1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 2 HOUSTON DIVISION 3 DAVID RUIZ, ET AL., Plaintiffs, 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CIVIL ACTION NO. Plaintiff-Intervenor, H - 78 - 9875 V. 6 GARY JOHNSON, Director TDCJ-ID, Austin, Texas et al., June 7, 2002 7 Defendants. 2:00 p.m. 8 9 TRANSCRIPT OF IN-CHAMBERS STATUS CONFERENCE 10 BEFORE THE HONORABLE WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE 11 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 12 13 APPEARANCES: For the Plaintiffs: Ms. Donna Brorby 14 Ms. Gail Saliterman Law Office of Donna Brorby 15 660 Market St., Ste. 300 San Francisco, CA 94104 16 17 For the Defendants: Mr. Carl Reynolds Mr. Gregory Coleman Ms. Sharon Felfe Weil, Gotshal & Manges 18 Assistant Attorney General 111 Congress Avenue 4th Floor Office of the Attorney General P. O. Box 12548 Austin, Texas 78701 Austin, Texas 78711 20 21 Ms. Kathy Carroll, CSR Court Reporter: 903 San Jacinto Blvd. 22 Suite 310 **ORIGINAL** Austin, Texas 78701 (512) 236-0998 23 24 (Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced by computer). 25

## PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Let the record reflect that this is an in-chambers conference convened at 2:22 p.m. on June 7th, 2002. The attorneys for both the plaintiff and the defendants are present.

Do you want to announce your presence for the record?

MS. BRORBY: Sure.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. BRORBY: I'm Donna Brorby with Gail Saliterman representing the plaintiffs David Ruiz and the class.

MR. COLEMAN: Greg Coleman with Sharon Felfe and Carl Reynolds on behalf of the defendants.

THE COURT: I understand that the parties have some kind of an announcement to make to me for the record, so proceed.

MS. BRORBY: I'll start?

MR. COLEMAN: Go ahead.

MS. BRORBY: Your Honor, as you're well aware, the last remedial order in this case of October 12, 2001 set up a process of an exchange of information among the parties and a filing of information with the Court. And I think it's apparent from the record that that involved some site visits that the parties did together at eight prison units. All of this was looking forward toward the possibility of jurisdiction in the case terminating on July 1st if there were no motion to continue

jurisdiction as a result of the evidence that was adduced during the course of the year.

And at the end of the production site visit exchange of information, I concluded and informed counsel for the defendants that I observed that there were still continuing extremely serious violations in the areas under court jurisdiction and I thought that I did have grounds for a motion to continue jurisdiction, but I thought that the parties might best be served by negotiating something that could avoid such a motion and permit jurisdiction in the case to terminate, and the parties have engaged in that negotiation.

In the course of the negotiation the parties reviewed the evidence and found broad areas of agreement about problem areas. We will never agree about what's constitutional and what's not constitutional, but we had broad areas of agreements about directions that would be a good thing for TDCJ to take. And, essentially, at this point we have made agreements about a few things. And I should say that the greatest reason that we're here is that I represent a class and I think it's important for the Court to be advised of what's going on in the course of the class representation in the end. As I'll explain later, I think it's not necessary to have a Rule 23 procedure, but I thought the Court should be aware of what the parties were doing and exercise its own judgment in the course of, you know, being conscious of the obligations of class counsel to a class.

In terms of the sort of negotiations about the substance of conditions and practices in the prison, the parties have come to some areas of agreement as to things that TDCJ is intending to do in the immediate future and over the course of the next couple of years that were really the product of TDCJ's proposal for an alternative to the continuation of jurisdiction in the case.

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This might seem slightly odd, but we would like not to go into the specifics of those things on the record here out of what is defendants' concern that somehow will be federalizing something at a time when really what we're trying to do is let federal jurisdiction in Ruiz end and move on in the future with TDCJ following some of its own initiatives to address, particularly the problems that are a subject of the Court's jurisdiction at this time.

So the -- you know, basically the parties went back and forth about some proposals for how to continue in a post-Ruiz environment having to continue to evaluate the situation on the individual units. As the Court will remember, the issue is not really central policies, but the implementation and enforcement of policies on the units. And, you know, at the end of the process of going back with a few ideas, we basically adopted one that TDCJ is enthusiastic about carrying out and really owns as its own plan for moving on into the future.

