

1 THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. ZILLY

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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
8 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
9 AT SEATTLE

10 M.R. et al.,

11 Plaintiffs,

No. C10-2052Z

12 vs.

ORDER

13 SUSAN DREYFUS, et al.,

14 Defendants.  
15

16 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary  
17 injunction (docket no. 95). This action arises out of the State of Washington's  
18 decision to reduce Medicaid spending in 2011 in response to the current budget crisis.

19 The individual named plaintiffs are disabled and elderly individuals who currently  
20 receive in-home personal care services<sup>1</sup> through Washington's Medicaid program,  
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24 <sup>1</sup> This case does not involve issues relating to the provision of medical care, i.e., care  
25 furnished by licensed medical practitioners; rather this case relates solely to in-home personal  
26 care services, which consist of non-medical assistance with activities of daily living, such as  
bathing, hygiene, and eating, and instrumental activities of daily living, such as shopping and  
meal preparation.

1 which is administrated by defendants Susan Dreyfus<sup>2</sup> and the Department of Social  
2 and Health Services (“DSHS”). Plaintiffs<sup>3</sup> seek to enjoin DSHS from implementing  
3 an across-the-board reduction in the number of personal care service hours  
4 beneficiaries currently receive in their own homes in lieu of treatment in an institution  
5 or nursing facility.<sup>4</sup>

7 Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is predicated on a fundamental misunderstanding of the  
8 manner in which personal care service hours are distributed under Washington’s  
9 Comprehensive Assessment and Reporting Evaluation (“CARE”) method. Plaintiffs  
10 attempt in various ways to characterize the hours allotted under CARE as a minimum,  
11 below which individuals cannot safely reside in their homes. CARE, however,  
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13 <sup>2</sup> Defendant Dreyfus is the Secretary of the Washington State Department of Social and  
14 Health Services. Dreyfus Decl. at ¶ 2 (docket no. 124).

15 <sup>3</sup> The plaintiffs in this case consist of fourteen individuals, two nonprofit associations ,and a  
16 union that represents personal care service providers. Whether the organizational plaintiffs  
17 have standing to bring the claims alleged in the amended complaint remains unclear. *See RX*  
18 *Pharmacies Plus, Inc. v. Weil*, 883 F. Supp. 549, 553 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding that medical  
19 providers only have standing under Medicaid provisions relating to reimbursement rates or  
20 payment procedures). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari on  
21 the question of whether medical providers may maintain a cause of action to enforce  
22 Medicaid’s reimbursement rate provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). *Independent Living*  
23 *Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolley*, 590 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009) *cert. granted* 78 U.S.L.W.  
24 3500 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (09-958). This Court will address the standing issue once the  
25 parties have fully briefed defendants’ pending motion to dismiss the plaintiff union for lack of  
26 standing, (docket no. 135).

<sup>4</sup> The pending motion is not the plaintiffs’ first request for injunctive relief. This case was  
filed on December 21, 2010, and the issues currently before the Court were the subject of a  
motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The Court denied the plaintiffs’ request  
for a TRO, for the reasons set forth in its Order, on January 5, 2011. In the short time this  
lawsuit has been pending, the Court has become well acquainted with the parties and the  
issues raised by the case. The parties have filed more than 164 separate docket entries, and  
the Court has carefully reviewed all of the pleadings and heard over five hours of oral  
argument on two occasions concerning the issues now ripe for adjudication.

1 allocates hours in accordance with beneficiaries' relative needs and State budget  
2 constraints, and not on the basis of what an individual actually needs to remain in a  
3 non-institutional setting.  
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5 Since the denial of their motion for a temporary restraining order, plaintiffs  
6 have had additional time and opportunities to further brief the issues, supplement the  
7 record,<sup>5</sup> and present their arguments. Plaintiffs, however, have not improved their  
8 showing of either likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable injury, and the  
9 balancing of equities and public interest tips sharply in favor of the State. The Court  
10 therefore DENIES plaintiffs' motion and the "extraordinary" interlocutory remedy  
11 they desire. *See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376 (2008)  
12 (observing that a preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy never awarded as  
13 of right").  
14

## 15 **BACKGROUND**

16

17 Under the Medicaid Act, also known as Title XIX of the Social Security Act,  
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396w, the federal government provides monetary assistance to  
19 participating States so that they may furnish medical care and other services to  
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21 <sup>5</sup> After completion of oral argument on January 28, 2011, the Court advised the parties that  
22 the motion for preliminary injunction was deemed submitted and directed the parties not to  
23 file any additional motions or documents, except for relevant supplemental authorities, until  
24 after the Court could review the enormous quantity of material submitted and render a  
25 decision. Minute Entry (docket no. 164). Nonetheless, plaintiffs filed an offer of proof  
26 requesting leave to amend their complaint to add certain individuals as plaintiffs. Offer of  
Proof (docket no. 165). The material submitted by plaintiffs in connection with this request  
are not timely for purposes of the Court's consideration of the present motion, and have not  
been considered, except as noted later in this Order. Likewise, the State's Opposition and the  
Engels Declaration filed today, docket nos. 169 and 170, are untimely.

1 qualified individuals. If a State elects to participate in Medicaid – which all fifty do –  
2 it must operate its program in conformity with applicable federal laws. Alexander v.  
3 Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n.1 (1985). The federal government administers Medicaid  
4 through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). 42 C.F.R.  
5 § 400.200. Washington’s Medicaid program is managed by DSHS. RCW 74.04.050.

7 Under the Medicaid program, each participating State must submit, and have  
8 approved by CMS, a state plan for the provision of “medical assistance.” See  
9 42 C.F.R. § 430.10. Only some categories of “medical assistance,” such as inpatient  
10 and outpatient hospital care, are mandatory for participating States, while others, such  
11 as in-home “personal care services,” are optional. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a) &  
12 1396a(a)(10)(A). Washington has elected to provide “personal care services,” which  
13 are defined by the Medicaid Act as services that are  
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16 furnished to an individual who is not an inpatient or resident of a  
17 hospital, nursing facility, intermediate care facility for the mentally  
18 retarded, or institution for mental disease that are (A) authorized for the  
19 individual by a physician or in accordance with a plan of treatment or  
20 (at the option of the State) otherwise authorized for the individual in  
21 accordance with a service plan approved by the State, (B) provided by an  
22 individual who is qualified to provide such services and who is not a  
23 member of the individual’s family, and (C) furnished in a home or other  
24 location.

25 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(24). DSHS has further divided personal care services into two  
26 types of activities for which beneficiaries might require physical or verbal assistance,  
namely activities of daily living (“ADLs”) and instrumental activities of daily living  
 (“IADLs”). WAC 388-106-0010. ADLs include basic personal tasks like bathing,

1 dressing, eating, and toilet use, while IADLs consist of functions performed around the  
2 home or community, for example, shopping, meal preparation, and housekeeping. *Id.*

3  
4 In administering Washington’s long-term personal care services program,  
5 DSHS uses a system known as CARE. WAC 388-106-0065. CARE begins with an  
6 individualized assessment that assesses each beneficiary’s functional capacity using  
7 five criteria, namely (i) cognitive performance score; (ii) clinical complexity;  
8 (iii) mood/behavior and behavior point score; (iv) ADL score; and (v) exceptional  
9 care. WAC 388-106-0125. Based on the results of these examinations, the beneficiary  
10 is placed into one of five acuity classification groups (A-E). *Id.* For example, if an  
11 individual meets the criteria for clinical complexity, and has a cognitive performance  
12 score less than four, the individual is placed into Group “C,” regardless of the  
13 individual’s mood and behavior qualification or behavior points. WAC 388-106-  
14 0125(3). Thereafter, beneficiaries are further classified into subgroups depending  
15 upon their ADL scores. *Id.* DSHS performs annual CARE reassessments for all  
16 45,000 personal care service beneficiaries to ensure that everyone is properly  
17 classified. WAC 388-106-0050(1) (“[DSHS] will assess you at least annually or more  
18 often when there are significant changes in your ability to care for yourself.”)  
19 (emphasis added).  
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21  
22

23 DSHS has assigned each acuity classification subgroup a maximum number of  
24 base hours for personal care services. WAC 388-106-0125. Beneficiaries with the  
25 most severe functional limitations are assigned to the group and subgroup with the  
26

highest number of base hours. *Id.* By emergency rule, WAC 388-106-0125, Wash. St. Reg. 11-02-041 (Dec. 30, 2010), the State identified the base hours assigned to each subgroup as follows:

**TABLE 1**

<b>Classification</b>	<b>2010 Base Monthly Hours</b>	<b>2011 Reduced Base Monthly Hours</b>
E High	416	393
E Medium	346	327
D High	277	260
D Med-High	234	215
D Medium	185	168
D Low	138	120
C High	194	176
C Med-High	174	158
C Medium	132	115
C Low	87	73
B High	147	129
B Med-High	101	84
B Medium	82	69
B Low	47	39
A High	71	59
A Medium	56	47
A Low	26	22

Once a beneficiary is assigned to an acuity classification subgroup and allocated the base number of hours associated with that subgroup, those base hours may then be adjusted, either up or down, in accordance with several factors, including: (i) the availability of informal supports; (ii) whether there are multiple clients in the same household; and (iii) the characteristics of the living environment, for example, offsite laundry facilities or wood used as a sole source of heat. WAC 388-106-0130(2)-(4) (2010). The result of this computation is the “maximum number of hours

1 that can be used to develop [a] plan of care.” Emergency Rule WAC 388-106-  
2 0130(6), Wash. St. Reg. 10-22-066 (Oct. 29, 2010).

3  
4 If a change in a beneficiary’s medical condition increases his or her need for  
5 personal care service hours, the beneficiary may request a reassessment. WAC 388-  
6 106-0140; 388-106-1303(6)(a). This request may occur at any time a beneficiary  
7 concludes the allocated hours are not sufficient. Beneficiaries may also ask their case  
8 managers to submit an exception to rule (“ETR”) request for additional hours.

9 WAC 388-440-0001.<sup>6</sup> In 2010, out of the roughly 45,000 adult personal care service  
10 beneficiaries, DSHS processed approximately 2,020 ETR requests. Rector Decl. at ¶ 9  
11 (docket no. 125). DSHS approved 89% of the requests for additional hours. *Id.*

12  
13 In 2009, the State reduced the base hours for each acuity subgroup by an  
14 average of four percent, with the largest percentage decreases applied to the  
15 classifications associated with the least acuity. *See* Emergency Rule 388-106-0125,  
16 Wash. St. Reg. 09-14-046 (July 1, 2009). In mid-2010, the State restored some of  
17 these base hours, using the same principle in reverse, *i.e.*, the categories with the  
18 greatest acuity were placed as closely as possible to pre-existing levels, while other  
19  
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21 <sup>6</sup> Of the individual named plaintiffs in this case, all have been informed about the ETR  
22 process since this litigation commenced, and most have requested an ETR. At least one  
23 plaintiff (M.J.B.) has received additional hours. Mot. at 12 n.13 (docket no. 95). DSHS  
24 denied five of the ETR requests after the committee reviewing the requests determined that  
25 those plaintiffs did not require any additional hours to preserve their health and safety.  
26 3d McNeill Decl. at ¶ 10 (docket no. 161). The committee determined that two of the other  
ETR requests identified changed medical conditions that required reassessments in CARE,  
and those individuals will ultimately receive more hours when their classifications change.  
*Id.*

1 classifications did not regain as much ground. This methodology was consistent with  
2 explicit legislative instructions:

3       The personal care services benefit shall be provided to the extent funding  
4 is available according to the assessed level of functional disability. Any  
5 reductions in services made necessary for funding reasons should be  
6 accomplished in a manner that assures that priority for maintaining  
7 services is given to persons with the greatest need as determined by the  
8 assessment of functional disability.

