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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
3	Case No. 11-cv-03350-CMA-BNB
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5	COLORADO CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY,
6	Plaintiff,
7	VS.
8	KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, et al.,
9	Defendants.
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11	Proceedings before BOYD N. BOLAND, United States
12	Magistrate Judge, United States District Court for the
13	District of Colorado, commencing at 1:32 p.m., August 31,
14	2012, in the United States Courthouse, Denver, Colorado.
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16	WHEREUPON, THE ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED PROCEEDINGS
17	ARE HEREIN TYPOGRAPHICALLY TRANSCRIBED
18	-
19	APPEARANCES
20	ERIC S. BAXTER, Attorneys at Law, appearing for
21	the plaintiff.
22	MICHELLE R. BENNETT, Attorney at Law, appearing
23	for the defendant.
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25	TELEPHONIC MOTIONS HEARING

1 PROCEEDINGS (Whereupon, the within electronically recorded 2 proceedings are herein transcribed, pursuant to order of 3 4 counsel.) THE CLERK: Court is in session. 5 THE COURT: We're here this afternoon in Case 6 7 11-cv-3350, Colorado Christian University against Sebelius and others, in connection with the Defendants' Renewed 8 Motion to Stay Discovery. Mr. Baxter is on the phone for 9 the plaintiff, Mr. Bennett is on the phone for the 10 defendants. I have allowed counsel who office in remote 11 places, Washington -- a remote place, Washington, D.C., to 12 13 appear by telephone because this matter was reset at my 14 request based on a last-minute scheduling conflict. 15 Mr. Baxter, can you hear me? 16 MR. BAXTER: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Bennett? 17 MS. BENNETT: Yes, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry, Ms. Bennett. 19 MS. BENNETT: That's okay. 20 THE COURT: I see Michelle, but I read Michael. 21 22 I'm sorry. All right. Also pending is an Unopposed Motion 2.3 for Extension of Deadlines. I've read the -- let's start 24 25 with the Motion to -- Renewed Motion to Stay Discovery,

3 1 which I have read, I've read the response. There have been a number of supplemental authorities submitted. 2 reviewed my previous order, the objection to my previous 3 4 order, the decision of the district judge in connection with my previous order. Ms. Bennett, I'll hear anything more you 5 have to say in support of your motion. 6 MS. BENNETT: Thank you, Your Honor. 7 I just -- I would just like to, I guess, highlight 8 a few of the -- as Your Honor knows, you consider the five 9 factors in determining whether to grant a stay. As I 10 understand you're aware, there are now three cases, nearly 11 identical to this one, that have been dismissed for lack of 12 13 jurisdiction based on the same arguments -- the same 14 jurisdictional arguments that defendants advance here in their pending motion and, to date, no court has rejected 15 defendants' jurisdictional arguments. 16 It's defendants' assertion that it would be an 17 18 undue burden and expense on them to have to engage in discovery at this point in the event that their Motion to 19 Dismiss is later granted. To give Your Honor a sort of 20 sense of the burden, as you know, there are three defendant 21 agencies in this case. Plaintiff's requests are rather 22

broad in applying to any employees, officers, agents of the

-- of the agencies, whether they had specifically anything

to do the rulemaking or not, but assuming, for the purposes

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of this argument, that we could limit that to just people that had some input into this rulemaking, we estimate that there'd be approximately 150 people with responsive documents to the requests that we would -- we would need to pull documents from. And not considering objections, which, as I'll get into in a moment, we think most of the requests would entail

a lot of documents that would be privileged. We anticipate that there could be several hundred thousands of pages of responsive material. To give Your Honor an example, I spoke to one employee at one component of one of the agencies who looked only through her e-mails for documents responding to just two specific document requests, and she excluded any e-mails dealing with the litigation, it was just e-mails dealing with the policy of the regulations, and found 495 e-mails, about 20 percent of which had attachments. As I said, most of those were privileged, but just to give you a

As I said, we expect that most of the documents that we would have -- that we haven't already given plaintiffs as part of the administrative would be privileged, either by the deliberative process privilege, attorney-client and work-product would probably be the main ones. As I said, we already produced to the plaintiffs the administrative record, which consists of the agencies'

sense of the magnitude of discovery involved here.