These -- the commitments that TDCJ has made about its

plan to move on in the future are not going to be enforceable as a federal court order. They are not going to be enforceable as any kind of court order, and we haven't even tried to make them an enforceable contract partly because of the impracticality and, in my view, relative meaningless of that anyway.

So the agreement under which we will continue to have some opportunity to have input and provide some feedback will be fully public. It won't be a secret. We just don't want to make it a part of any federal court proceedings.

As a part of the resolution of issues in the case, the parties have come to a more formal agreement and proposed judgment on the issues of attorneys' fees and costs and expenses in the case. And I have a copy of that here which I would give to the Court.

THE COURT: Hand it to Margarita.

MR. COLEMAN: This is our only copy. We have not officially filed it with the Court separately yet.

MS. BRORBY: That's correct, we just finished printing it.

THE COURT: Why don't you go make -- how many copies?

MR. BRORBY: We don't have any copies of the signature. I do have extra copies of the document without signatures.

COURT CLERK: Would you like for me to file this, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BRORBY: Basically, the stipulation of the parties on attorneys' fees and costs lays out some of the basic facts contained in the motion that has been pending before the Court and brings them up-to-date. At this point, at market rates plaintiffs' counsel fees, cost and expenses are approximately \$4.9 million. At PLRA rates, plaintiffs' counsel fees are approximately \$2.9 million. And the stipulation for entry of judgment on counsel fees provides the entry of the judgment for counsel fees, costs and expenses through May 31st, 2002, in the amount of \$1,930,000, so that it's just under two million in fees, costs and expenses as against the PLRA rate figure of just under three million.

THE COURT: Just under what?

MS. BRORBY: The PLRA rate figure is just under three million, so it's \$2.9 million as through -- for the bills through May 31, 2002.

You know, I lay out all of those facts and figures just so the Court can be aware of what's happening in the counsel fees issue. I think it's apparent from the figures that as we tried to keep the attorneys' fees issue just a matter of money about fees and separate from the class interests, I think we succeeded in doing so. And I think the figure for which class counsel settled would not indicate that there was in any way a class interest sold in settlement of fees, but I just

thought the Court would want to be clear on the specifics of our agreement.

And then, finally, as I said before, Counsel have discussed whether Rule 23 proceedings were necessary at this time. And after some consideration of the issue, I have come to agree with counsel for the defendants that they aren't that necessary.

I should probably mention, since I haven't made it clear yet, that part of the parties' settlement also settles the appeals and the appeals will be dismissed. So the case will be entirely gone, settled, and resolved as a result of what the parties have done.

And, you know, in my analysis, which I think is sort of similar to defense counsel's analysis, the Court's order of October 12, 2001 essentially set up a structure under which plaintiffs' counsel would have to make a judgment before June 1st about whether a motion to extend -- a motion -- an objection to termination of jurisdiction would be appropriate. And within the terms of that order, class counsel is making a judgment that it's not appropriate and what will happen -- the termination of the case will be by operation of the Court's October 12, 2001 order.

In terms of the mutual dismissal of appeals as part of a resolution of all the issues, you know, it was the judgment that I made as class counsel to file the appeal for the class on

the issues on which Your Honor ruled against us. So I think that I'm able to make the judgment in the context of what we're doing here, that the appeal is appropriately dismissed as part of this resolution.

Oh, I'm sorry, I did forget one other matter. The parties have actually resolved all but one issue between them. And there is going to be one issue that will be presented by the defendants on which we have just agreed at this point we will just disagree and let the courts resolve it, and that is whether as a result of this settlement here the Court's findings of March 1st, 1999 should be vacated. We have our different positions on that and we're not able to reach agreement on that issue, so we have agreed that we will present that issue to the -- first to Your Honor, and then possibly in the Fifth Circuit.

THE COURT: And then what?

MS. BRORBY: And then the defendants have reserved the right in the terms of all our agreements that they may present the issue in the Fifth Circuit. And, you know, defendants' counsel may want to speak to that issue.