RCW 74.09.520(4) (emphasis added).

9       At issue in this case is a new set of reductions, set in motion in September 2010,  
10 when Washington Governor Christine Gregoire issued Executive Order 10-04, which  
11 directed each State agency to reduce expenditures to compensate for a projected  
12 budget shortfall in the 2011 fiscal period. Exs. 2-3 to Brenneke Decl. (docket no. 12).  
13 In response to the Governor's Executive Order, DSHS announced plans to reduce in-  
14 home personal care service base hours by an average of ten percent,<sup>7</sup> effective January  
15 1, 2011. *Id.* at Ex. 4; *see also* Table 1, *supra*. The fourteen individual named  
16 plaintiffs in this case will experience the following reductions:  
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22 <sup>7</sup> This figure reflects the difference in the average numbers of base hours across all acuity  
23 categories for 2010 (161.2 hours) and 2011 (144.4 hours). When the decrease for each acuity  
24 group is separately considered, the range of values is between 6.3% (Group E Medium) and  
25 18.8% (Group B Low). The State has imposed a greater percentage reduction on individuals  
26 with the least amount of need. The targeted reductions are consistent with the notion that the  
individuals currently receiving only a handful of personal care service hours per month are the  
most independent and therefore the least likely to require nursing home care.



TABLE 2

Plaintiff	Acuity Subgroup	2010 Base Monthly Hours	2011 Reduced Base Monthly Hours
A.R.	D Med. High	322 <sup>8</sup>	309
M.R.	D Med. High	236	215
A.B.	D Med.	185	166 <sup>9</sup>
S.J.	C Med. High	162	145
M.J.B.	C Med. High	184	166 <sup>10</sup>
J.H.	C Med. High	176	158
C.B.	C Med.	132	115
H.C.	C Med.	116	100
K.S.	C Med.	133	115
D.W.	C Med.	133	115
M.B.	B High	146	126
J.B.	B Med.	82	68
An.B.	B Med.	82	68
T.M.	B Med.	83	69

Exs. 1A-B, 3, 4 to Frederick Decl. (docket no. 40); see also id. at ¶ 3; Exs. 1-4 to Jane B. Decl. (docket no. 33); see also id. at ¶¶ 4a-4d; Exs. 1-2 to S.J. Decl. (docket no. 27); Ex. 2 to Paolino Decl. (docket no. 45); see also id. at ¶ 20; Ex. 1A to C.B. Decl. (docket no. 29); see also id. at ¶ 22; Exs. 1-2 to Chatwin Decl. (docket no. 48); Ex. 1 to K.S. Decl. (docket no. 36); see also id. at ¶ 14; Ex. 1A to D.W. Decl. (docket

<sup>8</sup> Prior to the State's reduction, DSHS granted an ETR to A.R. that authorized an additional 165 hours beyond the 157 allocated to A.R. through her CARE assessment. Exs. 2-4 to Frederick Decl. (docket no. 40). This adjustment via ETR has the same effect as assigning A.R. to acuity subgroup E Medium.

<sup>9</sup> The State has subsequently reduced A.B.'s hours to 146 because her previous CARE assessment had not properly reduced available hours to account for the fact that A.B. resides with three siblings who also receive personal care services. Ex. 1 to 4th Jane B. Decl. (docket no. 167-8); see also WAC 388-106-0130(3)(a). A.B. retains the right to appeal this reduction. Ex. 2 to 4th Jane B. Decl. (docket no. 167-9).

<sup>10</sup> Plaintiff M.J.B. has been approved for an ETR that will increase her base hours. Mot. at 12 n.13 (docket no. 95).

no. 31); see also id. at ¶ 19; Ex. 1 to Hays Decl. (docket no. 39); see also id. at ¶ 21; Maxon Decl. at ¶¶ 5, 18 (docket no. 26); Ex. 2 to Hayes Decl. (docket no. 47). None of the individual named plaintiffs satisfies the criteria for “exceptional” care, a prerequisite to placement in the highest need acuity category, Group E. Most require only mild to moderate assistance with activities of daily living. DSHS sent written notifications to all beneficiaries of the planned service reductions on December 6, 2010. See Ex. 1 to Brenneke Decl. at 2-3 (docket no. 12).

### **PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

This litigation ensued shortly after DSHS sent out the service reduction notices. On December 23, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Mot. (docket no. 11). After extensive briefing and oral argument on an expedited schedule, on December 30, 2010, the Court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. Minute Order (docket no. 73); Order (docket no. 76).

On January 6, 2011, plaintiffs appealed the Court’s order denying the temporary restraining order, thereby creating ambiguity as to the jurisdiction of both this Court, and the Ninth Circuit. Notice of Appeal (docket no. 78); see also Order at 3, M.R. v. Dreyfus, No. 11-35026 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2011) (Smith, N.R., J., dissenting). Because of the jurisdictional ambiguity, this Court stayed the case pending review by the Ninth Circuit, and struck, without prejudice, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Minute Order (docket no. 80).

1 On January 10, 2011, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion with the Ninth  
2 Circuit, seeking an injunction pending the appeal. On January 14, 2011, the Ninth  
3 Circuit granted relief, but not in the form of an injunction pending appeal. Order, M.R.  
4 v. Dreyfus, No. 11-35026 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2011). Rather, the Ninth Circuit stayed the  
5 State's implementation of the emergency regulation pending a ruling by this Court on  
6 plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Id.

## 8 **DISCUSSION**

### 9 **A. Standard for a Preliminary Injunction**

10 In order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate  
11 (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm in the  
12 absence of preliminary relief; (3) a balance of equities tipping in favor of relief; and  
13 (4) a weighing of public interest that supports an injunction. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376;  
14 see also Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 2011 WL 208360 (9th Cir. Jan. 25,  
15 2011) (holding that the Ninth Circuit's "sliding scale" approach continues to be valid  
16 after Winter).<sup>11</sup> A preliminary injunction is "an extraordinary remedy never awarded  
17 as of right." Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376.

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22 <sup>11</sup> Under the sliding scale approach, "serious questions going to the merits' and a balance of  
23 hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary  
24 injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury  
25 and that the injunction is in the public interest." Id. at \*7. In the present case, the parties do  
26 not address whether the Court should apply the Ninth Circuit's sliding scale approach.  
Nonetheless, the Court concludes that application of the alternative standard would not lead to  
a different result.

1           **B.     Irreparable Harm**<sup>12</sup>

2           To show a likelihood of irreparable harm, plaintiffs argue they need only show  
3 that the State’s proposed reduction “may deny them needed medical care.” See  
4 Beltran v. Myers, 677 F.2d 1317, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Independent Living  
5 Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolley, 572 F.3d 644, 658 (9th Cir. 2009) (hereinafter  
6 Independent Living Ctr. I).<sup>13</sup> In the alternative, plaintiffs argue they need only show a  
7 “serious risk” of eventual institutionalization to show a likelihood of irreparable harm.  
8  
9 Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2003).

10  
11           Plaintiffs contend that they have satisfied the standards for irreparable harm  
12 because (1) CARE is an individualized assessment of the minimum number of hours

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14 <sup>12</sup> In their brief, and at oral argument, plaintiffs contended that the Ninth Circuit has already  
15 concluded that plaintiffs have shown irreparable harm, and consequently, this Court is bound  
16 by that determination. But the Ninth Circuit did not analyze the substance of plaintiffs’  
17 request for injunctive relief, and declined to issue a temporary restraining order. Order, M.R.  
18 v. Dreyfus, No. 11-35026 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2011). Instead, the Ninth Circuit issued only a  
19 stay pending this Court’s consideration of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Id.  
Accordingly, the question of irreparable harm remains undecided for this Court’s  
determination. Cf. Independent Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 2008 WL 3891211 at \*5  
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that Ninth Circuit’s order remanding case for a determination on  
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction was binding as to issue of irreparable harm  
where Ninth Circuit issued an injunction pending further review by the district court).

20 <sup>13</sup> The standard articulated in Beltran and Independent Living Ctr. I is not applicable in this  
21 case because personal care services are not included within Medicaid’s definition of “medical  
22 care.” Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(6) (definition of medical care) with 42 U.S.C.  
23 § 1396d(a)(24) (definition of personal care services). For example, in Beltran, the State  
24 imposed a rule that completely eliminated eligibility to a class of individuals for Medicaid  
25 services. 677 F.2d at 1318 (denying eligibility for medical care to individuals who transferred  
26 assets in order to become eligible for assistance). Similarly, in Independent Living Ctr. I, the  
evidence demonstrated that medical providers would cease providing services to Medicaid  
beneficiaries if the State went forward with its proposed ten percent reduction in  
reimbursement rates. 572 F.3d at 658. In the present case, plaintiffs do not face a similar  
reduction or elimination of medical services.

1 beneficiaries actually require to remain safely in their homes, and therefore, any  
2 reduction of the hours assessed by CARE will necessarily deny the plaintiffs needed  
3 services and will pose a serious risk of institutionalization; or (2) even if CARE does  
4 not assess beneficiaries' minimum needs, the individual declarations of the named and  
5 unnamed plaintiffs demonstrate that, at least as to them, the budget reduction will deny  
6 them needed services and pose a serious risk of institutionalization. The Court  
7 concludes that plaintiffs have failed to submit evidence that the reduction will deny  
8 beneficiaries needed services, or that it will create a serious risk of institutionalization,  
9 and therefore, plaintiffs cannot show likelihood of irreparable harm under either  
10 standard.<sup>14</sup>

13 **1. CARE Does Not Assess Beneficiaries' Actual Minimum Needs**  
14 **for Personal Care Services**

15 Plaintiffs take the position that DSHS uses CARE to individually assess the  
16 minimum number of hours that each beneficiary actually requires, and that any cuts in  
17 base hours will necessarily provide beneficiaries with less assistance than they  
18 absolutely need to preserve health and safety. Plaintiffs contention that CARE  
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21 <sup>14</sup> In addition, to establish standing necessary to obtain injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show  
22 that the likely irreparable harm relates to harm that the plaintiff "has sustained or is  
23 immediately in danger of sustaining." *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02  
24 (1983). The threat of injury must be "real and immediate." *Id.* "Abstract injury is not  
25 enough." *Id.* The Supreme Court's heightened requirement for injury in cases involving  
26 injunctive relief is particularly relevant here, where plaintiffs seek an order from a federal  
court enjoining the State from implementing a State policy. *Lyons*, 461 U.S. at 112 (noting  
that respect for principles of federalism require heightened showing of potential harm for  
plaintiffs to obtain federal injunctive relief of official state action).

1 assesses the “minimum” hours each beneficiary needs is misplaced. CARE does not  
2 assess beneficiaries’ minimum needs for personal care services.

