1	IN THE SUPERIOR COURS	I OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON	
2	IN AND FOR TH	HE COUNTY OF THURSTON	
, <b>3</b>			
4	SUNSIRAE TUNSTALL, et al.,	)	
5	Plainti	iffs, )	
6	vs.	) No. 97-2-02754-1	
7	TERESA BERGESON, Superinter of Public Instruction, et a		
8 9	Defenda	ints. )	
10		ANSCRIPT OF RULING E CHRISTINE A. POMEROY	
11	OCTOE	BER 9, 1998	
12		<u></u>	
13	APPE	APPEARANCES	
14	FOR DEFENDANT BERGESON:	LISA SUTTON	
15	TON BUTUNDANT BUNGBON.	Assistant Attorney General	
16	NOD DEPOSIDANT TEUMAN	THOMAS J. YOUNG	
17	FOR DEFENDANT LEHMAN, SECRETARY, DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS:	Assistant Attorney General	
18			
19	FOR THE SCHOOL DISTRICTS:	PHILIP B. GRENNAN	
20		Attorney at Law	
21	FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:	PATRICIA J. ARTHUR	
22		Attorney at Law	
23		PATRICIA H. WAGNER Attorney at Law	
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25		Attorney at Law	

Appendix B

1	OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1998
2	11:00 a.m.
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6	THE COURT: Good morning. This is
7	my decision in <u>Tunstall versus Bergeson</u> .
8	This case came before the Court on respective
9 .	parties' motions for summary judgment. The central
10	issue in the case is whether, under the Washington
11	Constitution, Washington Basic Education Act and the
12	Federal IDEA provisions, the defendants have a duty to
13	provide the opportunity to obtain a high school diploma
14	to all inmates in DOC facilities under the age of 22.
15	The undisputed facts in this case are the
16	plaintiff class is composed of persons below the age of
17	22 who are incarcerated in the Washington State
18	Department of Corrections due to adult criminal
19	conviction.
20	Historically, neither the State of Washington nor
21	the school district defendants have provided any
22	educational opportunities leading to a high school
23	diploma for these inmates in a DOC facility. The State
24	has provided opportunities through the community
25	colleges for the acquisition of a GED.

In addition, no educational programs for persons
who have disabilities, within this setting, has been
provided.

In 1998, the legislature attempted to address
these issues arising from this case by passing Engross
Substitute Senate Bill 6600. The plaintiffs' class

The language in the Washington Constitution,
Article IX, Sections 1 and 2, is critical to the
decision in this case. These provide, as in their
entirety, as follows:

challenges this enactment as unconstitutional.

"It is the paramount duty of the State to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders without distinction or preference on account of race, color, cast or sex.

"The legislature shall provide a general and uniform system of public schools. The public school system shall include common schools and such high schools, normal schools and technical schools as may hereafter be established. But the entire revenue derived from the Common School Fund and the State tax for common schools shall be exclusively applied to the support of the common schools."

These provisions were considered in School Funding One, which is 90 Washington Second 476, 1977, wherein

1	the Washington Supreme Court noted the following:	
2	"We also disagree with the appellant's suggestion	
3	that the framers only intended that a general and	
4	uniform school system be provided. See Constitution,	
<b>5</b> .	Article IX, Section 2."	
6	Had this been their intent, it would have been	
7	unnecessary to use the words "ample provision" in	
8	Section 1. Unlike other states, our constitution	
9	couples the State's "paramount duty" with the words	
10	"ample provision."	
11	The duty to make ample provision as opposed to	
12	merely providing for a general and uniform school	
13	system is the only instance in which our constitution	
14	declares a specific State function to be a "paramount	
15	duty" of the State.	
16	Had the framers intended that the paramount duty	
17	was to provide a general and uniform school system, the	
18	constitution would have so provided.	
19	They further write, "The Constitution, Article IX,	
20	Section 1, does not merely seek to broadly declare	
21	policy, explains goals or designate objectives to be	
22	accomplished. It is declarative of a constitutionally	
23	imposed duty. Thus, we hold that the Constitution,	
24	Article IX, Section 1, is not a preamble."	
25	This was our Washington Supreme Court in 1977.	

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Consistent with this holding, I find the duty contained in Section 1 is a separate and distinct duty from the duty to provide for a uniform, in general, common school scheme found in Section 2.

It is worth noting that even Section 2 recognizes the possibility that there may be more than one type of public school, distinguishing as it does between the common schools and high schools, normal schools and

It is also of significance that Section 2 provides that the funding for the common schools from the Common School Fund and State taxes for the common schools may not be used for other than that of common schools.

