Case 5:10-cv-00894-VAP-DTB Document 93 Filed 12/14/11 Page 1 of 39 Page ID #:2086

2.4

After Respondent the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service ("USCIS," or "the Government") denied his application for naturalization, Petitioner Tarek Hamdi requested this Court grant him American citizenship, pursuant to the Court's authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). (See generally Petition (Doc. No. 1).) The Government opposes Hamdi's petition, arguing Hamdi is ineligible for citizenship because he offered false testimony in earlier naturalization proceedings, thereby demonstrating that he lacks the requisite good moral character for American citizenship. The Government now moves for summary judgment, contending that undisputed evidence shows Hamdi testified falsely about four things in earlier proceedings before USCIS. (See Mot. for Summ. J. ("MSJ") (Doc. No. 85).)

First, the Government contends Hamdi lied about where his wife and children lived during his naturalization interview. (See MSJ at 11-13.) Second, the Government avers Hamdi lied about his employment status at the time of his interview. (See id. at 14-17.) Third, the Government posits Hamdi lied to USCIS about his connection to the Benevolence International Foundation, a charity designated a terrorist financier (albeit after Hamdi's alleged involvement with it). (See id. at 17-22.) Fourth, the Government contends Hamdi lied to USCIS about his connection to Care International, another

charity subsequently tied to terrorist organizations. (See id. at 22-23.)

Though the Government raises the specter of terrorism, it does not argue that Hamdi himself is a terrorist, or a supporter of terrorism, or otherwise a risk to national security. The Government argues only that Hamdi lied in an effort to gain citizenship, and therefore lacks the good moral character necessary to naturalize. The evidence supporting the Government's argument, however, is insufficent for the Court to grant summary judgment. As discussed more fully, below, the Court therefore DENIES IN PART the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment.

2.4

Hamdi's Petition contains a second claim, arguing that the phrase "associated with," in question 8 of part 10 of the application for naturalization (i.e., "Have you ever been a member of or associated with and organization . . . in the United States . . . ?"), is unconstitutionally vague. (Pet. ¶ 48.) The Petition, however, requests no relief predicated on the Court finding question 8 unconstitutionally vague.

Consequently, any opinion rendered on the question would not redress Hamdi's alleged injury; the Court's opinion would thus be solely advisory. See Ursack Inc. v. Sierra Interagency Black Bear Group, 639 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir.

2011) (reciting the rule that lest they render advisory opinions, federal courts may only rule upon live cases and controversies); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding the doctrine of standing, a "core component . . . of the case-or-controversy requirement," may only be satisfied if it is likely that a party's injury "will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'" (internal citation omitted)). As the Court may not issue advisory opinions, Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 409 (1792), the Court GRANTS the Government's Motion as to Hamdi's second claim.

### I. BACKGROUND

### A. Preliminary Evidentiary Issues

The Court first disposes of two preliminary issues related to the evidence before it. First, throughout this Order, the Court will refer to exhibits proffered by the Government in support of its Motion as "Gov.'s Ex."; those proffered by Hamdi in opposition to the Government's Motion will be referenced throughout "Pet.'s Ex."

Second, the Court addresses any objections that might narrow the scope of evidence before it. As to Hamdi's Evidentiary Objections (Doc. No. 86-1), because it is irrelevant to these proceedings that Hamdi failed to

appear for a naturalization interview in 2006, the Court sustains Hamdi's Objection No. 16.

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

The Court overrules the remainder of Hamdi's objections, most of which lack any merit whatsoever. For example, Hamdi makes a series of objections to immigration service officer Roberto Osuna's competency to testify to events that occurred during Osuna's interview of Hamdi (see, e.g., Objection Nos. 3-15). Osuna, however, is one of the two people who would have personal knowledge of what occured in that interview. further objects that various documents have not been authenticated, though they are either self-authenticating documents - <u>e.g.</u>, checks, <u>see United States v. Pang</u>, 362 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) - or are authenticated by testimony in the declaration to which they are attached, see Fed. R. Evid. 901(b). Hamdi's objection to the authenticity of his checks (Objection No. 23) is particularly frivolous, because in addition to their status as self-authenticating, Hamdi himself testified previously that he wrote the checks at issue (Hamdi Dep. 221:1-9, Apr. 14, 2011 ("Gov.'s Ex. G") (Doc. No. 85-9)). Hamdi goes so far as to object that a fact pled in his own Petition is irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible (Objection No. 30).

26

27

These types of meritless objections waste the parties' and the Court's time and resources, and consequently diminish the credibility of attorneys who make them.

### B. Factual Background

Petitioner Tarek Hamdi is an Egyptian citizen who became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1988, after his marriage to Linda Carriere, a United States citizen. (See Gov.'s Ex. A (Doc. No. 85-3); Gov.'s Ex. C (Doc. No. 85-5); Carriere Dep. 24:20-22, Apr. 7, 2011 ("Pet.'s Ex. C") (Doc. No. 86-6).) Hamdi and Carriere met while students at Northeastern University in Massachusetts; the couple are still married, and have four children between the ages of 14 and 22. (See Pet.'s Ex. C 25:10-18; Gov.'s Ex. A.) As observant Muslims, Hamdi and his family practice zakat, or charitable giving.