3  
4 Although the Court agrees that CARE involves an individualized assessment,  
5 the number of base hours allotted to each of the seventeen acuity subgroups is not  
6 linked to individual need.<sup>15</sup> Rather, the subgroups reflect the relative acuity of  
7 individuals, with beneficiaries in classifications that receive more base hours having  
8 more need for personal care services relative to those in categories associated with  
9 lower numbers of base hours.<sup>16</sup> See Moss Decl. at ¶ 4 (docket no. 68) (“CARE does  
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11 <sup>15</sup> The base hours outlined in WAC 388-106-0125 are based on the time study performed prior  
12 to the adoption of CARE. In that study, the department measured the amount of time  
13 providers spent assisting beneficiaries with their personal care needs. Moss Decl. at ¶ 3  
14 (docket no. 68). DSHS then correlated the time spent by providers with the clinical  
15 characteristics of the beneficiaries involved in the study to determine the relative resource  
16 usage of beneficiaries with similar characteristics. *Id.* The study did not, and indeed could  
17 not, describe or predict the actual number of hours any specific beneficiary might need to  
perform specific tasks. Rector Decl. at ¶ 6 (docket no. 125); Mahar Decl. at ¶ 6 (docket  
no. 130). To the contrary, the study merely showed that individuals with certain clinical  
characteristics require more (or less) personal care service hours than individuals with  
different clinical characteristics.

18 <sup>16</sup> Construing CARE as assessing only relative need is consistent with the history of CARE,  
19 which DSHS implemented in 2004 in response to the legislature’s direction to create a  
20 uniform system for comprehensively assessing functional disability. RCW 74.39.005(2).  
21 Prior to 2004, the department used an assessment tool (“Legacy”) that was subjective and  
22 unreliable. Moss Decl. at ¶ 5 (docket no. 68); Rector Decl. at ¶ 7 (docket no. 125). The  
23 legislature directed DSHS to create a more uniform assessment tool based on objective  
24 criteria that would allocate resources more consistently and thereby ensure that individuals  
25 with similar clinical characteristics would be awarded a similar number of personal care  
26 service hours. Leitch Decl. at ¶ 7 (docket no. 67); Mahar Decl. at ¶ 5 (docket no. 130) (“A  
primary goal for the redesign of the assessment tool was to develop classification levels that  
would ensure that clients who had the same clinical characteristics would fall within the same  
classification system and receive the same level of services.”). DSHS made the transition  
from Legacy to CARE in a “budget-neutral” manner, dividing the then-available resources  
between the various categories of recipients. See Leitch Decl. at ¶ 7 (docket no. 67). One of  
the negative consequences of a shift from a subjective assessment to an objective assessment  
is the loss of flexibility in dealing with individuals’ unique circumstances. Jenkins v. Dep’t of

1 not measure how many hours a person ‘needs,’ but instead determines what a person’s  
2 share of available resources should be based upon the individual’s level of acuity  
3 compared to other recipients.”).<sup>17</sup>  
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5 Similarly, the subsequent evaluation of other factors, performed after the CARE  
6 assessment assigns a beneficiary to an acuity classification subgroup, see WAC 388-  
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11 *Soc. & Health Servs.*, 160 Wn.2d 287, 310, 157 P.3d 388 (2007) (Fairhurst, J., dissenting)  
12 (“The price of uniformity is that fit may be imprecise in a particular individual’s  
circumstances.”).

13 <sup>17</sup> The Court has carefully reviewed the contrary assertions in the declarations of Charles  
14 Reed and Penny Black, filed by plaintiffs in support of their motion. Mr. Reed, however, has  
15 no personal knowledge about DSHS’s development and implementation of CARE because he  
16 retired from DSHS in 2000, before CARE was developed. Reed Decl. at ¶ 6 (docket no. 18).  
17 In contrast, Ms. Black was employed by DSHS in 2004, when it transitioned to CARE. Black  
18 Decl. at ¶ 4 (docket no. 19). In her current declaration, Ms. Black states that “[t]he CARE  
19 assessment tool produces an accurate measure of essential need. . . . [It] is designed to, has  
20 proven effective to, and is used by [DSHS] to measure the unmet needs that must minimally  
21 be met in order to support a client in his or her home without compromising health or safety.”  
22 *Id.* at ¶ 28. While she was still employed by DSHS, however, Ms. Black provided a  
23 declaration to the Washington State Court of Appeals in connection with an unrelated case.  
24 *See* Black Decl. (Apr. 11, 2005), attached to Work Decl. (docket no. 71). In Ms. Black’s  
25 earlier declaration, she averred that, “[f]ollowing the assessment, eligible individuals are  
26 classified into fourteen groups that reflect the intensity of care that is needed. This  
classification results in a baseline determination of the number of hours of in-home care  
[DSHS] *may be able to fund.*” *Id.* at ¶ 10 (emphasis added). Thus, Ms. Black’s current  
testimony, that CARE is an individualized determination of actual need, appears to be  
inconsistent with her testimony when she was employed by DSHS, which suggested that the  
base hour classification is not based on need, but rather on the number of “hours of in-home  
care that the Department may be able to fund.” In any event, on balance, the Court gives  
more weight to the testimony of current DSHS officials, and a plain reading of the  
Washington statute and regulations, than to the declarations of Mr. Reed and Ms. Black, and  
concludes that plaintiffs have not met their burden of producing evidence that CARE  
evaluates beneficiaries’ minimum needs for personal care services.

1 106-0130 (2010), does not take into consideration a beneficiary's actual individual  
2 needs when arriving at a final number of authorized personal care service hours.<sup>18</sup>

3  
4 Moreover, construing CARE as an individualized assessment of a beneficiary's  
5 actual minimum needs cannot be squared with other facts. For example, the parties do  
6 not dispute that the ETR process provides beneficiaries with a process for requesting,  
7 through their case manager, an increase in the number of personal care service hours  
8 over the amount authorized under CARE. See Moss Decl. at ¶ 9 (docket no. 68);  
9 Rector Decl. at ¶ 9 (docket no. 125). If plaintiffs were correct in their contention that  
10 CARE assesses each beneficiary's actual needs, the ETR process would be superfluous  
11 because beneficiaries would never require more hours than the amount they have been  
12 assessed by CARE.<sup>19</sup>

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15 <sup>18</sup> For example, if a beneficiary's residence does not have on-site laundry facilities, the  
16 beneficiary automatically receives an additional eight hours of personal care services, without  
17 regard to whether the nearest laundry facilities are across the street or across town. See WAC  
18 388-106-130(6) (2010) (noting that client is entitled to eight hours of additional personal care  
19 services so long as laundry facilities are located offsite, i.e., where the client does not have  
20 facilities in his or her own home, and as a consequence, the caregiver is not available to  
21 perform other services while laundry is done). Similarly, CARE provides for an additional  
22 eight hours of personal care services per month when a beneficiary uses wood as his or her  
23 sole source of heat. Id. The additional eight hours per month amounts to sixteen minutes per  
24 day in a typical month, more than enough in June, but likely insufficient in November.  
25 Moreover, the Court notes that a beneficiary located in Spokane will almost certainly require  
26 more assistance with stoking a fire through the winter than will a beneficiary located in more  
temperate Seattle. Nonetheless, the regulations would automatically award both such  
beneficiaries eight additional personal care service hours per month.

<sup>19</sup> Other structural components of CARE make it illogical to conclude that it determines  
beneficiaries' minimum needs. For example, plaintiffs do not dispute the State's assertion  
that CARE's acuity classification subgroups are comprised of individuals with a wide range  
of ADL limitations. Thus, for example, all individuals who meet the clinical complexity and  
cognitive performance requisites to warrant placement in Group C, and who also have an  
ADL score of between nine and seventeen, are placed into subgroup C-Medium. WAC 388-



1 Also relevant is the State's four percent reduction in personal care service hours  
2 in 2009. Plaintiffs dismiss the 2009 reduction as incomparable to the present case  
3 because it was smaller. But logic fundamentally dictates that, plaintiffs' contention,  
4 that CARE determines minimum individual need is true, the 2009 reduction,  
5 regardless of size, must have necessarily resulted in institutionalization or injury to  
6 every single personal care service beneficiary in the State of Washington. Not only  
7 have the plaintiffs failed to present any such evidence,<sup>20</sup> at oral argument, plaintiffs  
8 conceded that the admittedly larger 2011 reduction will not lead to injury or  
9 institutionalization for every beneficiary in Washington.  
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14 106-0125(3)(c). Consequently, two individuals that have the exact same clinical complexity  
15 and cognitive performance are assigned to subgroup C-Medium, even if one has an ADL  
16 score of nine (indicating only a moderate need for assistance with daily activities) while the  
17 other has an ADL score of seventeen (indicating a serious need of assistance with daily  
18 activities). *Id.*; *see also* Rector Decl. at ¶ 11 (docket no. 125) (stating that the 10,000  
19 individuals currently classified in subgroup C-Medium range significantly in the amount of  
20 assistance needed to perform ADLs and IADLS). Thus, despite having greater need for  
21 services, a beneficiary with an ADL score of seventeen receives no more personal care service  
22 base hours than others in the C-Medium subgroup.

23 <sup>20</sup> Indeed, the only evidence in the record is that the 2009 reduction *did not* result in any  
24 negative consequences to personal care service beneficiaries. Moss Decl. at ¶ 8 (docket  
25 no. 68) ("When personal care hours were reduced for all recipients effective July 1, 2009, the  
26 negative consequences predicted by plaintiffs did not occur. Health and safety were not  
compromised, and people were not forced into nursing homes due to lack of personal care  
services."). The increases in base hours that took effect in 2010, replacing some of the hours  
that the State eliminated in the 2009 reductions, also contradict plaintiffs' position. Plaintiffs  
point to no assessment of individual needs that triggered the rise in base hours. Instead, the  
record suggests that the 2010 increases resulted merely from a budget surplus, negating any  
link between the numbers of base hours and what is "necessary in order to meet the  
individually-assessed needs of the client and to permit the client to remain safely at home."  
Reed Decl. at ¶ 30 (docket no. 18).

1 Plaintiffs' concession is consistent with the statistical information submitted by  
2 the State. In a review of a sample of the records related to Medicaid beneficiaries who  
3 joined Washington's personal care services program after the reductions went into  
4 effect on January 1, 2011, over 99%<sup>21</sup> of the sampled records reflected no complaint  
5 concerning the adequacy of allotted hours. See 2d McNeill Decl. at ¶ 11 (docket  
6 no. 132).

8 Plaintiffs argue that CARE assesses beneficiaries' minimum needs,  
9 notwithstanding the structural and logical inconsistencies that result from that  
10 conclusion. In support of their contention, plaintiffs cite to a number of documents in  
11 which department officials suggest that CARE is a method of determining need. See  
12 generally Exs. 3, 4 to 3d Brenneke Decl. (docket no. 120); Exs. 3-4 to 4th Brenneke  
13 Decl. (docket no. 121); Exs. 3, 5 to Logan-von Wahlde Decl. (docket no. 117); Ex. 2  
14 to Black Decl. (docket no. 19); Ex. 2 to 5th Brenneke Decl. (docket no. 144).

16 Plaintiffs' reliance on the various cited documentary and testimonial exhibits for the  
17 proposition that CARE uses an individualized assessment to measure needs is  
18 misleading. Although the cited documents do generally reference individualized  
19 assessments and beneficiary needs, the documents do not specifically address the  
20 purpose of the individualized assessment, or the need that is actually being measured.

22 DSHS's submission, and the very structure of CARE itself, demonstrate that CARE

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24 <sup>21</sup> DSHS reviewed the records of 160 out of the 409 new and reactivated clients with care  
25 plans completed after January 1, 2011. 2d McNeill Decl. at ¶ 11 (docket no. 132). Of that  
26 total, only one indicated that the client felt that the CARE assessment did not allot an  
adequate number of personal care service hours. Id.

