UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA 2 NEW ORLEANS DIVISION 3 -0-4 5 RICHARD B. SOBOL, et al Civil Action VS 6 No. 67 243 E LEANDER H. PEREZ, SR., ET AL 7 -0-8 9 Transcript of excerpt of proceedings had January 22, 1968 in Open Court. The HON. ROBERT A. AINSWORTH, 10 HON. FREDERICK J. R. HEEBE, HON. FRED J. CASSIBRY, 11 Judges presiding. 12 -0-13 14 -0-15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

BY MR. SESSIONS:

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Before Mr. Bronstein calls his first witness, may it please the Court, we should like to solicit a stipulation from all parties relative to the Discovery pursued by the United States under its motion granted by Judge Cassibry. In examining the records under the Rule 34 Motion granted by the Court, the United States attorneys have seen the records of the Louisiana State Bar Association pertaining to the Bar examinations given as to the names of both successful and unsuccessful candidates for admission by the Louisiana Supreme Court. And, insofar as the records of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee is concerned, they have seen many files involving the names of third persons involved in complaints or matters within the jurisdiction of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, which are not pertinent to the issues in this case. We feel an obligation and duty to those persons as to whose identity is known to Government counsel, or in the event that copies have been made, known to others, in lieu of a Rule 30 (b) Order by the Court to protect those third parties, both unsuccessful Bar Candidates, or persons as to whom complaints have been made or who have been involved in proceedings or matters within which the Unauthorized Practice of Law

1 Committee has jurisdiction, that all parties stipulate that any information obtained by any attorney pertain-3 ing to persons not directly involved in this law suit. whether business firms or other associations of a 5 partnership nature, whether corporate or individual, 6 be held to be confidential and to be used only for the 7 purposes of this case and are not to be disclosed for 8 any other purpose or to any other person. BY THE COURT: 10 Is that agreeable, Mr. Fiss? BY MR. FISS: 11 As long as it is understood that for the purposes 12 13 of this case they could be disclosed as necessary on the record, I have no objection. 14 BY THE COURT: 15 Is that acceptable? 16 BY MR. SESSIONS: 17 Yes, sir. 18 BY THE COURT: 19 Did anyone else have any access to those records 20 other than Mr. Fiss? 21 BY MR. SESSIONS: 22 Or who Mr. Fiss may have let see them. 23 BY MR FISS: 24

None other than two letters that Mr. Sessions

agreed Mr. Bronstein have. 1 BY THE COURT: As far as you are concerned or have any knowledge, 3 Mr. Bronstein, I assume the stipulation is agreeable. BY MR. BRONSTEIN: 5 It is. 6 BY THE COURT: 7 It will be so noted. 8 BY MR. SESSIONS: 9 I would assume that all other parties so stipulate. 10 -0-11 CERTIFICATE 12 I certify the foregoing pages numbered 2 thru 4 contain 13 a true and correct transcript of an excerpt of the proceedings 14 taken January 22, 1968 in the above entitled and numbered 15 cause, all as will be more fully seen by the title page 16 hereof. 17 18 Joseph H. Echezabal Official Reporter 19 United States District Court 20 -0-21 22 23 24 25

1 January 22, 1968 2 BY THE COURT: 3 We will call the case. BY THE CLERK: 5 Civil Action Number 67-243, Robert Sobol, et al 6 versus Leander H. Perez, Sr., et al. 7 BY THE COURT: 8 Are the parties ready? BY MR. BRONSTEIN: 10 The Plaintiff is ready. 11 BY MR. FISS: 12 The United States is ready. 13 BY MR. SESSIONS: 14 Intervenor Defendant, Bar Association, State 15 of Louisiana, ready. 16 BY THE COURT: 17 I think we all should state appearances. 18 BY MR. BRONSTEIN: 19 Alvin J. Bronstein, 603 N. Farah Street, Jackson, Mississippi, Attorney for Plaintiff. If the 20 Court pleases, there are attorneys who are Plain-21 tiffs and have been admitted by order of this 22 Court as counsel for Plaintiff. Do you want me 23 to introduce other counsel? 24 BY THE COURT:

Yes, proceed.

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BY MR. BRONSTEIN:

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Mr. Robert Collins, New Orleans, Louisiana, 344 Camp Street. Mr. Lolis Elie, 344 Camp Street, New Orleans, Louisiana. Nils R. Douglas, 344 Camp Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, all members of the Bar of this Court. Mr. Anthony Amsterdam, 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Robert B. Sobol, 606 Common Street, New Orleans, Louisiana, a member of the Bar of this Court.

BY MR. FISS:

Owen W. Fiss for the United States, Plaintiff-Intervenor, Washington, D.C., Department of Justice My co-counsel will be Hugh Fleischer, also of the Department of Justice, New Orleans, Louisiana, 333 St. Charles Street.

BY MR. PROVENSAL:

Sidney W. Provensal, Jr., 1014 Whitney Bank Building, New Orleans, Louisiana, representing the 3 Defendants.

BY MR. BRAHNEY:

Thomas M. Brahney, III, Room 104, Supreme Court Building, New Orleans, Louisiana, Representing the State of Louisiana, Defendant-Intervenor.

