded in doing so.

Inaugural Meeting - April 10, 2019

The inaugural meeting of the Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Working Group will gather U.S. Election Assistance Commissioners (EAC) Commissioners and members of this group for an information sharing exercise that will inform future outreach to federal agencies and lay the foundation for future EAC products designed to assist election officials facing disasters.

Presentations:

Presentation: **Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Working Group
Presentation for U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Memphis, Tennessee**

Mark Andersen, Bay County Supervisor of Elections - Bay County, Florida

Presentation: **Conducting Elections in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina**

R. Kyle Ardoin, Secretary of State, Louisiana

Presentation: **Empowering Democracy through Technology**

Roberto E. Benítez, CIO Puerto Rico State Elections Commission

Presentation: **Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Working Group**

Presentation for U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Memphis, Tennessee

**Candace Grubbs, Clerk-Recorder/Registrar of Voters in Butte County -
Butte County, California**

Presentation: **Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Working Group**

Presentation for U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Memphis, Tennessee

**Margaret Jurgensen, Montgomery County Election Director - Montgomery
County, Maryland**

Presentation: **Florida's Perspective Presentation for U.S. Election Assistance
Commission's Disaster Preparedness & Recovery Working Group**

Maria Matthews Esq., Director, Florida Division of Elections - Florida

Example Continuity Plans:

**Business Continuity Plan for the Orange County, California Registrar of
Voters**

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President Donald J. Trump Directs FEMA Support Under Emergency Declaration for COVID-19

 English Español

Release Date

March 13, 2020

HQ-20-017

Release Number

Release Date: March 13, 2020

The federal government continues to take aggressive and proactive steps to address the COVID-19 threat as the health and safety of the American people remain a top priority.

Today, President Trump declared a nationwide emergency pursuant to Sec. 501(b) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121-5207 (the "Stafford Act"). This increases federal support to the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in its role as the lead federal agency for the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic response. As a result of the President's decisive, unprecedented action, FEMA is directed to assist state, local, tribal, territorial governments and other eligible entities with the health and safety actions they take on behalf of the American public. Today's declaration does not make direct financial assistance available to individuals.

The emergency declaration does not change measures authorized under other federal statutes and HHS remains the lead federal agency directing the federal response to COVID-19. FEMA actions will be in support of HHS and in coordination with state, tribal and territorial governments. Eligible emergency protective measures taken at the direction or guidance of public health officials in response to this emergency, and not supported by the authorities of another federal agency, will be reimbursed strictly under the FEMA Public Assistance program. FEMA assistance will be provided at a 75 percent Federal cost share. Reimbursable activities typically include emergency protective measures such as the activation of State Emergency Operations Centers, National Guard costs, law enforcement and other measures necessary to protect public health and safety.

For more information, visit the [COVID-19 Emergency Declaration Fact Sheet](#).

#

FEMA's mission is to help people before, during and after disasters. Follow [FEMA online](#), on Twitter [@FEMA](#) or [@FEMAEspanol](#), on FEMA's [Facebook page](#) or [Espanol page](#) and at FEMA's [YouTube account](#). Also, follow Administrator Pete Gaynor's activities [@FEMA_Pete](#). The social media links provided are for reference only. FEMA does not endorse any non-government websites, companies or applications.

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Last updated March 18, 2021

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ACCREDITED LABORATORIES

The following voting system test laboratories have been accredited by EAC to testing systems for more information about the test laboratories accreditation process visit the National Institute of Standards and Technology

Accredited Test Labs

NTS Huntsville Normandy Voting Laboratories
7800 U.S. Highway 27 West
Huntsville, AL 35806
Kevin Chambers, Voting Systems Program Manager
Phone: 256-718-8225

07/17/18 NTS completes accreditation of Vote Laboratories, Inc.

08/11/11 Wide Quality Assurance Letter of Agreement

08/11/12 Wide Quality Assurance Letter

09/08/10 Wide Accreditation Certificate

08/18/09 Wide Quality Assurance Letter

07/04/11 Wide Accreditation Certificate

09/25/11 Wide Quality Assurance Letter

01/11/11 EAC letter to Wide Laboratories on partnership in the workplace

Pro-Vote
100 Boulevard South
Huntsville, AL 35892
Jack Crabb, President
Phone: 256-727-0222

07/24/11 Pro-Vote Accreditation Certificate

NIJ Compliance, a Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC Huntsville, Alabama
Voting Systems Test Lab
400 Independence Street
Vernal Ridge, AL 35892
Tom Mason, Director of Operations
Phone: 256-822-1566

07/11/16 Letter on Compliance Name Address Change

04/01/15 Letter on Compliance Name Change

07/29/09 SysTest Response to EAC on Site Assessment

07/29/09 SysTest Response to EAC on Site Assessment

07/16/09 SysTest Accreditation Certificate

06/18/09 Final SysTest Policy and Procedures Laboratory Audit Report

03/05/09 EAC Notice to SysTest Labs Lifting Suspension of Accreditation

02/05/09 SysTest notifies EAC Premier files suit against SysTest

11/19/08 EAC Approval of SysTest Remedial Action Plan

11/05/08 SysTest Cure Plan

11/05/08 SysTest Labs Request to Cure EAC Program Non Compliance

10/31/08 SysTest Labs letter to EAC Regarding Suspension Notice

10/31/08 EAC Suspension of Accreditation Notice to SysTest Labs

10/08/08 EAC letter to SysTest Labs

08/11/08 EAC letter to SysTest Labs

08/08/08 NVLAP letter to SysTest Labs

08/04/08 SysTest Labs Letter to EAC

07/25/08 EAC letter to SysTest Labs

07/03/08 EAC letter to SysTest Labs

11/20/07 Correspondence between EAC, Sequoia, SysTest and Beta (notice of Non Compliance updated) File 1 File 2 File 3

09/12/07 SysTest Labs response to EAC

09/11/07 EAC letter to SysTest Labs


02/28/07 SysTest Accreditation Certificate

02/08/07 SysTest Quality Assurance Letter

01/11/07 EAC letter to SysTest Labs on partnership in the workplace

Exhibit S

Violation of Law: VSTL Documentation on SLI: EAC Website in Compliance with Policy?





JAMES C. KIRKPATRICK
STATE INFORMATION CENTER
(573) 751-4936

JOHN R. ASHCROFT
SECRETARY OF STATE
STATE OF MISSOURI


ELECTIONS DIVISION
(573) 751-2301

To: Chris Ortiz, Unisyn Voting Solutions, Inc.
From: Chrissy Peters and Brandon Alexander, Directors of Elections
Re: Certificate of Qualification for Unisyn OpenElect 2.0
Date: December 15, 2017

Enclosed is the certificate of qualification for the Unisyn OpenElect 2.0 Voting System and the regulations concerning the election authority's certification statement and escrow of source code.

If we can be of any further assistance, feel free to contact us.

Enclosures



STATE OF MISSOURI


Office of Secretary of State

APPROVAL NO. 2017-04
Unisyn OpenElect 2.0 Voting System

QUALIFICATION OF AUTOMATED VOTING EQUIPMENT FOR SALE AND USE

I, John R. Ashcroft, Secretary of State of the State of Missouri, having reviewed the observations of the Missouri Automated Voting Equipment Qualification Committee, the Application for Qualification, and the manufacturer's compliance with 15 CSR 30-10.020, have determined that Unisyn OpenElect 2.0 Voting System, as certified by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, meets state criteria under Section 115.225, RSMo, and have this date granted approval of the sale and use in Missouri of Unisyn Voting Solutions' OpenElect 2.0, as certified by the U.S. Election Assistance Commission.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I
hereunto set my hand and affix the
Seal of my office in the City of
Jefferson, State of Missouri, this 15th
day of December, 2017.


Secretary of State



15 CSR 30-10—ELECTED OFFICIALS

Division 30—Secretary of State

1: 2006, expired Feb. 22, 2007. Amended: Filed June 21, 2006, effective Dec. 30, 2006.

*Original authority: 115.225, RSMo 1977, amended 1993, 1995, 2002.

15 CSR 30-10.020 Certification Statements for New or Modified Electronic Voting Systems

PURPOSE: This rule provides that voting machine manufacturers file an initial affidavit stating that the voting machine complies with all applicable rules and laws and a second affidavit stating that when any changes are made in the system the voting machine's ability to continue to comply with the applicable rules and laws will not be affected and that voting machine manufacturers deposit into an escrow account the source code for each version of their voting system qualified for sale and use in Missouri.

(1) As a prerequisite to approval from the secretary of state, each manufacturer or supplier of electronic voting systems or equipment shall have completed and submitted to the secretary of state a certification statement in substantially the same form as contained in section (5), and shall have received certification from an independent testing authority approved by the secretary of state.

(2) Beginning on July 1, 2006, when no amendments have been made to an approved system or machine subsequent to qualification, the manufacturer or supplier shall notify the secretary of state that no amendments have been made on a semi-annual basis on January 1 and July 1 starting on the notification date immediately following approval.

(3) As a prerequisite to approval from the secretary of state, each manufacturer or supplier of electronic voting systems or equipment shall execute an escrow agreement with an escrow agent for the manufacturer's source code for each system fully qualified by the Office of the Secretary of State. At a minimum, the agreement must:

- (A) Identify an escrow agency;
- (B) Provide the software source code for all voting system components in a minimum of two (2) formats (one (1) human readable and one (1) machine readable) to the escrow agent;
- (C) Provide the software documentation to the escrow agent;
- (D) Contain a statement confirming that the state of Missouri will, within seven (7) days of the occurrence of one of the following events, receive full access to the source code

and unlimited rights to continue using and supporting the software at no cost to the state or the agency should the manufacturer:

- 1. Become insolvent; or
- 2. Make a general assignment for the benefit of creditors; or
- 3. File a voluntary petition of bankruptcy; or
- 4. Suffer or permit the appointment of a receiver for its business or assets; or
- 5. Become subject to any proceeding of bankruptcy or insolvency law, whether foreign or domestic; or
- 6. Wind up or liquidate its business voluntarily or otherwise and the state has reason to believe that the vendor will fail to meet future obligations; or
- 7. Discontinue support of the provided products or fail to support the products in accordance with its maintenance obligations and warranties;

(E) Contain a statement agreeing to notify in writing the Independent Testing Authority (ITA) that certified the system, giving the state of Missouri full access to "final build," records and test results related to the certification tests at no charge to the state; and

(F) Contain a statement agreeing that the escrow will stay in place as long as the system is used in Missouri, at no cost to the state.

(4) If any modification, deletion or improvement to approved voting or tabulating equipment, procedures or systems is made, the manufacturer, programmer or supplier shall notify the secretary of state and a certification amendment statement shall be submitted.

(A) No certification need be submitted if one (1) of the following conditions are met:

1. The equipment is not a device which—

A. Converts the intent of the voter into a data string, as an example, a card reader or scanner;

B. Changes, interprets, converts, modifies or records the data string being transmitted from the ballot counter; or

C. Manipulates data or the results of any data conversion into a report exclusive of the printer; or

2. The software only monitors system operation.

(B) Certificates from the software supplier or programmer shall always be submitted in the following cases when the additions could be used during the tabulating process:

- 1. Installation of a new release of system software, utilities software, or both;
- 2. Installation of new or expanded central processing units;

3. Installation of additional random access or read only memory (RAM or ROM); and

4. Installation of additional magnetic, electronic or optical data storage units.

(C) All systems installed as of January 1, 1987 are approved in the configuration that existed as of that date.

(5) Manufacturer's certification statement shall be completed substantially as the example which follows:

MANUFACTURER'S CERTIFICATION STATEMENT

I, _____, president of

(electronic voting systems company)

do hereby certify to _____, Secretary of State of Missouri that the _____ electronic voting

(name of equipment)

system will permit in accordance with section 115.225, RSMo:

- 1. Voting in absolute secrecy;
- 2. Each elector to vote at any election for all persons and offices for whom and for which s/he is lawfully entitled to vote;
- 3. The automatic tabulating equipment to be set to reject all votes for any office or on any measure except write-in votes when the number of votes exceeds the number the voter is entitled to cast;
- 4. Each elector to vote for as many persons for an office as s/he is entitled to vote for;
- 5. Each elector to vote for or against any questions upon which s/he is entitled to vote; and to vote, by means of a single device, where applicable, for all candidates of one (1) party or to vote a split ticket as s/he desires;
- 6. Each elector, at presidential elections, by one (1) punch or mark, to vote for the candidate of that party for president, vice-president and their presidential electors; and
- 7. The

electronic voting system complies with all other requirements of the election laws of the state of Missouri where they are applicable.

