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                         UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
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                             EASTERN DIVISION
      MICHAEL MARTINEZ, ERIC DEEKEN,
 3
      et al.,
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                Plaintiffs,
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           vs.
                                          No. 4:01-CV-580 JFN
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      CITY OF ST. LOUIS, et al.,
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                Defendants.
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                       TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING
10
                   BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN F. NANGLE
                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
11
                              April 18, 2005
12
13
      APPEARANCES:
      For Plaintiff
14
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1 2	Justice:	Mr. Benjamin Blustein U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Civil Right Division
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13	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, produced by computer-aided transcription.	
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(The following proceedings were held in open court on April 18, 2005 at 12:10 p.m.:)

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THE COURT: I apologize for the delay. They filed, as you folks are familiar with, the last minute motion in that other matter in addition to other matters that had been gathered. So we were, as you heard, debating.

Now, first, I well understand, Ms. Kistler and Ms. Tanner, that the City reserves any right to appeal and it's not waiving any rights by going on the assumption that my order was correct and valid. And I appreciate your cooperation in that regard.

I think as to the dates; Martinez, everybody seems to agree it's September '99; Deeken, March 2000. The City agrees only as to certification, not appointment. And, Nancy, let me -- those are my notes, so I'm not looking at the paper in chief. Am I right there?

MS. KISTLER: That's correct.

THE COURT: By saying agrees to attorneys' fees and argues no back wages, and, again, that's all premised, the City is not waiving any rights to appeal and object on appeal, et cetera.

And points out the duty to mitigate. Let's see, the plaintiff's back pay, benefits, et cetera. One of the things they want, dating back concerning benefits, back dating -- what are the words? And finally before I go any further, I

want to enter the stipulation that has been filed and enter it officially as part of the record of our proceedings herein. And that stipulation, the recent one that the parties filed.

On the question of -- well, because I mentioned that jury question on the telephone the other day, let's see here, Ms. Johns raised the question of the fact that the -- they give an advantage to an employee, I mean, more than advantage, it's big time advantage to the employees. I don't think, Althea, that was raised early on in this case, and I don't think it's a part of this case.

MS. JOHNS: Yes, it is, Judge. And I think
Mr. Diekemper, we had discussed it on the telephone back in I
think August or September, and you ordered us to brief the
issue by November 2nd. And we did so. And we sent -- we
gave copies to you, Mr. Diekemper, of all the briefs.

MR. DIEKEMPER: Judge, that's what's in that rubber band.

THE COURT: And I thought this related to the state court cases solely.

MR. DIEKEMPER: That's what that is, Judge.

THE COURT: Well, what I'm saying is, let's see,

Deeken is no on whether the state court proceedings impinged.

Do you have a memo in here, Althea?

MS. JOHNS: Yes, page 3 of my memo of October 1.

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               THE COURT:
                           Here we go.
 2
               MS. JOHNS:
                           Second issue that has arisen.
 3
               THE COURT:
                           What's that, Althea?
 4
               MS. JOHNS:
                           The middle of page 3, the second
 5
      issue --
 6
                           What number?
               THE COURT:
 7
                           -- that has arisen.
               MS. JOHNS:
 8
               THE COURT:
                           Do I have the right page 3?
 9
      No. 11, 12, 13, 14? No, that's not what you're talking
10
      about, I don't think. I have firefighter's compliance with
      the Court's order of October 1, 2004.
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12
               MS. JOHNS:
                           That's correct.
13
               THE COURT:
                           Now I see the page 3. I was on whatever
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      the next page is, the petition, okay. So on page 3, "The
15
      second issue that has arisen because the City seeks to hire,"
      that one?
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17
               MS. JOHNS:
                           Yes.
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               THE COURT:
                           I'll read that. Now, what I'm saying is
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      that well may be an issue before the state judge.
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      know how that it can be an issue before me if my thinking is
21
      correct. And what I'm saying is, I may agree or disagree
22
      with it as a matter of law. Of course, it's whether I agree
23
      or disagree doesn't make any difference, but I don't know
24
      that there's been any allegation that it had an impact as to
25
      discrimination, any effect on this discrimination, that plan
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that they follow where they just hire City employees. And I'll hear what Ms. Kistler says to that.

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MS. JOHNS: As I understand how this works is that if the test that you give has an adverse impact on a protected class, then the test has to be validated. And the reason for the test not being validated before our test in 2003 is because there was no adverse impact because there was 50/50 hiring, so there was no adverse impact on any group.

So now with the 2003 test, there's no more consent decree, so the persons being hired for the probationary classes, if you go straight down the list there would be no adverse impact as the list that was given in 2003, December 2003. However, if the promotional individuals are put at the top of the list then there would have been according to our calculations just I think five African Americans. But then the test was already validated. So the people of the validated part of the test, the African Americans, they have no cause of action because -- okay, Judge, the test as we said it predicts how a person would do in the test. There were reliability studies, and you saw all that.

THE COURT: Yes, ma'am.

MS. JOHNS: And according to the studies, if the people who would say were the first 30 persons who scored on the test, if they -- they would be the best candidates for the job. However, they were not going to be the first people

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As a matter of fact, the first 15 people were not
 1
 2
      even hired, people that did the best 15 on the test.
               THE COURT: Because of the benefit.
 3
 4
               MS. JOHNS:
                           Right.
 5
               THE COURT:
                           Because of being an employee of the City
 6
      at the time.
 7
               MS. JOHNS: Going to the head of the list.
 8
      Judge, that was our objection. And you already ruled on it.
 9
               THE COURT:
                           Ma'am?
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               MS. JOHNS: And you already ruled on it, Judge.
               THE COURT: I ruled on that point?
11
12
               MR. DIEKEMPER:
                               Yes, Your Honor.
13
               THE COURT: What did I say about that?
                               This is your order from November --
14
               MR. DIEKEMPER:
15
      or, I'm sorry, December the 3rd, and it was on the --
               THE COURT: Of what, 2004?
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17
               MR. DIEKEMPER:
                               '04, Judge. And you said the Court
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      found that the hearing of November 17, 2004 without
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      expressing an opinion on the merits of the claim that fires
20
      concerns were outside the scope of this case, which is just
21
      the case question you asked earlier. You already ruled on
22
             There is no pleading before you alleging other than
23
      the --
24
               THE COURT: So, Althea, you're satisfied with that
25
      then?
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MS. JOHNS: I don't agree with it, but I'm saying you already ruled on it.

