by counsel at the hearing and in supplementary materials filed with the Court.1

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¹Several submissions did not comply with Local Rule 11-5.3, which requires the use of tabs.

In separate orders the Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement and denied attorney's fees to Lackie & Dammeier. The Court hereby GRANTS the Motion as to the attorney's fees ON THE CONDITION that the settlement receives final approval.

I. BACKGROUND

A plaintiff class of approximately 125 police officers and others, represented by four law firms over the course of five years, seeks a judicial determination of the reasonable amount of its attorneys' fees. On the morning of the first day of trial, the parties settled their dispute, and the written settlement agreement provides for reimbursement of fees and costs. Plaintiffs now apply to the Court for approval of attorneys' fees and costs.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Attorney's fees in a section 1983 case are governed by 42 U.S.C. section 1988, which provides: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . " 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). "The purpose of § 1988 is to ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights

grievances." <u>Hensley v. Eckerhart</u>, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (quotation marks omitted).

The analysis of an attorney's fee award is twofold. The Court must first determine whether or not the party seeking fees is the prevailing party. Fischer v. SJB-P.D., Inc., 214 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2000). A plaintiff is the prevailing party when the legal relationship between the parties is altered so that "the plaintiff can force the defendant to do something he otherwise would not have to do" - such as pay a settlement. Id. at 1118. A plaintiff may be the prevailing party though he settles, rather than prevails at trial. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1980).

Next, the Court determines whether or not the amount requested is a reasonable one. Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1115. "In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the district court's first step is to calculate a 'lodestar' by multiplying the number of hours it finds the prevailing party expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. . . In determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, the district court should take into account the factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975)."

McGrath v. County of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, 252 (9th Cir. 1995). Then, Court decides whether to increase or

decrease the lodestar amount by evaluating those <u>Kerr</u> factors "not already subsumed in the initial calculation." McGrath, 67 F.2d at 252.

The <u>Kerr</u> factors are: time and labor required; the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; the skill needed to perform the legal service properly; the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; the customary fee, whether the fee is fixed or contingent²; time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; the amount involved and the results obtained; the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; the "undesirability" of the case; the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and awards in similar cases. <u>Id.</u>

III. DISCUSSION

Here Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties because they may now force the Defendants to pay the settlement amount, so long as the Settlement Agreement receives final approval. See Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119.

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²Although this factor is mentioned in <u>Kerr</u> the Court does not consider it as the Supreme Court disapproved of this practice in <u>City of Burlington v. Dague</u>, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) (attorneys' fees under Solid Waste Disposal Act and the Clean Water Act).

The Court must determine a reasonable fees award based on the reasonable hourly rate for class counsel and the number of hours spent. The requests of three firms are now before the Court: (1) the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation ("ACLU"); (2) Hadsell Stormer Keeny Richardson & Rennick ("Hadsell Stormer"); (3) Bahan & Associates. Attorneys' fees and costs are to be paid from a fund of \$1,210,000. Defendants have agreed not to oppose any request for attorneys' fees so long as the amount sought is 50% or less of the total settlement. (Mot. 4.) Defendants have not objected to the requested attorneys' fees.

Here, the requests of Bahan & Associates, the ACLU, and Hadsell Stormer, including anticipated future bills, and excluding costs, exceed the available funds. As discussed at the April 6, 2009 hearing, the Court presumes class counsel will appropriate amongst themselves the difference between the amounts awarded and the fund available.

The Court has reviewed in detail all of the declarations submitted by and on behalf of the attorneys and other billing professionals, as well as all other supporting evidence regarding market rates, the attorneys' experience, expertise, and reputations and all other factors relevant under Kerr. Many of the counsel

at the ACLU, Hadsell Stormer, and Bahan & Associates have stellar educational and employment histories and have been recognized with various awards for their work. Considering the rate prevailing in the Central District for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation, the Court finds the billing rates set forth below reasonable.

The Court also has reviewed and analyzed the tasks described in every monthly billing summary submitted. After doing so, the Court finds it appropriate to reduce the number of hours for which Plaintiffs seek to recover attorneys' fees. Specifically, the Court reduces fees for tasks for which excessive time was spent, such as on basic research performed by student interns, for tasks of a secretarial nature, and tasks the Court deems unnecessary, duplicative, or excessive.

The Court awards class counsel an additional \$30,000 for preparation and appearance at the hearing on the motion for final approval, distribution of funds to class members, and other tasks reasonably related to obtaining payment for the class. The Court presumes class counsel will appropriate this amount among themselves.

1. ACLU

The ACLU seeks \$567,246.50 in attorneys' fees incurred before the April 6, 2009, hearing, and \$42,013.28 for fees incurred since. For the reasons explained below, the Court awards the ACLU \$513,520.

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The Court approves Eliasberg's work at \$500 per hour and approves 682.1 hours' work for a total of \$341,050.