(Briefly describe the type of electronic voting system provided by

_____, the means by which it meets the requirements of provisions 1.-6. and list the areas in which the system is in use.)

I do hereby certify that the above information is true and accurate this _____ day of _____, 20____.

(President)

Chapter 10—Voting Machines (Electronic)

15 CSR 30-10



(Name of Company)

The above signator appeared before me this day of _____, 20____, and did personally sign this affidavit.

(Notary)

My commission expires _____

(6) Compliance with this certification statement will assist this office when approval is requested for use of electronic voting systems in this state. After receiving this information, the secretary of state will schedule a meeting with the election official making the request to use electronic equipment and representatives of the voting equipment company to discuss approval of its use in Missouri.

(7) The certification amendment statement shall be completed substantially as the example which follows:

AMENDMENT TO CERTIFICATION STATEMENT

I, _____ (Name)

_____, of _____ (Office)

_____, do hereby certify _____ (Company)

to _____, Secretary of State of Missouri, that the change outlined here will not affect the accuracy or legal operational requirements as outlined in section 115.225, RSMo of _____

_____, (Product Name and Version)

_____, (Briefly describe the change.)

_____, (Signature)

The above signator appeared before me this day of _____, 20____ and did personally sign this affidavit.

_____, (Name)

_____, (Name of Company)

_____, (Notary)

My commission expires _____

(8) No change in system software, utilities software, or both, may be made within six (6) weeks prior to an election in which the auto-

mated tabulating equipment will be used for the tabulating of ballots. In the event that system software, utilities software, or both, is to be changed within thirty (30) days after any election in which the automated tabulating equipment is used for the tabulating of ballots, the election authority shall have copies made of the original system software, utilities software, or both, and those copies shall be stored in the same manner as the ballots counted in that election.

AUTHORITY: section 115.225, RSMo Supp. 2005. * Original rule filed March 31, 1972, effective April 10, 1972. Amended: Filed April 7, 1978, effective July 13, 1978. Emergency amendment filed Oct. 5, 1982, effective Nov. 2, 1982, expired Feb. 2, 1983. Amended: Filed Oct. 5, 1982, effective Feb. 11, 1983. Amended: Filed Dec. 15, 1986, effective Feb. 28, 1987. Rescinded and readopted: Filed Aug. 8, 2001, effective March 1, 2002. Emergency amendment filed June 21, 2006, effective July 1, 2006, expired Feb. 22, 2007. Amended: Filed June 21, 2006, effective Dec. 30, 2006.

*Original authority: 115.225, RSMo 1977, amended 1993, 1995, 2002.

15 CSR 30-10.025 Election Authority's Certification Statement

PURPOSE: This rule provides a method by which the election authority and the secretary of state are assured that the systems being purchased are approved for use in Missouri.

(1) No election authority shall authorize payment for software or hardware used for the tabulation of ballots unless the following actions have been taken:

(A) They shall have on file in their office a copy of the letter of authorization from the secretary of state to the manufacturer of the equipment, software, or both, being purchased which states that the equipment, software, or both, is approved for use in Missouri; and

(B) They shall have filed with the elections division of the Secretary of State's office a sworn statement that they do have the letter referenced in section (S) in their file and they believe that the software, equipment, or both, purchased is the same as that approved by the secretary of state.

AUTHORITY: section 115.225, RSMo 1986. * Original rule filed Dec. 15, 1986, effective Feb. 28, 1987.

*Original authority: 115.225, RSMo 1977

15 CSR 30-10.030 Voter Education and Voting Device Preparation

PURPOSE: This rule provides for the conduct of voter education and voting device preparation.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE: The secretary of state has determined that the publication of the entire text of the material which is incorporated by reference as a portion of this rule would be unduly cumbersome or expensive. Therefore, the material which is so incorporated is on file with the agency who filed this rule, and with the Office of the Secretary of State. Any interested person may view this material at either agency's headquarters or the same will be made available at the Office of the Secretary of State at a cost not to exceed actual cost of copy reproduction. The entire text of the rule is printed here. This note refers only to the incorporated by reference material.

(1) Before elections in which an electronic voting system is to be used for the first time, the election authority shall conduct a public information program to acquaint voters who will be using the system with the manner in which ballots are voted and counted.

(2) Vote Recording Preparation—Polling Place. In addition to those supplies required for the conduct of elections generally, the election authority shall cause to have prepared and delivered to each polling place using the electronic voting system no later than forty-five (45) minutes prior to the opening of the polls, a sufficient quantity of the following:

(A) Each polling place in a primary or general election shall be provided with at least one (1) voting device for each one hundred fifty (150) registered voters. A sufficient number of machines shall be provided for other elections. There shall always be one (1) extra specimen voting device per polling place for use in the instruction of voters. Exceptions to this regulation for specific elections may be granted upon application therefor to the secretary of state. In primary elections there shall be at least one (1) voting device for each eligible political party or ticket. The voting devices shall be put in order, set, adjusted and ready for voting when delivered to the polling places;

(B) Ballot label assemblies for use on voting devices requiring ballot labels, in the format approved by the secretary of state, properly sequenced, mounted in each voting device supplied. The type of election and the date of election shall be plainly marked on



15 CSR 30-10—ELECTED OFFICIALS

Division 30—Secretary of State

the front cover of each ballot label assembly. In preparing a voting device for an election, it shall be arranged so that it will in every particular case meet the requirements for voting and counting at that election.

(C) Ballot cards in the form required for processing by the electronic data processing equipment. The number of ballot cards supplied shall be sufficient to comply with section 115.247, RSMo;

1. The ballot card shall be in the format approved by the secretary of state. In the case of ballot cards of the 5081 size, the ballot stub and the ballot card shall not contain any common identifying mark, number or symbol which would permit them to be matched after having been detached in the voting process. Systems using larger sheets for ballot cards shall likewise be void of matching marks.

2. All arrows on the ballot label indicating where a voter may mark to designate his/her vote shall point to the center of the appropriate hole in the mask or the proper area for marking. All play in the ballot label of the 5081 size cards shall be limited so that the point of the arrow always points to the hole.

3. Demonstration ballot cards of a distinctive color, clearly marked for demonstration for use in the instruction voting device to educate the voter in the use of the system shall be supplied in such number as may be determined by the election authority.

4. Sample ballots, demonstration ballot cards or ballot labels which shall be exact copies of the official ballots except for wording indicating the sample status of the sheet.

5. All ballot cards shall be delivered to the polling places in a sealed package or container;

(D) Envelopes, sufficient in size to cover the voting area of the ballot card, if ballot cards of the 5081 format are used, made of stiff paper into which the ballot card is inserted by the voter after voting. The envelope shall cover the voting area of the ballot card and shall be of sufficient width to prevent insertion into a voting device. Ballot envelopes shall contain space so that the voter may cast write-in votes, if allowable for that election. The number of ballot envelopes shall equal the number of ballot cards supplied. Envelopes shall not be required in systems where the voter inserts the ballot card into the electronic counting device him/herself.

(E) Paper ballots, if any part of the election is to be voted on paper ballots;

(F) Ballot boxes as required by general election law;

(G) A transfer case sufficiently large to hold, transfer to the counting location from

the polling place and store the ballot cards which have been voted in a polling place and the spoiled ballots envelope. The transfer case shall be constructed of metal and sealed with a numbered nonreusable seal;

(H) Envelopes and containers in which to enclose voted paper ballots, if used; spoiled ballot cards; envelopes; unused paper ballots; and unused ballot cards;

(I) A ballot card certificate, in the form set out with this rule, together with an envelope addressed to the election authority;

(J) Two (2) sample ballots of each ballot type to be voted on in the polling place;

(K) Pencils, seals and any other supplies and forms deemed necessary; and

(L) *Instruction Guide for Election Judges and Clerks* issued by the secretary of state.

*AUTHORITY: section 115.225, RSMo 1986. * Original rule filed March 31, 1972, effective April 10, 1972. Amended: Filed Sept. 15, 1972, effective Sept. 25, 1972. Emergency rescission filed Oct. 5, 1982, effective Nov. 2, 1982. Emergency rule filed Oct. 5, 1982, effective Nov. 2, 1982, expired Feb. 2, 1983. Rescinded and readopted: Filed Oct. 5, 1982, effective Feb. 11, 1983.*

**Original authority: 115.225, RSMo 1977.*

**Notice and Demand
Affidavit of Maladministration
Legal Notice and Warning
Notice to Secure Surety Bond / Insurance Liability Policy
Notice of Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud**

Christy McCormick,
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
2019 Chairwoman,
2020 Commissioner

Benjamin Hovland,
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
2020 Chairman,
2019 Commissioner

Donald Palmer,
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
2021 Chairman,
2020 Commissioner

Mona Harrington,
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
Executive Director

**NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND NOTICE TO
PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT**

Comes now Affiant, Tracy Welborn, one of the people (as seen in Missouri Constitution Bill of Rights Article 1, Section 2), Sui Juris, in this Court of Record, bring the following claims and facts that you and your agents, serving as elected servants and trustees of the People, must provide due care and remember your Oath of Office which binds you.

15 CSR 30-10.010 states it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, chief election official of the State of Missouri, to be, "the chief custodian of the electronic voting system and its components and shall be responsible for the proper maintenance and all necessary preparation for elections."

Exhibit U

**Notice and Demand
Affidavit of Maladministration
Legal Notice and Warning
Notice of Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud**

John R. (Jay) Ashcroft,
Missouri Secretary of State

Eric Schmitt,
Missouri Attorney General

Josh Hawley,
Missouri U.S. Senator

Roy Blunt,
Missouri U.S. Senator

Sam Graves,
Missouri Congressman

Emanuel Cleaver,
Missouri U.S. Congressman

Michael Parson,
Missouri Governor

**NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND NOTICE TO
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Comes now Affiant, Tracy Welborn, one of the people (as seen in Missouri Constitution Bill of Rights Article 1, Section 2), Sui Juris, in this Court of Record, bring the following claims and facts that you and your agents, serving as elected servants and trustees of the People, must provide due care and remember your Oath of Office which binds you.

15 CSR 30-10.010 states it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, chief election official of the State of Missouri, to be, "the chief custodian of the electronic

Exhibit U

voting system and its components and shall be responsible for the proper maintenance and all necessary preparation for elections.”

The law, policies and guidelines governing our elections of the HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT 2002 and the Election Assistance Commission were put into place to safeguard and protect the Peoples Voice to elect servants for the purpose of conducting the People’s business. If these same laws, policies, and guidelines are ignored, obfuscated, or conducted under the color of law as described in Title 18, U.S.C, Section 242, and our elected servants turn a blind eye to fraud, maladministration, misrepresentation, or misconduct, then it is the duty of the People to correct those elected servants.

It is therefore, hereby the will of Affiant, Order and Demand based upon the presented facts the duty of the elected servant, Secretary of State John R. (Jay) Ashcroft, the chief election official, to De-certify the 2020 General Election as a whole based on fraud, maladministration, misrepresentation, and misconduct perpetrated by the Election Assistance Commission, thru their own admission, their failure to properly certify the Pro V&V and SLI Compliance Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC, Laboratories as per the written policies of the EAC Voting System & Testing Laboratory Program Manual version 2.0, (OMB 3265-0018), dated May 31, 2015, Sections 3.6 and 3.8, and

Return the People’s Vote to Paper Ballots for all Missouri elections.

The Secretary of State shall recall all Missouri officials holding a District, House, or Senate seat by way of fraud, misconduct, and misrepresentation due to the failure of the Election Assistance Commission from 2018 through this current date of January 11, 2022, to properly certify their Laboratory Accreditation by not adhering to the policies as written in the Voting System & Testing Program Manual version 2.0, (OMB 3265-0018), May 31, 2015, Sections 3.6 and 3.8, and

The Secretary of State shall call forth a Special Election to fill vacant seats of office for the period 2018 through this current date of January 11, 2022, using Paper Ballots.