THE COURT: Because I know we had talked about it and all. So that's decided. Now, then you don't have to say anything Nancy.

I think that there's a way that I can word an order if given a little bit of time -- when do you appear in front of Judge Dowd, May --

MR. DIEKEMPER: 4th, I think it is.

MS. KISTLER: That's right.

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THE COURT: That's fairly close. Which may delineate what I think is left for him to decide. I know that Mr. Blustein, and I'll hear from Ben in a minute, in a few minutes hear from you. I know that both you and Ms. Johns feel as if the state matters really belong to me or that they are impinging as they now stand on my rulings as a judge. And it's a close question because on one hand I think I probably somewhere in there I retained possession --

MR. DIEKEMPER: I think you've already dealt with this as well. You issued an order on November 7, 2003 on our motion, the intervenor's motion to clarify and amend your May 5, 2003 order. And this came on the heels of your order of November 5 of 2003 in which you dissolved the consent decree. And you said in light of the Court's order of November 5, 2003 dissolving the consent decree, the Court finds that the

appeals taken to the Civil Service Commission prior to

December 3, 2003 deadline are not in danger of usurping
issues presently before this court. Therefore intervenor's
motion to --

THE COURT: I remember that now.

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MR. DIEKEMPER: To clarify, paragraph 4 of the May 4 order is granted in part. And this is in our memo, Judge, that we gave you.

THE COURT: I'm not totally -- I mean, my language may have been overbroad. And I think I can state an order because I was -- and I don't think that -- I think I can set out an order which would delineate precisely what I think is before Judge Dowd or should be before him, and that's mainly the area where the Civil Service Commission based upon whatever, and the practices that its agents follow concerning testing and more significantly the test for psychological personality matters, that's what you're questioning?

MR. DIEKEMPER: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: By and large.

MR. DIEKEMPER: Yes. We have 16 individuals who didn't pass the noncognitive portion of the test. And that test was graded on two scales. It was graded on a customer service scale and it was graded on a performance scale. And 12 out of the 16 plaintiffs that I represent passed one scale but not the other. And in one case the person missed it by

one point qualifying. And we're saying that --

THE COURT: You're saying that that's a state court matter.

MR. DIEKEMPER: Yes.

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THE COURT: And Benjamin and Althea I think feel otherwise.

MR. DIEKEMPER: Nothing to do with any race issues or any of the issues before you.

THE COURT: And that was my hunch judgment. And I still can see a line, but, yeah, I see what they are getting at. Now, I don't know that I want to go out and get into that territory if it's not mine.

Let me first hear from Ms. Kistler. What are your thoughts? You're the City attorney and municipal authority here.

MS. KISTLER: Sure. Well, I know this is an issue that I've been wrestling with some time too because on one level it doesn't seem to have any impact on federal issues at this point. It potentially could, you know, so I don't know if it's premature at this time or, you know, if that's something we have to wait and see or that's something you could get involved in to prevent that happening, but, I mean, I can certainly see some parties here being, you know, adversely impacted, particularly if the state court is being asked to -- the City is being asked to redesign these testing

measures as to these particular plaintiffs.

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Yeah, I mean, it really depends on where the state court judge sees his authority.

THE COURT: I'm just thinking out loud. And I think I should be able to, whether I can or not is a different thing, but I should be able to come up with an order forgetting about the other problems, you know, we have that are in dispute, which would rather precisely delineate what I -- you know, what I think is my territory and what I think is the state territory. Hopefully Judge Dowd, I don't know him as well, I've met David. I know his brothers much better. But I'm sure he's cut from the same cloth, he's a good, capable young man. I would think that he would have no problem with it.

But I'm trying to think of the wording of it. And we can get into that later. In fact, I might get all of you involved in that. But it seems to me that if they are just talking about what Jerry Diekemper said, if that's all Judge Dowd is going to rule on, whether those guys were the noncognitive part of it, it still, Jerry, the problem we have, it's still part of what they did under this court's order, right?

MR. DIEKEMPER: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: What the experts did and all that.

MR. DIEKEMPER: But I think when you issued your

order dissolving the decree --

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THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DIEKEMPER: -- everything went away at that point. I mean, both fire and the government had asked you to not dissolve the decree until there was a valid testing place. And you in your order specifically dealt with that issue and said you didn't need to wait, and this decree is gone. Once that decree is gone, you're not in the testing business anymore unless somebody files a new complaint. That's our position.

MR. BLUSTEIN: Your Honor, I would disagree.

THE COURT: This is Mr. Blustein.

MR. BLUSTEIN: Yes, Benjamin Blustein for the United States. I think we're here today on this issue as a result of another order that the Court issued in April of 2003 when the Court granted the United States' motion for a TRO, I think that's an April 11th, 2003 order. And the Court directed the City to implement a written examination for the entry level fire fighter position that was valid. And the City complied with that order and selected a test development firm in Minneapolis. The City complied with the schedule for developing the test and administering the test. And the Court directed the City to develop a valid test.

And that's essentially the issue that is in front of the Court now. And the way we see it is that this 15

plaintiffs that Mr. Diekemper represents are seeking to that issue. In other words, is this a valid test. And they are asking the state court judge to decide that.

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THE COURT: On this test, Ben, all of you, it seems to me that it has been tacitly validated in this court by our proceedings herein. Nobody has objected to it. In this case I have. I don't think anything --

MR. BLUSTEIN: I would agree with that, Your Honor, and the Court has given every opportunity to individuals to object to the validity. Mr. Bobinette represents Mr. Deeken. And Mr. Deeken is a plaintiff both in this case and in the state court action. And he on behalf of his client has not challenged the validity of the test.

It's my recollection that the Court has indicated to the parties several times that the Court would be open to bringing in the experts to air out this issue of the validity, bringing in -- I think Nancy has asked whether the City should bring in the people from Minneapolis. So if anybody wanted to challenge the validity of the test, the Court has provided a forum for them to do that. But nobody has. If we --

THE COURT: And that's over a period of time. I mean, that isn't something last week, Jerry, or last month.