1 uses individual assessments to measure the relative needs of beneficiaries, i.e., how  
2 much a beneficiary needs personal care service relative to beneficiaries with different  
3 functional limitations. The assessment of relative needs permits the State to fairly  
4 allocate a limited pool of resources, and to give preference to beneficiaries with the  
5 highest functional limitations.<sup>22</sup>

7 Finally, the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in Jenkins v. Wash. Dep’t of  
8 Soc. & Health Servs., 160 Wn.2d 287, 157 P.3d 388 (2007), does not require a  
9 contrary result. In Jenkins, the court addressed a provision in the CARE regulations  
10 that automatically reduced a beneficiary’s personal care service hours by fifteen  
11 percent if the beneficiary lived with his or her caregiver (the “shared living rule”). Id.  
12 at 295. Three beneficiaries challenged the shared living rule, arguing that it violated  
13 Medicaid’s comparability requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B),<sup>23</sup> because  
14 beneficiaries who lived with their caregiver did not receive the same number of  
15 personal care service hours as beneficiaries who did not live with their caregiver, even  
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18 <sup>22</sup> Plaintiffs suggest that, if CARE does not determine minimum needs, it violates federal laws  
19 that prohibit the provision of unnecessary medical services, as well as CMS directives that  
20 require States to make determinations on coverage based on individualized needs  
21 assessments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (state plan must “provide such methods and  
22 procedures . . . as may be necessary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care  
23 and services.”); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(33)(A), (a)(37); 42 C.F.R. §§ 456.22-.23;  
24 Ex. D to Hamburger Decl. (docket no. 151); Ex. 5 to 3d Brenneke Decl. (docket no. 120).  
Nonetheless, when pressed at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel expressly declined to argue  
that CARE, and by extension Washington’s entire personal care services program, is invalid  
under federal law because individual needs are not evaluated. As the plaintiffs have elected  
not to press the issue, the Court will not address it.

25 <sup>23</sup> The comparability provision mandates that the medical assistance a State provides for any  
26 individual “shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assistance  
available to any other such individual.” Id.

1 within the same acuity subgroup. The court agreed, holding that the shared living rule  
2 violated Medicaid's comparability provision because some recipients were treated  
3 differently from other recipients where each had the same level of need. *Id.* at 297  
4 (citing *Schott v. Olszewski*, 401 F.3d 682, 688-89 (6th Cir. 2005)). In this case,  
5 however, unlike in *Jenkins*, the State is treating individuals within the same acuity  
6 group similarly. *Jenkins* is therefore inapposite, to the extent it involved disparate  
7 treatment of similarly situated beneficiaries.  
8

9 In addition, however, the *Jenkins* court also held that the shared living rule  
10 violated Medicaid's comparability requirement because it reduced benefits based on  
11 considerations other than recipients' actual needs for services. *Jenkins*, 160 Wn.2d at  
12 298-300 ("Once a person is assessed to require and receive a certain number of care  
13 hours, the assessment cannot be reduced absent a specific showing that fewer hours are  
14 required."").  
15

16 Plaintiffs argue that under the second, alternative reasoning articulated in  
17 *Jenkins*, the State may not reduce benefits without assessing beneficiaries' needs. The  
18 Court construes the alternative reasoning articulated in *Jenkins* as dicta because it was  
19 unnecessary to the Court's holding. *United States v. Henderson*, 961 F.2d 880, 882  
20 (9th Cir. 1992) (defining dicta as language that is unnecessary to the court's  
21 holding).<sup>24</sup> To the extent that the language could be read otherwise, the Court declines  
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25 <sup>24</sup> In addition, the *Jenkins* opinion cites no authority for the broad proposition that Medicaid's  
26 comparability provision requires the State to perform individualized needs assessments. *See*  
*Jenkins*, 160 Wn.2d at 298-300. This Court cannot adopt the reasoning in *Jenkins* when the  
plain language of Medicaid's comparability provision (which only requires States to provide

1 to defer to the state court’s determination on a question of federal law.<sup>25</sup> Congoleum  
2 Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1984); RAR, Inc. v.  
3 Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 n.1 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is nonetheless  
4 beyond cavil that [federal courts] are not bound by a state court’s interpretation of  
5 federal law, regardless of whether [the court’s] jurisdiction is based on diversity of  
6 citizenship or a federal question.”).

8         The fact that CARE does not determine each beneficiary’s individual minimum  
9 need for personal care services is the primary reason why plaintiffs’ heavy reliance on  
10 V.L. v. Wagner, 669 F. Supp.2d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2009), is misplaced. In V.L., the court  
11 addressed the State of California’s decision to eliminate or reduce eligibility for  
12 personal care services based on beneficiaries’ scores in functional capacity tests. Id. at  
13 1109-11. California used functional capacity testing to determine the relative needs of  
14 individuals with different disabilities. Id. at 1112 (“FI scores were intended to be used  
15 by social workers and county and state administrators ‘to compare the FI scores and FI  
16 hours of clients on their caseload.’”). As with CARE, California’s functional capacity  
17 testing was “not meant to be used as a tool to predict the number of hours an  
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21 equivalent medical assistance to similarly situated beneficiaries) does not appear to require  
22 States to perform individualized needs assessments when the State has reduced benefits in the  
23 same proportion to similarly situated individuals.

24 <sup>25</sup> Moreover, as the Court has previously noted, CARE is not an individualized assessment of  
25 a beneficiaries’ actual needs. See Jenkins, 160 Wn.2d at 315 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (“The  
26 CARE tool does not—cannot—allocate state-paid personal care services based on  
individuals’ actual need.”). Consequently, to require the State to perform an individualized  
assessment prior to reducing benefits would be nonsensical.

individual beneficiary needed.” *Id.* Unlike Washington’s method for allocating personal care service hours, however, to be eligible for California’s personal care services program, a state statute required social workers to make a determination that each beneficiary “would not be able to remain safely in his/her home without [the authorized personal care services].” *Id.* at 1111. Consequently, California’s decision to reduce services based on the relative needs assessment would necessarily result in harm, because the State had already determined that all of the program’s beneficiaries required the authorized services to remain safely in their homes, independent of the State’s functional capacity assessment. *Id.* at 1121-22. By contrast, in Washington, personal care services are authorized *exclusively* based on relative need for services, and Washington’s statutes do not require DSHS to make an individualized determination that each beneficiary needs services to remain safely in his or her home.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> For similar reasons, the Court rejects plaintiffs’ reliance on *Mayer v. Wing*, 922 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In that case, Medicaid beneficiaries located in New York received personal care services based on a physician’s determination of the number of hours the patient actually needed to preserve the patient’s health and safety. *Id.* at 905 (“On the basis of the various assessments, a medical review team determines the number of hours of care that an applicant will need.”). Washington, by contrast, has elected to provide personal care services under its state plan, rather than by physician authorization.

1                                   **2.       The State’s Budget Reduction Will Not Cause Harm to**  
2                                   **Specific Beneficiaries**

3               In support of their motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs filed  
4 approximately eighty declarations<sup>27</sup> relating to fourteen named plaintiffs and twenty-  
5 one additional unnamed potential class members. The Court may not, however,  
6 consider evidence of injury to non-parties because in the Ninth Circuit, “system-wide  
7 injunctive relief is not available based on alleged injuries to unnamed members of a  
8 proposed class.” *Hodgers-Durkin v. de la Vina*, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999)  
9 (en banc).<sup>28</sup> Thus, the Court will only address in detail, in this Order, the harm, or  
10 threat of harm, alleged by the remaining twelve<sup>29</sup> named plaintiffs.  
11

12               With respect to the individual named plaintiffs, plaintiffs’ counsel suggests that  
13 the Court, in its previous Order denying plaintiffs’ request for a TRO, discounted or  
14 trivialized the severity of the various plaintiffs’ medical conditions by treating their  
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18 \_\_\_\_\_  
19 <sup>27</sup> The Court reduced that number to seventy-nine when it granted defendants’ motion to  
20 strike (docket no. 158), and struck the declaration of Jennifer Wujick (docket no. 119).  
Minute Entry (docket no. 164).

21 <sup>28</sup> In an abundance of caution, however, the Court has reviewed the declarations filed on  
22 behalf of the unnamed potential class members. Plaintiffs now seek to add these individuals  
23 as plaintiffs and to amend the complaint. *See* Offer of Proof (docket no. 165). In the event  
the additional plaintiffs are joined, the Court can address their specific complaints at a later  
date.

24 <sup>29</sup> The number has been reduced from fourteen to twelve because two of the plaintiffs no  
25 longer face a threat of harm. Plaintiff M.J.B. has received an ETR increasing her hours and  
26 plaintiff H.C. passed away on January 15, 2011, for reasons unrelated to the issues presented  
in this case.

1 allegations of harm as merely speculation.<sup>30</sup> Mot. at 13 (docket no. 95). To the  
2 contrary, nothing in the Court’s Order should be construed as minimizing the severe  
3 disabilities of any of the individual named plaintiffs, or the importance of the services  
4 provided through the State’s programs. Nonetheless, although the Court has  
5 thoughtfully considered the allegations in each of the plaintiffs’ declarations, in light  
6 of the prevailing standards for injunctive relief, the Court cannot conclude that  
7 plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of irreparable harm. In particular, the declarations  
8 relating to the individual named plaintiffs fail to show a threat of harm because they  
9 (1) ascribe the threat of institutionalization to plaintiffs’ deteriorating medical  
10 conditions, unrelated to the provision of personal care service hours; (2) demonstrate  
11 ineffective management of currently allocated personal care service hours; or (3)  
12 identify non-personal care services as the cause of their predicted institutionalization.  
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16 a. Deteriorating Medical Conditions

17 With respect to nine of the named plaintiffs, M.R., S.J., A.B., An.B., M.B., J.B.,  
18 J.H., D.W., and C.B., the record reflects that their medical conditions have deteriorated  
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20 <sup>30</sup> Plaintiffs cite to *Winter* for the proposition that specific, predictive judgments are not  
21 speculative, and may be considered by the Court in determining a likelihood of irreparable  
22 harm. 129 S. Ct. at 378. In *Winter*, the Supreme Court addressed a proposed injunction that  
23 would require naval vessels engaged in military exercises to suspend use of certain types of  
24 sonar when vessels detected marine mammals within a specified distance. *Id.* at 371. The  
25 Court held that the testimony from military officers regarding the effect of the injunction,  
26 based on their *actual experience* with similar (although not identical) interruptions in the use  
of sonar during training exercises, was not speculation, but rather, a specific, predictive  
judgment. *Id.* at 380. Here, unlike in *Winter*, the plaintiffs do not support their formulaic  
recitation of “likely” harm (which the Court notes is repeated verbatim or nearly verbatim  
throughout the various declarations) with the type of specific evidence that would render the  
opinions specific, predictive judgments, rather than mere speculation.