Missouri Constitution Article 1 Section 2 and Section 3
Purpose of government; Powers of the people

“That all constitutional government is intended to promote the general welfare of

the people; that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry; that all persons are created equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under the law; that to give security to these things is the principal office of government, and that when government does not confer this security, it fails in its chief design."

"That the people of this state have the inherent, sole and exclusive right to regulate the internal government and police thereof, and to alter and abolish their constitution and form of government whenever they may deem it necessary to their safety and happiness, provided such change be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States."

The People of the state of Missouri have the inherent right of regulating their internal government. Government is instituted for protection, security, and benefit of the People and at all times they have the right to alter or reform the same whenever the public good may require it. It is the People who decide what direction the government should proceed.

Missouri Constitution Article 1 Section 1
Source of political power

"That all political power is vested in and derived from the people; that all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole."

Affiant reminds you of the natural rights of this Sui Juris human is the Supreme Law of the land. Affiants' individual rights are also secured within the Missouri and United States Constitutions.

Affiant comes as one of the People from which your power is derived. Your Oath of Office affirms your main purpose is to protect and maintain my natural and individual rights.

Missouri Constitution Article 1 Section 4
Independence of Missouri

"That Missouri is a free and independent state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States ..."

You, as state servants, are subject to having your actions restricted if your actions are not consistent with protecting the People's freedom. Any failure on your part to protect these rights is a breach of contract and a breach of your trust indenture,

granted by the People, and will be considered an act of maladministration and misconduct and an attack on the People you have sworn to serve.

**Missouri Constitution Article 1 Section 25
Elections and right of suffrage**

“That all elections shall be free and open’ and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”

It is the responsibility of our elected servants to ensure our elections are fair, safe, and conducted legally without fraud, misconduct or misrepresentation.

**Title 15—ELECTED OFFICIALS Division 30—Secretary of State Chapter 1—
Organization**

15 CSR 30-1.010 General Organization –

“1. The secretary of state is the chief elections official”

RSMo Title IX 115.225 1 and 2 (10)

**Automated equipment to be approved by secretary of state -
Standards to be met – Rules, promulgation, procedure**

1 “Before use by election authorities in this state, the secretary of state shall approve the marking devices and the automatic tabulating equipment used in electronic voting systems and may promulgate rules and regulations to implement the intent of sections 115.225 to 115.235.”

2 “No electronic voting system shall be approved unless it:

(10) Has been tested and is certified by an independent authority that meets the voting system standards developed by the Federal Election Commission or its successor agency.”

(Exhibit A)

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission, (herein referred to as the “EAC Commission or EAC”), in a **Notice of Clarification, NOC 21-01 VSTL Accreditation Status** issued July 23, 2021, states, “The EAC is the sole Federal authority for the accreditation and revocation of accreditation of (Voting System Test Laboratories) VSTLs.”¹

(Exhibit B)

¹ https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2021-07/NOC%2021.01_VSTL%20Accreditation%20Status_1.pdf

HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 (HAVA 2002)

Title II – COMMISSION

Subtitle A – Establishment and General Organization

Part 1 – Election Assistance Commission (EAC)², Sec. 202. Duties.

“The Commission shall serve as a national clearinghouse and resource for the compilation of information and review of procedures with respect to the administration of Federal elections by—

- (1) carrying out the duties described in part 3 (relating to the adoption of voluntary voting system guidelines), including the maintenance of a clearinghouse of information on the experiences of State and local governments in implementing the guidelines and in operating voting systems in general;*
- (2) carrying out the duties described in subtitle B (relating to the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software);*
- (3) carrying out the duties described in subtitle C (relating to conducting studies and carrying out other activities to promote the effective administration of Federal elections);*
- (4) carrying out the duties described in subtitle D (relating to election assistance), and providing information and training on the management of the payments and grants provided under such subtitle;*
- (5) carrying out the duties described in subtitle B of title III (relating to the adoption of voluntary guidance); and*
- (6) developing and carrying out the Help America Vote College Program under title V.”*

Sec. 205. Powers.

“(a) HEARINGS AND SESSIONS. — The Commission may hold such hearings for the purpose of carrying out this Act, sit and act at such times and places, take such testimony, and receive such evidence as the Commission considers advisable to carry out this Act. The Commission may administer oaths and affirmations to witnesses appearing before the Commission.”

“(b) INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES. — The Commission may secure directly from any Federal department or agency such information as the Commission considers necessary to carry out this Act. Upon request of the Commission, the head of such department or agency shall furnish such information to the Commission.”

“(c) POSTAL SERVICES. — The Commission may use the United States mails in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.”

“(d) ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SERVICES. — Upon the request of the Commission, the Administrator of General Services shall provide to the Commission,

² <https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ252/PLAW-107publ252.pdf>

on a reimbursable basis, the administrative support services that are necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its duties under this Act."

"(e) CONTRACTS. — The Commission may contract with and compensate persons and Federal agencies for supplies and services without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (41 U.S.C. 5)."

HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 (HAVA 2002)

Title II – COMMISSION

Subtitle A – Establishment and General Organization

Part 2 -- Election Assistance Commission Standards Board And Board of Advisors, Sec. 211. Establishments.

"There are hereby established the Election Assistance Commission Standards Board (hereafter in this title referred to as the "Standards Board") and the Election Assistance Commission Board of Advisors (hereafter in this title referred to as the "Board of Advisors")."

Sec. 212. Duties.

"The Standards Board and the Board of Advisors shall each, in accordance with the procedures described in part 3, review the voluntary voting system guidelines under such part, the voluntary guidance under title III, and the best practices recommendations contained in the report submitted under section 242(b)."

HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002 (HAVA 2002)

Title II – COMMISSION

Subtitle B – Testing, Certification, Decertification, and Recertification of Voting System Hardware and Software

Sec. 231. Certification and Testing of Voting System.

"(a) CERTIFICATION AND TESTING. —

(1) IN GENERAL. — The Commission shall provide for the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software by accredited laboratories."

"(b) LABORATORY ACCREDITATION. —

(1) RECOMMENDATIONS BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY.—Not later than 6 months after the Commission first adopts voluntary voting system guidelines under part 3 of subtitle A, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall conduct an evaluation of independent, non-Federal laboratories and shall submit to the Commission a list of those laboratories the Director proposes to be accredited to carry out the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification provided for under this section."

"(2) APPROVAL BY COMMISSION. —

(A) IN GENERAL. — The Commission shall vote on the accreditation of any laboratory under this section, taking into consideration the list submitted under paragraph (1), and no laboratory may be accredited for purposes of this section unless its accreditation is approved by a vote of the Commission.

(B) ACCREDITATION LABORATORIES NOT ON DIRECTOR LIST. — The Commission shall publish an explanation for the accreditation of any laboratory not included on the list submitted by the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology under paragraph (1)."

"(c) CONTINUING REVIEW BY NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY. —

(1) IN GENERAL.—In cooperation with the Commission and in consultation with the Standards Board and the Board of Advisors, the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall monitor and review, on an ongoing basis, the performance of the laboratories accredited by the Commission under this section, and shall make such recommendations to the Commission as it considers appropriate with respect to the continuing accreditation of such laboratories, including recommendations to revoke the accreditation of any such laboratory.

(2) APPROVAL BY COMMISSION REQUIRED FOR REVOCATION. — The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this section may not be revoked unless the revocation is approved by a vote of the Commission."

STATEMENT

The EAC issued only TWO accredited VSTL's (Voting System Test Laboratories):

To meet its statutory requirements under HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT of 2002, (42 U.S.C. Section 15371(b)), the EAC has developed the EAC's Voting System Test Laboratory Accreditation Program. The procedural requirements of the program are established in the proposed information collection, **The EAC Voting System Test Laboratory Accreditation Program Manual**, (OMB 3265-0018). Although participation in the program is voluntary, adherence to the program's procedural requirements is mandatory for participants. The procedural requirements of this Manual will supersede any prior laboratory accreditation requirements issued by the EAC. This manual shall be read in conjunction with the EAC's **Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual** (OMB 3265-0019).

The (VSTL), Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual, version 2.0, May 31, 2015, (OMB-3265-0018), Program Requirements 2.3, pertains to the Laboratory Accreditation. *"As a condition of accreditation, all laboratories must be*

recommended to the EAC by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), unless the emergency provisions of VSTL Program Manual, Chapter 3 apply. NIST is responsible, pursuant to the HAVA ACT 2002, Section 231 (b), for performing a technical evaluation of laboratories and identifying and recommending those competent to test voting systems. This recommendation is provided directly to the EAC from NIST".³

The Testing & Certification Program Manual, version 2.0, May 31, 2015, (OMB-3265-0019), pertains to voting machine hardware and software testing standards.

**Testing & Certification Program Manual, version 2.0, May 31, 2015, (TCPM)
Introduction - Section 1.2**

*"1.2. Authority. HAVA requires that the EAC certify and decertify voting systems. Section 231(a)(1) of HAVA specifically requires the EAC to "... provide for the certification, de-certification and re-certification of **voting system hardware and software by accredited laboratories.**" The EAC has the sole authority to grant certification or withdraw certification at the Federal level, including the authority to grant, maintain, extend, suspend, and withdraw the right to retain or use any certificates, marks, or other indicators of certification."*

**Testing & Certification Program Manual, version 2.0, (TCPM)
Certification Document - Section 5.11,⁴**

*"**A Certificate of Conformance** will be provided to Manufacturers for voting systems that have successfully met the standard of the EAC Certification Program. The document will serve as the Manufacturer's evidence that a particular system is certified to a particular set of voting system standards. The EAC certification and certificate apply only to the specific voting system configuration(s) identified, submitted and evaluated under the Certification Program."*

Mona Harrington was appointed EAC Executive Director in June 2020.⁵ (**Exhibit C**)

The Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual, version 2.0, May 31, 2015, (VSTL)

Introduction – Section 1.2

*"1.2. Authority. HAVA Section 231(b) (42 U.S.C. §15371(b)) requires that the EAC provide for the **accreditation and revocation of accreditation of independent, non-federal laboratories qualified to test voting systems to Federal standards.** Generally,*

³ <https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/manuals-and-forms>

⁴ https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/Cert%20Manual%207%208%2015%20FINAL.pdf

⁵ <https://www.eac.gov/news/2020/06/10/eac-commissioners-unanimously-approve-appointment-mona-harrington-eac-executive>

the EAC considers for accreditation those laboratories evaluated and recommend by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) pursuant to HAVA Section 231(b)(1). However, consistent with HAVA Section 231(b)(2)(B), the Commission may also vote to accredit laboratories outside of those recommended by NIST upon publication of an explanation of the reason for any such accreditation."

VSTL Program Manual, version 2.0, Testing, Technical Practices and Reporting, Section 2.10

"As a condition of accreditation, each VSTL shall perform testing in conformance with the relevant standards of the applicable Federal Standards (VVSG). Additionally, the VSTL shall create written reports of such testing consistent with the requirements of the latest version of the VVSG, EAC's Voting System Testing and Certification Manual, any applicable test suites mandated by the EAC, and any other written guidance published by the EAC."

VSTL Program Manual, version 2.0, Accreditation Process: Section 3.6.1.

3.6.1. Certificate of Accreditation. *A Certificate of Accreditation shall be issued to each laboratory accredited by vote of the Commissioners. The certificate shall be signed by the Chair of the Commission and state:*

3.6.1.1. *The name of the VSTL;*

3.6.1.2. *The scope of accreditation, by stating the Federal standard or standards to which the VSTL is competent to test;*

3.6.1.3. *The effective date of the certification, which shall not exceed a period of two (2) years; and*

3.6.1.4. *The technical standards to which the laboratory was accredited."*

VSTL Program Manual, version 2.0, Expiration and Renewal of Accreditation, Section 3.8

"A grant of accreditation is valid for a period not to exceed two years. A VSTL's accreditation expires on the date annotated on the Certificate of Accreditation. VSTLs in good standing shall renew their accreditation by submitting an application package to the Program Director, consistent with the procedures of Section 3.4 of this Chapter, no earlier than 60 days before the accreditation expiration date and no later than 30 days before that date. Laboratories that timely file the renewal application package shall retain their accreditation while the review and processing of their application is pending."