MR. DIEKEMPER: Well, Judge, you issued that order on -- you issued the TRO on April the 3rd. On May the 5th of

'03 you ordered that the deadlines that were proposed -- on the 11th you issued a TRO and told us to develop time, a time line. On May the 5th you adopted that time line for the development of the test. And on October 31, '03 the intervenors filed a motion to clarify that order to see whether we could challenge that noncognitive portion of the test. And you entered your order of November 7, '03 after dissolving the decree on 11/5/03 saying that we could go forward and that you didn't see any problem.

So to say that nobody has challenged anything isn't correct. You gave us permission to challenge it in state court.

MR. BLUSTEIN: Your Honor, we had several conversations, I believe, about --

THE COURT: Let me say this. I think you're right, but I never did -- I don't know that that order was intended to say more than, you know, the test, and nobody has objected. And you still haven't objected. You were intervenors. You never objected to that test to my knowledge in any pleedings.

MR. DIEKEMPER: And that's because I don't think there's any basis for federal jurisdiction to bring a challenge to the test to you.

THE COURT: Let me tell you, you know me well enough to know I don't want any state court case or any state court

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business. And my only concern is what Benjamin is talking 1 2 about here, and is that obviously I issued an order to the City. We were all together. I issued it under the 3 4 consultation with every lawyer in here or I think with every 5 lawyer, Ms. Tanner, Ms. Kistler, Bobinette, Craig, Diekemper, Perkins was here, whatever, and Mr. Blustein. And we all 6 7 over the period of time -- I mean, that was then. 8 Not having any -- the test was I'd say validated 9 tacitly. I don't know that there was any formality. 10 Nancy, you sent to me this many papers, more than I 11 needed, but anyway, at the top of it was a page explaining 12 what they had done. And that has never been -- when we say 13 validated, Nangle has never said, okay, and we've never held 14 hearings on it if that's necessary. MS. KISTLER: No, I believe one of the things we 15 sent you, Your Honor, was a validation study performed by 16 17 PDRI, that was the test consultant that gave the test. 18 THE COURT: And I don't know that anyone else got a 19 copy of that. 2.0 MR. BLUSTEIN: We did, Your Honor. 21 MR. DIEKEMPER: The government did. 22 THE COURT: You didn't, Jerry? 23 MR. DIEKEMPER: I don't know. I can't remember. 24 There was so much concern about secrecy. I don't remember 25 whether -- I don't remember seeing it. Do you, Althea?

MS. JOHNS: I don't remember seeing it either.

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THE COURT: I think you're right. It's possible --

MR. DIEKEMPER: There was an in camera review of a lot of stuff.

THE COURT: -- Nancy, that I had you just send it me because you were concerned. They are in my office in Savannah. And needless to say, no one else sees them. But there were applications, things I didn't look through half of them. I just thumbed through them.

MS. KISTLER: I think Your Honor had issued an order, and there were certain things that we were to give to the other parties and there were certain things that we were to submit to yourself in chambers and to the United States. And which things went to who I'm not quite sure, but I know we're following an order when we sent those to the different parties.

MR. BLUSTEIN: Your Honor, going back to this issue of how to delineate what's before Your Honor and what's before Judge Dowd, I remember conversations that we were a part of and the Court was a part of and Jerry was part of where -- and tell me if I'm wrong -- where Jerry framed the issue in state court as being one of procedural matters, whereas the issues before this court were more the substance of the and the validity of the test. And by procedural matters it was my understanding that we were talking about

whether --

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THE COURT: Timeliness.

MR. BLUSTEIN: Of the Civil Service Commission.

THE COURT: Whether to file the papers at the right time and all that stuff.

MR. BLUSTEIN: And I don't know if that was the -that those conversations were the genesis of the November
7th, 2003 order that Jerry referenced.

THE COURT: Well, my memory is being jogged. I can't recall. I mean, I remember that idea. Jerry, do you? That procedural is in my mind somewhere.

MR. DIEKEMPER: Frankly, Judge, I can't tell you one way or the other on that. I don't even know if I was at that conversation, whether Perkins was there. I just don't remember.

THE COURT: Nancy, do you?

MS. KISTLER: Yes, and I think I can speak to that. When we talk about the procedural issues, the Civil Service Commission determined -- well, they limited their authority in this case to deciding whether the candidates had been ranked or whether they had been scored properly. Under our Civil Service rules it is our contention that they just had the authority to determine whether the scores or whether the tests were scored properly, that they do not have the authority to go out and decide, well, is this the best test

that could have been given, was there a better test. 1 2 that's why we hire testing consultants. So that was one 3 procedural issue that I think is before the state court. 4 Now, the other procedural issue is that the Civil Service Commission --5 6 THE COURT: How would you state that in one 7 sentence? I mean, what you've said I think to me means a lot 8 more than just procedure. 9 MS. KISTLER: It's --10 THE COURT: As I think of the term. MS. KISTLER: I believe it would be both the 11 12 jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and I guess --13 THE COURT: Well, the jurisdiction, that would be a 14 state court matter just pure and simple, the jurisdiction of 15 whatever the Civil Service Commission is not certainly 16 something that I would judge on normally, let's put it that 17 way. And -- but the darn test thing, it's a puzzle 18 obviously. I don't think any one of us has a total grip on 19 it, because there's no question I ordered the test, the new 2.0 test be comprised and all that. And then after it was 21 completed, when was that, in November of '03 when they 22 submitted their report? 23 MS. KISTLER: December of 2003 was when we had the 24 last --THE COURT: Here's the development, validation, and 25

administration of the City of St. Louis Probationary Fire

Private Selection Process. I suspect that this would not

have been under seal. But you guys got a copy of that?

Ms. Kistler? Ms. Kistler got a report of the defendant City

of St. Louis, et cetera, in response to this order of

April 11, 2003, and I think she attached something to that.

Anyway, it's a puzzle to me as well as -- well, I know you got copies of what I have in front of me. This is -- attached to is Report of City of St. Louis on the Implementation of a Validated Job Related Test for a Probationary Fire Private, and that's dated September 30, 2003. And Ms. Kistler sets out in several single sentences the paragraphs exactly what took place procedurally.

MS. KISTLER: That's correct.