2.4

In service of this obligation, Hamdi and Carriere both donated to the Benevolence International Foundation ("BIF"), an organization that first came to their attention in the mid-1990s. (See Hamdi Dep. 171:3-16, Apr. 14, 2011 ("Gov.'s Ex. G"); Pet.'s Ex. C 107:20-116:16.) Sometime in the early spring of 2000, while he was living in Westborough, Massachusetts, Hamdi wrote a check to the BIF for \$8,000; that sum represented

```
contributions from Hamdi, and from others who gave Hamdi
   money, to donate towards BIF's endeavors in Chechnya.
   (See Gov.'s Ex. G 226:23-227:14.)
 3
                                       The memo line on the
 4
   check indicated it was for "Chechnya Relief." (See
 5
   Caputo Decl. ("Gov.'s Ex. B") (Doc. No. 85-4); Gov.'s Ex.
   G 223:13-20.) The check was accompanied by a message
 6
 7
   stating the funds were to be directed to the "Chechnya
 8
   Relief fund," and "in particular the Injured Mujahadeen."
 9
   (Gov.'s Ex. B (emphasis in original); see Gov.'s Ex. G.
   224:5-226:17.) Between May 2000 and January 2002,
10
   smaller amounts were drawn for BIF from Hamdi's and
11
   Carriere's joint checking account on twenty occasions.
12
   (Pet.'s Resp. to Gov.'s First Req. for Admis. No. 3.
13
14
   ("Gov.'s Ex. J") (Doc. No. 85-12).) In November 2002,
15
   the Treasury Department designated BIF a terrorist
16
   financier. (Pet. ¶ 26.; see Press Release, U.S. Dep't
17
   of Treasury, Treasury Designates Benevolence
18
   International Foundation and Related Entities as
19
   Financiers of Terrorism (Nov. 19, 2002), available at
20
   http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages
                  There is no evidence that Hamdi or
21
   /po3632.aspx)
22
   Carriere donated money to BIF after January 2002.
23
```

2.4

25

26

27

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>$  Hamdi pled this fact in his petition and the Government did not dispute it in its answer. (See Answer (Doc. No. 10)  $\P$  26.) Accordingly, the Court treats the fact as admitted.

In addition to his donations to BIF, during his time in Westborough, Hamdi had some involvement with Care International ("Care"), an eleemosynary entity whose principals were investigated by the United States for falsely securing tax-exempt status for an organization that promoted violent jihad.<sup>2</sup> (See Gov.'s Ex. G 236:2-252:19; United States v. Mubayyid, 658 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2011).) Specifically, Hamdi volunteered to give out newsletters and fliers for Care from time to time, and occasionally made announcements of upcoming events for the organization; he also stuffed envelopes with fliers on how to calculate zakat. (See Gov.'s Ex. G 238:3-7; 242:7-16.) Additionally, Hamdi made financial donations to Care. (Id. 242:23-25.)

Hamdi also attended various functions at which some of Care's principals were present. (See id. 247:25-248:6.) He became acquainted with Suheil Lahir (a president of the organization), Emad Aldeen Muntsar (the incorporator and also a past president of the organization, see Mubayvid, 658 F.3d at 42), and Mohamed

2.4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In recounting the evidence on which a jury convicted several of Care's principals, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit referred to the form of jihad advocated by Care as "violent jihad," <a href="Mubayyid">Mubayyid</a>, 658 F.3d at 43, as distinguished from jihad, defined broadly, which could include more benign forms of struggle or resistance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> <u>See</u> Care International, Inc., Annual Report (M.G.L Ch. 180 Corp. Annual Report) (Nov. 20, 2001).

2.1

2.4

Mubayed (a past treasurer, <u>see Mubayyid</u>, 658 F.3d at 43).<sup>4</sup> (<u>See</u> Gov.'s Ex. G 248:13-25.) Hamdi testified that he has not "really communicat[ed]" with Lahir, since leaving Massachusetts in 2002, but Lahir "was a friend"; he further testified that while volunteering for Care, he saw Lahir "once a month at most." (<u>Id.</u> 249:1-17; <u>see id.</u> 250:14-20.) Hamdi then testified that he no longer knows Muntsar, and that he was closer to Lahir than to Muntsar - though he visited Muntsar's home "a couple times" and attended his wedding as a member of the Islamic community. (<u>Id.</u> 250:21-251:8.) As for Mubayed, Hamdi testified that they also lost contact in 2002, but that Hamdi knew him as "a neighbor." (<u>See id.</u> 252:11-15.)

In mid-2002, Hamdi - a civil engineer - moved from Westborough to Stockton, California, for work. (See Gov.'s Ex. A; Gov.'s Ex. G. 44:1-15.) In January 2003, FBI agents visited Hamdi at his Stockton residence, and arranged to interview him at a local coffee shop. (See Gov.'s Ex. G 214:4-215:4.) Acting on a request that they interview Hamdi about "his associations and/or fundraising efforts related to the Benevolence

These names appear here as spelled in the transcript of Hamdi's deposition. In the criminal proceedings against them, Muhmaed Mubayyid's and Emadeddin Muntasser's names are spelled differently. See Mubayyid, 658 F.3d at 40. Likewise, Suheil Laher's name is spelled differently in Care's corporate filings. See Care International, Inc., Annual Report (M.G.L Ch. 180 Corp. Annual Report) (Nov. 20, 2001).

International Foundation," the two agents, Michael Caputo and Leticia Lucero, met with Hamdi on January 8, 2003.