A Certificate of Accreditation is issued and must be signed by the EAC Chair of Commissioners which certifies the Laboratory used to test the voting machines and

software which have met the technical standards of which the laboratory was accredited and shall not exceed a period of TWO (2) years. VSTL 2.0, 3.6 and 3.8.

The EAC failed to have a quorum for over a calendar year leading to the inability to meet the standards of the EAC. Christy McCormick was appointed EAC Chair of the Commission in February 2019. The EAC reported the appointment of Christy McCormick was for the first time in nearly a decade with a full slate of commissioners.⁶ (Exhibit D)

Patricia Layfield was EAC Inspector General appointed by Barack Hussein Obama and was replaced by Brianna Schletz in October 2021.

Certificates of Accreditation provided to the Missouri Secretary of State from the EAC for the 2020 General Election were not in compliance with the written policy of the EAC VSTL Program Manual, version 2.0, Section 3.6 and 3.8 which violate the federal standards for laboratory testing accreditation set forth in the EAC Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual version 2.0 (OMB 3265-0018), and the HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT 2002, Subtitle B Section 231 (a) (1) (2) (b) (1).

In the United States each state is tasked to conduct an (IV & V) Independent Verification and Validation to provide assurance of the integrity of the votes.

If the “accredited” non-federal entities have NOT received EAC accreditation this is a failure of the states to uphold their own states standards that are federally regulated.

The state of Missouri requires testing to federal standards requiring testing by a federally accredited laboratory. (Exhibit E)

Category descriptions for state Voting System Certification Process: Requires Testing to Federal Standards: State statutes and/or regulations require that voting systems are tested by a federally or nationally accredited laboratory to federal standards. Older statutes may refer to Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs), but such test labs are now known as Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTLs) under the EAC’s testing and certification program. (Exhibit E)

Both laboratories, Pro V&V and SLI Compliance received (NIST) National Institute of Standards and Technology certifications outside the 24-month scope.

⁶ <https://www.eac.gov/news/2019/02/22/mccormick-elected-new-eac-chairwomen>

Pro V&V received a NIST certification on March 26, 2020, for ONE (1) year. Normally the NIST certification is good for TWO (2) years to align with that of EAC certification accreditation that is good for two years. **(Exhibit F)**

The last Pro V&V EAC accreditation certificate of this declaration expired in February 2017, meaning the (IV & V) Independent Verification and Validation conducted by Missouri claiming that the laboratory was accredited is false.

Pro V&V accreditation signature on the Certificate of Accreditation is not signed by the authorized EAC Chair of Commissioners, Thomas Hicks, appointed 2018, or Christy McCormick appointed 2019. **(Exhibit G & H)**

SLI Compliance Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC, accreditation expiration date was January 10, 2021, however, the signature on the Certificate of Accreditation is not signed by the authorized EAC Chair of Commissioners, Thomas Hicks, appointed 2018, or Christy McCormick appointed 2019. In fact, SLI Compliance Division was NIST ISO Certified for less than 90 days. **(Exhibit I, J, K)**

In a VSTL Certificates and Accreditation document dated July 21, 2021, listed on the EAC VSTL Pro V&V website under "related documents" the EAC states in footnote(1):

⁷*"(1) Pro V&V was accredited by the EAC on February 24, 2015, and SLI Compliance was accredited by the EAC on February 28, 2007. Federal law provides that EAC accreditation of a voting system test laboratory cannot be revoked unless the EAC Commissioners vote to revoke the accreditation: "The accreditation of a laboratory for purposes of this section may not be revoked unless the revocation is approved by a vote of the Commission."* **(Exhibit L)**

This statement is correct only in citing a *test laboratory* cannot be revoked unless the Commission votes to revoke the laboratory accreditation as cited in HAVA 2002, Subtitle B, Section 231(b) (1) (c) (2), **Continuing Review By National Institute of Standards and Technology**; however, the EAC is obscuring the fact the laboratories must be re-accredited every TWO (2) years and an authorized signatures must be that of the EAC Chair of Commissioners as specifically written in the EAC VSTL **Program Manual version 2.0, (OMB3265-0018), Accreditation Process: Section 3.6.1. and 3.8.**

7

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system_test_lab/files/VSTL%20Certificates%20and%20Accreditation.pdf

Within the same exhibit "K" document, paragraph (3) the EAC states with Its own admission:

"Due to administrative error during 2017-2019, the EAC did not issue an updated certificate to Pro V&V causing confusion with some people concerning their good standing status." "Even though the EAC failed to reissue the certificate, Pro V&V's audit was completed in 2018 and again in early 2021 as the scheduled audit of Pro V&V in 2020 was postponed due to COVID-19 travel restrictions."

The EAC admits it did not follow, and ignored, their own policies and procedures written in the EAC VSTL Program Manual to re-issue Certificates of Accreditation for Pro V&V Laboratory and SLI Compliance Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC for the 2020 General Election.

It acknowledges Its failure to re-certify PRO V&V Labs for the 2020 General Election in paragraph (3) stating, "the scheduled audit of Pro V&V was postponed due to COVID-19 travel restrictions."

However, The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) reported and confirmed COVID-19 in the United States on January 20, 2020,⁸ which should not have hampered, interfered, or delayed the re-certification accreditation of the Laboratories for the 2020 General election.

(Exhibit M)

In paragraph (4) of the exhibit "K" document the EAC reports, *"the Testing & Certification program has been fully staffed since May 2019, and we are confident that the integrity of the labs and our voting system certification programs has remained strong throughout."* "Confidence" does not equate to a valid Certification of Accreditation for election safety and integrity.

A letter dated January 27, 2021, from Jerome Lovato, Voting System Testing and Certification Director, in reference to Pro V&V EAC VSTL Accreditation⁹ acknowledges Section 3.8 of the VSTL Program Manual version 2.0 policy stating:

(Exhibit N)

"Pro V&V has completed all requirements to remain in good standing with the EAC's Testing and Certification program per section 3.8 of the Voting System Test Laboratory Manual, version 2.0:"

"Expiration and Renewal of Accreditation. A grant of accreditation is valid for a period not to exceed two years. A VSTL's accreditation expires on the date annotated

⁸ <https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6924e2.htm>

⁹ https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system_test_lab/files/Pro_VandV_Accreditation_Renewal_delay_memo013721.pdf

on the Certificate of Accreditation. VSTLs in good standing shall renew their accreditation by submitting an application package to the Program Director, consistent with the procedures of Section 3.4 of this Chapter, no earlier than 60 days before the accreditation expiration date and no later than 30 days before that date. Laboratories that timely file the renewal application package shall retain their accreditation while the review and processing of their application is pending. VSTLs in good standing shall also retain their accreditation should circumstances leave the EAC without a quorum to conduct the vote required under Section 3.5.5.

Due to the outstanding circumstances posed by COVID-19, the renewal process for EAC laboratories has been delayed for an extended period. While this process continues, Pro V&V retains its EAC VSTL accreditation."

Regardless of the assertion by Jerome Lovato, Voting System Testing and Certificate Director, "*Pro V&V retains its EAC VSTL accreditation.*", Mr. Lovato does not have the authority to certify the accreditation of the laboratories "good standing". The Laboratory remains un-certified under the EAC policies written in EAC VSTL Program Manual, version 2.0, (OMB3265-0018), Sections 3.6 and 3.8.

Title 18, U.S.C., Section 242 Deprivation of Rights Under Color Of Law makes it a crime for a person acting under color of law to willfully deprive a person of a right or privilege protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Under RSMo Title IX 115.225, 2 (10), Automated equipment to be approved by secretary of state - Standards to be met – Rules, promulgation, procedure 2 "No electronic voting system shall be approved unless it:

(10) Has been tested and is certified by an independent authority that meets the voting system standards developed by the Federal Election Commission or its successor agency."

The Secretary of State acting in good faith to perform his duties as per the "Rules, Promulgation, Procedure" as written under RSMo Title IX 115.225, 2 (10), in 2006, are not explicitly written and are ambiguous on certification to be employed, be that of Conformance or Accreditation. However, 15 CSR 30-10.010 states it is the responsibility of the chief election official of the State of Missouri to be, "the chief custodian of the electronic voting system and its components and shall be responsible for the proper maintenance and all necessary preparation for elections."

EAC policies as written in the VSTL Program Manual version 2.0, (OMB3265-0018), dated May 31, 2015, are explicitly clear *both* Certificates of Conformity certifying the machine and software components have met all standards and shall be signed by the

EAC Program Director, which was at this time, Mona Harrington, AND Certificates of Accreditation certifying the Laboratories, having met all standards for the 2020 General Election, are required to be issued by the EAC Commission and signed by the EAC Commission Chair, Thomas Hicks, appointed 2018 or Christy McCormick appointed 2019.

The EAC has misrepresented the Certificates of Accreditation to certify the Laboratories used for the Missouri 2020 General Election by substituting unauthorized signatures in place of the EAC Chair Commissioner, and the EAC failed to properly re-certify the Pro V&V and SLI Compliance Division of Gaming Laboratories International, LLC, Laboratories for the Missouri 2020 General Election.

With consideration there had been an administrative error, the EAC continues to misrepresent the Certification of Accreditation for Pro V&V and SLI Compliance, Division of Gaming Laboratories International LLC, in failing to properly validate accreditation for these same Laboratories for the 2022 upcoming elections. Donald Palmer was appointed as EAC Chairman February 2021, by President Trump. It is Mr. Palmer's signature which should appear on current laboratory Certificates of Accreditation. **(Exhibits H, I & O)**

Additional Correspondence & Documents:

Eric Schmitt #jointhesuit letter dated 11-30-2021	(Exhibit P)
Eric Schmitt meeting request election integrity dated 10-20-2021	(Exhibit Q)
John R. (Jay) Ashcroft election integrity letter dated 12-18-2021	(Exhibit R)
Emanuel Cleaver #jointhesuit letter dated 10-29-2021	(Exhibit S)
Sam Graves election integrity letter dated 12-01-2020	(Exhibit T)
Roy Blunt election integrity letter dated 01-29-2021	(Exhibit U)
Josh Hawley election integrity letter dated 01-28-2021	(Exhibit V)
Michael Parson election integrity letter dated 11-24-2020	(Exhibit W)

Therefore, it is hereby the will of Affiant, Order and Demand, as stated prior, based upon the presented facts the duty of the elected servant, Secretary of State John (Jay) R. Ashcroft, the chief election official, to De-certify the 2020 General Election.

Return the People's Vote to Paper Ballots for all Missouri elections.

The Secretary of State shall recall all Missouri officials illegally holding a District, House, or Senate seat due to the failure of the Election Assistance Commission from

2018 through this current date of January 10, 2022, to properly certify and accredit their Laboratories by not adhering to the policies as written in the Voting System & Testing Program Manual version 2.0, May 31, 2015, Sections 3.6 and 3.8.

The Secretary of State shall call forth a Special Election to fill vacant seats of office for the period 2018 through this current date of January 10, 2022, using Paper Ballots.

Legal Notice

This Affidavit is a Contract, and if you shall ignore this Affidavit by not responding by the terms, you agree to pay \$10,000 per day.

If you, as a government official, believe that these claims are untrue, please respond within 5 days with Constitutional Provisions, sworn under the penalty of perjury, by the Affidavit, point by point, showing where you have Constitutional Authority to ignore these rights of the People. If you do not respond within 5 days, you agree, by acquiescence, that you are knowingly interfering with the rights of the People you swore to protect, and that this Affidavit shall stand as evidence that you are acting in Maladministration and Misconduct and that no court shall have the power to again adjudicate these matters and that all Courts of Record shall accept this Affidavit as truth and law. You also agree to be bound by all said herein and the Affiant is able to bring this Contract before an Arbitrator of Affiant's choice at the sole expense of you, and you agree to be bound by any award.

If you cannot prove that you are acting under constitutional authority, please take further notice that any denial of protection and maintenance of the People's individual rights is **Maladministration, Treason and Insurrection**. Failure to respond means that by acquiescence you agree that all claims are true.

Verification

I hereby declare, certify, and state, pursuant to the penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, and by the provisions of 28 USC § 1746 that all the above and foregoing representations are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Executed in Jackson County, Missouri on this 15th day of February
15, 2022 in the year of Our Lord Two Thousand and Twenty-Two.