THE COURT: And it just seems to me that if there's anybody that had any complaint about that test with all that we have on the record here, it would have been brought before me.

Now, Jerry, when you say -- I don't know if that was in a -- the word procedural doesn't strike me, but I don't know if it was in a conversation we had in chambers, whether it was on the record in open court, but procedures is a lot different --

MR. DIEKEMPER: You had established, I think it was like a December 4th, 5th, 6th deadline for getting this test

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done. And that's when we filed this motion in October, on Halloween apparently, to, you know, be able to go forward and make these challenges before the Civil Service Commission. For these 16 individuals we thought there was a better measure of their ability to get along well and to service people, function together based on their service rate.

And we put that issue with your permission before the Civil Service Commission, and they really declined to deal with it. Then we had to appeal it to the circuit court. I don't see, though as a practical matter just getting down to the practicalities of the situation, given your order recently saying that the standard metropolitan statistical area is the proper area for applicant flow data, that no matter what happens with these 16 individuals, that there would be an adverse impact on anybody based on where, you know, I think -- and Ben probably knows the statistics better than I do, but I think the minority population in the SMSA is about 14 or 15 percent, something like that.

So I don't think whatever Judge Dowd would order with respect to this portion of the test, and all we're asking is that the individuals who were eliminated as a result of a pass/fail portion of the examination be given the opportunity to finish the rest of the test. And then they may or may not -- it may all be moot. He may deny our appeal, first of all, or they may not get on the list. So,

you know, I think we may be putting the cart before the horse here talking about this.

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THE COURT: Yeah, that's a little bit tangential to the nuts and bolts that I wanted to get down here today before -- and I wanted to find out. Now I have the status of that, I will have to tell you I do not have a satisfactory answer. I suspect I could prepare some kind of an order which would appropriately delineate authorities, et cetera, but I may not want to address it and depend upon Judge Dowd to follow his own judgment.

MR. DIEKEMPER: Judge, you ordered us to brief that issue on October 1, 2004 order. And we did brief it, and that's that package in the rubber band up there.

THE COURT: All right. Let's get to the simpler problem. You guys, Craig and Bobinette, I don't think I ever have suggested or requested that lawyers forget about jury trials, but can't you stipulate with the City on all the dollars and sense part of this? Where is the dispute of fact?

MS. JOHNS: Excuse me, Judge, before you move on, I have another engagement for which I have to leave, and this spot doesn't involve me at all. Is it okay for me to leave?

THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. Thanks, Althea. Good

THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. Thanks, Althea. Good seeing you.

Go ahead.

MR. CRAIG: Your Honor, Clyde Craig for Plaintiff
Martinez. Your Honor, I think on the calculation of lost
wages and benefits, we most probably will be able to agree on
those figures. We've been working towards that end and have
made some progress. And we got a document from the City this
morning, I haven't reviewed in detail, but I think we're
moving along on that.

But Plaintiff Martinez is also requesting compensatory damages. And that, of course, cannot be calculated mathematically. It's something that we can discuss agreeing on in --

THE COURT: Why does he think he's entitled to it?

MR. CRAIG: Because the impact of the denial of

employment severely affected him, it affected his life,

affected his relationship in his marriage.

THE COURT: He should be affected favorably by Nangle's decision, and that should compensate and make up for his upset.

But, anyway, I would like -- what I'd like to have done here is for me after today to get a good -- in my mind at least a solid order, and then it will be up to whoever objects, Ms. Kistler whatnot, if they want to appeal, appeal. And if not -- but I'll be done with that phase of it. And that will require me -- I would agree with you, compensatory damages are something that a judge shouldn't decide. But I'm

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not too inclined to think here under all the applicable facts 1 2 and circumstances that he's entitled to compensatory damages 3 in this case. This case is kind of a unique case. 4 that's why I tried to get you guys to agree to whatever you 5 could because I'm not -- I didn't work for the Civil Service 6 Commission and compute the value of benefits and all that 7 sort of thing. And I really would like Martinez, if he 8 mitigated his damages, forgetting about compensatory, 9 out-of-pocket lost wages, what is he behind? You know, 10 what he -- you and Ms. Kistler have agreed on that, huh? 11 MR. CRAIG: We haven't come to a final figure on the 12 lost wages, but we're working on that. There is a 13 differential between what he earned working in the Forestry 14 Department for the City and what he would have earned working 15 as a fire fighter. But that we can certainly calculate. 16 THE COURT: There's a figure that could be 17 computed --18 MR. CRAIG: That's correct, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: -- without a jury. And as -- has 2.0 Deeken's situation changed, Mr. Bobinette? MR. BOBINETTE: Good morning, Your Honor, Charles 21 22 Bobinette for Eric Deeken. Eric is still waiting for 23 appointment. Mr. Martinez was enrolled in a fire academy 24 class on the 21st of March, and despite our request, Deeken 25 was not enrolled in that.

THE COURT: Is there a certain date, Nancy,

Deeken -- Martinez was enrolled when?

MR. CRAIG: March 21st.

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MS. KISTLER: And Martinez was actually on this list so he was appointed off of that, and that was the problem with Deeken. We've just found out that right now we have a class that -- our newest information is they are planning to

start in May, the latter part of May, I believe May 27th.

THE COURT: When is the next one of those, Nancy?

MR. BOBINETTE: So we would ask the Court enter an order that the City enroll him in that academy the earliest opportunity or the next academy. With that then we could calculate his damages up to that point in time. In our brief to the Court in answer to the Court's question proposed, we attempted to detail, and these are rough numbers, but that Nancy has had a chance to look at, and I think we can refine these a little bit more. But basically on pages 8 and 9 of our memorandum we do a calculation.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you this: Both of you, I mean, both Martinez and Deeken, request Defendant City of St. Louis is or be permanently restrained and joined from discriminating against applicants for the position of probationary fire private on the basis of race. I don't know, it's kind of an inane thing, I don't know if it's necessary. Aren't we able to assume, forgetting the past,

assume they are going to carry on in good faith and good fashion without having that. Nancy, is that burdensome in any way to you, or maybe you don't care about it?

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MS. KISTLER: Well, I mean, we would prefer there not be an injunction entered, and I don't think it's appropriate in this case where I think everyone has agreed that the City's actions were taken pursuant to this long standing consent decree. There is no evidence that the City has or would continue to utilize a 50/50 hiring goal now that the decree has been dissolved. So I simply don't see any reason whatsoever for such an order.