1 since their last CARE assessment. See Maxon Decl. at ¶¶ 20, 29 (docket no. 26)  
2 (M.R.); 2d Maxon Decl. at ¶¶ 4-13, 18 (docket no. 102) (M.R.); S.J. Decl. at ¶ 20  
3 (docket no. 27); 2d Braddock Decl. at ¶ 3 (docket no. 100) (S.J.); C.B. Decl. at ¶ 23  
4 (docket no. 29); 2d Hayes Decl. at ¶ 7 (docket no. 103) (J.H.); 2d Jane B. Decl. at ¶¶ 6,  
5 6a, 6b (docket no. 96) (A.B., M.B., An.B. & J.B.); D.W. Decl. at ¶ 6 (docket no. 31)  
6 (noting that, after latest assessment took place in September 2010, D.W. was  
7 hospitalized for ten days in December 2010 for a heart attack); McIntosh Decl. at ¶ 7  
8 (docket no. 32) (D.W.). Consequently, the Court is unable to determine whether the  
9 alleged threat of institutionalization these particular plaintiffs face is the result of the  
10 State's reduction in personal care service hours or the deterioration in their medical  
11 conditions.<sup>31</sup>  
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15 <sup>31</sup> Even if the Court could conclude that the allegations in the declarations relating to these  
16 nine individual plaintiffs raised questions of potential harm resulting from the planned  
17 reductions, the State submitted evidence controverting the possibility of any harm. See  
18 McNeill Decl. at ¶ 6 (docket no. 131) (M.R.); Peterson Decl. (docket no. 127) (S.J.); Harper  
19 Decl. (docket no. 128) (A.B., An.B., J.B., M.B.); Chan Decl. (docket no. 129) (J.H.). For  
20 example, defendants submitted undisputed evidence that J.H. requested new living  
21 arrangements because his live-in provider, Ms. Hayes, refused to allow him to contact family  
22 members, and he no longer felt safe. Chan Decl. at ¶ 6 (docket no. 129). Although  
23 Ms. Hayes disputes the underlying facts, i.e., whether she refused to allow J.H. to contact  
24 family members, plaintiffs submit no evidence controverting the fact that J.H. sent a request  
25 to his case manager to change his living arrangements. Consequently, his placement in a  
26 nursing facility is unrelated to the number of hours DSHS has allocated for his care in 2011,  
but rather is based on the availability of temporary care options following J.H.'s emergency  
removal from his living arrangements. Id. ¶ 9. Moreover, many of the allegations in  
plaintiffs' declarations appear to be purely speculative. For example, one of A.B.'s providers,  
Jeanine Starr, testifies that the reduction in services "could result in the need for [A.B.] to seek  
emergency room care and [A.B.] will likely be admitted to a nursing home at that point."  
Starr Decl. at ¶ 26 (docket no. 34) (emphasis added). The chain of events described in  
Ms. Starr's declaration is speculative at best, and does not demonstrate a likelihood of  
irreparable harm.

b. Inefficient Use of Currently Allocated Personal Care Service Hours

The record reflects that, in response to the State's budget cuts, plaintiffs K.S. and A.R. have reduced or eliminated their weekend care provider hours. K.S. Decl. at ¶ 15 (docket no. 36); Albert Decl. at ¶ 12 (docket no. 37) (K.S.); Frederick Decl. at ¶ 18 (docket no. 40) (A.R.). Prior to the reduction, K.S. received 133 personal care service hours, which she apportioned 93 hours to her weekday provider, and 40 hours to her weekend provider. K.S. Decl. at ¶¶ 14-15 (docket no. 36); Morrow Decl. at ¶ 5 (docket no. 38). Although DSHS only reduced K.S.'s hours by 18, she responded by releasing her weekend provider entirely. K.S. Decl. at ¶ 6 (docket no. 36); Albert Decl. at ¶ 12 (docket no. 37). Now K.S. is receiving more hours during the week than she previously received (115 instead of 93), but has no coverage on the weekend, which she contends will result in harm. 3d K.S. Decl. at ¶ 7 (docket no. 145); 2d K.S. Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 6 (docket no. 97). The State responds that, rather than simply releasing her weekend provider, K.S. could have worked with her case manager to develop a schedule with shorter gaps between care. *See* 2d McNeill Decl. at ¶¶ 6-7 (docket no. 132). The Court concludes that a factual dispute exists as to whether the cause of K.S.'s lack of weekend services could be resolved by effective case management.

Similarly, the decision by A.R.'s guardian, Ms. Frederick, to eliminate care provider hours on Sundays appears to be an issue that might be addressed through case management. Specifically, Ms. Frederick decided to cut out one day of care on the weekend because it was "inconvenient for [the provider]" to work a partial shift on

1 Sunday. 2d Frederick Decl. at ¶ 5 (docket no. 113). The State agrees that the lack of  
2 assistance on Sundays could create a problem for A.R.'s health or safety, particularly  
3 given Ms. Frederick's inability to assist with A.R.'s care. 2d McNeill Decl. at ¶ 5  
4 (docket no. 132). But the State notes that Frederick should not have simply acceded to  
5 the provider's request to eliminate a partial Sunday shift for convenience reasons. *Id.*  
6 The Court can only conclude that the declarations relating to A.R. do not suggest a  
7 likelihood of irreparable injury because, until the State has had the opportunity to  
8 correct the gap in care through case management, the Court cannot determine whether  
9 the threat of harm is the result of the State's reduction, or the decision by A.R.'s  
10 guardian to give preference to the provider's convenience over A.R.'s care needs.  
11

12 These plaintiffs' apparent failure to contact their case managers about their  
13 concerns is particularly noteworthy. *See* 2d McNeill Decl. at ¶ 3 (docket no. 132).  
14 Rather than giving the State the opportunity to correct any gaps in care, these plaintiffs  
15 appear to assume that the reduction will result in harm and that the only alternative to  
16 reinstatement of their hours is institutionalization.  
17

18  
19 c. Non-Personal Care Services

20 Plaintiff T.M.'s provider, a family member who currently lives with T.M., is  
21 concerned that as a result of the State's reduction in T.M.'s personal care service hours  
22 from eight-three to sixty-nine, she will have no alternative but to seek other  
23 employment outside the home. Hays Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 6 (docket no. 39). She believes  
24 that if she is forced to take a position outside the home, T.M. faces a significant threat  
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26

1 of institutionalization because T.M. needs constant supervision and “is incapable of  
2 staying safe while alone for more than a few minutes.” *Id.* at ¶ 6. Plaintiffs M.R.,  
3 A.B., M.B., and A.R. likewise argue that they face a threat of institutionalization  
4 because the budget reduction will reduce available services for supervision, exercise,  
5 and medication management. Maxon Decl. at ¶ 26 (docket no. 26) (M.R.); Starr Decl.  
6 at ¶ 26 (docket no. 34) (A.B.); Jane B. Decl. at ¶ 23 (docket no. 33) (A.B., M.B.);  
7 Partridge Decl. at ¶¶ 5b, 28 (docket no. 35) (M.B.); Frederick Decl. at ¶ 18 (docket  
8 no. 40) (A.R.). But personal care services do not include supervision, exercise, or  
9 medication management. *See* WAC 388-106-0010 (defining personal care services as  
10 “physical or verbal assistance with activities of daily living (ADL) and instrumental  
11 activities of daily living (IADL) due to your functional limitations.”).<sup>32</sup> Plaintiffs  
12 cannot show a likelihood of irreparable harm based on factors that are unrelated to the  
13 reduction in personal care services.<sup>33</sup>

14 Plaintiffs have not shown that the budget reduction might deny any of the  
15 individual named plaintiffs needed services, or that it poses a serious risk of  
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20 <sup>32</sup> Although regulations define ADLs as including assistance with certain locomotion, the  
21 Court understands the regulations to refer to transit between living spaces or areas within  
22 living spaces, not the type of exercise necessary to preserve a beneficiary’s health, which is  
23 more akin to physical therapy. *See* WAC 388-106-0010; Harper Decl. at ¶ 10 (docket  
24 no. 128) (noting that personal care services do not include assistance with exercise); *see also*  
25 2d McNeill Decl. at ¶ 8 (docket no. 132) (noting that personal care services do not include  
26 supervision).

<sup>33</sup> None of these plaintiffs are in the highest acuity classification subgroup (*see supra* Table 2  
at 9) (T.M. – B Medium; M.R. – D Medium-High; A.B. – D Medium; M.B. – B High; and  
A.R. – B Medium-High) and could ask for either a reclassification to a higher subgroup, or an  
ETR, which could address any problems caused by service reductions.

1 institutionalization.<sup>34</sup> On balance, in reviewing the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’  
2 declarations, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiffs have shown by a preponderance  
3 of the evidence that the allegations contained in plaintiffs’ declarations are more likely  
4 true than the contrary allegations in the defendants’ declarations. Accordingly, the  
5 Court cannot conclude that plaintiffs have shown the likelihood of irreparable injury  
6 necessary to justify a preliminary injunction.  
7

### 8 **C. Likelihood of Success on the Merits**

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10 Although plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm, the  
11 Court has also considered the likelihood of success on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims  
12 that the decreases in personal care service hours violate the Due Process Clause of the  
13 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Americans with  
14 Disabilities Act, and the Medicaid Act, and has concluded that plaintiffs have failed to  
15 meet their burden on that prong of the preliminary injunction analysis as well.  
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20 <sup>34</sup> Plaintiffs argue that the Court need not rely on the individual plaintiffs’ showing of  
21 potential harm because the department has conceded that the cuts will result in individuals  
22 moving to nursing homes. *See* Ex. 4 to Brenneke Decl. (docket no. 12-8 at 7) (excerpt from  
23 the State’s policy plan noting that “[i]n some cases, a safe in-home plan of care will not be  
24 possible and clients may need to go to community residential or nursing facility settings.”).  
25 At oral argument, defendants did concede that some beneficiaries might require more care  
26 than the amount allocated after the reduction, and thus may end up moving into a nursing  
home at some future time. Defendants argue, however, that these issues can be resolved by  
effective case management, and use of the ETR process. The Court concludes that it cannot  
determine on the present record whether the claimed “serious risk” of institutionalization is  
the result of the hours reduction or plaintiffs’ failure to properly manage otherwise adequate  
resources.

1                   **1.     Due Process Claim**

2                   Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, formerly addressed with  
3 little detail,<sup>35</sup> is now the centerpiece of their argument in favor of a preliminary  
4 injunction. Now, for the first time, in their brief filed on January 21, 2011 (docket  
5 no. 95), plaintiffs contend that the Due Process Clause entitles them to notice of (1) the  
6 right to request an ETR if the reduced hours are insufficient to meet their health and  
7 safety needs; (2) the right to a CARE reassessment; and (3) the availability of  
8 alternative Medicaid benefits, such as nursing homes. The Due Process Clause does  
9 not, however, require the State to provide notice of the specific information sought by  
10 the plaintiffs. Moreover, as previously noted in the Court's Order denying plaintiffs'  
11 motion for a preliminary injunction, Medicaid recipients are not entitled to notice and  
12 a hearing when the State implements a mass change that affects some or all recipients.  
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15                                   a.     The State Had No Obligation to Give Notice of the ETR or  
16    ARE Reassessment Processes or the Alternatives to  
17    Community-Based Care

18                   Plaintiffs argue that DSHS's service reduction notice should have identified the  
19 available alternatives to increase beneficiaries' personal care services hours, including  
20 the ETR and CARE reassessment processes, and also should have notified  
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22 <sup>35</sup> In the first round of briefing on plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order,  
23 plaintiffs devoted little more than three pages of discussion to their due process claim. Mot.  
24 at 23-25 (docket no. 11); Reply at 7-8 (docket no. 69). Moreover, although citing to the  
25 seminal United States Supreme Court cases on notice and hearing rights, *Goldberg v. Kelly*,  
26 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and *Matthews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), plaintiffs limited their  
due process analysis to whether the State had failed to comply with Medicaid's regulatory  
notice requirements when DSHS sent out the original reduction notification letters in  
December 2010.