Tracy Rose Wellborn

Autograph of Affiant:

Notary as JURAT CERTIFICATE:

Missouri State
Jackson County

On this 18th day of February, 2022, before me,
Christen E Gavin, a Notary Public, personally appeared
Tracy Rose Wellborn Name of Affiant, who proved to me on the basis
of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within
instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same in their authorized
capacity, and that by their autograph(s) on the instrument the person executed, the
instrument.


I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the lawful laws of the State of
Missouri and that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and

official seal

Signature of Notary / Jurat

Christen E Gavin
SEAL



**Notice and Demand
Affidavit of Maladministration
Legal Notice and Warning
Notice to Secure Surety Bond / Insurance Liability Policy
Notice of Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud**

Christy McCormick,
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
2019 Chairwoman,
2020 Commissioner

Benjamin Hovland,
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
2020 Chairman,
2019 Commissioner

Donald Palmer,
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
2021 Chairman,
2020 Commissioner

Mona Harrington,
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
Executive Director

**NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND NOTICE TO
PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT**

Comes now Affiant, Tracy Welborn, one of the people (as seen in Missouri Constitution Bill of Rights Article 1, Section 2), Sui Juris, in this Court of Record, bring the following claims and facts that you and your agents, serving as elected servants and trustees of the People, must provide due care and remember your Oath of Office which binds you.

15 CSR 30-10.010 states it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, chief election official of the State of Missouri, to be, “the chief custodian of the electronic voting system and its components and shall be responsible for the proper maintenance and all necessary preparation for elections.”



FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888722

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 4:13 pm on March 24, 2022 in WASHINGTON, DC 20001.

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✓ Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room

March 24, 2022 at 4:13 pm
WASHINGTON, DC 20001

Feedback

SECTION ON DELIVERY	
Washington, DC 20001	03
\$3.75	0075
\$3.95	15
\$0.00	
\$0.00	
\$0.00	
\$0.00	
\$2.96	
\$9.76	03/24/2022
Christy McCormick EAC	
U.S. EAC 1233 3rd St N.W., Ste 200	
Washington, D.C. 20001	
7021 2720 0000 0288 8722	Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053	
Domestic Return Receipt	

Exhibit U

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FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888739

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 1:14 pm on March 22, 2022 in WASHINGTON, DC 20001.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

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March 22, 2022 at 1:14 pm
WASHINGTON, DC 20001

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT
Domestic Mail Only

Washington, DC 20001

Postage: \$3.75
Insurance: \$3.05
Registration Fee: \$0.00
Signature Confirmation: \$0.00
Return Receipt: \$0.00
Total: \$9.76

03/18/2022

Benjamin Howland
US EAC 433 3rd St NW, Ste. 200
Washington, D.C. 20001

7021 2720 0000 0288 8739

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

SECTION ON DELIVERY

103

Agent
Addressee

Signature of Addressee

Date of Delivery: 3/22/22

Is different from item 1? Yes
Delivery address below: No

Priority Mail Express®
Registered Mail™
Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
Signature Confirmation™
Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

Exhibit U

FAQs >

Remove X

Feedback

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888753

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 1:14 pm on March 22, 2022 in WASHINGTON, DC 20001.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ▾

✓ Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room

March 22, 2022 at 1:14 pm
WASHINGTON, DC 20001

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service®
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For delivery information, visit usps.com

Washington, DC 20001

Certified Mail Fee	\$3.75	0075
Postage	\$2.96	15
Total Postage and Fees	\$9.76	

03/18/2022

Mona Harrington USEAC
633 3rd St NW, Ste 200
Washington, D.C. 20001

SECTION ON DELIVERY

103

☐ Agent
☐ Addressee

Printed Name) C. Date of Delivery

1 3/22/22

Is the delivery address different from item 1? ☐ Yes ☒ No

Delivery address below:

☐ Priority Mail Express®
☐ Registered Mail™
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
☐ Signature Confirmation™
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

Collect on Delivery Restricted Delivery (for Mail Restricted Delivery or \$500)

Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

**Notice and Demand
Affidavit of Maladministration
Legal Notice and Warning
Notice of Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud**

John R. (Jay) Ashcroft,
Missouri Secretary of State

Eric Schmitt,
Missouri Attorney General

Josh Hawley,
Missouri U.S. Senator

Roy Blunt,
Missouri U.S. Senator

Sam Graves,
Missouri Congressman

Emanuel Cleaver,
Missouri Congressman

Michael L. Parson,
Missouri Governor

**NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND NOTICE TO
PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT**

Comes now Affiant, Tracy Welborn, one of the people (as seen in Missouri Constitution Bill of Rights Article 1, Section 2), Sui Juris, in this Court of Record, bring the following claims and facts that you and your agents, serving as elected servants and trustees of the People, must provide due care and remember your Oath of Office which binds you.

15 CSR 30-10.010 states it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, chief election official of the State of Missouri, to be, "the chief custodian of the electronic

4/2/22, 7:19 PM

USPS.com® - USPS Tracking® Results

USPS Tracking®[FAQs >](#)**Track Another Package +****Tracking Number: 70212720000002888760**[Remove X](#)

Your item was picked up at the post office at 8:15 am on March 30, 2022 in JEFFERSON CITY, MO 65101.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓**✓ Delivered, Individual Picked Up at Post Office**

March 30, 2022 at 8:15 am
JEFFERSON CITY, MO 65101

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service®
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT
Domestic Mail Only

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

Jefferson City, MO 65102

Postage: \$1.96
Total Postage and Fees: \$8.76

03/28/2022

John R (Jay) Ashcraft, S.O.S.
Capitol Bldg, Rm 208, Box 778
Jefferson City, Mo 65102

7021 2720 0000 0288 8760

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

Domestic Return Receipt

SECTION ON DELIVERY

☐ Agent
☐ Addressee

Signature: RD HOPKINS Date of Delivery: 03/30/22

different from item 10? ☐ Yes
any address below? ☐ No

☐ Priority Mail Express®
☐ Registered Mail™
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
☐ Signature Confirmation™
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

Exhibit U



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Tracking Number: 70212720000002888784

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 5:57 am on April 4, 2022 in WASHINGTON, DC 20510.

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☒ **Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room**

April 4, 2022 at 5:57 am
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

[illegible]

See Less

Exhibit U

FAQs >

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USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888807

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 7:05 am on April 4, 2022 in WASHINGTON, DC 20515.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ∨

✓ Delivered, Left with Individual

April 4, 2022 at 7:05 am
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

U.S. Postal Service® CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Domestic Mail Only	
To: Washington, DC 20515	
Certified Mail Fee	\$3.75
Postage	\$1.96
Total \$5.71	
03/28/2022	
Sam Graves, Congressman 1135 Longworth HOB Washington, D.C. 20515	
2. Article Number (transfer from service label) 7021 2720 0000 0288 8807	
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053	

SECTION ON DELIVERY	
☒ Agent ☐ Addressee	
Delivered Name)	C. Date of Delivery
Is different from item 1? ☐ Yes	
Delivery address below: ☐ No	
☐ Priority Mail Express® ☐ Registered Mail™ ☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery ☐ Signature Confirmation™ ☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	

Exhibit U

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FAQs >

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Tracking Number: 70212720000002888821

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 11:28 am on March 30, 2022 in INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 30, 2022 at 11:28 am
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service® CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Domestic Mail Only		ACTION ON DELIVERY	
To: Delivery Information: 7021 2720 0000 0288 8821 Independence, MO 64050		C. Date of Delivery	
Certified Mail Fee	\$3.75	Different from item 1? ☐ Yes	
Postage	\$1.96	By address below: ☐ No	
Postage and Fees	\$8.76	Delivery	
Service Fee (if applicable)	\$0.00	Delivery	
Return Receipt (hardcopy)	\$0.00	Delivery	
Return Receipt (electronic)	\$0.00	Delivery	
Delivery Point Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	Delivery	
Adult Signature Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	Delivery	
Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	Delivery	
Postage and Fees		Delivery	
Total Postage and Fees		Delivery	
Emanuel Cleaver, Congressman		Delivery	
411 W. Maple Ave, Ste F		Delivery	
Independence, Mo 64050		Delivery	
Article Number (Transfer from service label)		Delivery	
7021 2720 0000 0288 8821		Delivery	
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053		Delivery	

Exhibit U



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Feedback

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**Notice and Demand
Affidavit of Maladministration
Legal Notice and Warning
Notice to Secure Surety Bond / Insurance Liability Policy
Notice of Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud**

Cori Bush,
District 1
U.S. House Representative

Ann Wagner,
District 2
U.S. House Representative

Blaine Luetkemeyer,
District 3
U.S. House Representative

**NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND NOTICE TO
PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT**

Comes now Affiant, Tracy Welborn, one of the people (as seen in Missouri Constitution Bill of Rights Article 1, Section 2), Sui Juris, in this Court of Record, bring the following claims and facts that you and your agents, serving as elected servants and trustees of the People, must provide due care and remember your Oath of Office which binds you.

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888692

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 2:19 pm on March 21, 2022 in SAINT LOUIS, MO 63133.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

☒ **Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room**

March 21, 2022 at 2:19 pm
SAINT LOUIS, MO 63133

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT <i>Domestic Mail Only</i>		U.S. SECTION ON DELIVERY	
To: Saint Louis, MO 63133		☐ Agent ☐ Addressee	
Certified Mail Fee \$3.75	0075	193314 (Printed Name)	
Return Receipt Fee \$2.05	15	C. Date of Delivery 3/24	
☒ Return Receipt (hardcopy) \$0.00		Address different from item 1? ☐ Yes delivery address below: ☐ No	
☐ Return Receipt (electronic) \$0.00			
☐ Certified Mail Restricted Delivery \$0.00			
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery \$0.00			
Postage \$2.96	03/18/2022		
Total \$9.76			
2. Article Number (transfer from service label) 7021 2720 0000 0288 8692		☐ Collect on Delivery Restricted Delivery ☐ Insured Mail Restricted Delivery (over \$500)	
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053		Domestic Return Receipt	

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®[FAQs >](#)**Track Another Package +****Tracking Number:** 70212720000002888708[Remove X](#)

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 2:19 pm on March 24, 2022 in BALLWIN, MO 63011.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓**✓ Delivered, Left with Individual**

March 24, 2022 at 2:19 pm
BALLWIN, MO 63011

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service® CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Domestic Mail Only		SECTION ON DELIVERY	
To: Ballwin, MO 63011		☒ Agent ☐ Addressee	
Postage: \$3.75	0075	Signature (Printed Name):	C. Date of Delivery
Insurance: \$3.05	15	None	3/24/22
Registration: \$0.00		Is different from item 1? ☐ Yes	
Delivery Confirmation: \$0.00		Delivery address below: ☒ No	
Signature Confirmation: \$0.00			
Registered Mail Restricted Delivery: \$0.00			
Total: \$2.96			
Total: \$9.76	03/18/2022		
Ann Wagner US House Rep. 301 Sovereign Ct., Ste 201 Ballwin, Mo 63011		Registered Delivery	☐ Priority Mail Express®
		Registered Delivery	☐ Registered Mail™
		Registered Delivery	☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
		Signature Confirmation™	☐ Signature Confirmation™
		Signature Confirmation	☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery
7021 2720 0000 0288 8708		Registered Mail Registered Mail Restricted Delivery or \$500	

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7630-02-000-9053

Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888715

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 2:33 pm on March 21, 2022 in JEFFERSON CITY, MO 65109.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ∨

✓ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 2:33 pm
JEFFERSON CITY, MO 65109

Feedback

7021 2720 0000 0288 8715

U.S. Postal Service	
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT	
Postage & Fees Only	
Jefferson City, MO 65109	
Postage	\$3.75
Insurance	\$3.05
Signature Required	\$0.00
Registered Mail	\$0.00
Signature Confirmation	\$0.00
Return Receipt	\$0.00
Total	\$9.96
03/18/2022	
Blaine Luetkemeyer U.S. House Rep	
2117 Missouri Blvd	
Jefferson City, Mo 65109	

See Less ^

Exhibit U

**Notice and Demand
Affidavit of Maladministration
Legal Notice and Warning
Notice to Secure Surety Bond / Insurance Liability Policy
Notice of Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud**

Jerry M. Hunter,
St. Louis City Election Chairman

Leo G. Stoff, Jr.,
St. Louis City Republican Election Director

D. Benjamin Borgmeyer,
St. Louis City Democratic Election Director

Geraldine Kraemer,
St. Louis City Election Commissioner

Joseph A. Barbaglia,
St. Louis City Election Board Secretary

**NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND NOTICE TO
PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT**

Comes now Affiant, Tracy Welborn, one of the people (as seen in Missouri Constitution Bill of Rights Article 1, Section 2), Sui Juris, in this Court of Record, bring the following claims and facts that you and your agents, serving as elected servants and trustees of the People, must provide due care and remember your Oath of Office which binds you.