THE COURT: What do you need that for, guys?

MR. CRAIG: It's not critical from our standpoint,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah, I didn't think. Okay. Defendant has ordered plaintiff to hire Deeken, we're going to shift the date to May 27. I'm looking over Deeken's proposed order. Establishing seniority date as of March 13, 2000. I hate to get into these details, but what does that do, for example, on benefits? I'm just hesitant to make anything retroactive prior to the date of my order, Chuck, because, I mean, I don't know what could have happened in Deeken's life, maybe some big medical expense, maybe nothing but goodness and happiness, but I'm hesitant to date back.

MR. BOBINETTE: We would represent to the Court that

there would be no claims of, let's say, insurance or against the City.

THE COURT: What's the claim, that you have seniority?

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MR. BOBINETTE: One of seniority as well as an accumulation of vacation and sick days going into the actual period of employment, to bring him into parity with where he should have been had he been hired in March of 2000.

THE COURT: Have you and Nancy Kistler talked about that?

MR. BOBINETTE: We have -- Nancy gave to me an agreed upon statement in terms of the number of hours he would accumulate, and we can calculate from that.

THE COURT: Yeah, I would urge you do it. If you can't come up with a figure and if Nancy can help you and kind of lean, and I'm kind of pushing Nancy on that, so I'm going to give you the benefit of the doubt if you guys don't agree, because it's not -- for me it's complicated, I don't get involved in that. Go ahead, Nancy.

MS. KISTLER: Well, the only thing that I want to address as far as seniority, I'm not sure everything that that would encompass. I think if you're talking about purposes of future promotions or assignments in a house such as who gets the lead position, I think you have safety issues here. I mean, certainly we can't say now you have, you know,

five years for purposes of, you know, and then tomorrow you can be a captain.

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THE COURT: I want to tell you something, I'm sure some of these guys out there are firemen. And there's nobody -- I mean, I can say that. I have high respect for I know them. I was a city attorney at Brentwood for ten years. And my mentor and partner represented the Affton Fire District. I did work with them many years. I know more about firemen than they know about themselves. Every time the police would get an extra \$3 for a uniform allowance, the firemen are rushing in to get that. I lived I lived with Affton and -- or the with this for ten years. firemen would get a little twist to the right, police are coming in, they want the same twist. That's just the way it goes. And so firemen, I've dealt with them and I love them. I've handled more -- probably the best clients I had were two They had bad accidents. I bought the first down payment on my house was representing a firemen. So I have a personal feeling over and above, you know, September 11 and But I don't want to get down refining too much of this little stuff, that I think if you worked with Ms. Kistler as best you can and tell -- is Mr. Deeken out there?

MR. BOBINETTE: Yes, Mr. Deeken is in the back. Would you stand up.

THE COURT: I'm trying to get you a job, so shape up 1 2 and agree with the City here so we don't have to get down all 3 these details, two times two is four and all that stuff, will 4 you? 5 MR. DEEKEN: Absolutely. 6 MR. BOBINETTE: We can figure out Nancy's concerns 7 in terms of seniority for purposes of experience. THE COURT: Clyde, is Mr. Martinez back there? 8 9 MR. CRAIG: No, he's in the academy and couldn't be 10 here. THE COURT: Thanks, Mr. Deeken. 11 12 MR. CRAIG: However, seniority is a very important 13 issue. 14 THE COURT: I know that. But you see, what I didn't 15 say, I also remember the best job I ever had was city attorney at Brentwood. I loved it. I was a lot younger. 16 17 lived two blocks from city hall and people could come by, 18 firemen, police officers. I really mean it, I loved it. 19 the fire and police, I can remember so many stories because 2.0 they used to have, what do they call them, Kelly hours? 21 never did understand. What do they call it, Kelly hours? 22 MR. BOBINETTE: O Days. 23 THE COURT: One off, one on. And, God, they'd drive 24 me nuts trying to figure it out. And then I'd always get 25 them together in a corner just like I'm trying with you guys,

work this out because Nangle, you know, I didn't go to law school to do multiplication and subtraction tables.

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But one guy got to sleep in the upper bunk -- this is in Brentwood now -- and one guy in the lower bunk. And one of them had to clean the rails. I don't want to get in that Mickey Mouse stuff, and that's what seniority is. Here you got firemen, they are set in their ways and all of a sudden Deeken comes in and he's senior to these guys. And I don't know what preferences he gets. He knows better than I can tell us. Do you know what I'm talking about? Well, Craig knows because he's been in labor law longer.

MR. BOBINETTE: I appreciate what you're saying. I think we can work that out. I think we could.

THE COURT: Mr. Deeken will work that out with you.

I'll get after him if he doesn't. I'm trying to get him squared away. In a serious fashion I think that he should have been hired obviously and wasn't, and we're going to get him and Mr. Martinez squared away. And the sooner the better if you guys can come up with some agreements. Forget about the blasted jury trial on this stuff.

MR. BOBINETTE: Could I bring to the Court's attention?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. BOBINETTE: One problem that I think we will have a little difficulty working out, and your direction on

this would be helpful. We certainly understand that under Title VII lawsuits there is a duty to mitigate. And we have provided to the City the gross numbers of earnings during the relevant period of time. Our point is this, that I'm sure the Court knows speaking of the Kelly days, that there's an opportunity for secondary employment as a firefighter.

And --

THE COURT: I'm not a big believer in that

personally. I'm not talking as a lawyer. I'm talking just

as a guy down the street. I know that because of taking

those days off, but they should rest and be getting ready for

putting out the next fire is what I've always thought. But I

know what you are saying. And there are a lot of other

people who do two jobs. What's Mr. Deeken, he's got a second

job maybe or could have?

MR. BOBINETTE: Mr. Deeken has operated his own business with his wife, which is a carpet installer type of business where he does the sales and he does the installation. And this is the kind of thing that he does for owners of property that generally --

THE COURT: What are you telling me, and he makes money doing that?

