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8		TES DISTRICT COURT RICT OF KANSAS
	FOR THE DIST	RICI OF KANSAS
9	DED D.V. A DCI E.V.	) Case No.: 05-1368-MLB
10	PERRY APSLEY, BOB BAILEY,	) Case No.: 00 1000 MEB
11	JACOB A. BAKK,	) COMPLAINT-CLASS ACTION
	GARY BALL,	
12	PEGGY S. BELL,	
13	THOMAS BELTON,	)
13	MELONDA BIRCHER,	)
14	JAMES BOWMAKER,	)
	JERRY L. BRANSTETER,	
15	MICHAEL E. BURGARDT, ROCKY R. BURRIS,	)
16	DANIEL D. BURROWS,	ý
10	HENRY F. BUTLER,	
17	BETTY CHILDERS,	
1.0	DAVID L. CLAY,	
18	LARRY E. COMBS,	)
19	HARVEY J. CONYAC,	)
	LOREN W. COX,	)
20	PHYLLIS A. COX,	\ \
21	LINDA L. DEZARN,	<u>'</u>
21	WILLIAM D. DOSHIER,	ý
22	THROMA A. DYAS,	)
	ALAN S. EPPERSON, LLOYD C. FANSLER,	
23	JERALD J. GILBERT,	)
24	RICHARD GOTTHARD,	)
27	BRIAN GROOM,	ý e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
25	DENISE A. HARRIS,	)
	RON W. HENDERSHOT,	}
26	OLIVIA J. HOUSLEY,	)
	VERNA J. HOUSTON,	ý
		-1-
	CLACCACTION COMPLAINT	

1	LARRY W. JAMES,
	SHARRON N. JAMES,
2	GARY L. JOHNSON,
3	MELVYN J. JOHNSON,
	DONALD R. JONES,
4	RALPH O. KEENER,
5	DANNY R. KENNEDY,
7	MELVIN E. KERNS, ) GORDON B. KINKEAD, )
6	JIMMY LE,
	CARLTON E. LEE,
7	STEPHEN L. LINCK,
8	FREDDY J. MCCOLPIN,
	GLENNYS M. MONTGOMERY,
9	CATHY J. MUNSELL,
10	JAN W. MURRARY,
10	HUYEN T. NGUYEN,
11	LUYEN D. NGUYEN, ) KENT W. OWEN, )
1.0	LOWANDA J. PATTON,
12	PAUL D. PETE,
13	BRENT L. POPP,
	JAMES E. PORTER,
14	JAY E. POWELL,
15	WARREN PYLES,
	WILLARD J. RATCHFORD, )
16	VERONICA RIOS,   RICHARD D. ROEDER,
17	DARLENE E. ROZAR,
	ALBERT SCHLOETZER,
18	WILLIAM H. SETCHELL,
1.0	JAMES C. SHEPPARD,
19	DEBRA L. SMITH,
20	SAMMY J. SMITH,
	SHARON A. SOUTHERN,   LINDA C. SPARRER,
21	ABEL L. VASQUEZ,
22	HENRY F. VICTOR,
	JAMES WALKER,
23	JAMES R. WALLACE,
24	CAROLYN Y. WHEATON,
4-7	SYLVESTER WILLIAMS II,
25	JANET M. WILSON,
26	WALTER WOODS,   BETTY R. YOUNG, individually and on
26	behalf of those similarly situated,

1	
2	Plaintiffs, )
3	vs.
4	THE BOEING COMPANY, THE ONEX )
5	CORPORATION, SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, ) and MIDWESTERN AIRCRAFT, )
6	Defendants.
7	
8	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
9	COMES NOW plaintiffs individually and on be half of those similarly situated, by and
10	through their counsel, Lawrence W. W illiamson, Jr. and Uzo L. Ohaebosim of Shores,
11	Williamson, & Ohaebosim, LLC, and for his cause of action against defendants, allege and state
12	as follows:
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	CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

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### I. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

- 1. This case is about the betrayal by The Boeing Company and its partner in crime, Onex (Spirit Aerospace, Midwestern Aircraft ) against more that 1,000 employees who have dedicated decades in assisting Boeing collecting more that Ten Billion dollars in revenue.
- 2. Boeing and Onex kept decisions a secret. The defendants kept the nam es of the subsidiaries secret until after the decisions were made against the plaint iffs and Class. In furtherance of these secrets, Boeing provided a code name "Project Lloyd." Only certain personnel were provided access to the folders under the is database. This database was at least 7.59 MB in size and should be produced in its entirectly in defendants' initial disclosures. The defendants have also kept the true relationship between Boeing, Onex, Midwestern, and Spirit Aerospace a secret.
- 3. One act that was no secret was the term ination of the plaintiffs and Class. Instead of informing the employees when decisions were made, it tortured employees and put families and individuals through unexplainable feelings while they waited to see if they would receive a "pink slip." In announcing these terminations, the employees of Boeing were entitled to more respect than the insult of throwing "insult slips" into the driveways of the individuals who helped Boeing prosper throughout the years. The humiliation for workers did not end here. Nigel Wright, of Onex, publicly stated that the workers who were not of fered positions were individuals with bad attitudes, troublemakers, and/or dead beats. Some employees were even escorted off of the premises as if they were common criminals.
- 4. How much less dignity can som eone have, than for a delivery truck to throw an envelope out onto the driveway? Each plaintiff and Class member deserved much more than that and at the very least deserved to know "why" they were terminated. In failing to adequately protect the rights of the older workers, the defendants have injured not only these employees, but their families and loved ones as well. As Plaintiff Pete has noted, "Life isn't always fair but, why is Boeing playing with the people and their family's lives!?"

- 5. Instead of accepting responsibility for the treatm ent the defendants have perpetrated, defendants have begun playing "pin—the tail on the other." At the EEOC stage, Defendant Boeing stated that it did not have anything to do with the decisions made against the employees. However, there were notes sent from Onex that stated that Boeing's mangers were to help pick and choose who was staying for the new company. Additionally, plaintiffs have undisputable proof that Boeing's managers indeed had significant input into the wrongful terminations of the plaintiffs and Class.
- 6. While Boeing has instituted its "play dumb" defense, Onex has instituted its "see no evil" defense. Despite federal m andates to maintain proper records regarding why the decisions were made against plaintiffs and Class, Onex failed to do so. As a result, Onex was penalized by the EEOC for these actions.
- 7. Employees who had believed the myth of job security that Boeing professed over the years were, after 20 years, forced to ente r the job m arket, tainted as worker's not good enough to make the grade. Plaintiffs, such as Plaintiff James' dreams of retiring at a certain age were taken away from them.
- 8. Additionally, the laid off workers were denied the right to vote when time came to protest the actions of Boeing and Onex. The IAM did not represent the interests of these workers. One example of the Union's failures can be seen with the failure to file a grievance. IAM Union drafted a grievance and called for all to sign. However, mysteriously, the grievance disappeared.