USPS Tracking®[FAQs >](#)**Track Another Package +****Tracking Number: 70212720000002888678**[Remove X](#)

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 11:23 am on March 21, 2022 in SAINT LOUIS, MO 63101.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓**✓ Delivered, Left with Individual**

March 21, 2022 at 11:23 am
SAINT LOUIS, MO 63101

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service® CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Domestic Mail Only		SECTION ON DELIVERY	
Saint Louis, MO 63101		☐ Agent ☐ Addressee	
Certified Mail Fee \$3.75 Return Receipt (hardcopy) \$0.00 Return Receipt (electronic) \$0.00 Certified Mail Restricted Delivery \$0.00 Adult Signature Required \$0.00 Adult Signature Restricted Delivery \$0.00	0075 15	Signature of Addressee (Print Name) _____ C. Date of Delivery 3/21/22	
Postage \$2.96 Total Postage and Fees \$9.76	03/18/2022	Is different from item 1? ☐ Yes Delivery address below: ☐ No	
Jerry M. Hunter STL CBOE Chair 300 N Tucker Blvd St Louis Mo 63101		☐ Priority Mail Express® ☐ Registered Mail™ ☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery ☐ Signature Confirmation™ ☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	
Tracking Number (transfer from service label) 7021 2720 0000 0288 8678		☐ Collect on Delivery Restricted Delivery ☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery (over \$500)	
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053			

Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

1/2

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888654

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 11:23 am on March 21, 2022 in SAINT LOUIS, MO 63101.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 11:23 am
SAINT LOUIS, MO 63101

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Domestic Mail Only		SECTION ON DELIVERY	
To: Saint Louis, MO 63101		☐ Agent ☒ Addressee	
Postage: \$3.75		Printed Name) C. Date of Delivery	
Insurance: \$3.05		3/21/22	
Signature Confirmation: \$0.00		Address different from item 1? ☐ Yes	
Delivery Confirmation: \$0.00		Delivery address below: ☐ No	
Total: \$2.96			
Total: \$9.76			
D. Benjamin Borgmeyer STL BOE Dir		☐ Priority Mail Express®	
300 N Tucker Blvd		☐ Registered Mail™	
St Louis, Mo 63101		☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery	
2. Article Number (transfer from service label)		☐ Signature Confirmation™	
7021 2720 0000 0288 8654		☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053		Domestic Return Receipt	

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888661

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 11:23 am on March 21, 2022 in SAINT LOUIS, MO 63101.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 11:23 am
SAINT LOUIS, MO 63101

Feedback

7021 2720 0000 0288 8661

U.S. Postal Service®	
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT	
Domestic Mail Only	
Saint Louis, MO 63101	
Postage	\$3.75
Service Fee	\$3.05
Insurance	\$0.00
Signature Confirmation	\$0.00
Registered Mail	\$0.00
Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	\$0.00
Postage	\$2.96
Total Postage and Fees	\$9.76
Date of Delivery	03/21/2022
Heraldine Kraemer STLC BDB Comm	
300 N. Tucker Blvd	
St Louis MO 63101	

SECTION ON DELIVERY

Printed Name) C. Date of Delivery
3/21/22

Is this different from item 1? ☐ Yes
delivery address below: ☐ No

☐ Agent
☐ Addressee

Restricted Delivery ☐ Priority Mail Express®
Restricted Delivery ☐ Registered Mail™
Restricted Delivery ☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
Restricted Delivery ☐ Signature Confirmation™
Restricted Delivery ☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

2. Article Number (Transfer from service label)

7021 2720 0000 0288 8661

☐ Collect on Delivery Restricted Delivery
Restricted Mail
Restricted Mail Restricted Delivery
(over \$500)

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888685

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 11:23 am on March 21, 2022 in SAINT LOUIS, MO 63101.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ∨

✓ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 11:23 am
SAINT LOUIS, MO 63101

Feedback

7021 2720 0000 0288 8685

U.S. Postal Service
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT
Domestic Mail Only

Saint Louis, MO 63101

Postage \$3.75 0075
\$3.05
\$0.00
\$0.00
\$0.00
\$0.00

\$3.16 03/18/2022
\$9.96

Joseph A. Barbaglia STLC Secy
300 N Tucker Blvd
St Louis Mo 63101

SECTION ON DELIVERY

Printed Name) C. Date of Delivery
3/21/22

Address different from item? ☐ Yes
delivery address below: ☐ No

☐ Agent
☐ Addressee

☐ Priority Mail Express®
☐ Registered Mail™
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
☐ Signature Confirmation™
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

2. Article Number (Transfer from service label)
7021 2720 0000 0288 8685

☐ Collect on Delivery Restricted Delivery
Insured Mail
Insured Mail Restricted Delivery (over \$500)

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053 Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

**Notice and Demand
Affidavit of Maladministration
Legal Notice and Warning
Notice to Secure Surety Bond / Insurance Liability Policy
Notice of Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud**

Darla Wierzbicki,
Clay County Republican Election Chairman

Patty Lamb,
Clay County Republican Election Director

Tiffany Francis,
Clay County Democrat Election Director

Tom Brown,
Clay County Election Member

Anthony Bologna,
Clay County Election Member

Thelma Crawford,
Clay County Election Secretary

**NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND NOTICE TO
PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT**

Comes now Affiant, Tracy Welborn, one of the people (as seen in Missouri Constitution Bill of Rights Article 1, Section 2), Sui Juris, in this Court of Record, bring the following claims and facts that you and your agents, serving as elected servants and trustees of the People, must provide due care and remember your Oath of Office which binds you.

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888609

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 12:28 pm on March 21, 2022 in LIBERTY, MO 64068.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ▾

✓ Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room

March 21, 2022 at 12:28 pm
LIBERTY, MO 64068

Feedback

7021 2720 0000 0288 8609

U.S. Postal Service®
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT
Domestic Mail Only

Delivery Information (to be filled in by the addressee)
Liberty, MO 64068

0075 15

Service	Amount
Basic Service & Postage	\$3.75
✓ Return Receipt (hardcopy)	\$3.05
Return Receipt (electronic)	\$0.00
Signature Confirmation (hardcopy)	\$0.00
Signature Confirmation (electronic)	\$0.00
Signature Confirmation (restricted delivery)	\$0.00
Signature Confirmation (restricted delivery)	\$0.00

03/18/2022

\$2.96

\$9.96

Darla Wierzbicki Clay Co B&E Chair

100W. Mississippi St

Liberty, Mo 64068-1623

7021 2720 0000 0288 8609

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

Domestic Return Receipt

See Less >

SECTION ON DELIVERY

intended Name) C. Date of Delivery

Agent Addressee

Is different from item 1? Yes No

Delivery address below: Yes No

Priority Mail Express® Registered Mail™ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery Signature Confirmation™ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

Exhibit U



FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888586

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 12:28 pm on March 21, 2022 in LIBERTY, MO 64068.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room

March 21, 2022 at 12:28 pm
LIBERTY, MO 64068

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT
Domestic Mail Only

Postage paid by addressee (Certified Mail® fee only) 7/14/22

Liberty, MO 64068

Certified Mail Fee	\$3.75	0075
Basic Service Charge (Domestic Mail Only)	\$3.05	15
Return Receipt (Hardcopy)	\$0.00	
Return Receipt (Electronic)	\$0.00	
Certified Mail Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	
Adult Signature Required	\$0.00	
Adult Signature Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	

Postage: \$3.16

Total Postage and Fees: \$9.96

03/18/2022

Patty Lamb Clay Co. BOE Dir
100 W. Mississippi St.
Liberty, Mo 64068-1623

SECTION ON DELIVERY

L. Meigs ☐ Agent ☒ Addressee

Intended Name) C. Date of Delivery

Is different from item 1? ☐ Yes ☒ No

Delivery address below: ☐ No

☐ Priority Mail Express®
☐ Registered Mail™
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
☐ Signature Confirmation™
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

2. Article Number (Transfer from service label)
7021 2720 0000 0288 8586

☐ Collect on Delivery Restricted Delivery
Registered Mail
Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
or \$500)

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

FAQs >

Remove X

Feedback

 $\frac{1}{2}$

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888616

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 12:28 pm on March 21, 2022 in LIBERTY, MO 64068.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room

March 21, 2022 at 12:28 pm
LIBERTY, MO 64068

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service® CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Domestic Mail Only		SECTION ON DELIVERY	
For Delivery Information, Visit www.usps.com			
Liberty, MO 64068			
Certified Mail Fee	\$3.75	0075	15
Postage	\$2.96		
Total Postage and Fees	\$9.76	03/18/2022	
To: Tom Brown Clay Co BoE 100 W. Mississippi St Liberty, Mo 64068-1623		Signature of Agent or Addressee C. Date of Delivery	
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053		Domestic Return Receipt	

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888623

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 12:28 pm on March 21, 2022 in LIBERTY, MO 64068.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ∨

 **Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room**

March 21, 2022 at 12:28 pm
LIBERTY, MO 64068

Feedback



SECTION ON DELIVERY

L. Morgan
Printed Name) ☐ Agent
☐ Addressee

C. Date of Delivery

Is this address different from item 1? ☐ Yes
Delivery address below: ☐ No

- ☐ Priority Mail Express®
- ☐ Registered Mail™
- ☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
- ☐ Signature Confirmation™
- ☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

7021 2720 0000 0288 8623

Liberty, MO 64068

\$3.75

0075
15

\$3.05

\$0.00

\$0.00

\$0.00

\$0.00

\$2.96

03/18/2022

\$9.76

Anthony Bologna Clay Co. BOE

100 W. Mississippi St

Liberty, Mo 64068-1623

2. Article Number (Transfer from carrier label)

7021 2720 0000 0288 8623

1. Collect on Delivery Restricted Delivery

Insured Mail
Insured Mail Restricted Delivery
(over \$500)

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

**Notice and Demand
Affidavit of Maladministration
Legal Notice and Warning
Notice to Secure Surety Bond / Insurance Liability Policy
Notice of Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud**

Tammy Brown,
Jackson County Republican Election Director

Sara Zorich,
Jackson County Democrat Election Director

Jim McKinzie,
Jackson County Assistant Election Director

Lisa Cayer,
Assistant Election Director

Michael K. Whitehead,
Jackson County Election Chairman

Colleen M. Scott,
Jackson County Election Member

Henry R. Carner,
Jackson County Election Member

Vernon E Scoville, III,
Jackson County Election Secretary

**NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND NOTICE TO
PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT**

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USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70211970000053540736

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 12:29 pm on March 21, 2022 in INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✔ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 12:29 pm
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service™
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT
 Domestic Mail Only

For delivery information, visit our website at www.usps.com

Independence, MO 64050

Postage	\$3.75	
Insurance	\$3.05	0075
Registration Fee	\$0.00	15
Return Receipt (hardcopy)	\$0.00	
Return Receipt (electronic)	\$0.00	
Third Party Confirmation	\$0.00	
Signature Confirmation	\$0.00	
Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	
Signature Confirmation Registered Mail	\$0.00	
Signature Confirmation Registered Mail Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	
Signature Confirmation Registered Mail Restricted Delivery (over \$500)	\$0.00	
Total	\$3.16	
Postage Due	\$9.96	03/18/2022

Tammy Brown, ICBOE Dir
215 N. Liberty, Box 296
Indep., Mo 64050

7021 1970 0000 5354 0736

SECTION ON DELIVERY

☐ Agent
☐ Addressee

Printed Name) C. Date of Delivery

Address different from item 1? ☐ Yes
 delivery address below: ☐ No

☐ Priority Mail Express®
☐ Registered Mail™
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
☐ Signature Confirmation™
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