BY MR. DOWLING:

John P. Dowling, President of the Criminal Courts Bar Association, Representing the Criminal Courts Bar Association. BY MR. SESSIONS: Cicero C. Sessions, Alvin R. Christovich, Sr., Wood Brown, III, Representing the Louisiana State Bar Association, Intervenor-Defendant. BY THE COURT: Are those all of the appearances? Now Gentlemen, we first have set for this

morning the Motion to Dismiss filled by the Intervenor-Defendants, Louisiana State Bar Association
and for a Judgment on the pleadings, and a Motion
of the Intervenor-Defendants, State of Louisiana
for a summary judgment and in the alternative to
dismiss the suit.

The Court has considered the briefs and memoran and filed by the various parties. Before ruling, however, we will offer you an opportunity, if you feel that you have not covered everything in your brief, to make some extra remark, any extra remark that you want to make, that you desire to make.

You may waive that right if you desire because the Court is going to rule very shortly on these

motions.

Now, does the Intervenor-Defendant, Louisiana

State Bar Association wish to say anything?

BY MR. SESSIONS:

We would like to make an oral submission, if Your Honor please.

BY THE COURT:

You may proceed.

BY MR. BRAHNEY:

I would like to waive mine, Your Honor.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

May it please the court: The Louisiana State
Bar Association, as a predicate for its appearance
here wishes to make it clearly understood that we
are intervening in this case for the primary purpose and limited purpose of protecting the constitutionality of the Acts which the Louisiana
legislatures have passed and are under attack here.
Those Acts are Section 213 and 214 of Title 37 of
the Revised Statutes of Louisiana.

Our posture as an intergrated bar association
is that of the administrative agency of the Suprema
Court of Louisiana in the Judicial Branch of
Government in regulating the practice of law which
involves not only the qualification and admission

by bar examination but also insofar as visiting non-admitted attorneys are concerned. And, in filing our Motion, our Motions which are before this Court today and out other pleadings, we wish it specifically understood that we cast no personal aspersions whatsoever upon the public officials of the Parish of Plaquemines, either its District Attorney or sitting judge and we merely take the situation as we find it, factually, based upon the depositions and documents which were here before we were allowed to intervene.

In respect thereof, we rely, in support of our Motion upon the depositions of Judge Leon, Mr.

Sobol and the District Attorney, Lee R. Perez, Jr.

We offer those depositions in evidence in support of our Motion and we also include in that offer the exhibits attached to the different depositions, one of which includes the Bill of Information.

BY THE COURT:

Are you arguing your Motion for Summary Judgment

The Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b).

BY THE COURT:

Now, the difficulty the Court has there is that there are disputed questions of fact between the

parties and the Court cannot grant a Summary Judgment if there are such disputed facts.

Now, on questions of law, that's another thing. We have not heard you out but if there are questions of fact I don't think you are going to get very far.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

I think the basis, the gravamen of our Motion presented undisputed or undisputable questions of fact at the time. I shall briefly summarize those facts which we consider not to be disputed, predicated upon the deposition, the depositions which I have already mentioned.

Mr. Sobol, in his deposition says that he first went to Jefferson -- went to Plaquemines Parish accompanied by Mr. Douglas, a qualified Louisiana attorney, was introduced to Judge Leon as a visiting attorney from Washington, D.C., to be associated with Mr. Douglas in representing Mr. Duncan in the transaction involving a push-around in a school yard.

Judge Leon, in his deposition, does not dispute this, he cannot recall and cannot confirm that the introduction was made to him in that way. there is no denial or contradiction of the testi-

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mony of Mr. Sobol as to the manner in which he was introduced to the Court.

Now, the Bill of Information in this case, charges before the Court, does not specify any Statute of the State of Louisiana in which respect I invite the Court's attention to the provisions of Article 463 and 464 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. The form of the Bill of Information is set forth in 463, the form of the Bill of Information here follows generally that short form statutorily approved.

BY THE COURT:

He is charged with practicing law without being licensed to do so.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

No, sir. He is charged with practicing law.

This is the whole gravamen of the case. He is charged with practicing law without having been qualified and licensed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.

BY THE COURT:

I don't see the words Supreme Court, but, wherein does what you say differ from what I say?

BY MR. SESSIONS:

Because Section 213, Title 37, provides generall

for qualification by and licensing by the Supreme Court and Section 214, the constitutionality of which Plaintiff attacks is an exception to 213 because it provides for visiting attorneys who are temporarily present in the State to be authorized and qualified to practice by the Judge before whom they appear in specific cases.

BY THE COURT:

He was charged with practicing law without being admitted to practice. You are contradicting the Court and I don't see anything for you to contradict the Court about.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

No, sir.

BY THE COURT:

Without the words Supreme Court of Louisiana, how is the Court in error.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

Because, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has nothing to do with this as far as our Motion is concerned. That is the graviment of our complaint. Section 214 does not require qualification and licensing by the Louisiana State Supreme Court.