(Caputo Dep. 31:5-32:18 ("Gov.'s Ex. I") (Doc. No.85-11).) Caputo later testified that in the interview, Hamdi "claimed that . . . he had only ever done fundraising for children, children's causes, and that his amounts had only ever been small amounts. His terms, a couple of hundred dollars." (Gov.'s Ex. I 49:22-50:3.)

Caputo then confronted Hamdi with copies of the \$8,000 check and accompanying message, suggesting that Hamdi had contributed more than a couple of hundred dollars, and to something other than a children's cause. (See id. at 65:17-66:17.) Hamdi admitted to Caputo that the message looked like a document he drafted, and that the checks were his - but he did not recall sending so large an amount, and did not recall sending anything specifically for the benefit of mujahadeen. (Id. 66:9-17.) There is no evidence before the Court that Hamdi had any subsequent interactions with the FBI.

2.4

Hamdi found the climate in Stockton disagreeable, and obtained a job in Southern California, so he moved to Corona with his family in early 2006. (See Gov.'s Ex. A; Gov.'s Ex. G 156:1-157:15; Carriere Dep. 144:1-7, Apr. 7, 2011 ("Gov.'s Ex. H") (Doc. No. 85-10).) On February 15, 2007, Hamdi completed an application for naturalization.

2.4

(<u>See</u> Gov.'s Ex. A.) Several entries on the application are central to the dispute now before the Court:

- When asked to list "where [he] has worked . . . during the last five years," Hamdi wrote that between June 28, 2005, and the time of his application, he was working for Harris & Associates. (Id.)
- When asked his spouse's "home address," Hamdi wrote the address of the family's house in Corona. (Id.)
- When asked for the "current address" of his children, Hamdi wrote, for each child, "WITH ME." (<u>Id.</u>)
- When asked if he has "ever been a member of or associated with any organization, association, fund, foundation, party, club, society or similar group in the United States or in any other place," Hamdi answered "yes," and then listed three groups: (1) Al Hamra Academy School Board; (2) Islamic Society of Greater Worcester, and; (3) Islamic Society of Corona/Norco. (Id.)

2.4

At the end of the 2008 school year, Carriere and Hamdi's four daughters flew to Egypt, on one-way tickets. (See Pet.'s Ex. C 151:24-153:6; Gov.'s Ex. G 311:14-19.) Carriere testified the family went because "Tarek's mother . . . was ill and we hadn't seen her in awhile, and we have never been to Egypt." (Pet.'s Ex. C 152:1-10.) Hamdi then moved from Corona to a one-bedroom apartment in Riverside. (See Gov.'s Ex. G 311:20-313:11.) By the end of October, Hamdi was laid off from his job at Harris & Associates. (See Hamdi Dep. 169:2-5, Apr. 14, 2011 ("Pet.'s Ex. F") (Doc. No. 86-7).)

On November 3, 2008, immigration service officer
Roberto Osuna interviewed Hamdi in connection with his
application for naturalization. Osuna testified that
during the interview, he went over Hamdi's application
and asked him to verify his responses to various
questions. (See Osuna Decl. ¶¶ 5-7 (Doc. No. 85-1).)
Osuna further declared that as he went through the
application, he "made a check mark . . indicating that
[he] asked a particular question" (id. ¶ 6), and "where
Mr. Hamdi's answers differed from the written responses .
. . or where particular information needed to be updated
from the time Mr. Hamdi filed his . . . [a]pplication,"
Osuna "wrote the updated information in the corresponding
sections on [Hamdi's application] contemporaneous[ly]

with Mr. Hamdi['s]" responses to Osuna's questions ( $\underline{id}$ .  $\P$  7).

It is those responses the Government now alleges are false. Osuna declares he asked Hamdi whether Hamdi was employed at Harris & Associates at the time of the interview, and that Hamdi responded he was. (Id. ¶ 10.) Osuna further states he asked Hamdi where his wife and children lived, and Hamdi replied that they lived with him. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Osuna also declares that when asked whether "he is or was a member of or associated with any other organization that he did not report," Hamdi answered that he was not. (Id. ¶ 14.) When asked specifically whether he had ever made any donations to BIF, Osuna recalls that Hamdi responded "no," and further answered that he had never "given any false or misleading information to any U.S. government official while applying for any immigration benefit." (Id. ¶¶ 14-17.)

2.4

For his part, as the Court will discuss at greater length below, Hamdi argues that he told Osuna he was unemployed at the time of the interview. (Pet.'s Ex. F 291:2-15.) Hamdi further explains that he may have told Osuna that his wife and children lived with him, because the family still considered Hamdi's address in the United States their permanent address. (See Gov.'s Ex. H 144:25-145:2.) Further, Hamdi does not recall Osuna ever

asking him whether he contributed to BIF. (See Pet.'s Ex. F 293:8-10.)

USCIS rejected Hamdi's application for naturalization on June 8, 2009. (See Gov.'s Ex. F (Doc. No. 85-8).) In the letter denying Hamdi's application, USCIS wrote:

You failed to reveal your affiliation with the Benevolent Internat ional Foundation, an organization based in Chicago, IL. In addition, a source of public information revealed that your last employer was LIM & Nascimento Engineering Corp., Lan Engineering Corp.. You failed to reveal the aforementioned employer on your N-400 application and at your interview. Furthermore, the same public source reveals that you are currently unemployed and have no source of income which is contrary to your statement made during the interview.