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1 collection of non-privileged material that the defendants relied on in promulgating the regulations. That was almost 200,000 pages. So to the extent that plaintiffs request information that defendants relied on in the rulemaking, it would really, at this point, only be seeking documents that defendants have said either they didn't rely on or were 7 privileged, and as I'm sure Your Honor's aware, even pulling, reviewing, redacting and logging these documents 8 would be extremely time-consuming. And as I said, in light 9 of the fact that the defendants have a pending Motion to 10 Dismiss, we think that that would be an undue burden, 11 particularly if the motion is later -- is later granted. With respect to the second factor, the harm to 14 plaintiffs, plaintiffs waited nearly nine months after discovery commenced in this case to start serving any 15 discovery. Defendants don't think that waiting a little bit longer while the court resolves the jurisdictional issues will cause plaintiffs any harm. As Your Honor had said, I think the approximate time in this district is six months 19 for deciding a Motion to Dismiss. I don't know if that's 20 from the filing or the fully briefing, but defendants' motion has been fully briefed since May 18th. 22 Plaintiffs don't claim that there will be any 23 decline in evidentiary quality or witness availability

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during this time frame. Their -- their assertion of harm is

that, assuming the court has jurisdiction, they need a ruling on the legality of the regulations in time for their next plan year, which starts on July 1st of 2013. As we've noted in almost every filing, though, that doesn't take account of the safe harbor, which protects plans for an additional year, into July 2014.

And I also think it's relevant in this case that defendants have promised to amend the regulations by August of 2013 at the latest, so even if the court were to conclude that it had jurisdiction and provide a ruling by July 2013 when plaintiff's plan year starts, the new regulations wouldn't be in -- would be in effect, at the latest, a month later. And so we don't really see in this instance that plaintiffs have really shown any harm from a temporary stay of discovery until the court can resolve the jurisdictional issues.

With respect to the last three factors, I think mostly convenience to the court and the public interest. As we indicated, a lot of the material that plaintiff seeks will be objectionable based on privilege, based on burden, based on relevance, and so although I do think we could probably work out some of our differences, as plaintiffs suggests in their response, I think there would also be a lot of things that the parties wouldn't be able to work out and would require the court to resolve some objections, or

7 1 some discovery disputes generally, and I think that that would use up the court's time and resources and, which 2 again, would be an undue use of those resources if 3 4 defendants' motion is later -- a Motion to Dismiss is later granted. 5 Just one additional thing. I think in plaintiff's 6 response they cite United Financial Casualty Company for the 7 proposition that a stay of discovery is unwarranted in this 8 district, even when the pending Motion to Dismiss raises 9 jurisdictional issues, and I just wanted to point out that 10 in that case there were seven defendants and only one of 11 them had moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 12 not the case here. As we said, if our motion is granted, 13 14 then that will resolve the c ase. Also, there wasn't a situation there, like there is here, where similar motions 15 have been granted, and, of course, those are not binding on 16 this -- on this court, but we do think they're persuasive, 17 18 and so we would urge Your Honor to look at the cases that we cite in our brief which did impose a stay of discovery in 19 other cases where there was a challenge to subject matter 20 jurisdiction pending. 21 And so based on those factors, Your Honor, we 22 would ask again that you stay the case -- or stay discovery 23

And so based on those factors, Your Honor, we would ask again that you stay the case -- or stay discovery temporarily until -- just until the jurisdictional issue is resolved.

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1 THE COURT: The plaintiff has brought to my attention Judge Kane's preliminary injunction granted in the 2 Hercules case. What impact -- what do you make of the 3 4 significance of that case? BENNETT: Your Honor, first of all, with 5 respect to the -- that case is quite different here, that 6 involved a for-profit plaintiff, which doesn't qualify for 7 the safe harbor, and so -- and is not -- at least as it is 8 intended now -- is not going to benefit from the amendments 9 to the regulations that the agency is currently making, so 10 we didn't raise any jurisdictional arguments in that case, 11 12 and so --13 THE COURT: So you --14 MS. BENNETT: -- that doesn't impact the Motion to Dismiss that we filed. 15 With respect to any discovery, the parties are --16 first of all, we're still deciding whether to appeal that 17 case, and so the court has ordered us to meet, I think it's 18 near the end of October, to come up with some sort of a plan 19 for the rest of the case, and plaintiffs in that case have 20 indicated to me that they do not intend to seek any or will 21 only seek minimal discovery, so to the extent that 22 plaintiffs are suggesting that, well, you're going to have 23 24 to produce a bunch of stuff in that case, so what's the 25 burden here, I think that's just -- at least at this point,