It is implicit in the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the State shall -- that

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charge shall be spelled out and stated in the Bill of Information or the Indictment. And, that was not done here. So that we take the position here today that Mr. Sobol is charged with violating the provisions of Section 213 only because he was not qualified and licensed by the Louisiana Supreme Court, which puts him in the category of one not temporary within the State but one permanently present and who has to take a bar examination. Whereas, the indisputable facts and it is contained in the many depositions before the Court that Mr. Sobol -- Mr. Sobol's deposition states that he was only temporarily present within the State and that the Judge was told that he was an attorney from Washington, D.C.

BY THE COURT:

It seems that Mr. Provensal would dispute that.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

That's why Mr. Provensal eliminates Section

214, by his judicial confession, by his admission
that the domicile of Mr. Sobol is in Louisiana
instead of Washington, D.C. That eliminates any
consideration of Section 214 as a basis for the
Bill of Information which plainly, on its face,

1 does not indicate that it was based upon a vio-2 lation of 214 at all, but 213. 3 BY THE COURT: 4 And, you think that we can rule on this with-5 out hearing the case. 6 BY MR. SESSIONS: 7 Yes, I think on the depositions which are be-8 fore this Court. 9 BY THE COURT: 10 You see, Mr. Provensal does not dispute the 11 question of whether Mr. Sobol is temporarily in 12 the State of Louisiana. 13 BY MR. SESSIONS: 14 I say that Mr. Provensal, by his affirmative 15 pleadings, that Mr. Sobol is a domiciliary of 16 the State of Louisiana has eliminated this question 17 from any consideration. 18 BY THE COURT: 19 How do you understand the facts that have been 20 developed by the deposition, that he is or is not 21 here temporarily? 22 BY MR. SESSIONS: 23 That he is temporarily in the State of Louisi-24 ana as of January 25, 1967, not today.

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BY THE COURT:

And that would not be the same thing as domicired.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

That is correct. I am speaking of the depositic already taken. There is no dispute. There is no question, at least in the depositions, there are pleadings, but there is no controversy in the depositions.

BY THE COURT:

You say that there is no state of facts under which this Plaintiff could prevail in this case.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

Yes, I say there are.

BY THE COURT:

Then, if that is true, then your Motion must be denied because the Fifth Circuit has ruled time and again that if there is any state of facts upon which the Plaintiff might prevail then the Motion must be denied.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

I suggest that there is one proposition in our Motion that the judgment may be rendered on the pleadings and the judgment may be rendered pleading our Motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment as one and the Court could enjoin the further prosecution of this Bill of Information.

BY THE COURT:

Well, let's see. Perhaps I missed that. You say that a judgment can be rendered on the pleadings. I would assume that you mean pleadings, depositions and so forth which have been offered.

Yes, sir.

BY THE COURT:

BY MR. SESSIONS:

You mean that the Plaintiff can prevail under the existing state of the record.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

In a limited way, in the sense that the

Plaintiff has sued, attacking the constitutionality
of 214 and that is not a real issue before this

Court because the plain allegations of fact of
the Bill of Information exclude any pertinents
to Section 214. So, its constitutionality today
does not have to be reached by this Court.

BY THE COURT:

Do you seek a dismissal of the suit or a disposition of the case by way of Plaintiff getting a limited judgment?

BY MR. SESSIONS:

A dismissal of the suit except in one respect, only.

Let me reiterate. Section 214 has passed completely out of the case because the pleadings of the Defendant exclude any possibility of the averment of facts and the Bill of Information excludes any possiblity of Section 214 being the basis for the Bill of Information, any possibility whatsoever.

So that, no attack upon the constitutionality of Section 214 is presently present or available insofar as this Court is concerned on the basis

As far as 213 is concerned, there is no dispute, there is no contradiction except in Mr. Provensal's answer. There is no contradiction in Plaintiff Sobol's deposition, his testimony under oath, he is a domicilliary of the District of Columbia and also only temporarily is present in the State of Louisiana. Now, temporarily present is an antony.

of the particular Information before this Court,

I believe under Dombrowsky versus Pfister a proper analysis is involved there under the circumstances of this case in view of the fact of the ambiguity of the Bill of Information in that

of permanently present. This is completely ex-

cluded by Mr. Sobol's own testimony.

it does not specify which statute is proceeded under. Concededly the Code of Procedure of the 3 State of Louisiana, under the Code that would not be grounds for dismissal in the State Court on a Motion to Quash a Bill of Information but it would be grounds for a Motion to Supress. BY THE COURT: What judgment do you think the Court could render? BY MR. SESSIONS:

I think the Court could render, since there is no question of fact disputed before this Court, that as of January 25 and not speaking of today, but as of January 25, 1967, Mr. Sobol's testimony is not disputed, that he was only temporarily present in the State. And, based upon his undisputed testimony he was introduced to the Court under Section 214 to appear representing Duncan before Judge Leon. That is not in dispute.

BY THE COURT:

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You think that the prosecution, in the present state of the record, should be enjoined.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

Yes, we submit the matter on that basis.