(Gov.'s Ex. F.)<sup>5</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> This passage is copied verbatim - including typographical errors - from the original document.

The reader will observe the appearance, for the first time in this narrative, of the name "LAN Engineering." The Court will discuss Hamdi's relationship with LAN, which appears wholly irrelevant to anything Hamdi may have discussed with Osuna, in the pages to follow.

On July 15, 2009, Hamdi appealed USCIS's decision.

(See Pet.'s Ex. P (Doc. No. 86-11).) Responding to the charge that he failed in both his application and his interview to disclose his affiliation with BIF, Hamdi argued that as a mere donor to a charitable organization, he had no "affiliation" with the organization to disclose. (See id.) Further responding to the charge he failed to disclose his employment with LAN Engineering Corporation, Hamdi argued that he could not have disclosed that employment because he did not work for LAN until January 2009, while his interview took place in November 2008. (See id.) Finally, Hamdi contraverted USCIS's allegation that he was unemployed at the time USCIS denied his application. (See id.)

On April 8, 2010, USCIS again denied Hamdi's application. (Pet.'s Ex. T (Doc. No. 86-11).) In sum, USCIS found the following:

Hamdi made a false statement in his November 8,
 2003, interview, "in that [he] failed to reveal
 [his] affiliation with . . . BIF . . . . " (Id.)

2.4

 Hamdi made a false statement during the hearing on his appeal, when he first "stated, under oath, that [he] had no knowledge that the BIF had been involved in the financial support of

terrorist groups and activities," but "later in the interview, revealed that [he was] indeed aware that the BIF had been accused of financing terrorism . . . " (Id.)

 Hamdi's "testimony and responses did not include any voluntary mention of the BIF until [he was] shown a copy of [his] cancelled personal check .

 . . ." (<u>Id.</u>)

USCIS therefore concluded Hamdi's "omission of the material facts, both on [his] N-400 application and during [his] interview, that [he is] associated with and [has] made monetary contributions to the Benevolence International Foundation compromised the credibility of your testimony and made it impossible for you to establish that you are a person of good moral character . . . " (Id.)

2.4

Following USCIS's denial of his appeal, Hamdi petitioned this Court for naturalization. The Government now moves for summary judgment on the ground that Hamdi lacks the good moral character required to naturalize.

(See generally MSJ.) Hamdi filed a timely Opposition (Doc. No. 86), and the Government filed a Reply (Doc. No. 88).

#### II. LEGAL STANDARD

#### A. Naturalization

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

26

27

28

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), a district court may conduct a de novo review of a denied application for naturalization, making its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. A court may order a person naturalized if the person meets the criteria set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1427. <u>See United States v. Hovsepian</u>, 359 F.3d 1144, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Attala v. Kramer, No. CV09-1610-PHX-NVW, 2011 WL 2457492, at \*13 (D. Ariz., June 20, 2011). The statutory criteria must be applied strictly, as "Congress alone has the constitutional authority to prescribe rules for naturalization, and the courts' task is to assure compliance with the particular prerequisites to the acquisition of United States citizenship . . . to safeguard the integrity of this 'priceless treasure.'" <u>Fedorekno v. United States</u>, 449 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1981) (quoting <u>Johnson v. Eisentrager</u>, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting)).

As outlined in Section 1427, the criteria for naturalization are:

 An applicant must have resided continuously, as a lawful permanent resident, in the United
 States for five years immediately preceding his application to naturalize; must have been physically present in the United States at least half of that time, and; must have resided within the state or USCIS district in which he filed his application for at least three months. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1); see 8 C.F.R. § 316.5.

• An applicant must reside in the United States from the time of his application until the time of his "admission to citizenship." 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(2); see 8 C.F.R. § 316.5.

2.4

• An applicant must have been, and remain, "a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3); see 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.10-316.11. "In determining whether the applicant has sustained the burden of establishing good moral character," during the five year period prior to his application, the United States "may take into consideration . . . the applicant's conduct and acts at any time," including before and after the five year period. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e); see United States v. Hovsepian, 422 F.3d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("Conduct

occurring outside the regulatory period [i.e., the five year period in Section 1427(a)(1)] is relevant only insofar as it bears on [an applicant's] present moral character.").

The burden is on an applicant to show that he meets all of the criteria set forth in Section 1427 and expounded upon in 8 C.F.R. §§ 316.1 et seq. See Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 630, 671 (1967) ("[I]t has been universally accepted that the burden is on the alien applicant to show his eligibility for citizenship in every respect."). Any doubts about an applicant's eligibility should be resolved against the applicant. Id.

2.4

### B. Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party must show that "under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.

Generally, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that it is entitled to summary judgment.

Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1998);

Retail Clerks Union Local 648 v. Hub Pharmacy, Inc., 707

F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1983). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the elements of the claim or defense and evidence that it believes demonstrates the absence of an issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

When the non-moving party has the burden at trial, however, the moving party need not produce evidence negating or disproving every essential element of the non-moving party's case. <u>Celotex</u>, 477 U.S. at 325. Instead, the moving party's burden is met by pointing out there is an absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party's case. <u>Id.</u>

2.4

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact that must be resolved at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e);

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The non-moving party must make an affirmative showing on all matters placed in issue by the motion as to which it has the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322;

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also William W. Schwarzer,

A. Wallace Tashima & James M. Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, 14:144. "This burden is not a light one. The non-moving party must show more than the

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence." <u>In re Oracle Corp. Securities Litigation</u>, 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing <u>Anderson</u>, 477 U.S. at 252). "The non-moving party must do more than show there is some 'metaphysical doubt' as to the material facts at issue." <u>In re Oracle</u>, 627 F.3d at 387 (citing <u>Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.</u>, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991); T.W. Elec. Serv. Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987).