Restricted Delivery
 Restricted Delivery
 Restricted Delivery

7021 1970 0000 5354 0736

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-905°

Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888517

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 12:29 pm on March 21, 2022 in INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 12:29 pm
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050

Feedback

Get Updates ✓

U.S. Postal Service™
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT

Domestic Mail Only

FOR DELIVERY TO ADDRESSEE ONLY (See PSN 7530-02-000-9053)

Independence, MO 64050

Domestic Mail Fee	\$3.75	0075
Basic Service & Postage (incl. Postage Due)	\$3.05	15
Return Receipt (hardcopy)	\$0.00	
Return Receipt (electronic)	\$0.00	
Certified Mail® Postage Due	\$0.00	
Adult Signature Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	
Adult Signature Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	

Postage \$3.16

Total Postage Due \$9.96

03/18/2022

Sara Zorich, JCRoe Dir
215 N. Liberty, Box 296
Indep., Mo 64050

SECTION ON DELIVERY

☐ Agent
☐ Addressee

Printed Name)

C. Date of Delivery

Address different from item 1? ☐ Yes
 Delivery address below: ☐ No

Restricted Delivery

Restricted Delivery

☐ Priority Mail Express®
☐ Registered Mail™
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
☐ Signature Confirmation™
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

2. Article Number (Transfer from service label)

☐ Collect on Delivery Restricted Delivery
☐ Insured Mail
☐ Insured Mail Restricted Delivery (over \$500)

7021 2720 0000 0288 8517

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888524

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 12:29 pm on March 21, 2022 in INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ∨

✓ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 12:29 pm
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT
Domestic Mail Only

DELIVERED TO ADDRESSEE
Independence, MO 64050

Service Fee	\$3.75	0075
Postage	\$3.05	15
Return Receipt (hardcopy)	\$0.00	
Return Receipt (electronic)	\$0.00	
Certified Mail Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	
Adult Signature Required	\$0.00	
Insured Signature Restricted Delivery	\$0.00	

Postage: \$3.16
Total Postage and Fees: \$9.96
03/18/2022

7021 2720 0000 0288 8524

Jim McKinzie, JC Box Asst Dir
215 N. Liberty, Box 296
Indep, Mo 64050

SECTION ON DELIVERY

☐ Agent
☐ Addressee

Printed Name) C. Date of Delivery

Address different from item 1? ☐ Yes
Delivery address below: ☐ No

☐ Priority Mail Express®
☐ Registered Mail™
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
☐ Signature Confirmation™
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

Restricted Delivery
Insured Mail
Insured Mail Restricted Delivery (over \$500)

Domestic Return Receipt

2. Article Number (transfer from service label)
7021 2720 0000 0288 8524

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-90.

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888531

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 12:29 pm on March 21, 2022 in INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ **Delivered, Left with Individual**

March 21, 2022 at 12:29 pm
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Domestic Mail Only		SECTION ON DELIVERY	
For Sender Information: USPS Tracking Results			
Independence, MO 64050			
Postage and Fees	\$3.75	0075	15
Postage and Fees	\$3.05		
Postage and Fees	\$0.00		
Postage and Fees	\$0.00		
Postage and Fees	\$0.00		
Postage and Fees	\$0.00		
Postage and Fees	\$0.00		
Postage and Fees	\$3.16		
Postage and Fees	\$9.96		
03/18/2022			
Lisa Cayer, Jr BOE Asst Dir			
215 N Liberty, Box 296			
Indep., Mo 64050			
Article Number (transfer from service label)			
7021 2720 0000 0288 8531			
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053			
Domestic Return Receipt			

Exhibit U

USPS.com® - USPS Tracking® Results

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888548

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 12:29 pm on March 21, 2022 in INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✔ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 12:29 pm
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Return to Sender Only		SECTION ON DELIVERY	
TO: Addressee's Name and Complete Address Independence, MO 64050		☐ Agent ☐ Addressee	
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID \$3.75	ZIP CODE 0075 15	Printed Name)	C. Date of Delivery
First-Class Mail® Registered Mail® Signature Confirmation® Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery® Registered Mail Restricted Delivery® Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery®	\$3.05 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00	Is delivery address different from item 1? ☐ Yes Is delivery address below? ☐ No	
\$3.16	05/18/2022		
\$9.96			
Michael K. Whitehead Jr BOE Chair 215 Liberty Box 296 Indep, mo 64051		☐ Priority Mail Express® ☐ Registered Mail™ ☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery ☐ Signature Confirmation™ ☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	
Return to Sender (transfer from service label) 7021 2720 0000 0288 8548		Insured Mail Insured Mail Restricted Delivery (over \$500)	
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053		Domestic Return Receipt	

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888562

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 12:29 pm on March 21, 2022 in INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 12:29 pm
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050

Feedback

7021 2720 0000 0288 8562

U.S. Postal Service CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Domestic Mail Only	
E-DELIVERED: NUMBER OF UNDELIVERED DELIVERIES: 00000000000000000000	
Independence, MO 64050	
POSTAGE	0075 15
POSTAGE & FEE (check box and fee amount)	
☒ Registered Mail™	\$3.05
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery	\$0.00
☐ Signature Confirmation™	\$0.00
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	\$0.00
☐ Return Receipt for Merchandise	\$0.00
☐ Return Receipt for Registered Mail	\$0.00
Postage	\$3.16
Total Postage and Fees	\$9.96
03/18/2022	
Colleen M. Scott JCBOE	
215 N. Liberty, Box 296	
Indep, Mo 64050	
Article Number (transfer from service label)	
7021 2720 0000 0288 8562	
Insured Mail	
Insured Mail Restricted Delivery (per \$500)	
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053	
Domestic Return Receipt	

SECTION ON DELIVERY

☐ Agent	
☐ Addressee	
Printed Name)	C. Date of Delivery
Address different from item 1?	☐ Yes
Delivery address below:	☐ No
☐ Priority Mail Express®	
☐ Registered Mail™	
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery	
☐ Signature Confirmation™	
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70212720000002888579

Remove X

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 12:29 pm on March 21, 2022 in INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✔ Delivered, Left with Individual

March 21, 2022 at 12:29 pm
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT Some Mail Only		SECTION ON DELIVERY	
Independence, MO 64050 Postage \$3.75 0075 15 Total \$3.00 Insurance \$0.00 Signature Confirmation \$0.00 Registered Mail Restricted Delivery \$0.00 Total \$3.16 \$9.96 03/18/2022 Henry R. Carner, Jr. 215 N Liberty, Box 296 Indep, Mo 64050		☐ Agent ☐ Addressee Intended Name) C. Date of Delivery Is different from item 1? ☐ Yes Delivery address below: ☐ No ☐ Priority Mail Express® ☐ Registered Mail™ ☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery ☐ Signature Confirmation™ ☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	
7021 2720 0000 0288 8579 PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053		Domestic Return Receipt	

Exhibit U

3/24/22, 3:28 PM

USPS.com® - USPS Tracking® Results

USPS Tracking®[FAQs >](#)**Track Another Package +****Tracking Number:** 70212720000002888555[Remove X](#)

Your item was delivered to an individual at the address at 12:29 pm on March 21, 2022 in INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available **✓ Delivered, Left with Individual**

March 21, 2022 at 12:29 pm
INDEPENDENCE, MO 64050

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT		SECTION ON DELIVERY	
Independence, MO 64050			
Postage \$3.75	0075	☐ Agent	
Insurance \$3.05	15	☐ Addressee	
Signature Confirmation \$0.00		Printed Name) C. Date of Delivery	
Registered Mail \$0.00			
Signature Confirmation \$0.00		Address different from item 1? ☐ Yes	
Registered Mail \$0.00		Delivery address below: ☐ No	
Postage \$3.16	03/18/2022		
Insurance \$9.96			
Vernon E. Scoville, III Jacob Secty			
215 N. Liberty, Box 296		☐ Priority Mail Express®	
Independence, Mo 64050		☐ Registered Mail™	
		☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery	
		☐ Signature Confirmation™	
		☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery	
7021 2720 0000 0288 8555			
PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053			
Domestic Return Receipt			

Exhibit U

**Notice and Demand
Affidavit of Maladministration
Legal Notice and Warning
Notice to Secure Surety Bond / Insurance Liability Policy
Notice of Misrepresentation, Misconduct and Fraud**

Jim Murphy,
Missouri State Representative

Michael O'Donnell,
Missouri State Representative

Dan Shaul,
Missouri State Representative,
Election Committee Chairman

Kurt Bahr,
St. Charles County Director of Elections

Eric Fey,
St. Louis County Director of Elections

Rick Stream,
St. Louis County Director of Election

**NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND NOTICE TO
PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT**

Comes now Affiant, Tracy Welborn, one of the people (as seen in Missouri Constitution Bill of Rights Article 1, Section 2), Sui Juris, in this Court of Record, bring the following claims and facts that you and your agents, serving as elected servants and trustees of the People, must provide due care and remember your Oath of Office which binds you.

15 CSR 30-10.010 states it is the responsibility of the Secretary of State, chief election official of the State of Missouri, to be, "the chief custodian of the electronic

Plaintiff Pro se

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Notice of Maladministration was served on February 19, 2022, via PERSONAL service to the Respondent Jim Murphy, at 3200 Lemay Ferry Rd., St. Louis, Mo. 63125

2/19/2022
[Signature]

[Signature]

Service accepted by:

[Signature]

Service performed by:

Plaintiff Pro se

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Notice of Maladministration was served on February 19, 2022, via PERSONAL service to the Respondent, Michael O'Donnell, at 3200 Lemay Ferry Rd., St. Louis, Mo. 63125

2/19/2022
Refused
Service
[Signature]

Service accepted by:

[Signature]
Service performed by:

Plaintiff Pro se

CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Notice of Maladministration was served on February 19, 2022, via PERSONAL service to the Respondent, Dan Shaul, at 3200 Lemay Ferry Rd., St. Louis, Mo. 63125

2/19/2022
Refused
Service
[Signature]

Service accepted by:

[Signature]
Service performed by:



FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70211970000053540675

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 2:16 pm on February 28, 2022 in SAINT CHARLES, MO 63301.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room

February 28, 2022 at 2:16 pm
SAINT CHARLES, MO 63301

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service®
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT
Domestic Mail Only

7021 1970 0000 5354 0675

Saint Charles, MO 63301

\$3.75 \$3.05 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00 \$0.00

\$2.96 \$0.76

02/28/2022

Kurt Bahr, SCC Dir Bof
201 N. Second St
St Charles, Mo 63301

2. Article Number (Transfer from service label)
7021 1970 0000 5354 0675

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

SECTION ON DELIVERY

5C

Agent
Address

nted Name) C. Date of Delive
9 2-28

is different from item 1? Yes
very address below: No

led Delivery
Delivery

Collect on Delivery Restricted Delivery
sured Mail
sured Mail Restricted Delivery
ver \$500)

Priority Mail Express®
Registered Mail™
Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
Signature Confirmation™
Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

Exhibit U

USPS Tracking®

FAQs >

Track Another Package +

Tracking Number: 70211970000053540668

Remove X

Your item was delivered to the front desk, reception area, or mail room at 2:00 pm on February 26, 2022 in SAINT LOUIS, MO 63105.