1 based on what plaintiff's counsel in that case has told me -- is not an issue. 2. THE COURT: So did I understand you to say that the 3 4 Motion to Dismiss in Judge Kane's case is not based on a lack of jurisdiction? 5 MS. BENNETT: That's right, Your Honor, it's only 6 based on --it's based on the merits, it's based on failure 7 to state a claim. We have not raised any jurisdictional 8 arguments in that case and, again, that's because for-profit 9 organizations don't qualify for the enforcement safe harbor, 10 are they expected to benefit from the amended 11 regulations that the agency is currently working on. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 14 Mr. Baxter? MR. BAXTER: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 Let me respond first to your question about the 16 Hercules litigation, and then I'll try to respond of each of 17 18 Ms. Bennett's points after that. The Hercules decision is significant because it 19 shows that there is substantial merit to the party's claim. 20 The judge in that -- Judge Kane in that case found there was 21 a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and it's 22 not correct that the safe harbor protects non-profit 2.3 24 entities to the extent that is implied. The safe harbor 25 simply says that the government will not enforce or seek

penalties against a non-profit that is in violation of the law, but in related proceedings, in the Wheaton case, the Wheaton College case, defendants have already acknowledged that the mandate is in fact -- will, in fact, still be in effect against non-profits and they will be subject to private enforcement claims which are allowed -- which are provided under ERISA, ERISA's link into the Affordable Care Act. So the reality of the matter is that on July 1st, 2013, Colorado Christian will be subject to the mandate, it will be subject to potential private enforcement suits regardless of the safe harbor.

I'd also like point out that even if there's no -no discovery from Hercules, which is I'm not aware if the
plaintiff in that case decided he will seek discovery or
not, with 26 cases pending there's bound to be discovery in
one case or another, and there's no harm by requiring the
plaintiffs to go -- or the defendants to go forward with
their discovery obligations at this time.

It's also incorrect -- I think that there are some kind of (inaudible) out there that all of the courts are deciding -- you know, agree that there's no jurisdiction. In the Nebraska case that the defendants cite, the judge there, on standing, didn't reach any issues that are present in this case. Several of the plaintiffs were not directly subject to the regulation, and the court found that they

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didn't have standing, and the parties that were directly subject to the regulation were grandfathered, and so they -- they also weren't required to comply with the mandate.

In the two DC cases that have been decided, Judge Boasberg's case looks at the merits. Judge Huvelle at the hearing just last week, or the last two weeks, indicated that she was not happy that she hadn't realized until the day before the hearing that they were companion cases and she was not comfortable having different decisions coming out of the same district, and both of those decisions rely on the same circuit opinions from the Third Circuit while distinguishing DC cases, and there will be appeals, and there's a Motion for Reconsideration on one of them and an appeal had been filed in the other, and so I don't think there's any indication that those cases will necessarily be upheld or that other courts won't decide otherwise.

So, in essence, the claims here are the same they were at the time that the defendants first filed their motion for a stay. At that time they alleged that there was going to be -- you know, there was going to be a jurisdictional motion to dismiss, the court was aware of that, the fact that there could be a dismissal in this case, and even on the appeal up to Judge Arguello -- although she denied the appeal for timeliness, she acknowledged that she had authority if she thought there was some problem to grant

1 the relief that the defendants seek, and she chose not to. So there's really n othing new here that would 2 justify a different ruling. It's really almost an attempt 3 4 get around the fact that, you know, the clearly (inaudible) standard from the -- from your first order 5 denying the stay back in January. Or February. 6 As far as the burden, again, there's nothing 7 different here than what was known at the time of the first 8 There are procedures for, you know, narrowing 9 motion. discovery or seeking protective orders that are available to 10 They have never consulted with us about the 11 defendants. burden of discovery. Today is the first time I've heard 12 about the number of people they think would be involved, or 13 14 the number of pages, and we're certainly willing to consult with them on that and, if necessary, resolve any of those 15 issues by motion. 16 As far as Ms. Bennett mentioned that there's no 17 18 concern about the decline of evidentiary quality, again, that's always a concern, there's -- with time documents are 19 If we seek a 30(b)(6) or other deposition, the 20 knowledge and ability of that witness to prepare for the 21 deposition is impaired as time passes, and so we do think 22 that there is -- there is prejudice to Colorado Christian if 2.3 24 discovery is further stayed. 25 So finally, I would just reiterate that, you know,