2.4

#### III. DISCUSSION

The Government contends it is entitled to summary judgment on the question whether Hamdi lacks the good moral character necessary to naturalize. (See generally MSJ.) As the Court set forth previously, the Government presents four areas in which it argues Hamdi lacked candor during the administrative process, thereby presenting an insurmountable obstacle to his

naturalization. 6 (See id. 11-13, 14-17, 17-22, 22-23.)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

To carry its burden on summary judgment, the Government therefore must prove there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether, in the course of his application, Hamdi testified falsely about: (1) where his wife and children lived; (2) whether he was unemployed; (3) his involvement with BIF, and; (4) his involvement with Care. This is no mean feat, however, because Hamdi's allegedly false testimony only undermines his good moral character if given "for the purpose of obtaining [immigration benefits]." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6). Hamdi therefore must have made any culpable misrepresentations with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 779-80 (1988). Thus, to prevail on summary judgment, the Government must demonstrate that a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that Hamdi made the alleged misrepresentations for some other reason, "such as embarrassment, fear, or a desire for privacy." Kungys, 485 U.S. at 780 (internal quotation omitted). With these principles in mind, the Court examines each of Hamdi's four alleged misrepresentations, in turn.

24

26

27

28

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The Government does not argue that any of Hamdi's actions outside the context of the naturalization process evidence a lack of a good moral character.

2.4

# 1. Did Hamdi testify falsely about where his wife and children lived?

The Government argues Hamdi lacks good moral character because he falsely told Osuna that his wife and children lived with him, even though they flew to Egypt - on one-way tickets - months before Hamdi's interview with Osuna. (See Pet.'s Ex. C 151:24-153:6; Gov.'s Ex. G 311:14-19.) Hamdi counters that he did not lie, because he did not believe his wife and children had "moved," and still considered them domiciled at his house. Presented with this conflicting evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Hamdi's testimony about where his wife and children lived was not meant to deceive USCIS into granting Hamdi an immigration benefit, because Hamdi

did not intend to testify falsely.

Hamdi wrote on his application for naturalization that both he and Carriere lived at "1000 Trailview Lane" in Corona. (See Gov.'s Ex. A.) While interviewing Hamdi, Osuna marked through Hamdi's address, and wrote in "1112 Linden St," in Riverside; he marked through Carriere's address and wrote "SAME." (Osuna Decl. ¶¶ 9, 12; see Gov.'s Ex. A.) Osuna testified that he made the changes after first asking Hamdi whether he was still living in Corona, and then asking Hamdi "where his wife lived." (Osuna Decl. ¶¶ 9, 12; Osuna Dep. 181:8-15, Apr.

13, 2011 ("Gov.'s Ex. L") (Doc. No. 85-14).) Hamdi also wrote on his application that the "current address" of all four of his children was "WITH ME." (See Gov.'s Ex. A.) Osuna testified that Hamdi confirmed, at the time of the interview, his children lived with him. (Osuna Decl. ¶ 13; Gov.'s Ex. L 183:13-23.)

Courts regularly draw a "distinction between individuals who are physically present without intending to stay in a locale" - visitors - "and those who are present with an intent to remain" - domicilaries. <u>United States v. Jackson</u>, 480 F.3d 1014, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2007). "[O]ne can reside in one place but be domiciled in another," <u>Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield</u>, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989), for example, one can reside in a place for the purpose of attending college while lacking the intent to remain after graduation. In this case, the Government avers that Hamdi's wife and children traveled to Egypt with the intent to remain there, thus changing both their residence and domicile, and categorically belying Hamdi's statements to Osuna. (<u>See</u> MSJ at 11.)

<sup>7</sup> For Hamdi himself, however, the rule is different:
27 "an alien's residence is the same as that alien's domicile, or principal actual dwelling place, without regard to the alien's intent . . . . " 8 C.F.R. § 316.5.

In support of its argument that Hamdi's wife and children intended to stay in Egypt, the Government points to Hamdi's testimony that when his family left for Egypt, Hamdi moved from a five-bedroom house to a one-bedroom apartment, and that Hamdi planned to go to Egypt eventually to join them. (Gov.'s Ex. G 311:20-313:18, 314:18-20.) Hamdi also testified that he "was certainly going to try to see my hand at finding work [in Egypt] because [he] knew the economy was getting worse in the United States and things were getting expensive." (Id. 314:21-315:2.)8

Hamdi disputes telling Osuna anything regarding the residency of his wife and children (Opp'n at 15), but assuming he did, he admits he would have told Osuna they lived at his address, because his family considered (and considers) it their permanent address. (Id.) Thus, when asked whether she ever lived in Riverside (where Hamdi resides currently), Carriere testified "[t]hat's where my husband - that's our permanent address now." (Gov.'s Ex.