- 9. As another sign of defendants' bad f aith, Nigel Wright stated that as a gesture of good will to the machinists union, when the company needs to hire again that they would first hire back the laid off workers. However, Onex (Spirit) has not honored that prom ise. Indeed, many of the plaintiffs and Class members have applied for positions that they are qualified for and have held for years, and have not been offe red a position. In some cases plaintiffs have been rejected as "unqualified." Additionally, Spirit Aero space has set arbitrary standards regarding being hired into the company so that former workers could almost never receive a job offer.
- 10. In connection with the RIF, the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of age discrimination, in treating younger em ployees more favorably than older em ployees, including (but not limited to) some of the following specific actions:
  - a. Consciously deciding not to comply with the Older Workers Benefit
    Protection Act ("OW BPA") for certain job grades, in order to avoid
    having to disclose demographic data and its "selection criteria" to those
    affected by the RIF;
  - b. Terminating more qualified older workers while employing less qualified younger workers;
  - c. Failing to provide the term inated workers with the ration ale why they were terminated;
  - d. Filling "open" positions within departments with younger employees (i.e., under the age of 40) just before the RIF, then te rminating older workers (i.e., those 40 years of age and older) in the same or similar positions as part of the RIF;
  - e. Allowing managers to access improper criteria, such as age, date of birth, and other age related data, for use in making RIF decisions;

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- f. Setting up a "sham" process for displaced workers to "re-apply" for open positions with Spirit, r esulting in situations where older applicants (i.e., those 40 years of age and older) were not given the same consideration as younger employees and were denied even the opportunity to interview for such open positions; and
- Continuing to hire new and younger employees after the RIF. g.
- 11. The alleged system was subjective, arbitrary, non-substantive, dishonest, and inaccurate. Additionally, the system was:
  - a. Biased against older (over age 40) workers; and
  - b. Inequitable and inappropriate because of pool size and composition.
- 12. In addition to the foregoing facts, Plaintiffs are "similarly situated" in that: all are over 40; all were term inated by Boeing and/or not hired by Onex as part of a Reduction in Force.

#### II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 13. This is a civil action over which original jurisdiction is vested in this Court by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(a) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(3). This Court also is vested with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims under ERISA pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and (f)12. T his Court has supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over all other claims that are so related to claims within its original or exclusive jurisdiction that they form part of the sam e case or contro versy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Venue is appropriate in this Court under 2 8 U.S.C. § 1391 and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (2) as it is brought in a ju dicial district in which the de fendants reside or may be found at the time the action is commenced. Further, many of the plaintiffs and class members reside in the State of Kansas.
- 14 Plaintiffs have exhausted and satisfie d all conditions precedent to filing this action. Addition ally, plaintiffs invoke the single file rule as defendants were placed on

sufficient notice of the class wide nature of the action. Multip le plaintiffs filed a class -wide charge of age discrim ination with the US. Equal Employment Commission ("EEOC"), which was cross filed with the Kansas Human Rights Commission ("KHRC"). Each plaintiff has consented to join this action. The Consent to Sue forms for the named plaintiffs will be filed separately due to the size of the files but are incorporated herein by reference.

#### III. PARTIES

#### A. General Allegations as to all Plaintiffs

- 15. At all pertinent times, each of the plaintiffs and Class member in this action was an employee of the defendants within the meaning of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630, and ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6), and a participant in and/or be neficiary of the Plans within the meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1002(7) and (8).
- 16. The plaintiffs, and each of them, were affected by the defendants' general pattern and practice of discriminating against older workers.

### B. Specific Allegations as to Individual Plaintiffs

- 17. Plaintiff Perry Apsley ("Plaintiff Apsley") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born May 5, 1955, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Apsley was employed by Boeing for twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Apsley was qualified to hold his position as a Strechpress operator. Thus, Plaintiff Apsley filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 18. Plaintiff Bob Bailey ("Plaintiff Bailey") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 1, 1953, and who, as of June 10, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Bailey was employed by Boeing f or eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Bailey was qualified to hold his positi on as an eq uipment maintenance electrician. Thus, Plaintiff Bailey filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 19. Plaintiff Jacob A. Bakk ("Plaintiff Bakk") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on March 6, 1954, and who, as of May 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Bakk was employed by Boeing for twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Bakk was qualified to hold his position as a chief metal machine operator. Thus, Plaintiff Bakk filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 20. Plaintiff Gary Ball ("Plaintiff Ball") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on September 26, 1946, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Ball was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Ball was qualified to hold his position as a plum ber/boiler employee. Thus, Plaintiff Ball filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 21. Plaintiff Peggy S. Bell ("Plaintiff Bell") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on April 2, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Bell was employed by Boeing for more than twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Bell was qualified to hold her position as a material processor. Thus, Plaintiff Bell filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 22. Plaintiff Thomas Belton ("Plaintiff Belton") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on March 23, 1950, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Belton was employed by Boeing for more than eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Belton was qualified to hold his position as a plumber/boiler employee. Plaintiff Belton filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 23. Plaintiff MeLonda Bircher ("Plaintiff Bircher") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on Dece mber 20, 1960, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by

Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plai ntiff Bircher was employed by Boeing for twenty-two (22) years. Plaintiff Bircher was qualified to hold her pos ition as an asset manager. Plaintiff Bircher filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 24. Plaintiff James A. Bowmaker ("Plaintiff Bowmaker") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born December 24, 1954, and who, as of June 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Bowmaker was employed by Boeing for several years. Plaintiff Bowmaker was qualified to hold his position at Boeing. Thus, Plain tiff Bowmaker filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 25. Plaintiff Jerry L. Branste tter ("Plaintiff Branstetter") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on July 11, 1945, and w ho, as of June 3, 2005, w as employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Pla intiff Branstetter was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-seven (27) years. Plaintiff Branstetter was qualified to hold the power district electrician position. Thus, Plaintiff Branstetter filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff Michael E. Burgar dt ("Plaintiff Burgardt") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 26, 1952, and who, as of May 24, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plain tiff Burgardt was em ployed by Boeing for thirty (31) years. Plaintiff Burgardt was qualified to hold his position as a power feed drill technician. Thus, Plaintiff Burgardt filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 27. Plaintiff Rocky R. Burris ("Plaintiff Burris") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 8, 1950, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plain tiff Burris was employed by Boeing f or twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Burris was qualified to hold his position as a plum ber. Thus, Plaintiff Burris filed a

timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 28. Plaintiff Daniel D. Burrows ("Plaintiff Burrows") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on Septem ber 20, 1932, and who, as of August 22, 2003, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Burrows was employed by Boeing for thirty-three (33) years. Plaintiff Bu rrows was qualified to hold his tooling position. Thus, Plaintiff Burrows filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 29. Plaintiff Henry F. Butler ("Plain tiff Butler") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on August 13, 1953, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Butler was employed by Boeing for twenty-six (26) years. Plaintiff Butler was qualified to hold his position as a material processor. Thus, Plaintiff Butler filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 30. Plaintiff Betty Childers ("Plaintiff Childers") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on July 19, 1953, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Childers was employed by Boeing for twenty-six (26) years. Plaintiff Childers was qualified to hold her position as a material processor. Thus, Plaintiff Childers filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff David L. Clay ("Plaintiff Clay") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on May 18, 1946, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Clay was employed by Boeing for more than thirty-five (35) years. Plaintiff Clay was qualified to hold his position at Boeing. Thus, Plaintiff Clay filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- Plaintiff Larry E. Combs ("Pla intiff Combs") was a resident of the State of Kansas during the stated allegations. Plaintiff Combs was born on September 9, 1948, and as of June 3, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Combs was employed by Boeing for twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Combs was qualified to hold his position as a business process analyst. Thus, P laintiff Combs filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 33. Plaintiff Harvey J. Conyac ("Plaintiff Conyac") is a res ident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 15, 1945, and who, as of May 27, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Conyac was employed by Boeing for twenty-seven (27) years. Plaintiff Conyac was qualified to hold his position. Thus, Plaintiff Conyac filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 34. Plaintiff Loren W. Cox ("Plaintiff Cox") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on July 21, 1955, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Cox was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-four (24) years. Plaintiff Cox was qualified to hold her position as a bench mechanic.
- 35. Plaintiff Phyllis A. Cox ("Plaintiff P. Cox") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 1, 1949, and who, as of June 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff P. Cox was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff P. Cox was qualified to hold her position as a sheet metal machinist. Thus, Plaintiff P. Cox filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 36. Plaintiff Linda L. DeZarn ("Plaintiff DeZarn") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on June 16, 1956, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff DeZarn was employed by Boeing for ten (10) years. Plaintiff DeZarn was qualified to hold her position as a cert ified solder. Thus Plaintiff DeZa rn filed a

timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- Plaintiff William D. Doshier ("P laintiff Doshier") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on Dece mber 6, 1953, and who, as of June 17, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Doshier was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-nine (29) years. Plaintiff Doshier was qualified to hold his position as a equipment operator.
- 38. Plaintiff Throma A. Dyas ("Plaintiff Dyas") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on December 2, 1951, and who, as of May 19, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Dyas was employed by Boeing for nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff Dyas was qualified to hold her position as an inspector.
- 39. Plaintiff Alan S. Eppers on ("Plaintiff Epperson") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on August 22, 1964, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Epperson was employed by Boeing for sixteen (16) years. Plaintiff Epperson was qualified to hold his position as an inspector. Thus, Plaintiff Epperson filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 40. Plaintiff Lloyd C. Fansler ("Plaintiff Fansler") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born August 5, 1946, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by B oeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Fansler was employed by Boeing for thirty-one (31) years. Plaintiff Fansler was qualified to hold his position as a skin and spar area person.
- 41. Plaintiff Jerald J. Gilbert ("Plaintiff Gilbert") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on April 20, 1950, and who, as of May 19, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Gilbert was employed by Boeing f or seventeen (17) years. Plaintiff Gilbert was qualified to hold his position as sheet metal mechanic. Thus, Plaintiff

Gilbert filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 42. Plaintiff Richard Gotthard ("Plaintiff Gotthard") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on December 23, 1956, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Gotthard was employed by Boeing for twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Gotthard was qualified to hold his position as a machinist. Thus, Plaintiff Gotthard filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 43. Plaintiff Brian Groom ("Pl aintiff Groom") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born October 2, 1958, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Groom was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-four (24) years. Plaintiff Groom was qualified to hold his position as a plastics bench mechanic. Thus, Plaintiff Groom filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 44. Plaintiff Denise A. Harris ("Plaintiff Harris") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on August 10, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Harris was employed by Boeing for m ore than twenty-nine (29) years. Plaintiff Harris was qualified to hold her position as a factory clerk.
- 45. Plaintiff Ron W. Hendershot ("Plaintiff Hendershot") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on March 10, 1957, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. P laintiff Hendershot was employed by Boeing for twenty-seven (27) years. Plaintiff Hendershot was qualified to hold his position as a carpenter millwright specialist.
- 46. Plaintiff Olivia J. Housley ("Plaintiff Housley") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on Dece mber 1, 1948, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Housley was employed by Boeing for twenty-

six (26) years. Plaintiff Housley was qualified to hold her position as a master scheduler. Thus, Plaintiff Housley filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 47. Plaintiff Verna J. Houst on ("Plaintiff Houston") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born March 26, 1949, and w ho, as of May 18, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Houston was employed by Boeing for ten years. Plaintiff Houston was qualified to hold her position as a sealer. Thus, Plaintiff Houston filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 48. Plaintiff Larry W. James ("Plaintiff L. James") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born June 26, 1958, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff James was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-four (24) years. Plain tiff James was qualified to hold his position as a material processor. Thus, Plaintiff James filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 49. Plaintiff Sharron N. James ("Plaintiff James") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born March 21, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was e mployed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff James was employed by Boeing for twen ty-five (25) years. Plaintiff James was qualified to hold her position as a material processor. Thus, Plaintiff James filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 50. Plaintiff Gary L. Johnson ("Plaintiff Johnson") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on August 6, 1952, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Johnson was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Johnson was qualified to hold his posit ion. Thus, Plaintiff Johnson filed a

timely EEOC com pliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- Plaintiff Melvyn J. Johns on ("Plaintiff M. Johnson") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on April 28, 1953, and who, as of June 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff M. Johnson was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-seven (27) years. Plaintiff M. Johnson was qualified to hold his position as a laminator. Thus, Plaintiff M. Johnson filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff Donald R. Jones ("Plaintif f Jones") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on August 9, 1953, and who, as of May 19, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Jones was employed by Boeing f or nineteen (19) y ears. Plaintiff Jones was qualified to hold his position as an environm ental operator. Thus, Plaintiff Jones filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff Ralph O. Keener ("Plaintiff Keener") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on August 22, 1948, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Keener was employed by Boeing f or eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Keener was qualified to hold his position as an assembly installer. Thus, Plaintiff Keener filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff Danny R. Kennedy ("Plaintiff Kennedy") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on September 12, 1952, and who, as June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Kennedy was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-six (26) years. Plaintiff Kennedy was qualified to hold his position as a carpenter/millwright specialist.