MR. BOBINETTE: He makes money doing that. And in this unique circumstance is that it's the perfect kind of business that he would be doing secondary to being a fire

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fighter. The argument being is although we have acknowledged his interim earnings, we do not think that it should be an offset against the gross earnings that he would have earned had he been a fire fighter.

THE COURT: Well, what kind of money you talking about, Chuck, roughly?

MR. BOBINETTE: Maybe a hundred thousand dollars over the course of --

THE COURT: Oh, Santa Maria, a hundred thousand dollars. I live next door to a guy that did carpets, he didn't make that kind of money. Deeken has got -- find out what kind of business he's got going and we better --

MR. BOBINETTE: Well, it would be about \$20,000 a year.

THE COURT: 20,000 a year.

MR. BOBINETTE: Right.

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THE COURT: And Ms. Kistler reacted like I did.

Let's be serious. I understand carpet laying because I'm familiar, I had a client that did it. I didn't know that kind of money came out of it. But that was then, this is now. How in the dickens -- if he's a firemen, he can't spend that much time. His wife -- he's doing that tacking in those corners, his wife doesn't do that, I bet. Does she? Is that his wife next to him? He doesn't make you do that, does he?

MRS. DEEKEN:

THE COURT: No.

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MR. BOBINETTE: What my experience has been with this is that firemen have their own side businesses, lawn mowering, painting, house fix-up, all of those kinds of things.

THE COURT: But why shouldn't that mitigate?

MR. BOBINETTE: Well, because he would have been doing it anyway.

THE COURT: Would have been doing it anyway. Let me see what Ms. Kistler has to say.

MS. KISTLER: Well, I believe his argument has been he's been able to conduct this business in the evenings and during the nights. So for the past, I don't know, four or five years he's worked strictly evenings and nights. I mean, I just wonder what kind of money he could have been earning if he had a day job the last four years as well. I think that would be a real windfall to him if that were permitted.

THE COURT: Yeah, I think -- go ahead, Chuck. I don't know, I think Ms. Kistler is right in principle. It seems to me we're getting down to the -- it's not nickel and dime if you're talking about even \$20,000. Nancy, do you know if the fire department allows firemen to hold other jobs?

MS. KISTLER: Sure, yes, they do permit secondary employment. Now, how much other fire fighters make in their

secondary employment, I couldn't even tell you.

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THE COURT: So that presumably, and I'm thinking out loud, knowing I sense I know what Mr. Deeken does, and he's got some people if he's a good carpet layer, he's in demand, he probably doesn't have to worry too much about unions or whatever, maybe he's a member of the carpet layers union, but in any event, his wife handles all the paperwork or should get the jobs, so all he's got to go out to do is do it and get the carpeting there. Is that about it? Buy it maybe and measure?

MR. BOBINETTE: Buy it, sure, order it, and size it.

THE COURT: So he could do that as a firemen.

MR. BOBINETTE: But that's his business and that's what he has relied upon on his earnings these past four years.

THE COURT: Why don't you guys give me alternative figures on the mitigation. And you use the ones that Mr. Deeken wants and what his income has been attributing to his other job and to his carpet laying.

MR. BOBINETTE: Okay. And just leave that legal question for you to resolve then.

THE COURT: Yes. But I'll give you some report.

When I finish here I'll give you an order and then you can include that in your response to my order.

MR. BOBINETTE: Very good. Thank you.

THE COURT: So I'm going to take care of what I give the Martinez and Deeken matter first. And let's see if there's anything else any of you folks want to tell me with regard to that. I'm going to assume under these circumstances, Harry, Craig, and Chuck Bobinette that you're waiving a jury trial and the City agrees to that? Yes? If you don't, if there's compensatory damages, I'm going to rule against. You can appeal on it, I don't care.

MR. CRAIG: I think we can handle the rest of it by agreement, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What I come up with, remember, you can reserve your right, I have no problem with that. Just like Ms. Kistler is reserving the right to appeal from the whole thing. But I feel guilty. I want to get this out so you guys can -- everybody can get caught up.

Let's see, 2002 Personnel Decisions Research Institute, that's who did the 2003 study, Nancy?

MS. KISTLER: That's correct.

THE COURT: We talked about the permanent injunction thing. No evidence in this case.

Oh, okay. Now, Diekemper, get your pleading out.

You find it faster. I had made a note to look at the wherefore clause in what you're asking the state court. And is this it?

MR. DIEKEMPER: It's attached to Althea's memo,

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1 Judge. 2 THE COURT: Wait a minute. Decision. That's the 3 civil service. Yeah, I took those papers apart. 4 Bobinette here. Count I, Petition for Administrative Review. 5 Now, that's Deeken. That's Exhibit A. 6 MR. DIEKEMPER: 7 THE COURT: And here's your memorandum. 8 MR. DIEKEMPER: Can I show you, Judge? 9 THE COURT: Yeah. I just want to see your wherefore 10 clause in your petition for review. Don't let me take your file copy. 11 12 MR. DIEKEMPER: You've got it right here. 13 THE COURT: Okay. I'm on page --14 MR. DIEKEMPER: Unfortunately it's not numbered. 15 THE COURT: But I'm on the page that's dark print, combined prayer for relief, therefore, the plaintiffs request 16 17 the Court. And then I'm going to A, B -- make the plaintiffs 18 whole for any injury or damages suffered, back pay. Well, 19 part of it, plaintiffs be permitted to complete all stages 2.0 and portions of the selection process for provisionary fire 21 private that they were not permitted to complete, and that 22 plaintiffs be ranked and placed on the eligibility list. 23 Well, let me hear from -- although Althea is gone, 24 I'm sure -- let me hear from Ben. Go ahead. Let me hear

from Ben Blustein on this before I -- in that prayer,

Benjamin, we're right back where we were before I guess, huh?

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MR. BLUSTEIN: Yes, Judge. Two things; one is although the prayer for relief doesn't specifically indicate this, I think Jerry has said very straightforwardly that the part of the challenge in the state court is a challenge to the validity of the noncognitive part of the test, and so our first concern is the inconsistent ruling by the state court as to the validity of the -- or the invalidity of the test.

The second problem is a practical problem of throwing a monkey wrench into the eligibility list. If the state court were to permit these 15 plaintiffs to complete the other portions of the exam and then place them on the eligibility list, we're not talking about an order affecting only those 15 plaintiffs, we're talking about an order affecting, first of all, everybody on that eligibility list who is going to be after them because --

THE COURT: Nancy, I'm sorry, did you hear what he is saying?