1 beneficiaries of alternatives to community-based care. However, the hours awarded  
2 via an ETR are not an entitlement to which plaintiffs hold a legitimate property interest  
3 because, by definition, an ETR is an award of hours in excess of the amount the  
4 beneficiary is entitled to by rule. WAC 388-440-001(1)(b). Accordingly, plaintiffs  
5 have no right to notice or a hearing as to the availability of the ETR process. Bd. of  
6 Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that a beneficiary of state aid has  
7 no right to notice or a hearing unless the beneficiary has a legitimate property interest  
8 in the entitlement). With respect to the right to a reassessment, which plaintiffs  
9 contend is critical in light of the evidence of changes in their informal supports, the  
10 State may modify an existing assessment without notice or an opportunity for a  
11 hearing when a beneficiary experiences a change in available informal supports.  
12 WAC 388-106-0050(2)(c). Accordingly, the State is under no obligation to provide  
13 notice of the right to a reassessment under the present circumstances. Finally, with  
14 respect to plaintiffs' contention that the State should have provided notice of care  
15 alternatives, plaintiffs already have notice. In order to receive community-based care,  
16 plaintiffs must sign a waiver acknowledging their right to institutional care. See 2d  
17 McNeill Decl. at ¶ 12 (docket no. 132).

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22 b. The State Had No Obligation to Provide Notice and  
23 Hearing Rights for a Mass Change in Benefits

24 Although Medicaid regulations provide for notice and an opportunity to be  
25 heard in connection with certain State actions, see, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 431.200,  
26 recipients are not entitled to a hearing if the sole issue is a state law requiring an

1 automatic change affecting some or all recipients. 42 C.F.R. § 431.220(b). The  
2 limitation on the hearing requirement arises out of the practical consideration that,  
3 absent some factual dispute about an individual’s right to benefits, a hearing would  
4 serve little, if any purpose. *See Rosen v. Goetz*, 410 F.3d 919, 926 (6th Cir. 2005);  
5 *Benton v. Rhodes*, 586 F.2d 1, 3 (6th Cir. 1978) (“[M]atters of law and policy are not  
6 subject to any hearing requirements under the applicable regulations, whether the  
7 hearing be pre- or post-termination.”). Washington law is in accord, as both the statute  
8 and regulations disclaim any right to a hearing for the purpose of challenging mass  
9 changes to public benefits programs. RCW 74.08.080(1)(b) (“An applicant or  
10 recipient has no right to an adjudicative proceeding when the sole basis for the  
11 department’s decision is a state or federal law that requires an assistance adjustment  
12 for a class of recipients.”); WAC 388-418-0020(9) (noting that fair hearing rules do  
13 not apply to a mass change in medical assistance benefits).

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17 Plaintiffs appear to concede<sup>36</sup> that a mass change does not give rise to hearing  
18 rights; only changes that create disputed facts give rise to hearing rights. *See*  
19 *Washington v. DeBeaugrine*, 658 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1335 (N.D. Fla. 2002) (“Both  
20 sides have agreed further that there is no right to a hearing when there is no factual  
21 issue attending a denial or reduction in services—that is, when there is no factual issue  
22 to be heard.”). Nonetheless, plaintiffs contend that the State’s reduction in this case  
23 necessarily gives rise to factual questions as to whether individual beneficiaries will  
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25 <sup>36</sup> Mot. at 25 (docket no. 95) (noting that hearings must only be provided for challenges to  
26 service reductions that are *factually erroneous*).



1 have sufficient personal care service hours to meet their needs. While an across-the-  
2 board reduction will always raise factual questions about the effect of the reduction on  
3 specific individuals, it does not create factual questions as to the reduction itself. See,  
4 e.g., Jeneski v. Myers, 163 Cal. App. 3d 18, 32, 209 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1984) (“The initial  
5 cutback is indeed an across-the-board reduction in benefits mandated by state law and  
6 is not an individual denial thereof . . . [and therefore] we do not believe that an  
7 evidentiary hearing prior to termination was mandatory.”).<sup>37</sup> The wholesale nature of  
8 the State’s budget reduction is fatal to plaintiffs’ due process claim because an across-  
9 the-board reduction is, by its very nature, unrelated to the specific facts of any  
10 individual case, and therefore not a proper subject for an evidentiary hearing.<sup>38</sup>

13 Plaintiffs are not entitled to notice or hearing rights for an across-the-board  
14 budget reduction, and as such, have failed to show a likelihood of success on the  
15 merits of their due process claim.

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20 <sup>37</sup> Plaintiffs retain the right to request a reassessment under CARE, or to ask their case  
21 manager to request an ETR on their behalf. Both events provide for a right to grieve or appeal  
the decision. See WAC 388-106-1305; 388-440-0001(4).

22 <sup>38</sup> In the alternative, plaintiffs rely heavily on Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa.  
23 1978), for the proposition that even an across-the-board reduction of Medicaid benefits  
24 requires a hearing. In Budnicki, the court held that the State could not reduce Medicaid  
25 benefits with an across-the-board budget reduction without providing notice and an  
26 opportunity for a hearing, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(4). 450 F. Supp. at 551-52. The  
Sixth Circuit subsequently rejected the legal theory adopted in Budnicki. Benton, 586 F.2d at  
3. Moreover, the regulation at issue in Budnicki is no longer applicable. See 42 C.F.R.  
§ 431.220(b); Rosen, 410 F.3d 919, 926 (6th Cir. 2005).

1                                   **2.       Americans with Disabilities Act Claim**

2                   Plaintiffs fail to show a likelihood of success on their Americans with  
3                   Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim because (i) the State’s budget reduction does not leave  
4                   individuals with no choice to submit to institutional care to obtain needed services, and  
5                   therefore does not violate the ADA’s integration mandate; and (ii) it is likely that  
6                   requiring the State to continue current funding levels for personal care services  
7                   indefinitely would constitute a fundamental alteration in the State’s Medicaid program.  
8

9                                   a.       The Reduction to Personal Care Service Hours Does Leave  
10                                   Plaintiffs with No Alternative but to Submit to Institutional  
11                                   Care to Obtain Needed Services

12                   The ADA precludes public entities from administering programs in ways that  
13                   have the effect of segregating disabled individuals from the general community.  
14                   Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). Known as the “integration  
15                   mandate,” and codified by regulation, the ADA requires that persons with disabilities  
16                   receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. 28 C.F.R.  
17                   § 35.130(d); Cota v. Maxwell-Jolly, 688 F. Supp. 2d 980, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing  
18                   Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597). In order to comply with the integration mandate, States  
19                   must implement reasonable modifications to otherwise discriminatory state policies,  
20                   practices, or procedures, although the ADA does not require States to make  
21                   modifications that “fundamentally alter” the nature of the service program or activity.  
22                   28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).<sup>39</sup>  
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26                   <sup>39</sup> The fundamental alteration defense is an affirmative defense that the Court considers only  
if the plaintiff has met its burden in showing a likely violation of the ADA’s integration

1 To analyze whether a State’s actions violate the ADA’s integration mandate,  
2 the Court must apply the following three-prong test: (1) whether the State’s treatment  
3 professionals have determined that community placement is appropriate; (2) whether  
4 the affected persons consent to community placement; and (3) whether the placement  
5 can be reasonably accommodated, “taking into account the resources available to the  
6 State and the needs of others with . . . disabilities.” *Olmstead*, 527 U.S. at 607  
7 (emphasis added).<sup>40</sup>

8  
9 Here, plaintiffs rely heavily on *Fisher*, 335 F.3d 1175, contending that the  
10 State’s budget reduction will violate the ADA’s integration mandate by forcing  
11 individuals to either forego needed personal care services or move to a nursing home.  
12 In *Fisher*, the State of Oklahoma imposed a limit on the number of prescriptions that  
13 beneficiaries in community-based care programs could receive each month. *Id.* at  
14 1178. The State did not impose a limit on the number of prescriptions that  
15 beneficiaries living in nursing facilities could receive. *Id.* The plaintiffs, a group of  
16 individuals receiving community-based care, sued under the ADA, arguing that  
17 Oklahoma’s new prescription limitations facially discriminated against beneficiaries  
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21 mandate. *See Olmstead*, 527 U.S. at 603-04. The Court may consider the viability of  
22 affirmative defenses in addressing whether plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on  
23 the merits. *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th Cir. 2007)  
24 (“Because the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial, once the  
moving party has carried its burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits, the  
burden shifts to the non-moving party to show a likelihood that its affirmative defense will  
succeed.”).

25 <sup>40</sup> Although the cited section of *Olmstead* only commanded a plurality of votes, the Ninth  
26 Circuit has adopted it as controlling authority. *See Townsend v. Quasim*, 328 F.3d 511, 519  
n.3 (9th Cir. 2003); *Sanchez v. Johnson*, 416 F.3d 1051, 1064 n.7 (9th Cir. 2005).

1 who had chosen community-based care, and would compel beneficiaries to either  
2 move into nursing homes or forego needed medication. Id. at 1179. The Tenth Circuit  
3 held that the facial discrimination violated the ADA's integration mandate because it  
4 forced individuals to move into nursing homes to obtain needed medical care. Id. at  
5 1182.  
6

7 Fisher is distinguishable from the present case. In Fisher, the court addressed a  
8 case of facial discrimination. The State provided certain services in nursing homes  
9 that it did not provide to individuals living outside nursing homes. Id. at 1179;  
10 compare Townsend, 328 F.3d at 517 (noting that the problem with the State program  
11 was not whether the State provided the services, but where it provided the services).  
12 The ADA prohibits States from providing services to beneficiaries living in  
13 institutions while simultaneously limiting the availability of those same services to  
14 beneficiaries who elect to live in a community-based setting. See Townsend, 328 at  
15 517. In the present case, the record does not reflect that the State is providing services  
16 to individuals in institutions that it has declined to provide to individuals living in  
17 community-based settings. To the contrary, plaintiffs' evidence demonstrates that  
18 individuals living in community-based settings currently receive more and better care  
19 than individuals living in institutions. See Anderson-Webb Decl. at ¶ 31 ("I am  
20 worried that in a nursing home, [J.P.'s] pressure sores will not improve because [J.P.]  
21 will not get the attention [J.P.] needs to combat infection and move often enough.")  
22 (docket no. 105); see also Jane B. Decl. at ¶ 24c (docket no. 33) (An.B); Davis Decl. at  
23  
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¶ 33 (docket no. 30) (C.B.); Maxon Decl. at ¶ 30 (docket no. 26) (M.R.); Paulino Decl. at ¶ 26 (docket no. 45) (M.J.B.); Hays Decl. at ¶ 32 (docket no. 39) (T.M.); McIntosh Decl. at ¶ 21 (docket no. 32) (D.W.); Faatoafe Decl. at ¶ 26 (docket no. 56) (Z.J.); Lee Decl. at ¶ 30 (docket no. 147) (G.R.); Frost Decl. at ¶ 21 (docket no. 149) (J.W.).

Based on the record, therefore, the Court cannot conclude that the reduction discriminates against beneficiaries that have elected community-based care.

