2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

FILED

NOV - 1 2002

CLERK, U.S. DISMICT COURT
STERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEFUTY CLERK



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 KARLUK M. MAYWEATHERS;
DIETRICH J. PENNINGTON;
12 JESUS JIHAD; TERRANCE MATHEWS;

ASWAD JACKSON; ANSAR KEES, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

CALVIN TERHUNE; A.C. NEWLAND;

Defendants.

BARRY SMITH; BONNIE GARIBAY; N. FRY; M.E. VALDEZ; N. BENNETT;

Plaintiff,

and F.X. CHAVEZ,

NO. CIV. S-96-1582 LKK/GGH P

ORDER

15

- -

16

17

18

19

20

21

23

24

Plaintiffs are a class of Muslim state prisoners housed at California State Prison-Solano seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.

free exercise of their religion, as well as their Fourteenth

Amendment right to Equal Protection of the law. This matter comes

\$ 1983 for alleged violations of their First Amendment right to the

Amendment right to Equal Protection of the law. This matter comes before the court on plaintiffs' motion to renew the court's

47

injunction with respect to grooming. The standards for such a motion are well-known and need not be repeated here. <u>See Topanga Press Inc. v. City of Los Angeles</u>, 989 F.2d 1524, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiffs move for a preliminary injunction identical to that which the court has previously ordered. They argue that the court may summarily reenter a preliminary injunction based upon the principles of the law of the case.

The law of the case doctrine requires that when a court decides on a rule, it should ordinarily follow that rule during the pendency of the case. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). It is, of course, merely a prudential doctrine; nonetheless, the doctrine guides the court's discretion on issues such as the one at bar. See Slotkin v. Citizens Cas. Co., 614 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1979) (The law of the case "does not constitute a limitation on the court's power but merely expresses the general practice of refusing to reopen what has been decided.") "The rule of practice promotes finality and efficiency of the judicial process by 'protecting against the agitation of settled issues" Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816 (1988).

Grounds justifying departure from the law of the case include substantially different evidence, a change in controlling authority, or the need to correct a clearly erroneous decision which would work a manifest injustice. See White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431-432 (5th Cir. 1967).

2

3

6

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

Defendants' contentions were previously argued and rejected when the court issued the first, second and third preliminary injunctions and in the court's order denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has recently affirmed the propriety of the issuance of successive preliminary injunctions and has made clear that such renewal presents no conflict with the automatic expiration provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3636(a)(2). See Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the court affirms its prior rejection of defendants' contentions because the defendants have failed to identify substantially different evidence, a change in the controlling legal authority, or any error in the court's prior decisions. See White, 377 F.2d at 431-432.

In granting this renewed preliminary injunction, the court specifically finds that the relief afforded extends no further than necessary to correct the threat to plaintiffs' rights under RLUIPA and, accordingly, it is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). In so finding, the court incorporates by reference the analysis set forth in its order dated February 8, 2001. There, the court found that there was a substantial likelihood that defendants' grooming

It is only because of the defendants' insistence on exercising their right to appeal each of the previously issued orders that the court has been unable to try the matter and finally resolve it.

policy violated plaintiffs' rights under RLUIPA. The court further found that a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from imposing discipline on plaintiffs for wearing beards in contravention of the challenged policy was necessary to correct the violation of plaintiffs' federally-protected rights:

[W]ithout an order enjoining the grooming regulations and allowing plaintiffs to grow half-inch beards, plaintiffs may lose the opportunity to earn time off from their sentences, face restricted visiting hours, be restricted from canteen draw, lose time outside their cells, lose work credits, and be denied the opportunity to attend Jumu'ah.

February 8, 2001 Order at 15. The preliminary injunction is thus necessary to correct that harm justifying injunctive relief.

According to the legislative history behind § 3626(a)(2), the "provision stops judges from imposing remedies intended to effect an overall modernization of local prison systems or provide an overall improvement in prison conditions" by "limiting remedies to those necessary to remedy the proven violation of federal rights." H.R.Rep. No. 21, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, at 24 n. 2 (1995). Far from seeking to effect an overall improvement in prison conditions, the injunction at issue here is narrowly drawn to remedy a particular violation of RLUIPA. In granting the original injunction, the court noted that it is "not unsympathetic to the inconveniences that an injunction may cause to the prison staff at CSP-Solano." February 8, 2001 Order at 16. Nevertheless, for all the reasons stated in the court's original order, injunctive relief remains appropriate.

26 1///

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to renew the court's grooming injunction for a fourth time is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 29, 2002.

SENIOR JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

LETUC HOT BEEF COOL

ndd

United States District Court for the Eastern District of California November 1, 2002

* * CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE * *

2:96-cv-01582

Mayweathers

٦*٢*

Sutton

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California.

That on November 1, 2002, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office, or, pursuant to prior authorization by counsel, via facsimile.

Susan Dee Christian SJ/LKK
Law Offices of Stewart Katz
1001 G Street VC/GGH
Suite 100
Sacramento, CA 95814

Tami M Warwick
Attorney General's Office for the State of California
PO Box 944255
1300 I Street
Suite 125
Sacramento, CA 94244-2550

John K Vincent United States Attorney 501 I Street Suite 10-100 Sacramento, CA 95814

Marc D Stern NOT EDCA ADMITTED American Jewish Congress 15 East 84th Street New York, NY 10028

Jack L. Wagner, Clerk

by: Deputy Clark