- 55. Plaintiff Melvin E. Kerns ("Plaintiff Kerns") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 15, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Kerns was employed by Boeing for more than fifteen (15) years. Plaintiff Kerns was qualified to hold his position as a plum ber/power plant specialist. Thus, Plaintiff Kerns filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff Gordon B. Kinkead ("P laintiff Kinkead") is a reside nt of the State of Kansas who was born on October 7, 1953, a nd who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Kinkead was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Kinkead was qualified to hold his position as a corrective action coordinator. Thus, Plaintiff Kinkead filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 57. Plaintiff Jimmy Le ("Plaintiff Le") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on April 4, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Le was employed by Boeing for nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff Le was qualified to hold his position as a mill operator. Plaintiff Le filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies. Plaintiff Le filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff Carlton D. Lee ("Plaintiff Lee") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 15, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by B oeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Lee was employed by Boeing for more than twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Lee was qualified to hold h is position as a sheet metal assembler. Thus, Plaintiff Lee filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 59. Plaintiff Stephen L. Linck ("Plaintiff Linck") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on June 11, 1951, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by B oeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Linck was employed by Boeing for m ore than thirty (30) years. Plaintiff Linck was qualified to hold his position as an engineer.
- 60. Plaintiff Freddy J. McC olpin ("Plaintiff McColpin") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on Dece mber 9, 1947, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff McColpin was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-three (23) years. Plaintiff McColpin was qualified to hold his position as a plumber/boiler house power plant employee. Thus, Plaintiff McColpin filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 61. Plaintiff Glennys M. Montgom ery ("Plaintiff Montgomery") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on October 14, 1940, and who, as of March 22, 2002, was employed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Montgomery was employed by Boeing for nine years. Plaintiff Montgomery was qualified to be employed at Boeing.
- 62. Plaintiff Cathy J. Munse ll ("Plaintiff Munsell") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on December 30, 1956, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plai ntiff Munsell was employed by Boeing for twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Munsell was qualified to hold her position as an assembler installer. Thus, Plaintiff Munsell filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff Jan W. Murray ("Plaintiff Murray") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on February 28, 1948, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Murray was employed by Boeing for more than seventeen (17) years. Plaintiff M urray was qualified to hold his position as plastic bench composite mechanic. Thus, Plaintiff Murray filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

64. Plaintiff Huyen T. Nguyen ("Plaintiff Nguyen") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on Nove mber 10, 1952, and who, as of May 18, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Nguyen was employed by Boeing for more than eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Nguyen was qualified to hold the sealer position. Thus, Plaintiff Nguyen filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 65. Plaintiff Luyen D. Nguyen ("Plaintiff L. Nguyen") is a reside nt of the State of Kansas who was born on Nove mber 20, 1950, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff L. Nguyen was employed by Boeing for sixteen (16) years. Plaintiff Nguyen was qualified to hold the tape machine operator position. Thus, Plaintiff Nguyen filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 66. Plaintiff Kent W. Owen ("Plaintiff Owen") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on December 17, 1958, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Owen was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-one (21) years. Plaintiff Owen was qualified to hold his position as a MR&D technical analyst. Thus, Plaintiff Owen filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff Lowanda J. Patton ("Plaintiff Patton") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on November 26, 1948, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Patton was employed by Boeing for twenty-six (26) years. Plaintiff Patton was qualified to hold her position as a steel metal employee. Thus, Plaintiff Patton filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 68. Plaintiff Paul D. Pete ("Plaintiff Pete") is a res ident of the State of Kansas who was born on December 13, 1954, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

 Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Pete was employed at Boeing for more than twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Pete was qualified to hold his position as a sheet metal employee.

- 69. Plaintiff Brent L. Popp ("Plaintiff Popp") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on August 6, 1959, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Popp was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Popp was qualified to hold his position. Thus, Plaintiff Popp filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 70. Plaintiff James E. Porter ("Plaintiff Porter") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 2, 1947, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Porter was employed by Boeing for more than eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Porter was qualified to hold his position as a project planner.
- 71. Plaintiff Jay E. Powell ("Pla intiff Powell") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on October 6, 1954, and who, as of June 16 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Powell was employed by Boeing for m ore than thirty-one (31) years. Plaintiff Powell was qualified to hold the production machinist position. Thus, Plaintiff Powell filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- Plaintiff Warren Pyles ("Plaintiff Pyles") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on September 8, 1956, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Pyles was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Pyles was qualified to hold his position as a millwright employee. Thus, Plaintiff Pyles filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 73. Plaintiff Willard J. Ratchford ("Plaintiff Ratchford") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on October 16, 1957, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by

Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Ratchford was employed by Boeing for nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff Ratchford was qualified to hold his position as a hand rou ter operator. Thus, Plaintiff Ratchford filed a tim ely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to su e and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 74. Plaintiff Veronica Rios ("Plaintiff Rios") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on November 20, 1961, and who, as of May 21, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Rios was employed by Boeing for more than five years. Plaintiff Rios was qualified to hold her position as a bench mechanic.
- 75. Plaintiff Richard D. R oeder ("Plaintiff Roeder") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on May 8, 1953, and w ho, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Roeder was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Roeder was qualified to hold his position as a machinist. Thus, Plaintiff Roeder filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to some and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 76. Plaintiff Darlene E. Rozar ("Plaintiff Rozar") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on October 19, 1947, and who, as of May 21, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Rozar was employed by Boeing for nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff Rozar was qualified to hold her position as a machinist. Thus, Plaintiff Rozar filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 77. Plaintiff Albert Schloetzer ("Plaintiff Schloetzer") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on August 21, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Schloetzer was employed by Boeing for fifteen (15) years. Plaintiff Schloetzer was qualified to hold his position as a housekeeper.
- 78. Plaintiff William H. Setchell ("Pla intiff Setchell") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on March 30, 1954, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by

Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plai ntiff Setchell was employed by Boeing for twenty-seven (27) years. Plaintiff Se tchell was qualified to hold his pos ition as a storek eeper/clerk. Thus, Plaintiff Setchell filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 79. Plaintiff James C. Sheppard ("Plaintiff Sheppard") is a res ident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 24, 1953, and who, was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Sheppard was qualified to hold his position. Thus, Plaintiff Sheppard filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 80. Plaintiff Debra L. Smith ("Plaintiff Smith") was a resident of the State of Kansas during all applicable dates. Plaintiff Smith was born on January 27, 1962, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Sm ith was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Smith was qualified to hold her position as a manufacturer helper. Thus, Plaintiff Sm ith filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 81. Plaintiff Sammy J. Smith ("Plaintiff S. Smith") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on January 31, 1959, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff S. Smith was employed by Boeing for more than nineteen (19) years. Plaintiff S. Smith was qualified to hold his position as an machinist. Thus, Plaintiff S. Smith filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 82. Plaintiff Sharon A. Southern ("Plaintiff Southern") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on Septem ber 23, 1951, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaint iff Southern was employed by Boeing for twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Southern was qualified to hold her position as a sheet metal assembler.

Thus, Plaintiff Southern filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 83. Plaintiff Linda C. Sparrer ("Plaintiff Sparrer") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on February 26, 1948, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plain tiff Sparrer was employed by Boeing for sixteen years. Plaintiff Sparrer was qualified to hold her position as IWTP operator. Thus, Plaintiff Sparrer filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 84. Plaintiff Abel L. Vasqu ez ("Plaintiff Vasquez") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on May 17, 1942, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Vasquez was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-eight (28) years. Plaintiff Vasquez was qualified to hold the manufacturing engineer position. Thus, Plaintiff Vasquez filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 85. Plaintiff Henry F. Victor ("Plaintiff Victor") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on March 6, 1937, and who, as of May 21, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Victor was employed by Boeing for m ore than twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Victor was qualified to hold his position as a material processor. Thus, Plaintiff Victor filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 86. Plaintiff James Walker ("Plaintiff Walker") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on November 15, 1955, and who, as of June 16, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Walker was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Walker was qualified to hold his position as an assembler. Thus, Plaintiff Walker filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

Plaintiff James R. W allace ("Plaintiff Wallace") is a r esident of the State of Kansas who was born on August 11, 1948, and who, as of June 3, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Wallace was employed by Boeing for more than twenty-six (26) years. Plaintiff W allace was qualified to hold his position as a power distribution electrician. Thus, Plaintiff W allace filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

- 88. Plaintiff Carolyn Y. W heaton ("Plaintiff Wheaton") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born June 15, 1962, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Wheaton was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Wheaton was qualified to hold her pos ition a factory attendant. Thus, Plaintiff Wheaton filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 89. Plaintiff Sylvester Williams II ("Plaintiff Williams II") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on February 7, 1954, a nd who, as of May 19, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Williams II was employed by Boeing for more than twenty (20) years. Plaintiff Williams II was qualified to hold his position as a skin quality employee. Thus, Plaintiff Williams II filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.
- 90. Plaintiff Janet M. W ilson ("Plaintiff Wilson") is a resident the State of Kansas who was born on January 6, 1960, a nd who, as May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Wilson was employed by Boeing for eighteen (18) years. Plaintiff Wilson was qualified to hold his position as an assembler. Thus, Plaintiff Wilson filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted a ll administrative remedies.
- 91. Plaintiff Walter Woods ("Plaintiff Woods") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on March 27, 1947, and who, as of May 20, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its

Wichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Woods was employed by Boeing for sixteen (16) years. Plaintiff Woods was qualified to hold his positions as a structure mechanic. Thus, Plaintiff Woods filed a timely EEOC compliant, received a notice of the right to sue and has exhausted all administrative remedies.

92. Plaintiff Betty R. Young ("Plaintiff Young") is a resident of the State of Kansas who was born on July 11, 1957, and who, as of May 27, 2005, was employed by Boeing at its W ichita, Kansas facility. Plaintiff Young was employed by Boeing for twenty-five (25) years. Plaintiff Young was qualified to hold her position.

#### C. Defendants

#### 1. Boeing

93. Boeing's Wichita Division supp orted the commercial, military, and space products and services of the Boeing Corporation. Operations in Wichita date back to the old Stearman Aircraft Company, which became part of Boeing in 1934 when the federal government required United Airlines, Pratt and Whitney, and Boeing to split into three separate companies. It is the largest employer in the State of Kansas. The division produces 75 percent of the parts for Boeing's 737 commercial airliners as well nacelles, nose sections and other parts for Boeing's 747, 757, 767, and 777 as well as a range of maintenance services and parts for the company's military and commercial products. Boeing can be served as set forth in the summons

### 2. Onex/Spirit/Midwestern (referred to collectively as Onex)

Onex is a Canadian corporation that is the parent company of Spirit A erospace. Midwestern Aircraft Systems is the former name of Spirit Aerospace. Onex negotia ted the terms of the sale of the Boeing plants and, along with Boeing, made the decisions against the plaintiffs. Midwestern Aircraft Systems was formed solely to be the entity to run the Wichita plant and was not publicized until after the sale of the Boeing plant. Midwestern and Spirit were not properly capitalized and shared the same directors, officers and employees. Onex boasts on its website that Nigel Wright (managing director of Onex) and Seth Mersky (managing director

- e. whether the defendants intentionally interfered with the retirement rights of plaintiffs;
- f. whether defendants have violated the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA");
- g. whether defendants violated Title VII by failing to keep records of the decisions made against plaintiffs; and
- h. whether further in junctive relief is appropriate as a rem edy for the past, present, and future discrimination.
- 101. Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the Class.
- 102. Plaintiffs and Class counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.

#### B. 23(b) Requirements

- 103. <u>Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)</u>: The defendants have acted /refused to act and are acting/refusing to act on grounds generally appli cable to the Class, thereby m aking appropriate final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief to the Class as a whole.
- 104. <u>Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)</u>: Common questions of fact and law predom inate over questions affecting only individual members.
- 105. A class action is superior to other avai lable methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.
- 106. There are no unusual difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of this litigation as a class action.
- 107. Notice to the Class may be accomplished inexpensively, efficiently and in a manner best designed to protect the due process rights of all Class members by means of written notices supplied through defendant's system of communication. Add itionally, notice can be posted on plaintiffs' counsels' website, <a href="https://www.swolawfirm.com">www.swolawfirm.com</a>.