1 There is no necessity for this Court to ever 2 reach the question of constitutionality of 3 Sections 213 or 214. 4 BY THE COURT: 5 I understand your arguement about the Bill 6 of Information with respect to 213 and 214 but 7 I don't quite understand what your authority is. 8 What authority do you say there is under these circumstances to enjoin this State procedure? 10 Do you say that it is under the Dombrousky ruling? 11 BY MR. SESSIONS: 12 13

Yes, I think that Dombrousky has brought us under these circumstances to enjoin the prosecut of under that Bill of Information or under any other bill because I believe that under the 1964 Civil Rights Statute, Mr. Sobol, once he acquires the franchise of the State of Louisiana which is a priviledge, once that is acquired, once he acquires that franchise to appear and represent Mr. Duncan, then he had a right to be recognized.

BY THE COURT:

You don't feel that he had to have associate counsel with him each time he went to Court?

BY MR. SESSIONS:

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No, sir. All that 214 requires, as an

analogy to General Rule 1 of the Court...

BY THE COURT:

Well, is there to be any limitation on the number of associates that he may have?

BY MR. SESSIONS:

There is none in the Statute. It is simply a question of whether he is temporarily present within the State and shall be presented in each case, case by case.

BY THE COURT:

Well, is this setting a trap for Mr. Sobol so that in all or any of the Parishes, the 67 Parishes of the State of Louisiana that the prosecutor may determine for himself whether Mr. Sobol is temporarily present and prosecute him from time to time and harass him if he gets into his representation of negroes in the pursuance of their Civil Rights? Is this a trap which is set deliberately or inadvertantly in which he would be subjected to such situation.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

The Bar Association is setting no trap in our presentation of this situation and I want to make that very clear.

As far as the other 63 Parishes are concerned,

we contend that the sole and only issue before this Court concerns Mr. Sobol and Plaquemines Parish and what Mr. Sobol has done since January 25, I don't know and this Court does not know. If Mr. Sobol had passed the point where he is temporarily present then the antonym of that presence is permanently present in the State of Louisiana and it would seem to me that this is for another Court and another occasion.

Mr. Bronstein argues in his brief that the
State Statute is vague and indefinite and has
interpreted it a trap, if I paraphrase his
language correctly so that Mr. Sobol is unable
to tell at what point he has crossed the line
between temporarily and permanently present and
that, therefore, the Statute is unconstitutional
on its face.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

BY THE COURT:

I don't think that that is a valid or legitimate argument. I see no unconstitutionality on its face.

It might well be unconstitutional if the

Louisiana legislature in its inherent and im-

should seek to amend or if the Supreme Court should adopt a rule or corollary to 213 or 214...

BY THE COURT:

Has that been offered in any way as one of the exhibits?

BY MR. SESSIONS:

I propose, at the proper time to offer the entire Articles and By-laws. They have the effect of law and are in Volume 21A West Revised Statutes. I consider that the Court may take Judicial Notice but I will offer and file it now.

BY THE COURT:

It would strike me that we would take Judicial Cognizance if it was necessary.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

But, let me finish my analogy. If the Louisian Legislature should amend Section 214 or the Supreme Court should modify its own mandate as to the qualifications for the practice of law, say that a non-resident attorney is considered by way of comparison to the new Rule in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi where a non-resident attorney may be qualified in that state for only one appearance, rather one would be associated in one case for

every 12 month period, then I think this would be 1 2 plainly unconstitutional on its face. 3 Also, I believe that any limitation put on the 4 number of cases might well be unconstitutional on 5 its face. 6 I don't believe there is any necessity for the 7 legislature or the Supreme Court in its exercise 8 of its control of this provision which has not 9 been deligated to central government and is still 10 reserved to the State under the Tenth Amendment 11 needs any constitutional refinement as far as

ambiguity is concerned on its face.

If that would be so then every Statute that depends upon domicile or residence, and there are many of them, Tax Statutes and otherwise, then all of those Statutes would also be unconstitutionall.

BY THE COURT:

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It depends upon whether any of these Statutes infringe on a federally constitutionally protected right.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

I would have to concede that.

BY THE COURT:

Do any of you gentlemen here wish to say anything in connection with what Mr. Sessions has

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just offered?

to enjoin my client.

BY MR. PROVENSAL:

brief.

May it please the Court, I will be kind of

BY THE COURT:

When the Bar Association attempted to intervene,

I understood that they were intervening on my side.

I didn't know that they were going to ask the Court

To begin with, the deposition of Judge Leon is quite clear. He says that he was introduced in the proceedings which is a Juvenile Court proceedings in the manner, this is Mr. Sobol, how are you Mr. Sobol period. No one other than Mr. Sobol appeared in the proceedings of Simple Battery. The juvenile proceedings were nolle proceed. At no time did anyone appear in the Simple Battery proceedings.

BY THE COURT:

Mr. Sobol says they did in his deposition. Is there a dispute on that?

BY MR. PROVENSAL:

The record of the two proceedings revealed by the minutes of the clerk who was present and who was not present.