2.2

2.4

By The Government also cites the testimony of Carriere's sister, who when asked whether "it was [her] understanding when [Carriere and the children] moved to Egypt that they were moving to Egypt on a permanent basis," responded: "Pretty permanent, well, for awhile. I didn't know if it was going to be permanent, but I knew it was going to be for a little while." (Dragon Dep. 22:7-12, May 16, 2011 ("Gov.'s Ex. K") (Doc. No. 85-13).) Without responses to further questions, e.g., "how long is 'a little while,'" or "why did you understand the move was 'pretty permanent,'" the Court cannot credit this testimony either in favor of, or against, the Government's argument.

H 144:25-145:2.) When asked whether she intended to stay in Egypt for three years, Carriere testified she did not. (Pet.'s Ex. C 152:19-24.) While Carriere testified the family planned to stay "for awhile," and that Hamdi would join them (id. 152:25-153:3), she also agreed with the propositions that she and the children "were just going to figure out how long [they] were going to stay and purchase one-way tickets back" (id. 153:7-10), and that the family is waiting for Hamdi to complete his naturalization proceedings before making any further decisions (id. 153:18-22).

2.4

Given this evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude either that Hamdi's wife and children changed their domicile to Egypt, or that they had taken an extended trip and would be returning in the indefinite future. Consequently, the same factfinder could determine that Hamdi did not intend to testify falsely about where his family lived, because he considered them on an extended, but not permanent, trip. There thus remains a genuine dispute about whether Hamdi testified falsely in his interview with Osuna, with the intent of misleading USCIS into granting him an immigration benefit.

2.4

# 2. Did Hamdi testify falsely regarding his employment status?

The Government further argues that Hamdi misrepresented his employment status during his interview with Osuna. Specifically, the Government contends Hamdi, though unemployed at the time of his interview, told Osuna that he remained employed with Harris & Associates. (MSJ at 14.) Hamdi testified, however, that he recalls telling Osuna he was unemployed. (Pet.'s Ex. F 291:2-15.) The remainder of the evidence before the Court on this question is inconclusive; consequently, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that Hamdi misrepresented his employment status.

On his application for naturalization, Hamdi wrote that as of February 15, 2007, he was employed at Harris & Associates. (See Gov.'s Ex. A.) Osuna declares that when he interviewed Hamdi on November 3, 2008, he "asked Mr. Hamdi if he was still presently employed by Harris & Associates," and that "Mr. Hamdi testified that he was." (Osuna Decl. ¶ 10.) Osuna also declares he made a check mark next to the employment question on Hamdi's application at the same time, "[b]ased on Mr. Hamdi's response to my question." (Id.)

Osuna then testified alternately that (1) during the interview, he had a "gut feeling" that Hamdi was lying about being employed (Osuna 30(b)(6) Dep. 72:7-73:15, Sept. 23, 2011 ("Pet.'s Ex. A") (Doc. No. 86-6)), and that (2) he came to believe Hamdi was unemployed after having a discussion with another immigration service officer (Gov.'s Ex. L 73:20-22). In any event, Osuna disbelieved Hamdi's purported testimony regarding his employment at Harris & Associates.

USCIS did not issue a decision explaining that Hamdi testified falsely about his employment with Harris & Associates; instead, it issued a decision relying on Hamdi's failure to mention his employment with LAN Engineering in his interview. (See Gov.'s Ex. F.) It is undisputed, however, that Hamdi did not start work for LAN Engineering until approximately two months after his interview. (See Pet.'s Ex. P.)

2.4

USCIS's seemingly incongruous conclusion raises questions about the content of Osuna's and Hamdi's discussions of Hamdi's employment during Hamdi's interview. While Osuna states unequivocally that Hamdi told him in the interview he was still employed by Harris & Associates, Hamdi testified unequivocally that he said no such thing (Pet.'s Ex. F 290:25-291:6).

Osuna wrote contemporaneous notes on Hamdi's application form, but these shed little light on what occurred during their interview. Deciphering Osuna's notes requires determining the meaning of various marks he made on Hamdi's application - specifically, check In his sworn declaration, however, Osuna marks. attributes two different meanings to the markings. First, Osuna states he "made a check mark on Mr. Hamdi's Form N-400 Application for Naturalization on or near Mr. Hamdi's written response on his Form N-400, indicating that [he] asked that particular question." (Osuna Decl. ¶ 6.) Later, however, Osuna declares that based on Hamdi's response to his question about Harris & Associates, he "contemporaneously made a check mark next in the row of Part 6.B. on page 3 of Mr. Hamdi's Form N-400 indicating that Mr. Hamdi testified that he was presently employed by Harris & Associates." (Id. at 10.)

1819

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

26

27

28

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

It makes a substantial difference whether Osuna's check mark means merely that Osuna asked a question, or that Hamdi answered the question in the affirmative.

Moreover, if the check mark means Osuna asked a question, the precise question he asked is lost to history, because he did not otherwise record his interview with Hamdi.

Given Hamdi's and Osuna's conflicting testimony, the incongruous USCIS decision that came approximately seven

months after the interview in question, and Osuna's own conflicting remarks about what his notes on Hamdi's application mean, the Government is not entitled to summary judgment on the question whether Hamdi's moral character was besmirched by his allegedly false testimony about his employment status.