MS. KISTLER: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: He's talking about something on the -what would happen if the state court upheld Jerry Diekemper's
request and what the effect would be on the eligibility list,
placing them above the others.

MR. BLUSTEIN: You would be essentially moving these 15 folks to the top of the list and bumping down people below

them. And there's also the problem of, well, the fact that we've already started hiring off this eligible list. We've got a class of 20 some odd people entered last month and then we've got a new class that's coming in. And then a sort of larger global problem is if the noncognitive portion of the test is invalid as to these 15 folks, well, then it's maybe invalid as to other people.

THE COURT: Is that right, Jerry, have you personalized it?

MR. DIEKEMPER: I don't necessarily agree with that.

Anybody who was adversely affected by this test had an opportunity to challenge it. There were time limits for doing that. And I think the time limits are long gone. So, you know, I don't see that as being a real threat.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MR. BLUSTEIN: I understand what Jerry is saying, but I guess my point is that the test did not single out these 15 people, the test applied to everybody as a whole.

THE COURT: If it's, let's say, dubious to them, question mark as to others, it may be I would suspect everybody would be guilty of laches at least, and I don't know about a statute of limitation. There are certainly -- 2003, they've had a year and a half to challenge it. And the only ones that have done it are the ones in the state court case.

MR. BLUSTEIN: So those would be my main concerns; one, the inconsistencies of rulings as to whether this test is valid.

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THE COURT: Okay, well, here's what I think I'm going to do or I plan to do. You folks -- I'm going to give Bobinette, Craig, and Kistler and, of course, I don't know --I don't think you want to be involved in theirs, do you, Ben? A week to come up as much as you can with agreed upon figures. And where you don't agree, set it out just like you did in the last -- like on the point concerning Mr. Deeken's income, and what their salaries gross, et cetera, were. my indications, my leanings are not to go back on that seniority because my personal experience probably shouldn't influence me, but I'm saying as a matter of record so anybody wants to appeal they can say it, my personal experience with firemen and policemen has been great. And I say the best ten years of my life was working with them in Brentwood. toughest thing to ever do, and Craig knows this better than any, than I do in labor matters is stick somebody else up in front of somebody else sort of arbitrarily, and if he doesn't know his dad -- your dad died?

MR. CRAIG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But old man Craig and John Wiley would have turned in their graves if somebody did that to some of their clients, wouldn't they, Clyde?

MR. CRAIG: Well, I guess that depends on who you would be talking to on the list.

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THE COURT: So anyway, my leaning is not on the seniority thing. The other -- what else -- and I'll get out an order. I'm not going to get into the question that Althea and Benjamin and Diekemper, Jerry Diekemper are involved in on this other one until after this first matter is disposed of because I want to get it in shape so the parties can appeal, exercise whatever rights they want and have that done, because I feel that I'm out of time. I'm late on this.

Now, let me see, there was something about interest. You had wanted some interest payments or something. Oh, I know, the attorneys' fees, the interest. What is this stuff?

MR. CRAIG: Prejudgment interest, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What's the rate, Nancy? Do you object to prejudgment interest, Nancy?

MS. KISTLER: Yes, we do, and we've got some Eighth Circuit cases that --

THE COURT: I'll tell you what, you submit that along with everything else, both sides. If there's any case law on that question, I'll take that. Then on attorneys' fees we know the right way to handle them would be -- well, if you can't stipulate, I don't know what the hourly rate is anymore in St. Louis, and I don't want Nancy to -- I don't expect her to give away the City's coffers, but the right way

is, of course, for me to come back and hold a hearing. I don't know that that's necessary. I'm not anxious to do it.

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But another way is if you gentlemen submit your hours and your fee requests to Ms. Kistler and she can respond. That's the way -- as to whether she thinks it's an inordinate amount of time and high rates and all of that stuff. If that's enough. Now, I don't want to twist anybody's arm on that. Is that enough, Mr. Craig, Mr. Bobinette, Ms. Kistler?

MR. CRAIG: We have submitted to the City our hours at least up until several weeks ago. And we will update that and give them the figures. And the hourly rate we're requesting is \$250 an hour for attorneys' hours and 75 for paralegal hours, which I think is pretty standard.

THE COURT: I never had paralegals. I never needed those. But all the paperwork today you guys. You agree with that, Mr. Bobinette?

MR. BOBINETTE: Yes, Your Honor. I think --

THE COURT: I hate to put Nancy -- is that hourly rate, give me what's going on in the City today. What are the insurance defendants' lawyers charge an hour? They don't charge any 250.

MS. KISTLER: No, it's been awhile since I've been in private practice, so I'm probably not the best person to address that, and it's been awhile since I've had to address

that issue in court as far as the hourly attorneys' fees. It seems somewhat high, but I may need to look at other documents. I don't know if Kathleen has looked at that tissue.

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MS. TANNER: I haven't had anything recently, Your Honor.

MR. BOBINETTE: Your Honor, our fee is 225 an hour, and that fee has been approved by Judge Jackson in civil rights cases two years, so that 250 to 225 range I believe is common, a little bit higher for certain classes of attorneys. Are you asking us to include the issue of attorneys' fees in this memo in a week's time?

MR. BOBINETTE: Well, I was just thinking that the time will be up to our stipulation and then maybe a week after that.

THE COURT: Do you need more time on that?

THE COURT: Yes, I'll give you a week after that for the attorneys' fee question because then I can prepare an order on the rest of it hopefully, and then just pick up the attorneys' fees a week later. But the main question is, is any one of you demanding a hearing? Because you're entitled to it. And Nancy, I guess, is the one that may want to -- you don't know their final figures, Ms. Kistler?

MS. KISTLER: No, I don't.

THE COURT: Well, you get their figures and see, and

then if you let me know. And really I don't want you to
worry about Nangle coming from Savannah, I want you to handle
it like any other legal matter. If you object, why you can
set out your objections. And if you want a hearing on it,
Ms. Kistler, let me know.

MR. BOBINETTE: Then typically we would submit a
bill of costs. But that would be after the Court enters its
final order. I mean, that's been my experience.