1 this is -- if the defendants really wanted to avoid discovery, that is completely within their control. 2 could -- you know, they claim that they don't seek to impair 3 4 the religious liberty rights of the plaintiffs in this or any of the other cases, that's why they put the safe harbor 5 in place, but the safe harbor's incomplete. There -- it 6 7 would not be difficult for them to simply grant a full exemption, and that was requested of them in the Wheaton 8 College case, they refused to do that, and so by keeping the 9 pressure of the final regulation, which will take effect 10 against Colorado Christian University on July 1st, you know, 11 they've showed that they're not willing to do what it would 12 take to really put this -- you know, really take the burden 13 14 off the organizations like Colorado Christian, and so for that reason alone, I would urge the Court to deny their 15 motion for a stay. 16 THE COURT: Thank you. 17 18 Ms. Bennett, anything more? MS. BENNETT: Sure, Your Honor, just to follow-up 19 on a few points that Mr. Baxter made. 20 With respect to the private enforcement, I would 21 urge Your Honor to -- which you probably already have looked 22 at the Wheaton College decision, the court explicitly 23 24 addressed that issue and said that the speculative nature of 25 that did not create a standing or a ripe claim. And I'd

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also note that in that case the college's plan year start in January of 2013, whereas here, it's not until July of 2013, and so as I mentioned before, the new regulations, the agency intends to finalize them by August of 2013, so a month later, and so the courts, both in Wheaton College and in Belmont Abbey both addressed the speculative nature of the private enforcement and said that that's not sufficient to create jurisdiction.

I would also note that if you read the Wheaton College decision, there's absolutely nothing in there about the court in some way feeling bound by -- to adopt Judge Boasberg's decision. She -- Judge Huvelle certainly considered arguments that the parties made, had oral argument on the issue and wrote her own separate decision, and so there's no reason to think that it was in some way because she felt bound by Judge Boasberg's decision.

With respect to plaintiff's assertion that there -- well, with all these cases surely there will be discovery in one. At this point, this is the only case where any party has sought discovery against the defendants. We have, as I indicated, moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction all of the cases brought by non-profits, and we've also, in instances where there has been some sort of moving forward of discovery, a Rule 26 conference or what have you, we have also moved to stay discovery and will continue to do so, and

so we don't think that provides any basis that eventually
there may be discovery in one of these cases to allow us to
go forward here.

And I think -- oh, with respect to plaintiff's concern about evidentiary quality, first of all, I would notice that this is the first time they've mentioned that, it wasn't in their response, but as defendants indicated before, we have taken measures to preserve documents and data in the event that discovery is ultimately needed, and so there's no concern about the evidentiary quality in that regard, and so, again, for the reasons we stated, we would request that the Court grant our motion.

THE COURT: Thank you.

The Defendants' Renewed Motion to Stay Discovery is denied. Let me begin by emphasizing what is not before me, and that is the Motion to Dismiss. I make no judgment on the merits of that, that's a matter which the district judge has reserved to herself, and I'm not going to attempt to anticipate what her ruling would be based on the strength or weaknesses of decisions in other jurisdictions.

Turning then to the five factors appropriately considered with respect to the Motion to Stay, I find that the interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously to determination of this important issue -- which is an important issue of public concern -- so that brings in also

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the public interest, is substantial. This is an important case. There are risks of enforcement against the plaintiff which a stay would exacerbate, and so I find that those interests, the interest of proceeding expeditiously and the public interest weigh heavily in favor of having the matter move forward and against a stay.

There is always burden on all parties to litigation. Here, there's an argument that the burden is

litigation. Here, there's an argument that the burden is undue on the defendants. I don't allow discovery which imposes an undue burden. I allow that discovery which is appropriate and necessary to the reasonable resolution of a case. So if the discovery sought by the plaintiff is unduly burdensome, that matter can be brought before me, and I'll consider the arguments and make a decision on that so I can address the burden issue separately and more precisely than through an overall stay.