1 It seems to me that I read somewhere that 2 Mr. Collins went with him in connection with the 3 Criminal Prosecution, other than the juvenile 4 proceedings. 5 BY MR. PROVENSAL: 6 No, sir. The only time Mr. Collins was present 7 was at the trial of the Juvenile Court proceedings. At that time Mr. Collins requested a Bill of Particulars and a Motion to Quash. 10 BY THE COURT: 11 Who hears juvenile proceedings? 12 BY MR. PROVENSAL: 13 The same judge, the judge recesses the Twenty-14 fifth Judicial Court and then goes into a different 15 room and ... 16 BY THE COURT: 17 It is the same judge? 18 BY MR. PROVENSAL: 19 The same judge and he convenes the Juvenile 20 Court and the juvenile proceedings were nolle 21 prosed, as I have mentioned to you. Then the criminal proceedings were brought charging this 22

person with Simple Battery. At this time Mr. Sobol

and Mr. Sobol alone appeared. Judge Leon said that

the first time he knew that Mr. Sobol was not an

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attorney admitted to the practice of law in

Louisiana was when he had a conversation with one
member of the firm of Collins, Douglas and Elie,
right before sentencing, the day before sentencing.

I take it that you don't agree that I may issue a judgment against you in these proceedings under the pleadings. Now, what about the Motion to Dismiss, I would assume that you will go along with the Motion to Dismiss.

BY MR. PROVENSAL:

BY THE COURT:

I filed a Motion to Dismiss on different grounds.

The Bar Association is incorrect in what it says. The Bill of Information was filed in the Gourt. A bench warrant was issued prior to the time of the arrest and prior to the institution of proceedings on this Bill of Information. All of this is in the records. And, we contend that purely and simply this Court doesn't have to define what is temporary in the State. It is for the Twenty-fifth Judicial District Court to determine whether or not Mr. Sobol was temporarily within the State. It is a question of whether or not any evidence can be adduced at that time to show

his subsequent activities within the State to determine whether he really intended to stay in the State and that he was not here temporarily. All of that would have to be passed upon. Was he temporarily in the State or wasn't he temporarily in the State.

We disagree with the Bar Association that the opposite of temporary is permanently domiciled, we disagree, that's not so by any stretch of the imagination. It is a pure and simple contention of here is a man who moved into the State in July, moved his family with him and his wife and children and are renting a house and has credit cards which are used throughout the State, filed Louisiana Income Tax Returns, obtained a Louisiana driver's license, receives all of his mail here, opened up an office, obtained a telephone in his office, a telephone at his home.

BY THE COURT:

If not temporarily, what is it? What term would you use?

BY MR. PROVENSAL:

I don't think you have to have an opposite.

The Statute doesn't say domiciled. It just says that he must be temporarily within the State,

temporarily.

BY THE COURT:

You say that he was not temporarily within the State. That's what I said to Mr. Sessions during his argument. I read that in this great mass of papers that was handed me for reading.

BY MR. PROVENSAL:

Well, may I make a short statement. The issue for all practical purposes, and my trial brief, in my trial brief, I raise each issue that I think is before the Court and in there one is:

Is Mr. Sobol temporarily within the State or was he temporarily within the State on January 25, 1966.

Thank you.

BY THE COURT:

Mr. Bronstein.

BY MR. BRONSTEIN:

Your Honor, Mr. Amsterdam will respond.

BY THE COURT:

I just ask you that we move along on these things because we have considered your briefs.

BY MR. AMSTERDAM:

We recognize the imposition of a long three judge trial and I will be very brief.

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I think the only important statement or position or new matter that Mr. Sessions has raised is and, we agree with Mr. Sessions on the facts of the case that Mr. Sobol is not in violation of the Statute and I would like to speak particularly to Judge Cassibry's point. We also agree that under the law in Dombrowsky an injunction could issue on that ground and not simply because he 9 is not violating a Statute because if he is not 10 violating a Statute then this is a case of 11 harassment which is one ground for injunction. 12 We do not agree with Mr. Sessions' interpre-13 tation of the Statute nor with Mr. Provensal's.

In deed, our whole contention is and the reason for our disagreement is that the Statute is meaningless. What is temporary, what is Association, in an exercise of this vagueness Statute is meaningless and as such has a deterent effect.

BY THE COURT:

You had trouble with your word Association in your brief. You wrote the brief?

BY MR. AMSTERDAM:

Yes, sir.

BY THE COURT:

I don't un prate why you have a problem there

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I could understand a problem with temporary or permanent but the word association, everybody knows what association is.

BY MR. AMSTERDAM:

In this case I think so, where one is introduced by another attorney. But, our complaint
seeks injunctive relief. Now, in the other case,
the Dombrousky Case...

BY THE COURT:

Well, I noticed that counsel for the Bar

Association also said that he didn't think there

was any limitation on the number of associations.

He didn't urge the question of when temporary

runs out and permanent takes over. Of course,

that is a matter of construction. This is the

matter that you labored hardest on in your brief.

Did I use the words correctly, that it would be

a trap for an unwary attorney in not knowing

when he had crossed over from temporarily to

permanently.

Could the Court issue a decree in your favor without passing on the constitutionality, either on its face or as applied?