108. With respect to their claims for age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, all named plaintiffs seek certification of Count I pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b) of the following presently ascertainable subclass: All persons employed by Boeing who was terminated or laid off or whose employment was terminated by Boeing or not hired by Onex who wer e age forty and over as of the date of their term ination and who file a consent to join th is action with the Court (collectively, the ADEA subclass).

109. Plaintiffs' claims under the ADEA warra nt the creation of the ADEA s ubclass because the named plaintiffs who were age forty and over at the time of the termination of their employment are similarly situated to the class of persons they seek to represent in this collective action. All were term inated as a result of a single discrim inatory program designed and implemented at the highest levels of Boeing a nd Onex's management, and all are seeking the same relief.

#### V. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

#### A. Pattern and Practice of Discrimination

#### 1. Boeing and Onex Made Decisions against Employees

- 110. Both Boeing and Onex engaged in a pattern and practice of age discrimination in connection with the RIF by treating younger employees more favorably than older employees in implementing the RIF. Employees were told that Boeing's managers would have "great input" on the decisions that were made against them. Employees were also told that there would be an objective system in place to ev aluate and retain the most qualified individuals. However, this never happened as the defendants have discarded the most qualified employees because of their age.
- 111. The defendants have already begun in the "I blam e you and you blam e me" game. For instance, Onex claim s that it did not keep documents that support the reasons that decisions were m ade against the employees desp ite a cle ar federal mandate to reta in this information. As a result of their actions, Onex received a records keep ing violation from the

EEOC. On the other hand, Boeing claim s that it did not play any part in m aking the decisions against the employees. If this is true, the defendants will not be able to rebut the statistical analysis presented by the plainti ffs or the p rima facie evidence established by the plaintiffs. Because of this adverse inference, plain tiffs believe that somehow the defendants' stories will change from that originally told to the EEOC.

- 112. The defendants together, and in conspir acy and concert, specifically targeted individuals who were over the age of forty in its adverse business decisions. There is no legal justification for these decisions.
- The decisions made against plaintiffs and Class were part of a common plan and scheme. The scheme was implemented in at least two parts, maybe more. One wave of lay offs occurred in May 2005. The second wave of layoffs occurred in June 2005. All layoffs were part of "Project Lloyd."

#### **B.** Disparate Treatment

#### 1. Similarly Situated Younger Individuals Treated More Favorably

- 114. In some divisions, all of the senior grade employees were term inated while similarly situated younger workers were not. Fo r instance, in Department 3271, the top senior employees of their grade level were terminated.
- 115. Boeing and Onex were targeting individuals over the age of forty. In one department, each of the individual's who were laid off were in the age 51 to 52 bracket and were the top five senior people of that grade level in the shop.
- 116. Onex through Spirit continues its pattern of releasing older seniority employees while retaining and hiring younger workers at a lo wer pay rate. The jobs of these individuals were not eliminated and some plaintiffs have even applied for the exact same position that they were terminated from.

#### 2. Direct Evidence of Intentional Discrimination

117. Many managers have specifically told employees that they were simply too old to work at Boeing. At meetings, managers would show a pyramid shop. This pyramid chart would show the ages of workers in the division, with the oldest person at the top. Other mangers would simply tell employees that they should retire because the employee was too old. Consider for example the following statements made by managers:

- (1) Plaintiff Houston was told "If I were you and your age I would retire."
- (2) Plaintiff Schloetzer was asked, "W hat will you do Albert if you don't get a job offer, you're getting old and you're handicapped?"

  In fact, a week before Plaint iff Schloetzer was laid off, management stated, "That's what happens when you get old ... you can't move as fast!"
- (3) Plaintiff Kerns was asked: "are you getting to old to do your job?" and told "Maybe, we should put yo u on another shift if you're too old! Getting to old to get it done on time?"
- (4) Plaintiff Housley was told that "these younger folks are much better on the computer than the older folks". She was also asked how old she was. When she infor med him of her a ge, the manager stated she should just c onsider retirement and not worry about anything because "we do not know what the future holds."
- (5) Plaintiff Bonesteel, heard the m anagers mention the "Aging Workforce" comment several times. Plaintiff Bonesteel, knew that the age of the workers was a concern of Boeing.
- (6) Plaintiff Montgomery was also consistently questioned as to when she was going to retire.

- (7) Plaintiff Williams II was referred to as the "old guy" by his managers. When Plaintiffs Williams II received his twenty year award, his managers to him that it was time for him to retire. Additionally, Plaintiff Williams II was always harassed about his age and was called the old guy in a crew meeting and even told "man your getting gray."
- (8) Plaintiff Bronnenberg recalls m eetings where m anagers would consistently comment on the age of the work force.
- (9) Plaintiff Callaway's manager continuously pushed him to retire.
- (10) Plaintiff Apsley heard management say, "if you are fifty-five or older than you should go on and retire."
- (11) Managers told Plaintiff Jam es that "Boeing is changing. Young people will come and the older people will go!"
- (12) Plaintiff Bakk heard comments m ade by management regarding the age of individuals which lead him to believe he was laid off because of his age.
- (13) Plaintiff Childers was strong ly encouraged to re tire by management.
- (14) Plaintiff Cox was told by management "If you are too old to keep up the pace ... get out! If you are retirement age ... get out! This is for the younger people to do the work now."
- (15) A week before Plaintiff P. Cox was laid off, m anagement asked her how old she was.
- (16) Management informed Plaintiff DeZarn, on several occasions, that her age and handicap would hinder her future employment.

Plaintiff Jones often heard m

(48) to forty-nine (49).(18) However, Plaintiff Powell heard management say, "Boeing needs to be competitive with an aging older workforce. Younger people are stronger and faster."

meetings that the average age of the workforce was forty-eigh

anagement repeatedly state in

(19) Plaintiff Smith that if she was close to retirement than it would be best for her to retire.

#### C. Disparate Impact

#### 1. Alleged Criteria

(17)

Boeing and Onex have not inform ed any of the employees as to why they were not chosen. Boeing or Onex have not informed any employee what criteria were actually utilized. To the best of plaintiffs' knowledge there was a document generated by either Onex or Boeing titled "RE-Hire Recomm endation Criteria." The criteria contained in this document allowed for excessive subjectivity in the decisions made. More importantly, the criteria violated the collective bargaining agreement. However the criteria were in reality questions that had no real method to measure and instead allowed managers to exercise prejudices and biases in the employment decisions.