MR. COLEMAN: I'm happy to, Your Honor. As Ms. Brorby has stated, we have worked very diligently and hard over the past month or so to come up with a set of actions that TDCJ will take on initiative in order to convince class counsel that filing an objection to termination is not in the class's best

interest. And I'm thrilled and excited that we have reached that point.

We have made a separate agreement on the attorneys' fees. I know that our conversation last week, that you -- that you had known that we would be mediating that, and that mediation started at 9:00 that morning. I think we ended up leaving somewhere close to 9:00 that evening, but we were successful in doing that.

We have also mutually agreed to dismiss the appeals.

And as Ms. Brorby just stated, the one issue that we have had some concern about is there is an old case called McDuffy from the Fifth Circuit in which assertion was made in a prison conditions case that because of Your Honor's prior findings from 20 years ago, that the department should be stopped from defending itself against certain claims of unconstitutionality. That's obviously a concern to us with respect to the most recent findings, and we would --

THE COURT: Now, I don't quite understand what you're saying --

MR. COLEMAN: Well, let me give you an example.

THE COURT: -- about McDuffy. I don't remember it.

MR. COLEMAN: Yeah, it's an old case that just addressed whether an inmate could use collateral estoppel defensively against the department and say you have already been judicially determined to have unconstitutional policies and

practices, and therefore I shouldn't have to -- as a member of the class it's been held against you, and, therefore, I shouldn't have to prove that up.

MS. FELFE: If I could interrupt for just a second.

MR. COLEMAN: Of course.

MS. FELFE: He claims that he was assaulted by building tenders and the case was quite old by the time it was decided. In 1991, I believe the offender claimed that he was assaulted in 1976, which would have been around the time that the Court was making some findings. So I don't know if that helps the Court at all, but it was a building tender case.

MR. COLEMAN: And then ultimately I think the second aspect of that is as a result of our discussions and

Ms. Brorby's decision that she can for the sake of the class not oppose termination, the appeals will end and we will be unable to carry out the appeals that we sought, and so we had made a decision based on our concerns about collateral estoppel and some case law that we would ask the Court to vacate those opinions. And, obviously, that's an issue under which we have not reached agreement and we thought it's simply a matter -- it's not something that should be a sticking point in the whole matter and that what we hoped to do is ask you to vacate those opinions and dismiss the case, and then hopefully the dismissal part won't be a sticking point, and then we'll also dismiss the Fifth Circuit -- all of the Fifth Circuit appeals.

And we simply reserved and ask that we be allowed to ask the Fifth Circuit to vacate those opinions because of our collateral estoppel appeals -- excuse me, collateral estoppel concerns, and that we will live with whatever decisions come out It's not intended to be something that is a deal breaker for us or anything else. We just thought that given those concerns about, for instance, an offender coming in and saying, I was denied a -- I had requested a transfer or safekeeping, I was denied that, and I don't want to sue the individual officer necessarily or maybe do, but I also want to sue the system because of a policy that has already been found to be unconstitutional, and, therefore, you know, this matter of summary judgment or what have you, you know, I want a summary judgment on liability against -- against TDCJ because of this policy that's already been found to be unconstitutional. And I think that is the heart of our concern and we wanted to raise it.

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THE COURT: Well, just how substantial do you think those concerns are?

MR. COLEMAN: It is unclear to me. I have looked at some case law - I haven't spent a lot of time - and I frankly don't see a lot of instances in which it has been asserted. And I don't know that there will be others or how many. If there are, how many. So I can't say that I stand -- or sit before you, Judge, and say that I think that this is an absolute

concern and it's going to multiply itself hundreds of times. I think that there's an argument that someone may make and we would like to -- or that many could make, and that we would like to be able to avoid that.

THE COURT: I won't consider that very hard. I will tell you frankly, I'm very reluctant to set aside those findings because they took so much time and effort to come to the conclusion.

But is there any precatory language we could insert to say that this is not to be considered as a basis for a collateral estoppel?

MR. COLEMAN: That would be acceptable to us, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't know whether you can do that or not.

MR. COLEMAN: We could try.

MS. BRORBY: I don't know, either, Your Honor, but I'm certainly willing to look into it.

THE COURT: See what you can find out.