THE COURT: Well, I prefer not. Why do you have to

MR. BOBINETTE: It's what the rule says. I mean, the rule provides that --

THE COURT: What rule?

wait until after the Court's order?

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MR. BOBINETTE: What the rule says is the submission of fees, attorneys' fees, expenses, and the bill of costs shall be entered, I believe it is within 20 days following the issue of the Court's final order.

THE COURT: It's a local rule that's been changed.

I know it wasn't that way years ago. But I'm not up to -- I mean, you guys -- Dave will know more about that than I do.

Because I always -- in fact, these cases I don't believe you have a final judgment unless attorneys' fees are included.

MR. BOBINETTE: No, actually it's a separate issue, and even if you waited and the Court has under consideration the attorneys' fees, your time for appeal is clicking on that

final order.

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THE COURT: Is that right?

MR. BOBINETTE: So it's actually handled as a separate issue, and you have a separate right of appeal on the attorneys' fee issue.

THE COURT: If I had the time I'd check and see when the change took place. It doesn't make a difference. It was not that way 25 years ago, but God knows what happens.

Anyway, I give you one week from today to get the best you can and get it in to me, the three of you; Mr. Craig,

Mr. Bobinette, and Ms. Kistler representing your respective parties with regard to the -- all of the damages questions and the instatement question, et cetera. And I'm using the dates that I said before: Martinez, September '99; Deeken,

March 2000. And separate those moneys about Mr. Deeken that I'm talking about.

MR. BOBINETTE: On mitigation?

THE COURT: Yes, sir. And maybe all the mitigation for both of them should be submitted, of course, to

Ms. Kistler. You're doing all that now.

Did I say I'm not too much on relating back on insurance coverage and any back benefits? I'm even -- the interest I'm not talking about, but I'm dubious about that seniority thing. And just because of the havoc. I don't think it would be a wise move for getting along. I think it

might be a troublesome move. And I don't want to do anything to affect the morale of the fire department. I just think it would be based on experience. You guys can object in what you're giving me.

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In a week what I should get from you is whatever you can stipulate to, No. 1. No. 2, if you take objection, any of the three of you, to anything in the stip or want to add to it, do so. Submit a private thing from Deeken and from Martinez and from the City and attach that, not too long, but I know you guys well enough you never, you've been well within limits of time and space and pages, so there's no problem there.

And then within one week from that you gentlemen will submit your -- I'd rather have the expenses along with the attorneys' fees and have done with it. I don't know why you can't do that.

MR. BOBINETTE: I can give it to you. Because I don't know -- Mr. Braun, will they accept my bill of costs before a final order?

THE CLERK: Yes, you can file it electronically. It won't be ruled on until the judge rules on it.

THE COURT: Don't they still do in St. Louis what the judge tells them to do since Nangle left? I can't figure it out. Maybe I better come back for a longer period of time. You got to get an okay --

MR. BOBINETTE: Point well taken.

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THE COURT: Have the blasted cost and attorneys' fees in within one week and we'll worry about accepting it.

Now, most seriously, anything, Jerry or Ben, that you guys want to ask or point out to me? I've got your matter and Althea's matter under advisement. I don't know, just be sure to tell Judge Dowd, you know, that he's got a matter pending over here.

MR. DIEKEMPER: He's well aware of that. He's constantly postponed making a decision.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Kistler.

MS. KISTLER: Just one issue, Your Honor. Will we be receiving I guess fairly soon an order ordering the City to enroll Mr. Deeken in the next class?

THE COURT: I'll order that. What was that date again, May --

MS. KISTLER: That's tentative. I mean, I don't want to be bound by that date. I mean, I'm sure in the latter part of May or June, but it should be a class of 30, so the chief is going to need to interview enough people and send them to medical for medical exams, and so sometimes there's a delay in that.

THE COURT: I will order it orally to you now and instruct you to instate him, if that's the right word, in that process. And I will hope to get a written order out

before -- certainly before May the 25th, 6th or 7th. Is that 1 2 clear enough? 3 MS. KISTLER: Is that all right for the personnel 4 department? THE COURT: Yeah, Ms. Tanner. 5 Judge, I think in connection with 6 MS. TANNER: 7 instating this individual into the class, we would 8 respectfully request a written order ordering that as opposed 9 to just a verbal communication. 10 THE COURT: Well, I thought Nancy wanted something 11 now. But I want to give a little more thought to what I -in fact, I won't have a written order until after I receive 12 13 the information from you folks in the next week or so. 14 MS. TANNER: And all I was going to say, Judge, is 15 what I think Nancy is trying to convey too is that it's 16 actually May 29th as opposed to the 27th. But that's a 17 tentative date. That date very well may change to a latter 18 date depending on interviewing and whether there is a need to 19 get more individuals certified to be interviewed because they 2.0 will want to start the class only when it's full. 21 THE COURT: Thanks. 22 MR. BOBINETTE: Your Honor, could I make this 23 suggestion? 24 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 25 MR. BOBINETTE: The Court enter an order in

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      anticipation of receiving information about back pay that
 2
      would instate Mr. Deeken to the next available class and
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      leave it that way so we don't have to worry about these
 4
      particular dates.
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               THE COURT: Is that helpful, Nancy?
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               MS. KISTLER:
                              That would be very helpful.
 7
               THE COURT: We'll do that. We'll get that out.
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               MS. KISTLER:
                              Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? Fine.
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                (Court in recess at 1:18 p.m.)
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## 1 CERTIFICATE 2 I, Susan R. Moran, Registered Merit Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Eastern 3 4 District of Missouri, do hereby certify that I was present 5 at and reported in machine shorthand the proceedings in the above-mentioned court; and that the foregoing transcript is 6 7 a true, correct, and complete transcript of my stenographic 8 notes. 9 I further certify that I am not attorney for, nor 10 employed by, nor related to any of the parties or attorneys in this action, nor financially interested in the action. 11 I further certify that this transcript contains 12 13 pages 1 - 47 and that this reporter takes no responsibility 14 for missing or damaged pages of this transcript when same 15 transcript is copied by any party other than this reporter. 16 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand at St. Louis, Missouri, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of 17 \_\_\_\_\_, 2005. 18 19 20 /s/ Susan R. Moran 21 Registered Merit Reporter 22 23 24

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