BY MR. AMSTERDAM:

This is one thing I would like to say in con-

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clusion since Mr. Sessions' Motion is directed toward this permanency proposition. I would like to call the Court's attention to a decision of the United States Supreme Court in connection with Mr. Sessions' argument, because Mr. Sobol is not in violation of the Statute and Mr. Sessions is doubtfull that the Statute doesn't apply and therefore this Court can't reach any of those constitutional issues. Last week in the matter of James versus Gilmore, 36 Law Week, 3285. That decision was affirmed by a per curiam a three judge court decision, the matter of Gilmore versus James, 274 Fed. Supp. 75, the Northern District of Texas, August of 1967. That was the case in which the Plaintiff was a tuba instructor at a junior college and challenged the State loyalty oath on the grounds that the oath was vague and over broad.

The Attorney General intervened for the State of Texas and said that the Statute never applied to this Plaintiff because he was not a member of a faculty of a school, a State school or a school wherein funds are paid out of State Funds. junior college, the Defendant, agreed that he was not covered by the Statute and therefore he had

no standing in challenging this statute on the question of constitutionality.

The Court held, and we submit rightly, that since the Statute had been applied to him, even erroenously, it gave him a right to challenge it and the Court the right to entertain the constitutionality objection to the Statute in view of its application to him and threatened further application.

Two judges signed the opinion, I don't know the disposition of the third judge, Goldberg, Circuit Judge and William M. Taylor, District Judge.

What is significant in that case is that the Defendant in that case took a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of the United States, last week affirmed the ruling below.

BY THE COURT:

And the Statute was declared unconstitutional?

BY MR. AMSTERDAM:

The Statute was declared unconstitutional.

BY THE COURT:

How, as applied?

BY MR. AMSTERDAM:

On its face.

I think, therefore, it is plain that although I agree with Mr. Sessions, I say we are entitled to an Injunction, as sought. I think in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision we are entitled to the relief we seek of a declaration of unconstitutionality on its face and that the application is unconstitutional and we are entitled, we believe, to an Injunction against Enforcement in this case.

Thank you.

BY THE COURT:

Mr. Fiss.

BY MR. FISS:

The interest of the United States in this case is essentially that the negroes in Plaquemines Parish, we don't feel, get adequate representation in Civil Rights cases.

When the prosecution of Richard Sobol was commenced in February of 1966 and for the following, I believe 6 or 8 months, until the United States moved to intervene, we understood two things. First, that the prosecution of Richard Sobol was a form of harassment and a form of intimidation. We also understood that the

Defendants, the District Attorney of Plaquemines
Parish, the Constitutional Enforcement Officer
of the State, sought to inforce 214 through a
certain construction and understanding of 214.

We understood then at that time that they placed very restrictive limitations not only upon the word Temporary but also upon the word Association.

We understood that they required in the term
Association that counsel be present in the Courtroom at all times, the associated counsel. We
believed at that time that that was the construction of the Statute and that was the
application of the Statute and as such was unconstitutional. It threatened and had the
threat of deprivation of negroes in the parish
of adequate representation.

BY THE COURT:

You are referring to an unconstitutional application rather than unconstitutional on its face?

BY MR. FISS:

Yes, sir.

BY THE COURT:

In your view, is a three judge court required

1 under the present circumstances? 2 BY MR. FISS: 3 We do not believe a three judge court is required under the harassment issue. We do 5 believe that to enjoin a three judge court is appropriate, to enjoin the application of the 7 Statute. 8 BY THE COURT: 9 Any injunction upon constitutionality, whether 10 on its face or by application is a three judge 11 court? 12 BY MR. FISS: 13 Yes, sir. That is the Poindexter Case. 14 BY THE COURT: 15 On the simple issue of harassment it is not 16 necessary that the courts pass upon the con-17 stitutionality and could issue an injunction 18 without a three judge court. 19 BY MR. FISS: 20 That's right. 21 BY THE COURT: 22 But, you seek a further ruling, you don't 23 seek only on harassment but you seek something 24 else, an injunction against further harassment

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for similar practice in the State of Louisiana.

BY MR. FISS:

It is not so much for an injunction against further arrests but it is an injunction or a limitation upon the Statute of a State being construed by law enforcement officials in a certain way, the way it had been construed by the officials in Plaquemines Parish. We seek that injunction not only against the officials in the State -- against the officials of Plaquemines Parish but we are trying to ask the Court to enjoin not only the prosecution of Richard Sobol by injunction but asking that the Statute is not construed in the future in the same way it had been in the past, as in this case.

BY THE COURT:

I think we might as well be prepared, if
we should go ahead with the trial of the merits
of the case, to develop this further. It is not
necessary to go into it at great length right
now. But, what of the Motion of the Bar Association, which is now converted, as I see it,
to a Motion for Summary Judgment?

BY MR. FISS:

What I would like to do, Your Honor, is just

was our understanding of the case. Now, subsequent to the intervention of the United States things have moved along and our understanding as far as our pre-trial conferences and investigation showed, we were, and understood that this was more an old construction of the Statute. Now, subsequent to the intervention of the State Bar Association and subsequent to an exhaustive investigation of documents in the possession of the State Bar Association we understand that they take a different view of the meaning of that Statute. They take the view which is still contradicted by the Defendant District Attorney. Also we take the view that one introduction by an attorney licensed to practice in Louisiana is sufficient for purposes of the Statute.