#### 2. Alleged Criteria Was Not Utilized

- 119. Employees never received a notice as to how they did not meet the criteria offered and in most cases, the employees met every criteria except for being older than forty.
- 120. In a cursory review of the history of the employees leaves no doubt that any alleged criteria were never us ed. Many of the employees, if not the majority, received no discipline and received great performance reviews. Additionally, many, if not all, employees were qualified to complete their jobs and even received numerous awards and accolades for their great work.

#### 3. Even If Criteria Was Used, It Allowed for Too much Subjectivity

- 121. The alleged criteria placed excessive subjectivity in the hands of managers who hold inherent biases against employees. For instance, one of the alleged criterions was "favorable attitude to ward the company." This "criterion" is inherently biased against individuals who have reported misconduct on behalf of Boeing and have reported that their managers and Boeing had discriminated against employees because of the employee's age, race, or disability.
- Along the same lines, the alleged criteria state "does the employee take an active role in developing and solutions to problem s that pose a risk for injury?" This subjective question seems to specifically target individu als who have exercised worker's compensation right's in the past and who held work restrictions in the future. By its very nature this criterion also places target signs on employees who are over the age of forty.
- 123. There were no objective measures in place that would curtail the use of this excessive subjectivity. The excessive subjectivity allowed managers to exercise their age biases in recommending individuals for employment.

# D. Statistics Provide Evidence for Pattern and Practice, Disparate Treatment, and Disparate Impact

- 124. A review of statistics will raise the irrefutable presumption that the defendant has intentionally discriminated against older work ers. Additionally, the statistics will raise the irrefutable presumption that the alleged criteria utilized by the defendants had a disparate impact against older workers.
- 125. The statistics of the samples available yield a statistical significance greater than 0.05, that necessary to legally establish discrimination.
- 126. Additionally, of 930 workers over the age of fifty, 130 were not provided offers (13.9%). In contrast to individuals under the age of forty, where only 10 of 215 were not

provided offers from the defendants (4%). This glaring disparity is unexplainable: especially in light of the fact that the bargaining agreement called for lay-offs to take place by seniority.

#### E. Release Violated the ADEA and the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act

- 127. The defendants required Boeing employees to sign a "Consent to Release Personnel Information" form. This form threatened employees that if they did not sign the release, they would not receive a job offer from Onex. In essence, employees were told that they would be terminated if they did not sign the form.
- 128. In order to evade accountability for conduct that it well unders tood to be unlawful, Boeing and Onex presented its employees with an ultimatum: sign a "Consent to Release Personnel Information" which purported to waive the employees' right to challenge the legality of Boeing's conduct.
- 129. In successfully strong-arming well over 99 percent of its employees into signing the Release, Boeing exploited the vulnerability of its employees and be trayed the confidence they had reposed in the company during relationships that spanned a decade or more.
- 130. Indeed, when employees attempted to state that they were signing the form under duress, Boeing returned the form to the employee. For in stance, Sharron James signed the release and placed "signed under duress" on the form. Within a week, the document was returned to Plaintiff James and was told to sign the document without the "under duress" or she would be reprimanded by first line manager.
- 131. This release violates the OWBPA. The OWBPA is designed to protect the rights and benefits of older workers and imposes spec iffic requirements for releases covering ADEA claims. The requirements are as follows:
  - (1) the release m ust be written in a m anner calculated to be understood by the employee signing the release, or by the average individual eligible to participate;
  - (2) the release must specifically refer to claims arising under the ADEA;

2.5

- (3) the release must not purport to encompass claims that may arise after the date of execution;
- (4) the employer must provide consideration for the waiver or release of ADEA claims above and beyond that to which the em ployee would otherwise already be entitled;
- (5) the employee must be advised in writing to consult w ith an attorney prior to executing the agreement;
- (6) the employee m ust be given at leas t 45 days to consider signing if the incentive is offered to a group;
- (7) the release m ust allow the employee to revoke the agreem ent up to 7 days after signing; and
- (8) if the release is offe red in connection with an exit incentive or group termination program, the employer must provide information relating to the job titles and ages of thos e eligible for the program, and the corresponding information relating to employees in the same job titles who were not eligible or not selected for the program.
- 132. The defendants did not provide plaintiffs with any of these safeguards and in failing to do so have violated the OWBPA.

#### F. IAM Breached its Duty of Fair Representation

- 133. Boeing terminated employees prior to their pension vesting, som etimes just months or days away. Additionally, the workers who did not receive an offer from Onex were not allowed to vote. Moreover, the IAM did not file grievances against the defendants and allowed them to make decisions against the Collective Bargaining Agreement
- Boeing/Onex illegally took the above m easures and others to classify its employees on the basis of age, and to otherwise adversely affect the employment of older is employees and other sim ilarly situated employees. However, the Uni on failed to protect its members.

## COUNT I: Age Discrimination (Pattern and Practice, Disparate Treatment and Impact)

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

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136.	Defendants have engaged in a patter	n and practice	of dis crimination	against
plaintiffs o	on the basis of her age in violation of the A	Age Discrimination	on in Employment	Act, 29
U.S.C. § 62	23.			

- 137. Each of the plaintif is is within the protected age group and their work was beyond satisfactory. Additionally, the plaintiffs and Class were discharged despite the adequacy of their work and not hired despite being the most qualified for the positions. As incorporated in this section, there is evidence the defendants intended to discriminate against the plaintiffs and Class in reaching its decisions.
- 138. Additionally, the defendant has implemented standards that have had a disparate impact against older workers.
- 139. As a result of defendants' conduct, plaintiffs and members of the Class have suffered and continue to suffer loss and damage.

# **COUNT II: Declaratory Relief** (Violation of Title VII Regulations)

- 140. Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
- 141. Title VII r equires employers to m ake and keep re cords "relevant to the determinations of whether unlawful employment practices have been or are being committed." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 8(c). EEOC regulations specify that employers must preserve personnel records, including application forms, for one year. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14.
- 142. The defendants have not kept this required information and Onex received a records keeping violation from the EEOC.

# COUNT III: Declaratory Judgment (Invalidity of the Release under ERISA, OWBPA, the ADEA and Common Law)

143. Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set forth herein.