MS. BRORBY: Our view, of course, is very -- is different in a lot of ways in terms of the posture of things that I think affects the applicable legal rules. The parties have jointly reached a conclusion that has produced a situation where we have agreed that will dismiss appeals and I don't think that the defendants have a basis to ask for vacating of the

underlying findings and orders, but additionally I think it's not a large concern. Of course, it's easier for me to say that sitting in my shoes.

As Your Honor will recall, most of the evidence was about the facts of practices on the units, and not -- you know, there wasn't -- the Court didn't find that there was a --

THE COURT: Systemwide.

MS. BRORBY: -- policy that applied to everybody that denied transfers to safekeeping, just that too many people were involved. But for an individual who came forward, the issue would be whether he was -- whether his constitutional rights were violated. I don't think the findings of a court will apply to that situation. But Your Honor has a new idea that we didn't think about and we could certainly try to figure out where it sits legally.

MR. COLEMAN: For obvious reasons, I understood that there might be some reluctance to that, but your idea, Your Honor, of injecting some language would certainly be a big help and we might have to test that later whether it's effective, and we hope that we never would have to and that our concerns are unfounded. I simply don't know that they are and would be willing to test that later on.

MS. BRORBY: I forgot to say I would echo that it was a lot of work.

THE COURT: Well, let me express my delight that you

have reached this much of a settlement in the matter, and I'm particularly grateful that you settled the matter of attorneys' fees because that was giving me heartburn in the preparation of the findings and conclusions of law.

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MR. COLEMAN: I'm only sorry we didn't do it earlier, Your Honor.

MS. BRORBY: Nobody is as sorry about that as I am.

THE COURT: Obviously you chose well as far as a mediator was concerned. Mr. York is a very fine lawyer. He's had a lot of experience in that field. I first encountered him, it must have been about 1976, when he was an Assistant Attorney General representing the State in Morales against Turman, a juvenile justice case. Hard one, too. It only lasted six weeks as opposed to eleven months for Ruiz.

MS. BRORBY: We were young lawyers then.

THE COURT: Yeah, very. Well, I was a younger judge in those days.

Is there any other matter that needs to be discussed?

MR. COLEMAN: The one other thing I guess we would formally request, Your Honor, and I'm not sure that -- the stipulation that has been filed does -- I think is contingent upon -- I think the language that was used was termination or dismissal of the case or --

MS. BRORBY: It's not contingent. The stipulation is that the parties agree that the Court can file the judgment when

1 the case is dismissed or jurisdiction terminates, whichever 2 comes first. I always speak of jurisdiction terminating because 3 that's the concept I'm familiar with. He speaks of dismissal, 4 that's the concept he's familiar. One way or the other, the 5 case is going to end. And contemporaneously with its end, we 6 stipulate that the judgment on fees can be issued -- may be 7 issued. 8 THE COURT: Maybe before you leave I better take a 9 look at what you have presented here. 10 MR. COLEMAN: We have brought with us -- and I don't 11 know if -- you may want to spend some time thinking, but we did 12 bring with us an order of dismissal that we would at least 13 present for your consideration. 14 THE COURT: All right. Give it to Ms. Herrington back 15 over there. 16 MR. COLEMAN: We brought two versions, one with the 17 vacating and one without. I'll give Ms. Herrington one of each 18 of those. (Indicating). 19 THE COURT: Well, this case came in like a lion and 20 it's going out like a lamb. MS. FELFE: That's the way it ought to be. 21 THE COURT: It suits me fine. 22 Excuse me for a moment while I read this. (Reading). 23 (Off-the-record discussion) 24 THE COURT: Back on the record. 25

MS. BRORBY: In our view of the sort of status of the case, the Court's remedial order of October 12 provides a structure that I think it would be just appropriate to follow. And under that order, there's a deadline set for a motion to continue jurisdiction. And if the motion is not filed, then jurisdiction will terminate.

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And the parties have reached an agreement that includes that the plaintiffs are not filing that motion which now technically is due on Monday. So it is certainly ascertained now and we have a completed agreement now that there will be no motion, but somehow as class counsel I don't have strong feelings about that, but it seems sort of to me inappropriate for the delay that Your Honor built into the order in the first place in October, you know, that the case just be allowed to have jurisdiction terminate that way. But, you know, I think whatever Your Honor considers appropriate will be appropriate.