Consequently, unlike in *Fisher*, where the State facially discriminated against individuals in community-based settings by only making some medically necessary services available in an institutional setting, here, plaintiffs' evidence does not demonstrate that the reduction leaves them no choice but to submit to institutional care.<sup>41</sup>

Plaintiffs also argue that they are not required to show that the budget reduction leaves them no alternative but institutional care, relying heavily on *Brantley v. Maxwell-Jolley*, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (N.D. Cal. 2009), for the proposition that they only need to demonstrate that the State's proposed action poses a serious risk of institutionalization. In *Brantley*, California attempted to impose a limit on Medicaid beneficiaries of three days of Adult Day Health ("ADH") services per week. *Id.* at 1167. Prior to the change, beneficiaries could have up to five days of ADH per week. *Id.* at 1164-65. Individuals in California's program obtained ADH services by

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<sup>41</sup> In *Fisher*, the plaintiffs presented evidence from their physicians that they required more than five prescriptions per month. *Id.* at 1179 ("[One plaintiff] takes approximately sixteen prescription medications . . . all of which are prescribed by her doctors."). Conversely here, plaintiffs' personal care services are not *medically* necessary to preserve the plaintiffs' health and safety.

1 participating in a rigorous medical screening evaluation over a three-day period. *Id.* at  
2 1165. Following the lengthy assessment, performed by doctors, nurses, social  
3 workers, and physical therapists, among others, the team of evaluators prepared a plan  
4 of care, which included certifications that the number of days of ADH authorized by  
5 the plan were medically necessary to preserve the health of the specific beneficiary.  
6 *Id.* In reviewing the likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiffs' claim that the  
7 State's planned reduction violated the ADA's integration mandate, the court held that,  
8 under *Fisher*, the plaintiffs need not show that the State's action would leave the  
9 plaintiffs no choice but to go into an institution to obtain needed medical care. *Id.* at  
10 1170. Instead, the *Brantley* court held that plaintiffs had met their burden because the  
11 reduction posed a "serious risk" of institutionalization. *Id.* at 1171. In reaching its  
12 decision, the court relied heavily on the physician-prepared care plans, which certified  
13 that the authorized ADH benefits were medically necessary to preserve the health and  
14 safety of individual beneficiaries and to prevent the need for institutionalization. *Id.* at  
15 1172.

16  
17 *Brantley* is inapposite. As a factual matter, each of the plaintiffs in *Brantley*  
18 had physician-certified care plans indicating that ADH care was medically necessary  
19 to preserve their health and safety, and to prevent the need for institutionalization.  
20 *See, e.g., id.* ("Of the 100 participants, 44 of them have Medi-Cal approved [care  
21 plans] certifying a need for four to five days per week of attendance to avoid  
22 institutionalization.""). Conversely, the hours assessed in CARE do not represent the  
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1 minimum number of hours necessary to prevent institutionalization, and plaintiffs  
2 point to no analogous certification by a physician or other professional that says  
3 otherwise.  
4

5 Moreover, the court in Brantley erroneously relied upon Fisher for the  
6 proposition that a plaintiff need only show a “serious risk” of institutionalization to  
7 establish a violation of the integration mandate.<sup>42</sup> Id. at 1171. In Fisher, the Tenth  
8 Circuit did not state that a beneficiary need only show a “serious risk” of  
9 institutionalization to show a likelihood of success on the merits of an ADA  
10 integration mandate claim. 335 F.3d at 1184. To the contrary, the court in Fisher held  
11 that plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits “[b]ecause the [State’s  
12 action] does not allow the plaintiffs to receive services for which they are qualified  
13 unless they agree to enter a nursing home.” Id. at 1182 (emphasis added). Thus, in  
14 Fisher, the court required the plaintiffs to show that they had no choice but to enter  
15 into a nursing home to obtain needed care. In Brantley, the court expressly rejected  
16 the defendants’ claim that Fisher required plaintiffs to show that the State’s action left  
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20 <sup>42</sup> The Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed an  
21 amicus brief in support of plaintiffs’ claims, arguing that under ADA regulations, parties need  
22 only show a threat of eventual institutionalization to establish a violation of the integration  
23 mandate, rather than a threat of immediate institutionalization. Amicus Br. (docket no. 139).  
24 DOJ argues that, as the agency charged with enforcement of the ADA, the Court must give  
25 deference to its interpretation of ADA regulations. Id. But DOJ has not promulgated  
26 regulations interpreting the ADA’s integration mandate to require only a showing of eventual  
institutionalization to show a violation of the integration mandate. To the contrary, DOJ has  
merely taken a position in this litigation that the Court should adopt its interpretation of the  
regulation. The Court owes no deference to a self-serving agency interpretation taken solely  
in the context of ongoing litigation. Mid-America Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638, 642  
(6th Cir. 1998); Alaniz v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 728 F.2d 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

1 them no choice but to enter a nursing home, holding instead that *Fisher* only required  
2 plaintiffs to show a “serious risk” of institutionalization to demonstrate a likelihood of  
3 success on their ADA claim. *Brantley*, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (“Defendants fail to  
4 cite any relevant authority imposing a ‘no choice’ requirement.”). The Tenth Circuit  
5 only discusses the “serious risk” of institutionalization in the context of its analysis of  
6 *likelihood of irreparable harm*. 335 F.3d at 1184. Accordingly, the *Brantley* court  
7 erred in concluding that a “serious risk” of institutionalization is sufficient to show a  
8 *likelihood of success on the merits* of an ADA integration mandate claim. The proper  
9 standard to show a violation of the integration mandate, set forth in *Fisher*, requires  
10 plaintiffs to show that the State’s action leaves them no choice but to submit to  
11 institutional care to obtain services for which they are otherwise qualified.  
12  
13

14                   b.     Any Order Requiring the State to Continue Funding  
15                             Personal Care Services at Pre-2011 Levels Likely  
16                             Constitutes a Fundamental Alteration of the State’s  
17                             Medicaid Program

18           Even if plaintiffs could establish a likelihood of success on their claim that the  
19 State’s budget reduction violated the ADA’s integration mandate, the Court concludes  
20 that the State has met its burden in presenting evidence that the return to pre-2011  
21 funding levels would likely constitute a fundamental alteration of the State’s Medicaid  
22 program. Courts have construed the third element of the *Olmstead* test as  
23 incorporating the fundamental alteration defense. *See, e.g., Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v.*  
24 *Braddock*, 427 F.3d 615, 618 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The Supreme Court has instructed  
25 courts to be sympathetic to fundamental alteration defenses, and to give States  
26



1 ‘leeway’ in administering services for the disabled.”); see also *Olmstead*, 527 U.S. at  
2 604 (“Sensibly construed, the fundamental alteration component of the reasonable-  
3 modifications regulation would allow the State to show that, in the allocation of  
4 available resources, immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the  
5 responsibility the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and  
6 diverse population of persons with mental disabilities.”) (emphasis added). The State  
7 can satisfy its burden to show that the requested modification is a “fundamental  
8 alteration” by submitting evidence demonstrating that the modification would in fact  
9 compel cutbacks in services to other Medicaid recipients. See, e.g., Townsend, 328  
10 F.3d at 520 (noting that the State could be entitled to the benefit of the fundamental  
11 alteration defense if it could show that the added financial burden would result in  
12 cutbacks to other Medicaid programs); see also Fisher 335 F.3d at 1183 (rejecting  
13 State’s argument that the need to fill a budget deficit was sufficient to constitute a  
14 “fundamental alteration” of the State’s Medicaid program, but noting that a budget  
15 deficit might be sufficient if the State submitted evidence demonstrating that  
16 preserving the beneficiaries’ right to unlimited prescriptions would in fact compel  
17 cutbacks in services to other Medicaid recipients).

18  
19 Here, the State has submitted unrefuted evidence that it will need to make  
20 drastic cuts in other state programs if this Court grants plaintiffs’ requested  
21 preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Drefus Decl. at ¶ 6 (docket no. 124) (describing  
22 alternative programs that will be reduced or eliminated if the Court enjoins the State  
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1 from reducing funding for the personal care services program); Ex. 3 to 2d Work Decl.  
2 (docket no. 134) (describing other cuts DSHS will likely be required to make to social  
3 services beginning in March 2011).  
4

5 Plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of success on their claim that the  
6 State's reduction of hours constitutes a violation of the ADA's integration mandate,  
7 and even if they could show likely success, their proposed modification would likely  
8 constitute a fundamental alteration of the State's Medicaid program. So long as a  
9 State is genuinely and effectively in the process of deinstitutionalizing disabled  
10 persons with an even hand, courts should not interfere. *Arc of Wash. State, Inc.*, 427  
11 F.3d at 620. Based on the record in this case, the Court finds that Washington has a  
12 genuine and effective commitment to deinstitutionalization. Over the last decade, the  
13 number of institutionalized disabled individuals in Washington has steadily declined.  
14 Leitch Decl. at ¶ 2 (docket no. 67); Moss Decl. at ¶ 2 (docket no. 68). The number of  
15 institutionalized disabled individuals continued its decades-long decline even *after* the  
16 State reduced the budget for personal care services by four percent in 2009, and  
17 despite the fact that the number of individuals who are eligible for institutional care  
18 has steadily increased. Lindeblad Decl. at ¶¶ 6, 11 (docket no. 159) (noting that the  
19 number of individuals eligible for institutional care increased from 39,506 in FY 2008  
20 to 44,709 in FY 2010, and is forecasted to be approximately 51,693 by FY 2013).  
21 Indeed, despite the 2009 reduction, the State transitioned approximately 4,400  
22 individuals from institutional care to in-home or residential care in 2010. *Id.* at ¶ 6.  
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1 Given that the State has a system in place that has been proven to work, and indeed has  
2 been repeatedly referred to by plaintiffs in this litigation as the “gem” of the fifty  
3 States, the Court sees no basis for meddling with matters that are more appropriately  
4 left to state legislators and administrators.  
5

### 6 **3. Medicaid Act Claims**

7 Plaintiffs’ Medicaid Act claims, tabbed as the primary focus of this lawsuit at  
8 the temporary restraining order stage of the case, have now been relegated to an  
9 afterthought. Plaintiffs raise no new arguments for the Court’s consideration, instead  
10 restating the points that the Court rejected when it denied plaintiffs’ motion for a  
11 temporary restraining order. Accordingly, the Court will only briefly address the  
12 merits of plaintiffs’ Medicaid Act claims.  
13

#### 14 a. Reasonable Standards Requirement

15 Medicaid requires that state plans have “reasonable standards . . . for  
16 determining . . . the extent of medical assistance under the plan which . . . are  
17 consistent with the objectives of [Medicaid].” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17). Plaintiffs  
18 contend that DSHS’s reduction in personal care services is unreasonable because it  
19 will decrease available services below the level necessary for beneficiaries to remain  
20 safely in their homes. Plaintiffs have not shown that CARE determines the actual  
21 minimum personal care service needs of individual beneficiaries, and they have not  
22 established that the hours awarded after the State’s proposed downward adjustment  
23 will fail to meet any individual plaintiffs’ specific needs. Consequently, plaintiffs  
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26

1 have not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their reasonable standards  
2 claim.<sup>43</sup>

3  
4 b. Sufficiency Requirement

5 Medicaid's sufficiency provision requires that "[e]ach service must be  
6 sufficient in amount, duration, and scope to reasonably achieve its purpose."  
7 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b). Service levels are sufficient if they meet the purposes of the  
8 specific program. Curtis v. Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 651 (5th Cir. 1980). Whether the  
9 available personal care service hours after the reduction are sufficient to meet the  
10 program's purposes must be examined in the context of the substantial discretion  
11 States are afforded to choose the proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations  
12 on Medicaid coverage. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 303 (holding that Medicaid merely  
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17 <sup>43</sup> Plaintiffs cite several cases for the proposition that a reduction in Medicaid services without  
18 consideration of the needs of individual beneficiaries is unreasonable. See Lankford v.  
19 Sherman, 451 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 2006); V.L., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1106. But those cases involved  
20 the complete elimination of programs, or the wholesale elimination of categories of eligibility.  
21 For example, in Lankford, the State of Missouri passed a law that eliminated optional  
22 coverage for Medicaid recipients for durable medical equipment ("DME"). 451 F.3d at 501.  
23 The Missouri agency administering Medicaid then passed emergency regulations that  
24 reinstated the right of recipients to some, but not all, of the medically necessary DME devices.  
25 Id. The Eighth Circuit held that the reinstatement of eligibility as to only a portion of the  
26 DME devices was unreasonable because the regulation did not provide any mechanism for  
individuals to obtain non-covered DME devices. Id. at 513. Similarly, in V.L., the State of  
California passed a law that eliminated some beneficiaries' eligibility for all covered services.  
669 F. Supp. 2d at 1117. The law also eliminated categories of eligibility for other recipients.  
Id. Conversely, here, none of the beneficiaries are losing eligibility for in-home personal care  
services or categories of care. DSHS is merely exercising its broad discretion to modify the  
extent of medical assistance in light of scarce resources. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444  
(1977).