The ACLU seeks compensation for Ahilan Arulanantham's work at \$425 per hour; the Court approves \$400 as a reasonable rate, 75.6 as a reasonable number of hours, and \$30,240 as a reasonable total fee for his work.

The Court approves Peter Bibring's ("Bibring") work at the ACLU at the rate of \$375 per hour as requested; Lori Rifkin's ("Rifkin") work at \$335 per hour as requested; and the work of experienced ACLU paralegals at \$175 per hour as requested. The Court finds Bibring reasonably spent 166.2 hours on this matter; that Rifkin reasonably spent 100 hours, and that experienced paralegals at the ACLU reasonably spent 138.61 hours. Accordingly, the total approved fee for Bibring's work at the ACLU is \$62,325; for Rifkin, \$33,500.00; and for the experienced paralegals \$24,256.75.

The ACLU has requested compensation for the work of law students at \$200 per hour. The Court awards the ACLU \$135 per hour for the work of the students. The Court finds the law students reasonably spent a total of 117.4 hours on this matter, and awards a fee of \$15,849 for their work.

The ACLU also seeks compensation at the rate of \$695 per hour for 10.5 hours of work by Professor Allan Ides ("Ides"), who assisted with writing a portion of a brief. The Court finds \$600 to be the reasonable hourly rate for Ides. The Court approves all of his 10.5 hours as reasonable. The ACLU shall be awarded \$6,300 for his work.

2. Hadsell Stormer

Hadsell Stormer seeks \$587,163.65 in attorneys' fees for work before the Court's April 6, 2009 hearing and \$48,222 for work since, a total of \$635,385.65. (Mot. 15.) The Court awards Hadsell Stormer \$607,768 in attorneys' fees.

The Court finds \$700 per hour is a reasonable rate for Dan Stormer's ("Stormer") work. Stormer demonstrates exceptional qualifications and experience and provides evidence his requested rate of \$800 is within the range of billing rates at the 250 largest Los Angeles firms.

Stormer shows several courts have granted fee requests for attorneys of his skill and experience in the \$700 to \$800 range. The Court finds 322.5 of Stormer's hours reasonably spent and accordingly awards Hadsell Stormer \$225,750 for his work.

Hadsell Stormer requests compensation for Anne Richardson's ("Richardson") work at the rate of \$575 per hour. The Court finds compensation at \$550 per hour reasonable and that she reasonably spent 399.6 hours on this matter. Accordingly, the Court awards \$219,780 for Richardson's work.

Likewise, the Court finds the reasonable rate for Lisa Holder's ("Holder") work is \$375, that Holder reasonably spent 161.68 hours on this matter, and that Hadsell Stormer shall be awarded \$60,630 for Holder's efforts.

The Court finds the requested \$275 per hour compensation for Nagwa Ibrahim's ("Ibrahim") work, and \$250 per hour for Radhika Sainath's ("Sainath") work, reasonable. The Court approves 56 hours of Ibrahim's time as reasonably spent on this matter and likewise finds 78.1 of Sainath's time compensable. The Court accordingly awards \$15,400 for Ibrahim's work and \$19,525 for Sainath's labors.

The Court declines to award Hadsell Stormer \$200 per hour for the work of law students. (See Richardson Decl. ¶ 13.) Rather, the Court finds compensation at the rate of \$135 per hour reasonable, finds law students reasonably worked 35.8 hours on his matter and awards \$4,833 for their work.

The Court approves Hadsell Stormer's request for \$175 per hour for experienced paralegals, finds 200 hours' work reasonable, and awards \$35,000 for their work.

Likewise, the Court approves \$150 per hour for midlevel paralegals at Hadsell Stormer, as requested, finds 42 of their hours were reasonably spent on this matter, and awards \$6,300 for their work.

As to entry-level paralegals at Hadsell Stormer, the Court finds \$100 per hour for their work reasonable, finds they reasonably worked 205.5 hours on this matter, and awards Hadsell Stormer \$20,550.00 for their work.

3. Bahan & Associates

Bahan & Associates requests \$140,044.25 in attorneys' fees. (Bahan Decl. ¶ 15.) The Court approves \$128,475.00.

The Court finds \$600 to be the reasonable hourly compensation for Bahan, as stated in the tentative ruling, based on her decades of experience and record of success with multi-million dollar settlements in employment cases. The Court finds she reasonably spent 68 hours on this case and awards Bahan & Associates \$40,800 for her work.

The Court awards Bahan & Associates \$375 per hour for the work of Puja Batra in light of the relative dearth of information about her work. She reasonably spent 97.2 hours on this matter, so Bahan & Associates is awarded \$36,450. The Court awards fees for Bibring's work at the rate of \$375 per hour, as requested, and approves 136.6 of his hours at Bahan & Associates; the reasonable fee for his labors is \$51,255.00.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS the Motion for Attorneys Fees filed on behalf of the ACLU, Hadsell Stormer, and Bahan & Associates ON THE CONDITION THAT the Court grants final approval to the Settlement Agreement.

Dated: June 11, 2009

VIRGINIA

United States District Judge