The legislature has recognized that there are two types of schools authorized by the constitution, the common school as defined for purposes of educational law in Washington. As schools maintained for public expense in each school district in carrying on a program from kindergarten through the 12th grade, I

Public schools, on the other hand, are defined as consisting of the common schools and other schools below the college age supported at public expense.

The school districts in this case are creatures of statute, not of the constitution. As public agencies,

they have only those powers and rights granted by the
statutes creating them. School districts are
authorized by Chapter 28(a) 315. And those created are
given certain authority in Chapter 28(a) 320, together
with other provisions throughout the Basic Education
Act, which is RCW 28(a).

I find other than Engross Substitute Senate Bill 6600, this court cannot find any statute in which the school districts are given either the power or the right to go into DOC facilities to provide educational programs. Even 6600 does not mandate school districts to provide educational services in DOC facilities. It merely authorizes them to do so if satisfactory contractural arrangements can be made.

Therefore, this court finds that the school districts have no obligation under the constitution, Federal or State, or the laws of Washington to provide any educational programs to inmates in the prisons of the State of Washington and grants summary judgment in their favor.

As noted above, the constitution provides that the State has a paramount duty to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its border without distinction. This duty is carried on in part by the creation and maintaining of common schools

under Section 2, Article IX.

However, the Basic Education Act provides that the act covers children from age 3 to 22 under various circumstances. Since the legislature has seen fit to define children for purposes of education as reaching up to the age of 22, this is the age range which applies to all constitutional provisions and statutes dealing with education. And the State cannot discriminate based on cast or class.

Therefore, this court finds the State has a duty to make provisions for basic education for juvenile immates in adult DOC facilities. However, the issue of how the State carries forth this duty is not before the Court at the present time.

This court finds the legislature retains the right to restrict the age definition for children for educational purposes and may change their definition as they see fit. However, such a change in definition must be uniform and applied to all children who fit into the redefined definition of children.

The legislature attempted to do this during this past year's session with the passage of 6600. However, in doing so, it has distinguished between inmates in a DOC facility and persons who are not inmates. Since the duty to provide basic education is a "paramount

1	duty," it has been recognized by the Supreme Court as
2	creating the paramount or absolute right.
3	A right which is absolute is a right that is
4	somehow greater than one that is merely fundamental.
5	It has been held by the Supreme Court that a statute
6	which infringes on a fundamental right is presumed
7	unconstitutional. See <u>State versus Copfer</u>
8	Enterprises, 82 Washington Second 994, 1973.
9	To overcome this presumption, the State bears the
10	burden of justification and must show a compelling
11	State interest in the regulation of the subject within
12	the State's constitutional power to regulate. And that
13	connection between the statute and the State interests
14	must be a necessity and not merely a rational,
15	reasonable or even a substantial relationship.
16	The same analysis will apply with at least equal
17	force to a right which is paramount or absolute.
18	Therefore, Engross Substitute Senate Bill 6600 impinges
19	on the right of a juvenile inmate to receive a basic
20	education by not providing for special educational
21	opportunities by limiting the availability of basic

education to under the age of 18.

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This statute is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is on the State to demonstrate a compelling

State interest that necessitates the infringement on

the right to a basic educati
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The interests which have been cited to the Court have been in the area of security and the need to restrain or maintain control over the inmates. While these interests are certainly rational and reasonable and may even bear a substantial relationship to the structure created in 6600, they do not necessitate the infringement of the right to a basic education which is needed in order for the State to prevail.

In summary, the constitution mandates that the State make ample provision for basic education for the children residing within the borders of the state. The duty to provide for the basic education remains through, and as such, it remains the duty of the State.

Further, so long as the Basic Education Act applies to persons up to the age of 22, the State cannot constitutionally limit these services to juvenile inmates in DOC facilities without also limiting these services in the same manner to non-inmates.

In summary, it is my decision today as follows:

One, the school district defendants' motion for
summary judgment is granted, and the school district
defendants are now dismissed.

Two, plaintiffs' motion regarding the Washington

1	Constitution is granted, and the State of Washington	
2	Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction and the	
3	Department of Corrections defendants' motion for	
4	summary judgment is now denied, as the Court finds that	
5	Article IX, Section 1 places a paramount duty on the	
6	State to provide educational opportunities to inmates	
7	of DOC under the age of 22.	
8	The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment	
ģ	regarding Engross Substitute Senate Bill 6600 is	
10	granted, and the chapter is held unconstitutional.	
11	The Court now elects not to decide the issues	
12	raised by the Federal questions at this time as I have	
13	now granted relief under the Washington Constitution.	
14	MS. ARTHUR: Thank you, your Honor.	
15	THE COURT: I'll sign judgments on	
16	the 6th of November.	
17	Thank you very much.	
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