1 provides a package of services that has the general aim of assuring that individuals will  
2 receive necessary medical care, it does not assure “adequate health care.”<sup>44</sup>

3  
4 In this case, DSHS has continued to provide a substantial number of in-home  
5 personal care service hours following implementation of the 2011 reduction. Indeed,  
6 the record reflects that over 99% of the beneficiaries sampled that have joined the  
7 program since January 1, 2011, have not questioned the adequacy of personal care  
8 service hours allocated pursuant to CARE. 2d McNeill Decl. at ¶ 11 (docket no. 132).  
9 In light of the broad discretion granted to states to craft a manageable Medicaid plan,  
10 plaintiffs have not shown that the 2011 reduction fails to satisfy the purpose of  
11 Washington’s program, namely providing disabled individuals with assistance with  
12 their ADLs and IADLs. WAC 388-106-0010.  
13

14 c. Comparability Requirement

15 Medicaid’s comparability provision requires states to provide “comparable  
16 services when individuals have comparable needs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B).  
17 Plaintiffs do not contend, however, that the 2011 reduction treats similarly situated  
18 beneficiaries differently. *See, e.g., Jenkins*, 160 Wn.2d at 297 (“[C]ourts have  
19 consistently . . . found that states violated the comparability requirement where some  
20 recipients are treated differently from other recipients where each has the same level of  
21 need.”). At oral argument, counsel for plaintiffs conceded that all similarly situated  
22  
23

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24 <sup>44</sup> Plaintiffs contend that any reliance on *Alexander* is misplaced because that case addressed  
25 violations of the Rehabilitation Act. Mot. at 36 n.58 (docket no. 95). The Supreme Court’s  
26 discussion about the purpose of the Medicaid Act in *Alexander* is nonetheless guidance in this  
Court’s consideration of whether the State’s 2011 budget will provide sufficient resources to  
meet the program’s purposes.

beneficiaries (i.e., beneficiaries in the same acuity subgroup) are subject to the same reduction in hours. Moreover, CMS regulations interpreting the comparability provision appear to contemplate that state agencies “may place appropriate limits on a service.” 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d).<sup>45</sup> Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their comparability claim.

d. Free Choice Requirement

Medicaid’s free choice provision requires that beneficiaries be “informed of the feasible alternatives” to institutional care, and have individual choice. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396n(c)(2)(C), 1396n(d)(2)(C). Here, plaintiffs apparently contend that the State did not inform them of feasible alternatives when it distributed notices of the planned reductions in services in December 2010. But plaintiffs in this case are necessarily already aware of alternatives to institutional care. By virtue of their receipt of personal care service, either under Washington’s state plan or through one of its Medicaid waiver programs, the plaintiffs are already participating in Washington’s alternative to

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<sup>45</sup> Specifically, the regulations provide that “[t]he agency may place appropriate limits on a service based on *such criteria as* medical necessity or on utilization control procedures.” 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (emphasis added). The Court reads the regulation’s use of the words “such criteria as” to mean that “medical necessity” and “utilization control procedures” are examples, not the only grounds upon which an agency may place limitations on a service. *See, e.g.*, Health Care Financing Administration, Proposed Rules, Payment for Covered Outpatient Drugs under Drug Rebate Agreements with Manufacturers, 60 Fed. Reg. 48442, 48458 (1995) (noting that prior to enactment of an amendment to Title XIX in 1990 applicable only to prescription drugs, “[s]tates could establish amount, duration, and scope restrictions on Medicaid services, including prescription drugs . . . based on such criteria as medical necessity and utilization control, *or [these restrictions] could be based on other factors* so long as the amount of the services provided was sufficient to ‘reasonably achieve its purpose’”) (emphasis added).

1 institutional care. At oral argument, plaintiffs posited an entirely novel legal theory,  
2 contending that whenever the State alters its community-based services, the State is  
3 obligated to inform beneficiaries of their right to receive *institutional* care. Plaintiffs  
4 cite no authority to support this proposition, which is directly contrary to the plain  
5 language of the free choice provision.<sup>46</sup> *See, e.g.*, 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(d)(2)(C) (stating  
6 that individuals must be informed of the “feasible alternatives to the provision of  
7 *skilled nursing facility or intermediate care facility services.*”) (emphasis added); *see*  
8 *also* 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(C). The Court rejects any such requirement, and  
9 concludes that plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the  
10 merits for their freedom of choice claim.<sup>47</sup>

13 e. Federal Approval Requirement

14 Finally, plaintiffs contend that the 2011 reduction is a material change in the  
15 State’s Medicaid plan that requires federal approval. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(ii).  
16 As previously noted by this Court, and also by a different court in this district in  
17 connection with the 2009 budget reduction, federal approval is not required because  
18 Washington’s Medicaid plan does not describe a minimum number of personal care  
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21 <sup>46</sup> The Court also notes that plaintiffs received notice of their right to receive alternative care  
22 when they originally elected to receive community-based care in lieu of institutional care.  
23 *See, e.g.*, 2d McNeill Decl. at ¶ 12 (docket no. 132).

24 <sup>47</sup> The Court also rejects plaintiffs’ contention that the reduction in services will place  
25 beneficiaries in the untenable position of either choosing to go without needed care or  
26 submitting to unwarranted institutionalization. *See, e.g., Ball v. Rodgers*, 492 F.3d 1094,  
1107 (9th Cir. 2007). As previously noted, plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden to show  
a likelihood of irreparable harm, and as such, cannot show that the reduced services will fail  
to satisfy beneficiaries’ health and safety needs.

1 service hours or, for that matter, a method of calculating personal care service hours.  
2 Order at 20 (docket no. 76); see also Freeman v. Wash. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.,  
3 2010 WL 3720285 (W.D. Wash.). As such, the planned reductions do not amend the  
4 state plan or trigger the need for federal approval. See Freeman, 2010 WL 3720285 at  
5 \*9 (“Because [Washington’s] state Medicaid plan does not indicate the number of  
6 hours or the methodology to be used in determining the number of hours to be  
7 provided to recipients, any modification to that methodology need not be reflected in  
8 an amendment to the state plan.”). Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to show a  
9 likelihood of success on the merits on this claim.  
10  
11

12 **D. Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest**

13 The Court is tasked with balancing plaintiffs’ claims of potential harm with the  
14 State’s inability to fund the personal care services program. Plaintiffs argue that when  
15 balancing the medical needs of the indigent against a State’s budgetary crisis, the  
16 Ninth Circuit has come down firmly on the side of preserving medical benefits.  
17 Independent Living Ctr. I, 572 F.3d at 659 (“State budgetary concerns cannot . . . ‘be  
18 the conclusive factor in decisions regarding Medicaid.’”). However, these reductions  
19 do not involve medical care. Rather, this case deals with personal care services;  
20 assistance with activities of daily living performed by caregivers who have no  
21 particular medical training.  
22  
23

24 In addition, the record includes evidence about the steps the State will be  
25 required to take if the service reductions cannot take effect. Dreyfus Decl. at ¶ 6  
26



1 (docket no. 124); Ex. 3 to 2d Work Decl. (docket no. 134). Consequently, the Court is  
2 presented not merely with a question of finance, but rather, availability of funding for  
3 other critical Medicaid and social service programs.<sup>48</sup> Plaintiffs respond to the State's  
4 concerns by arguing that the State can deal with the current fiscal crisis by (1) raising  
5 taxes; (2) closing institutions;<sup>49</sup> or (3) simply declining to balance the budget, in  
6 contravention of state law.<sup>50</sup> None of plaintiffs' proposals seriously addresses the  
7 potential harm that will result to other needy beneficiaries if the State is forced to  
8 make cuts to other social service programs.  
9

10  
11 Finally, as the Court noted in its denial of plaintiffs' motion for a temporary  
12 restraining order, DSHS has conducted a comprehensive review to determine how best  
13 to accomplish the fiscal goals mandated by the governor, and it has applied its  
14 expertise in weighing the competing interests of the various clients it serves. Thus,  
15 even if a few of the plaintiffs ultimately require institutionalization as a result of the  
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17 <sup>48</sup> The reductions to personal care services will save the State \$19.2 million dollars over the  
18 remaining five months of the fiscal biennium. Dreyfus Decl. at ¶ 5 (docket no. 124). Thus,  
19 for each month the State is enjoined from implementing the reduction in personal care service  
20 hours, the State might have to find an additional \$3.8 million dollars by cutting other social  
21 service programs. *See id.*

22 <sup>49</sup> The Supreme Court has expressly rejected any reading of the ADA that would force states  
23 to close institutions to fund community-based care. *Olmstead*, 527 U.S. at 604 ("The ADA is  
24 not reasonably read to impel States to phase out institutions, placing patients in need of close  
25 care at risk.").

26 <sup>50</sup> Plaintiffs contend that the Washington State Constitution permits the State to run a budget  
deficit. *See* WASH. CONST. art. 8, §§ 1(b), 8. But State law *requires* the governor to balance  
the budget if at any time during the fiscal biennium, the governor projects a cash deficit. *See*  
RCW 43.88.110(7) ("If at any time during the fiscal period the governor projects a cash  
deficit . . . the governor *shall* make across-the-board reductions in allotments . . . so as to  
prevent a cash deficit.") (emphasis added). To the extent plaintiffs actually contend that  
violating State law is an alternative to the budget reductions, the Court rejects that contention.

1 State's reduction in services, the Court cannot conclude that the threat to these  
2 individuals outweighs the State's interest in preserving the carefully orchestrated  
3 personal care services program that currently serves more than 45,000 individuals. For  
4 the same reasons, the Court cannot conclude that the possible threat of  
5 institutionalization for a few personal care service beneficiaries outweighs the State's  
6 interest in balancing the competing needs of a host of different state-sponsored social  
7 service programs that currently provide aid to a diverse group of medically and  
8 financially disadvantaged state residents.

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11 The Court concludes that the balance of the equities tips in favor of the State,  
12 and as a consequence, the public interest would not be served by forcing DSHS to  
13 target perhaps more vulnerable individuals or programs while the merits of plaintiffs'  
14 claims in this matter are resolved.


15 **CONCLUSION**

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17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs' motion for a  
18 preliminary injunction, docket no. 95.

19 IT IS SO ORDERED.

20 The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.

21 DATED this 9th day of February, 2011.

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25 Thomas S. Zilly  
26 United States District Judge