7

8

9

3

4

5

6

# 3. Did Hamdi testify falsely regarding his connection to BIF?

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

2.4

25

26

27

The Government contends Hamdi testified falsely about his connection to BIF, an organization implicated in financing terrorism, in both his interview with Osuna and in his subsequent appeal interview before immigration service officers Cecil Clark and Elias Valdez. at 17-18, 20-21.) Hamdi argues that he was asked about his "association with" BIF, and based on his understanding of the word "associate," he truthfully denied being associated with an organization to which he donated money and for which he did some insubstantial volunteer fundraising. (See Opp'n at 7-10.) He further notes that whenever he was asked specifically whether he donated money to BIF, he answered that he did. (See id.) Here again, the Government's evidence that Hamdi testified falsely about his association with BIF is insufficient to warrant summary judgment in the Government's favor.

As discussed above, Hamdi's application for naturalization lists three entities of which Hamdi claims to be a member or with which he claims to be associated. (See Gov.'s Ex. A.) Hamdi did not list BIF. Osuna states that as he interviewed Hamdi, he asked whether "he is or was a member of or associated with any other organization that he did not report," and Hamdi answered he was not. (Osuna Decl. ¶ 14.) Hamdi's file contained a declaration from Caputo, the FBI agent who interviewed Hamdi in 2003. (Id. ¶ 16.) Based on Caputo's declaration, Osuna "asked Mr. Hamdi several questions about BIF, including whether he had ever made any donations to BIF." (Id.) Osuna recalls "Mr. Hamdi responded, 'No.'" (Id.)

2.4

If Hamdi actually told Osuna he had never donated to BIF, it is undisputed that Hamdi's testimony would have been false. Osuna's declaration is the only evidence the Government offers to support its claim that Hamdi denied donating to BIF. Osuna made no notes on Hamdi's application reflecting any questions about donations to BIF, or Hamdi's answers. (See Gov.'s Ex. A.) When asked in his deposition "how . . . the subject of BIF ar[o]se in the course of the interview" with Hamdi, Osuna testified: "I didn't mention the BIF. I don't recall I mentioned the BIF at the time. Actually, it - I think after - after I asked him, 'Are there any other[]

```
[affiliations], 'I wrote, 'Claims; no others.'" (Osuna
   Dep. 71:20-25, Apr. 13, 2011 ("Pet.'s Ex. H") (Doc. No.
 3
   86-10).) Osuna then testified that Hamdi said he had
   never even heard of BIF, nor donated to it. (Id. 72:5-
 4
 5
   13.) However, later in the same deposition, the
   following colloguy took place:
 6
 7
 8
       Q:
                But you said in this case that [Hamdi] did
 9
                not admit that he had given money to BIF;
10
                right?
11
                When I mentioned BIF, he mentioned that they
       Osuna:
12
                were a charitable organization.
13
                Oh. So when you said - when you asked him
       0:
14
                if he had heard of the BIF, he said it was a
15
                charitable organization?
16
       Osuna:
                Yes.
17
                And then at that point, did he say that he
       Q:
18
                had given money to BIF?
19
       Osuna:
                No.
20
   (Pet.'s Ex. H 152:19-153:4.)
21
22
        In addition to Osuna's inconsistent testimony on BIF,
23
   when Hamdi appealed USCIS's decision, Hamdi submitted a
   brief in which he wrote:
2.4
25
        . . . as to [BIF] which is a charitable
26
27
        organization the applicant has sent the
```

organization charitable donations like anybody else Islamic Organization which helps the poor and needy people and for that the application believed there is no need to list such organization on his application just for giving charitable donations.

(Pet.'s Ex. P.)9

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

2.4

25

6

1

2

3

4

5

Hamdi therefore admitted freely, in writing, that he had given money to BIF. Based on the evidence before it, the Court could find Hamdi admitted his donations to BIF in his written brief because he realized USCIS knew about them, and wanted to preempt any claim that he previously testified falsely to obtain an immigration benefit. Paredes-Urrestarazu v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 36 F.3d 801, 817-20 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that it would be reasonable to conclude that a witness intended to deceive an immigration judge, rather than avoid embarrassment, when the witness lied about his military service and dishonorable discharge until he thought the judge had information belying his original, false, testimony). Alternately, the Court could find given Osuna's inconsistent testimony, the lack of a contemporaneous record of Osuna's questions about BIF, Hamdi's previous discussion of his BIF donations with Caputo, and his subsequent acknowledgment of the

26

27

 $<sup>\,^{9}</sup>$  Typographical errors are reproduced as they appear in the original.

donations in his appellate brief - that Hamdi was forthcoming with USCIS about donating to BIF. As the non-moving party, Hamdi is entitled to the benefit of reasonable inferences. Consequently, the Court cannot now conclude as a matter of law that Hamdi testified falsely about his donations to BIF.

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

2.4

25

26

27

3

4

5

6

The testimony of officers Clark and Valdez does nothing to alter this result. Clark testified that during Hamdi's appeal, he questioned Hamdi about BIF. (Clark Dep. 116:13, May 3, 2011 ("Gov.'s Ex. N") (Doc. No. 85-16).) Clark further testified that while he could not remember the exact questions he asked Hamdi, Clark and Valdez did ask Hamdi "if he, in fact, had ever donated money to [BIF]," and Hamdi said he did not until he was presented with the canceled checks. 116:16-22.) Valdez, while testifying that his memory of the interview was limited, recounted that Hamdi never denied donating to BIF, but instead said he did not recall making such a donation until he was shown the checks. (Valdez Dep. 127:13-20, May 11, 2011 ("Pet.'s Ex. K'') (Doc. No. 86-10).) To be sure, it is odd that Hamdi would not recall a donation he made to BIF about which he had been questioned previously by the FBI. Nonetheless, Hamdi admitted to making donations to BIF in the brief he filed before Clark and Valdez interviewed It is curious that Hamdi would prevaricate about

making donations to BIF after already admitting having done so. Thus, a reasonable factfinder could conclude Hamdi did not testify falsely to Osuna, Clark, or Valdez about donating money to BIF.