USPS Tracking Plus® Available ✓

✓ **Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room**

February 26, 2022 at 2:00 pm
SAINT LOUIS, MO 63105

Feedback

U.S. Postal Service®
CERTIFIED MAIL® RECEIPT
Domestic Mail Only

Postage paid at Saint Louis, MO 63105

Postage paid for \$3.75

Postage paid for \$3.05

Postage paid for \$0.00

Postage paid for \$0.00

Postage paid for \$0.00

Postage paid for \$0.00

Postage paid for \$0.00

Postage paid for \$2.96

Postage paid for \$9.76

Eric Fey, Dir. of Elections
419 Central
Clayton, Mo 63105

SECTION ON DELIVERY

19 TYW
Printed Name

02/26/2022
C. Date of Delivery

Is different from item 1? ☐ Yes
Delivery address below: ☐ No

☐ Agent
☐ Addressee

☐ Priority Mail Express®
☐ Registered Mail™
☐ Registered Mail Restricted Delivery
☐ Signature Confirmation™
☐ Signature Confirmation Restricted Delivery

2. Article Number (transfer from service label)
7021 1970 0000 5354 0668

PS Form 3811, July 2020 PSN 7530-02-000-9053

Domestic Return Receipt

Exhibit U

Plaintiff Pro Se

Certification Of Service

I certify that a copy of this Notice of Maladministration was served February 19, 2022, via PERSONAL service to the Respondent, Rick Stream, at 3200 Lemay Ferry Rd., St. Louis Missouri 63125

*Plaintiff
Rick Stream
2/19/22*

Service Accepted by



Service Performed by

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND OF MALADMINISTRATION

Being the sole Federal Election authority, the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) oversees the definition of federal voting system certification requirements. The EAC also oversees the thorough, independent testing process which determines whether a voting system meets those requirements, including those standards designed to ensure the systems accuracy. There are two types of certifications granted after this required testing;

A) A Certificate of Conformance is provided to Manufacturers for voting systems that have successfully met the standard of the EAC Certification Program. The EAC certificate shall be signed by the EAC Executive Director. (Testing & Certification Program Manual ver. 2.0, age 49, section 5.11)

B) A Certificate of Accreditation is the document issued by the EAC and signed by the EAC *Chairperson* to certify the laboratory used to test our voting machines. A laboratory being accredited is what gives them the authority to certify our voting systems. This accreditation vetting includes providing the following-

- *Conflict of Interest policy
- *Company Annual Report
- *Names of Board of Directors (Current & Previous)
- *Major shareholders
- *Insurance Bond
- *Audited Financials

Under VSTL version 2.0 Section 3.8 guidelines: "A grant of accreditation is valid for a period not to exceed two years. A VSTL's accreditation expires on the date annotated on the Certificate of Accreditation."

The 3 laboratories used in the State of Missouri to certify our election machines for the 2020 General Election were **Pro V&V Inc, SLI Compliance Division of Gaming Laboratories, and NTS Huntsville.**

The provided spreadsheet contains data pulled from Missouri's Secretary of State website. This data shows the following pertaining to the 2020 election; MO counties, the machine manufacturer, what election software was used as well as the latest version of that software at the time of election, and the laboratory that performed the testing.

Of the 86 voting districts verified, **10** used the **Pro V&V Laboratory**, **5** used **SLI Compliance Division of Gaming Laboratories**, and **71** used **NTS Huntsville**. Per documents received via open-source information from the Missouri Secretary of State sharefile website and Sunshine requests, there is solid evidence all EAC Laboratories used to test and certify MO's voting machines for the 2020 election were, and still, not lawfully accredited. They are not in compliance with the federal 2002 HAVA ACT and EAC policy guidelines. Therefore, none of the

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND OF MALADMINISTRATION

machines used in Missouri in the 2020 election were certified to be in use. Rendering any vote tabulated on any of these machines not legal.

Let's start with the most widely used laboratory statewide, NTS Huntsville.

An important fact here is that NTS is the former Wyle Laboratories. NTS acquired Wyle Laboratories in a letter to the EAC on March 5, 2014¹. Wyle's last accreditation certificate was effective through April 27, 2012. However, once NTS Laboratories absorbed Wyle in 2014, They never received THEIR legal accreditation, or an Accreditation Certificate. All 71 MO counties also report using the same, very outdated version of the software, version 1.3. However, oddly enough, this version of OpenElect 1.3 was granted a Certificate of *Conformity* by the EAC in January of 2015 without ever having an accredited laboratory test this update. This is in direct violation of the Election Assistance Commission's own policies and the HAVA ACT 2002. When requesting the lab accreditation for these 71 counties machines, the Secretary of State's office answered with the Wyle Laboratories Inc. Certificate of Accreditation dated 5/04/10 expiring 04/27/2012.²

Now let's talk about the 2nd laboratory, SLI Compliance Division of Gaming Laboratories. 10 MO counties used this lab for their 2020 election machines. Per the EAC's own "Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual, Version 2.0" any modifications made to Missouri voting machine software requires testing by accredited laboratories.

3.1. Overview. An EAC certification signifies that a voting system has been successfully tested against an identified voting system standard adopted by the EAC. Only the EAC can issue a Federal certification. Ultimately, systems must be submitted for testing and certification under this program to receive this certification. **Systems will usually be submitted when** (1) they are new to the marketplace, (2) they have never before received an EAC certification, (3) **they are modified**, or (4) the Manufacturer wishes to test a previously certified system to a different (newer) standard. This chapter discusses the submission of de minimis change orders, which may not require additional testing and certification. Additionally, this chapter outlines provisional, pre-election emergency modifications, which provide for pre-election, emergency waivers.

For these 10 MO counties, SLI Compliance supposedly tests their voting machine software modifications, however, their accreditation certificate expired in 2/28/2009³. So how did Hart

¹ https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system_test_lab/files/2014.03.05.NTS_Acquisition_Ltr.pdf

²

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system_test_lab/files/Wyle%20Accreditation%20certificate%202010.pdf

³ See Notice Of Maladministration EXHIBIT "K"

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE AND DEMAND OF MALADMINISTRATION

InterCivic have a major update^{4 5} to their Verity software (version 2.3) in 2019 without the testing of an accredited lab? Again, illegal.

Lastly, Pro V&V Inc.'s last valid accreditation⁶ expired February 24, 2017, despite the machines receiving a Certificate of Conformance in October 17, 2017 for the OpenElect software update from 1.3 to 2.0. Who was the accredited lab that tested this new update prior to the 2020 election?

With the receipt of this knowledge, it is your duty of office and responsibility to your Oath of Office to investigate any Policies, State or Federal laws which have been ignored side-stepped or broken. Choosing to do nothing, your office will be complicit in Federal criminal fraud charges. These findings of Election Fraud must immediately be brought to the appropriate authorities and the public made aware. The 2020 General Election, up and down the ballot, must be Decertified in the State of Missouri due to the illegal EAC voting machine laboratory certificates.

Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents and even judgements..., or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually considered in the judgment assailed. UNITED STATES v. THROCKMORTON

To hold power as an elected official through deceit, lies and fraud for the sole purpose of holding onto power is despicable and despicable. I look forward to an explanation as to how your office will move forward with this matter.

Alison Graeff

4

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/Hart_Intercivic_Verity_Voting_2.3_Certification_Modification_Test_Report_v1.3_-_FINAL2.pdf

5

https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/AttachmentJ_VerityVoting2_0to2_3SystemModifications.pdf

⁶ See Notice Of Maladministration EXHIBIT "G"

STATE	COUNTY	MANUFACTURER	PRODUCT	VERSION	CERTIFICATION	ISSUE	LAST CERTFD
Missouri	Jackson County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Cass County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Clay County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Cedar County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Barry County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Pettis County	Unisyn	OpenElect	2.1	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Livingston County	Dominion	D-Suite	5.5	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Polk County	Dominion	D-Suite	5.5	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Butler County	Dominion	D-Suite	5.5	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Pemiscot County	Dominion	D-Suite	5.5	Pro V&V	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	2/24/2017
Missouri	Washington County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Monroe County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Lewis County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Shelby County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Clinton County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Stone County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Jefferson County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Marion County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Knox County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Madison County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Clark County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Douglas County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Franklin County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Ripley County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Christian County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Dallas County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Lawrence County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Morgan County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Perry County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Randolph County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Benton County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Howard County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017

Missouri	Miller County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Pulaski County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Scott County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Atchison County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Barton County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Linn County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	St. Charles County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Holt County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Wayne County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Webster County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Putnam County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Caldwell County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Iron County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Buchanan County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Andrew County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Audrain County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Bates County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Bollinger County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Camden County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Cape Girardeau County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Chariton County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Cole County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Dade County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Davies County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	DeKalb County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Dent County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Dunklin County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Gentry County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Hickory County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Howell County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	New Madrid County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Oregon County	Unisyn	OpenElect	1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017

Missouri	Ozark County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Ralls County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Ray County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Reynolds County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Schuyler County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Scotland County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Shannon County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	St. Francois County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Ste. Genevieve County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Stoddard County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Taney County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Texas County	Unisyn	OpenElect		1.3 Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Macon County	ES&S	Unity	3.4.1.0	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Greene County	ES&S	EVS	5.2.2.0	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Johnson County	ES&S	EVS	5.2.2.0	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Laclede County	ES&S	EVS	5.2.2.0	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	Vernon County	ES&S	EVS	5.2.2.0	Wyle / NTS	No Certification	3/13/2017
Missouri	St. Louis County	Hart	Verity		2.3 SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018
Missouri	Lincoln County	ES&S	EVS	6.0.2.0	SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018
Missouri	Boone County	ES&S	EVS	6.0.2.0	SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018
Missouri	Cooper County	ES&S	EVS	6.0.2.0	SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018
Missouri	Plette County	ES&S	EVS	6.0.2.0	SLI	Invalid Signature; Accreditation expired	1/10/2018


<https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/certified-voting-systems>

<https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/qualifications>

Verification

I hereby declare, certify, and state, pursuant to the penalties of perjury under the laws of the United States of America, and by the provisions of 28 USC § 1746 that all the above and foregoing representations are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

Executed in St. Charles County, Missouri on this 22nd day of February in the year of Our Lord Two Thousand and Twenty-Two.


Autograph of Affiant:

Notary as JURAT CERTIFICATE:

Missouri State
St Charles County

On this 19th day of February, 2022, before me,
Alison Graeff, a Notary Public, personally appeared
Mehresh Khan Name of Affiant, who proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same in their authorized capacity, and that by their autograph(s) on the instrument the person executed, the instrument.


I certify under PENALTY OF PERJURY under the lawful laws of the State of Missouri and that the foregoing paragraph is true and correct.

WITNESS my hand and official

seal

Signature of Notary / Jurat







U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001

VIA EMAIL

June 30, 2022

Ali Graeff
alimariegraeff@gmail.com

Greetings:

This acknowledges the U.S. Election Assistance Commission's receipt of your Freedom of Information Act request (No. 22-00066):

"Please provide an electronic copy of the NTS Huntsville Laboratory Certificate of Accreditation from the EAC for the dates of 2015-2017."

The EAC does not possess records responsive to your request.

This letter completes the response to your request. If you interpret any portion of this response as an adverse action, you may appeal this action to the Election Assistance Commission. Your appeal must be in writing and sent to the address set forth below. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within 90 days from the date of the acknowledgment to your request. Please include your reasons for reconsideration and attach a copy of this and subsequent EAC responses.

U.S. Election Assistance Commission
FOIA Appeals
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001

Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001, e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

If you have any questions please contact my office at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Camden Kelliher



U.S. Election Assistance Commission
633 3rd Street NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20001

Camden Kelliher, Associate Counsel
U.S. Election Assistance Commission
ckelliher@eac.gov



U. S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION
VOTING SYSTEM TESTING AND CERTIFICATION PROGRAM
1225 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 1100
Washington, DC. 20005

Mary Saunders
Chief, Standards Services Division
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 2100
Gaithersburg, MD 20899

July 10, 2008

Dear Ms. Saunders,

Now that many of the Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTLs) have completed their 2nd NVLAP accreditation review, the EAC would like a status report from NVLAP on the items we noted as observations and concerns in our letter to you dated March 13, 2008. (Attached) Because these issues are so critical to the success of our certification program, we are requesting a response by August 8, 2008, or sooner if possible.

Specifically, we are interested in updates on how SysTest Labs LLC, iBeta Quality Assurance, and Wyle Laboratories:

- Assign appropriately qualified staff to EAC certification engagements.
- Assure that testers have certification in specific critical areas, particularly a CISSP or similar certification for staff involved in security testing.
- Prioritize EAC certification engagements in light of other State or local contractual responsibilities.
- Use their quality management process to develop and validate test methods to ensure test-to-test and case-to-case repeatability.

As you know, the credibility of the EAC Testing and Certification Program depends largely on having competent VSTLs to thoroughly test voting systems to the applicable Federal Standards. NVLAP review of the technical competency of these laboratories is a critical prerequisite to EAC accreditation of the VSTLs and provides assurance that the labs will function in accordance with internationally accepted standards for testing bodies.

Thanks to you and the NVLAP staff for your continued great work and support.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Brian J. Hancock", is written over a light blue rectangular background.

Brian J. Hancock
Director, Testing and Certification