The convenience of the Court is not seriously implicated either way. We are here to resolve disputes and to prepare disputes for resolution, and so I find that that doesn't -- that factor doesn't weigh either way, and there are no non-party interests that I am aware of which weigh heavily towards a stay. So I'm going to deny the Motion to Stay for those reasons.

That brings us to the Unopposed Motion for Extension of Deadlines. If I have understood that motion,

1 what you are seeking is an extension by which the defendants must respond to the currently existing and outstanding 2. discovery of -- which would take that to October 1st. A 3 4 cutoff of the discovery -- I mean, an extension of the cutoff discovery to two months after that, so that would be 5 December 3rd, and a dispositive motion deadline extension to 6 7 approximately a month after that, which would be giving you a little extra time because of holidays surroundings there, 8 around January 11. 9 MR. BAXTER: Your Honor, this is --10 THE COURT: Yes. 11 MR. BAXTER: -- this is Eric Baxter, if I may. 12 13 think that we had asked -- I'm sure if you're assuming we 14 had asked for what you're ruling, we'd asked for December 29th for discovery cutoff, and then the dispositive motions 15 30 days after that. If we had from the date that the 16 government's responses were originally due, which was August 17 18 15th, we would have had 75 days after that for the discovery cutoff, which would have put us at least -- I guess, 19 assuming that there's -- if the relief in the 30-day 20 requests from today were granted, that would put us into the 21 22 middle of December for the discovery cutoff deadline, and then we would ask for two extra weeks after that just to 2.3 24 make sure -- just for clarification. 25 THE COURT: So I've misunderstood. What -- when do

1 you want the discovery -- the currently pending -- the responses to the currently depending -- pending -- let me 2 start over. When do you want responses to pending discovery 3 4 due? MR. BAXTER: So we had agreed to 30 days from 5 today, which would roughly be the 30th of September or 6 7 October 1st, that part's correct. THE COURT: All right. And then a cutoff of what? 8 MR. BAXTER: I think we asked for December 29th for 9 discovery cutoff, and then January 28th for the 10 dispositive motion. 11 THE COURT: All right. And that's -- those 12 13 extensions that you've said are what you still want, is that 14 right? 15 MR. BAXTER: Correct. 16 THE COURT: All right. Do you agree with that, Ms. Bennett? 17 18 MS. BENNETT: Yeah, we have no objection to that. THE COURT: All right. I will grant the Unopposed 19 Motion for Extension of Deadlines as follows: Responses to 20 currently outstanding discovery are due on October 1, the 21 22 discovery cutoff is extended to December 29th, and the dispositive motion deadline is extended to January 28th, 2.3 24 2013.

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MR. BAXTER: Your Honor, this is Mr. Baxter

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1 again --THE COURT: Yes, sir. 2 MR. BAXTER: -- and I apologize to make this 3 4 difficult. Since we are -- since your order has just 5 requested us that number of days and the 29th falls on a 6 7 Saturday, I'm wondering if we can just for clarity say, you know, January 2nd for the discovery cutoff deadline, which 8 puts us right past the first holiday, and then February --9 February -- or, yeah, I guess that would be February 1st for 10 the dispositive motion deadline. 11 THE COURT: Any objection to that, Ms. Bennett? 12 MS. BENNETT: No, Your Honor. 13 14 THE COURT: All right, that's what I'll do then. Let me make sure I've got it right. Responses due October 15 1; the discovery cutoff, January 2nd, 2013; the dispositive 16 motion deadline, February 1st, 2013, right? 17 18 MR. BAXTER: Correct. THE COURT: Okay. 19 Mr. Baxter, anything else this afternoon? 20 MR. BAXTER: Nothing. Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Ms. Bennett? 22 MS. BENNETT: No, Your Honor. Thanks again for 2.3 24 allowing us to appear via phone. 25 THE COURT: Yes, thank you for making yourselves

available. Good day. MR. BAXTER: Thank you, Your Honor. THE CLERK: Court is in recess. (Whereupon, the within hearing was then in conclusion at 1:59 p.m. on August 31, 2012.) I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript, to the best of my knowledge and belief, from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. /s/ Bonnie Nikolas September 04, 2012 Signature of Transcriber Date