The remaining question is whether Hamdi testified falsely if he denied being associated with any organizations, e.g., BIF, other than the three he listed. The answer turns on the meaning of the word "associate," or more precisely, whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude Hamdi lacked the intent to deceive when he denied being associated with BIF, because he did not believe his interactions with BIF (discussed above) made him an "associate" of the organization.

The Government attempts to sidestep this argument, labeling it "self-serving" and insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. (MSJ at 18.) It notes that his deposition transcript shows "Hamdi has little trouble with the English language" (MSJ at 20), and therefore should have either known the meaning of the word "associate," or known to consult a dictionary or attorney to learn it.

In the last six months (approximately), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court have turned to at least 15 different dictionaries

to clarify the meaning of a word. To pick just one, the Oxford English Dictionary offers several definitions of 3 the verb "associate," including "to join in common purpose . . . ," "to keep company or consort with . . . 4 5 ," or "to make oneself a partner in." Oxford English <u>Dictionary</u> (2d ed. 1989; online version Sept. 2011). 10 7 Which of these definitions, or any definitions in other 8 dictionaries, ought Hamdi have applied? Any person, in the course of his life, "associates" with many groups; 10 some limiting term is required to make sense of the term 11 used in the naturalization application. The only clue 12 Hamdi, or the Court, can take from the application itself 13 as to how "associate" should be limited is that to be 14 "associated with" a group is similar to being "a member 15 of" that group, but not exactly the same thing. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 295 (2008) 16 17 (explaining "the commonsense canon of noscitur a sociis which counsels that a word is given more precise content 18 19 by the neighboring words with which it is associated");

20

21

22

2.4

26

alter the outcome as to Hamdi. Asking whether Hamdi joined in common purpose with BIF would require Hamdi to distill one, or a few, purposes for which he donated to BIF, then to consider whether by making such donations, he "joined with" BIF toward that purpose. Asking whether he kept company or consorted with BIF would require an analysis of the corporate form of the organization, and then questions about whether Hamdi kept company with or consorted with agents of the entity - or would attending a function sponsored by the entity be enough? Asking whether Hamdi made himself a partner in BIF requires a similar analysis: would Hamdi have to partner with BIF in the legal sense? If not, when would a donor to an organization become its partner?

```
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) ("[T]he
  Court will avoid a reading which renders some words
 3
  altogether redundant.").
 4
 5
       Nor does the Government offer a definition of the
   word "associate." Indeed, when deposed as to its meaning
 6
 7
   as he applies it, Osuna first said the definition he uses
 8
   "came from the English dictionary" (Pet.'s Ex. H 30:17-
   18), then said he did not have to look it up because it
   is a word he knows (\underline{id}. 30:19-23), and then said he
10
   learned it in grade school (id. 31:9-10). He did not,
11
12
   however, give much by way of a substantive definition.
13
   Indeed, the Government went so far as to assert a
   privilege to cloak the definition Osuna used in
14
15
   adjudicating naturalization applications:
16
17
                And what definition of association do you
       Q:
18
                apply in processing and adjudicating those
                applications?
19
20
                Object to the extent it calls for privileged
       Bauer:
21
                information that's covered by the
22
                deliberative process privilege. You don't
23
                have to answer that question.
2.4
   (Pet.'s Ex. H 26:18-23.)
25
26
        In sum, given the lack of an authoritative definition
```

of the word "associate," and indeed, the Government's

27

assertion that the definition it uses is so sensitive as to be subject to a privilege, a factfinder could conclude Hamdi lacked the intent to deceive when he denied having any associations other than the three he listed on his naturalization form.

## 4. Did Hamdi testify falsely regarding his connection to Care International?

Finally, the Government argues Hamdi testified falsely by also omitting Care International from the list of organizations with which he was associated, and then telling Osuna that the list was complete. For at least the same reasons applicable to Hamdi's alleged association with BIF, the Court finds the Government has not presented evidence sufficient to foreclose the conclusion that Hamdi lacked the intent to deceive USCIS when he testified he had no associations other than those listed on his naturalization application.

2.1

2.4

#### IV. CONCLUSION

In moving for summary judgment, the Government seeks to establish that Hamdi lacked the necessary moral character to naturalize, because he allegedly gave false testimony in earlier naturalization proceedings. On the evidence before the Court, however, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that even if Hamdi's testimony

differed from the facts as the Government understood them, his testimony was not given with the intent to deceive, and therefore was not culpably false.

Consequently, the Court DENIES the Government's Motion as to Hamdi's naturalization claim.

The Government also seeks summary judgment as to Hamdi's second claim, <u>i.e.</u>, that a question on the application for naturalization is unconstitutionally vague. As Hamdi sought no relief tied to his second claim, the Court cannot adjudicate it summarily. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Government's Motion as to Hamdi's vagueness claim.

2.4

Dated: December 14, 2011

VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS United States District Judge