144. I	n threatening to term inate the relati onships of its em ployees agents Boeing
threatened to ter	rminate employees and Onex refused to consider the employees for employment
unless they first	t signed the Release waiving their rights to pursue their claims, including those
under ERISA ar	nd the ADEA. Boeing and Onex have engaged in retaliatory conduct in violation
of the ADEA, 2	9 U.S.C. § 623(d), and Section 5 10 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Inasm uch as
they were procu	ared by means of such unlawful re taliatory conduct, the Releases are invalid and
unenforceable u	nder ERISA and the ADEA

145. The Release also is invalid and unenf orceable because it does not satisfy the requirements set forth in the OWBPA (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)).

## Count IV: Interference with ERISA Rights (In Violation of Section 510 (29 U.S.C. § 1140))

- 146. Plaintiffs and Class hereby incorporate the previous paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
- 147. Defendants are prohibited from discharging or otherwise discriminating against a plan participant "for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
- 148. Here the defendants have specifically intended to interfere with the plaintiffs ERISA rights. Boeing and Onex designed and im plemented its sale with the intention of interfering with the attainment and receipt of benefits under the Plans.
- 149. As a result of defendants' conduct, pl aintiffs and members of the Class have suffered and continue to suffer loss and damage.

# Count V: Breach of Contract (Violation of LMRA)

- 150. Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
- 151. Defendants have entered in to contracts, and m ade oral and written representations to plaintiffs and members of the Class, regarding the term s and conditions of

their employment, including but not limited to assurances that older workers would and will have the same employment opportunities as others.

- 152. Defendants' representations constitute binding contractual comm itments with plaintiffs and members of the Class, and defendants have contractual obligations with others as to these matters, which were designed to protect plaintiffs and the Class from the alleged conduct at issue.
- 153. Moreover, defendants have breached their employment contracts with plaintiffs and members of the Class and their contractual commitments to others to treat their older employees fairly and not discriminate against them because of their age.
- 154. The Collective Bargaining Agreement that Boeing entered into required that lay offs were to occur based on an individual's seni ority. However, Boeing failed to abide by these contractual terms in recommending the lay offs of the plaintiffs, thus vi olating the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiffs have standing to bring a breach of contract action.
- 155. Furthermore, the IAM, failed to properly file grievances for the egregious acts of Boeing. Moreover, IAM breached its duty of fair representation. The union's breach of this duty actually affected the integrity of the entire union process. The IAM has simply ignored the meritorious claims of the plaintiffs and Class.
- 156. Defendants' contractual breaches have directly and proximately caused plaintiffs and the Class to suffer dam ages including, but not limited to, lost past and future earnings, lost benefits and consequential damages, in amounts to be proven at trial.

# Count VI (Injunctive and Equitable Relief)

- 157. Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set forth herein.
- 158. Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to injunctive and equitable relief restraining defendants from illegally discriminating against plaintiffs and the Class, and providing plaintiffs

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25 26 and the Class the benef its that they would have received but for the discrimination and other illegal conduct of defendants.

159. An award of attorney's fees is appropriate in this case pursuant to applicable law.

### **COUNT VII: Retaliation** (Exercising Rights under Protected Activities)

- Plaintiffs and Class here by incorporate the previous pa ragraphs as if fully set 160. forth herein.
- 161. Many of the class members are females who have complained of discrimination, minorities who have com plained of discrimina tion, individuals who have filed worker's compensation, exercised FMLA, exercised disability rights, or have blown the whistle on managers, all of which are protected activitie s. Besides being over the age of forty, upon information and belief, defendants' alleged criteria targeted individuals who have exercised their rights. Thus, the defendants have taken an adverse decision against these individuals.
- 162. As a result of defendants' conduct, pl aintiffs and members of the Class have suffered and continue to suffer loss and damage.

#### VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:

- A. That this case be certified as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 and/or a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. ' § 216(b) on behalf of the proposed plaintif f class and subclasses, and that plaintiffs' counsel of record be designated as Class Counsel for the class and subclass;
- B. That a declaratory judgm ent be issued declaring that the Release is invalid and unenforceable under the ADEA, ERISA and the common law, pu rsuant to 2 9 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202;
- C. That a permanent injunction be issued compelling Onex to offer all plaintiffs and the class and subclass members the opportunity to be reinstated as employees under the same terms

and conditions which existed prior to the term ination of their employment status and restoration to participant status under the Plans, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) and 29 U.S.C. § 626(b);

- D. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and the class and subclass m embers and against the defendants restoring to them all benefits and other forms of compensation lost between the dates of the termination of their employment and the date of judgm ent, together with interest or an appropriate inflation factor, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3);
- E. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and the class and subclass members and against the defendants for lost benefits, future benefits, back pay (including interest or an appropriate inflation factor), front pay, lost investment capital, and liquidated damages, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(b);
- F. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and class and subclass m embers and against the defendants for all di rect, incidental, and consequential damages arising out of the defendants' breaches of contract;
- G. That judgment be entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants for all direct, incidental, and conseque ntial damages, including non-financial injuries, arising out of defendants' actions, and for punitive damages in amounts to be determined at trial no less than one billion five hundred million dollars (\$1,500,000,000) to be divided equally among the class members;
- H. That a constructive trust be im posed over defendants' assets sufficient to cover all losses suffered by the class members as a result of the violations of ERISA;
- I. That plaintiffs and class and subclass members be awarded such other and further legal and equitable relief as may be found appropriate and as the Court may deem just or equitable;
- J. That plaintiffs and class and subcla ss members be granted their a ttorneys' fees, experts' fees, and the costs and expenses of this litigation;
- K. That a d eclaratory judgment be issued declaring that the defe ndants have violated Title VII by failing to retain proper documentation; and

1 L. That the Court retain jurisdiction over all defendants until such time as it is satisfied 2 that they have remedied the practices complained of and are determined to be in full compliance 3 with the law. 4 5 DATED: December 19, 2005 6 7 8 9 10 11 Respectfully submitted, 12 13 14 s/Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. 15 Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr. #21282 Uzo L. Ohaebosim #20983 16 Shores, Williamson and Ohaebosim, LLC 1400 Epic Center 17 301 N. Main Street Wichita, Kansas 67202-4814 18 Telephone: (316) 261-5400 19 Facsimile: (316) 261-5404 Attorneys for plaintiffs 20 21 22 23 **DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL** 24 COMES NOW plaintiffs, by and through their counsel, and respectfully request that this 25 matter be set for a jury trial. Wichita, Kansas is designated as place of trial. 26 -43-

1	By:	<u>s/Lawrence W. Williamson, Jr.</u> W. Williamson, Jr. #21282
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