BY THE COURT:

On each particular case or does one introduction to the Court by an associate, in the future on all Civil Rights Cases, cover this entire situation?

BY MR. FISS:

Not at all, case by case. We have a problem here of defining what a case is. For the first time I have heard the argument and maybe it was

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due to my error, that we were dealing here with two separate cases. We are dealing with a Juvenile charge and we are dealing with a Simple Battery charge. And, that these being separate cases require the introduction by an associate in each instance. We would like to show that that type of construction of the Statute is also too restrictive. What we are dealing with is the same factual transaction, the same judge, the same prosecutor and all it was was an attempt to avoid a dismissal of the Juvenile charge and to substitute in its place the Battery charge.

Summarize, what type judgment does the United States seek in the case?

It seeks two things, first the United States seeks to enjoin the prosecution of Richard Sobol because it poses a threat to the negroes of the parish.

In this case, all right. Proceed.

BY MR. FISS:

No, from getting adequate representation.

BY THE COUDT.

You seek an injunction against this prosecution.

Now go on.

BY MR. FISS:

That's right. The second thing we seek is a limitation on the Statute, on 214 so that people, attorneys that are not domiciled in the State of Louisiana and that act in association, in the sense that they are introduced to the Court the first time to represent negroes in Civil Rights Cases and Civil Rights workers in Civil Rights Cases...

BY THE COURT:

But, that does not require a ruling on the constitutionality, does it, the second point that you have raised?

Y MR. FISS:

It requires a ruling on the constitutionality
of the Statute as construed by the Defendants
because the Defendants take a different and a more
expansive construction of the Statute.

As an example, if the State Bar Association had control of the State law, of the limiting of the Statute, 214, which they disclaim and have disclaimed and they said that this is exactly what the Statute means and it was read we would not ask

for a ruling on the constitutionality of the Statute, the United States would not. But, we have a different situation here. This is a situation where the District Attorney within the State takes a different interpretation and asked that his interpretation, his construction prevail. This may or may not prevail in the rest of the State and we ask that that be limited.

BY THE COURT:

Well, I am just trying to formulate in my own mind a decree such as you suggested may be written in this case. I would assume that you mean that at the conclusion of the evidence a decree, is ordered that there be a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff enjoining the prosecution of Richard Sobol under Information number so and so filed at such and such a time.

BY MR. FISS:

That's right.

BY THE COURT:

And, how would you word paragraph number 2?
BY MR. FISS:

Paragraph 2, Defendants would word it this way, that the Defendant, District Attorney, do not arrest or threaten to arrest or prosecute any

attorney licensed to practice law in another State who is not domiciled in the State of Louisiana and who had been introduced to the Court for the purposes of that case. In those circumstances we 5 would ask the Court to enjoin the Defendants from 6 enforcing 214. So, you see it is a second, a 7 separate paragraph. 8 BY THE COURT: All right, you have not reached the constitution-10

BY MR. FISS:

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The second paragraph would constitutionally limit 214.

ality yet. You haven't mentioned the word.

I might say that you could word it another way, that Section 214 not be construed by the Defendants, the District Attorney, so as to prevent an attorney who is licensed to practice law in another State and who is not domiciled in Louisiana and who had been introduced to the Court by an attorney licensed in Louisiana. We would then ask an injunction by enjoining them from construing 214 so as to prevent this individual from practicing law.

BY THE COURT:

Do you have a similar case where a Court gave

this type of remedy? I am talking now relative to the second part of your relief. In other words, do you have a case where the Federal Court held that the State District Attorneys are to interpret this Act within these limits and not to exceed those limits?

BY MR. FISS:

We believe that there are such cases.

BY THE COURT:

Do you have any that you may refer to?

BY MR. FISS:

Not at this moment. I would get a brief on that.

BY THE COURT:

I think I understand your position. Mr. Dowl-ing.

BY MR. DOWLING:

May it please the Court. Since each of the parties, Intervenors, the Primary Party and Intervenors have somewhat slightly different approaches and appreciations of the issues of this thing and the thing that ought to be protected about which the Court is to be concerned, the Criminal Court Bar Association is of the vehement opinion that it is absolutely essential to protect the rights of

the minority groups to due process. However,
we think the best way to do this is not by practice
of test tube law by an attorney who is from out
of the State where counsel, themselves had a particular case that they just happened to choose,
who have none of the responsibility for accepting
representation of an indigent defendant as due
members of the Criminal Courts Bar Association,
and where such attorneys are not subject to the
grievances and discipline of the State Bar Associatio
and who pay no dues.

As a matter of fact, it seems rather anomalous when arguing about the issues presented by this petition, when Mr. Sobol or somebody like Mr.