As to the possibility of some specific language in a dismissal going to collateral estoppel, that's something I have told opposing counsel to consider and try to understand, but as I sit here I don't fully understand all the issues and I would like a chance to consider that, too.

THE COURT: When can I expect a resolution of that?

MS. BRORBY: Are you going to make a -- are you going to file a written motion?

1 MR. COLEMAN: I'm not sure that's necessary. 2 THE COURT: No, I don't think it's necessary. 3 MR. COLEMAN: I think the Court has understood my 4 position on that. And with respect to the delay, my personal 5 view on it, again, the Court will need to speak to this, was 6 that the month-long delay was built in to allow the Court to 7 consider something that might be filed. And that even if 8 nothing were filed, just as a technical matter there would need to be at the close something that complies with Rule 58, just a 9 10 piece of paper. And I obviously would like to have it sooner 11 rather than later, but I understand --MS. BRORBY: I am just now remembering, Your Honor, 12 13 that as a part of our sort of agreement tidying up details, the 14 parties have agreed that defendants have no objection to certain 15 additional documents be filed in the action before jurisdiction terminates, which we will do next week. 16 17 THE COURT: What are they? MS. BRORBY: Documents that we think relate to the 18 19 filing of April 1st that we just thought should be part of the 20 record of the case as it closes. MR. COLEMAN: Our position is they don't need to be 21 22 filed, but we are not going to make a big fuss and oppose. MS. BRORBY: Or even a little fuss. 23 THE COURT: This is refreshing. 24 25 MR. COLEMAN: Although I will say, I don't know that

there's anything relating to that that would prevent the entry 1 2 of a Rule 58 judgment. There are frequently things --THE COURT: Oh, I will probably enter some form of a 3 judgment. 4 5 Can you get me a brief on this matter of additional language that might foreclose possibly the collateral estoppel 6 7 issue? MR. COLEMAN: I'll be happy to have something here 8 Monday morning with whatever we can find. Ms. Brorby may want 9 10 some additional time. She's flying back. THE COURT: I'll give you more time than that. She 11 has to fly back to San Francisco, for God's sake. 12 MS. BRORBY: Could we have maybe until Wednesday? 13 THE COURT: Sure. 14 MS. BRORBY: Could we deliver something by fax on 15 16 Wednesday? THE COURT: That will be fine. 17 MR. COLEMAN: Okay, Wednesday. 18 THE COURT: Well, I want to express my appreciation to 19 counsel on both sides for the very professional manner in which 20 this matter has been resolved. This has been, unfortunately, 21 the highlight of my judicial career, this particular case. It's 22 not that I wanted it to be, it just turned out to be that way. 23 How long has it been? Thirty years? 24 25 MR. COLEMAN: Thirty years this year.

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MS. FELFE: Yes, Your Honor, 30 years this year.
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              MS. BRORBY: There were a few-year breaks here and
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    there.
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              THE COURT: I beg your pardon?
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              MS. BRORBY: It wasn't 30 consecutive years.
              THE COURT:
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                          I know. I didn't have to hold hearings
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    every year. It's the longest case I expect that -- have there
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    been any longer cases that you know of?
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              MS. SALITERMAN: Other than in fiction.
              MS. FELFE: Guajardo.
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              THE COURT: They were incorporated in this case,
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    though, weren't they?
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              MS. FELFE: Only portions of them, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Yeah, I guess that's right. Were they
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    before Judge Seals?
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              MS. FELFE: I believe that Guajardo was, though it was
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    many years ago.
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              THE COURT: No, I remember now, I think Judge
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    Singleton had one of them.
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              MS. FELFE: Judge Singleton had Guajardo.
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              THE COURT:
                         Well, any concluding remarks anybody wants
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    to make for the record?
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              MS. BRORBY: Your Honor, I would like to thank you for
    your courtesy and courage throughout the long years of this
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    litigation. It's been --
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1	THE COURT: I'm not asking for compliments.
2	MR. COLEMAN: I would like to add to that. Although
3	you are not asking for it, I appreciate your help all through
4	this process.
5	THE COURT: Well, thank you, Counsel. With that, this
6	hearing will be adjourned.
7	(Proceedings concluded at 2:56 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATION I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the stenographic notes of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my ability. Court Reporter State of Texas No.: 2222