Sobol could not be qualified to practice before this very Court, at this time, according to the rules of this Court and I am looking at the Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastera District of Louisiana dated the 12th day of

November A.D. 1965 wherein it reads that any member in good standing of the Bar or of the Supreme

Court of Louisiana who resides in or maintains an office for the practice of law in the State of

Louisiana is eligible for admission to the Bar of this Court. Therefore, before he can practice in

the United States District Court, according to 2 these rules ... 3 BY THE COURT: 4 That is not exclusive. There are many attorneys 5 that are not licensed to practice in Louisiana 6 that do practice here. 7 BY MR. DOWLING: 8 I am aware of that. 9 BY THE COURT: 10 What that means is that if you are licensed to 11 practice by the Supreme Court of Louisiana you 12 can get licensed to practice here. It is not 13 exclusive. I am going to try to defend that. I 14 used to be a mamber of that Court and if it does 15 what you are saying then we have not been following 16 the rules. 17 BY MR. DOWLING: 18 He can practice before this Court with local 19 counsel. 20 BY THE COURT: 21 Mr. Fiss is not licensed to practice in Louisiana. We have an attorney right here, Mr. 22 Bronstein, who is not licensed to practice in 23 24 the State of Louisiana.

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BY MR. DOWLING:

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I understand that. None of these gentlemen, as far as I know, practice law in the State of Louisiana continually on a permanent basis. I think you can have a self-serving declaration of how the State law should be defined, whether or not he is temporarily or permanently practicing. I think this is a question of fact. I think you would find yourself with a situation where you would have men who handled numerous cases. We can't have them then contend and say we are here only temporarily. We have rules that you say that out of state lawyers can practice before this Court in a particular case, but, to practice continuously, continuously practice without the necessity of association, without the necessity of being specifically permitted to do so, this is an entirely different thing.

However, we feel in the case of Mr. Sobol, whether it came about as a mistake of fact or whether it came about because of a mistake of law or whether somebody didn't hear something that was said, the fact remains that he was allowed to and he did practice in the Parish of Plaquemines all the way to the point where we are taking a misdemeanor on Certiorari to the

United States Supreme Court. But, be that as it may, we think in this particular prosecution the State would be estopped from prosecuting Mr. Sobol.

We feel that there is no other issue at all and we believe that this Court, as a Court of equity, in its exercise of equitable jurisdiction can say that you cannot prosecute Richard Sobol in this case, in this particular cause and dismiss everything else from the case.

BY THE COURT:

You think on the basis of depositions that have been offered and the facts of record at this point that the Court could and should enter an injunction enjoining this prosecution.

BY MR. DOWLING:

But, not on the basis of constitutionality of the Statute.

BY THE COURT:

I didn't say that.

BY MR. DOWLING:

Yes, it should enjoin the prosecution of Richard Sobol in this particular cause.

Right now what it boils down to is the question of credibility between Judge Leon and Mr. Sobol.

I don't think it's a question of credibility at

all. It may be just a question of mistake. I would just prefer to believe that it is a question of mistake. I believe Mr. Sobol was in good faith. I don't think he was in bad faith. I think he thought that he had a right to do what he was doing but I don't think that he did have that right and I don't think that the Court gave him that right.

I think that this Court should say, we enjoin the prosecution of Mr. Sobol.

I think it would be rather a simple matter to make a defense of entrapment or estoppal in the State Court and go to the Supreme Court and come back here with writs of habeas corpus and the whole matter could be resolved. I don't think the labels that are placed upon the pleadings by counsel govern the action of this Court. I think this Court in its inherent power has the right to declare in this particular instance and in this particular instance alone that Mr. Sobol was a victim of estoppal or entrapment and they can enjoin this prosecution and dismiss the remainder of the suit.

Thank you.

BY THE COURT:

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I understand that Mr. Brahney waives his argument.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

Briefly, in rebuttal may I invite the Court's attention to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association which has the effect of law. It is approved by the Supreme Court. Section 9, the second paragraph of Article 12 of the Articles of Incorporation and I shall paraphrase, but it has an entirely different language than Section 214. This part of the Article reads: A person licensed and qualified to practice as an attorney-at-law or as an attorney and counsellor-at-law in any other state and temporarily present in this State -- and this is not in the Statute -- (herein after termed a visiting attorney) may practice law in this State if such visiting attorney acts in association with some attorney duly and legally licensed and admitted to the practice of law by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

This is within the judicial power of the Supreme Court and is not involved in this law suit but is within the power of the Louisiana State Bar Association to ascribe a meaning for

214 and you could go into the Civil Court if you differed, with an injunction suit or an action in quo warranto.

BY THE COURT:

We will take it under submission, the Motion of the Bar Association of the State of Louisiana. The Court is going to take a 10 minute recess and come back and rule on the Motion.

(RECESS)

BY THE COURT:

The Court is of the belief as to the Motions filed by the Louisiana State Bar Association to Dismiss by judgment on the pleadings and as to the Motion of the State of Louisiana for a Summary Judgment, in the alternative, to Dismiss, that there are issues of fact which can only be determined after a trial on the merits and that we are unable to say as to the Motion: to Dismiss that there are no sets of facts under which the Plaintiff could prevail.

Under the circumstances, both Motions are denied.

You may proceed with the case, Mr. Bronstein.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

Before Mr. Bronstein calls his first witness,

may it please the Court, we should like to solicit a stipulation from all parties relative to the Discovery pursued by the United States under its motion granted by Judge Cassibry. In examining the records under the Rule 34 Motion granted by the Court. the United States attorneys have seen the records of the Louisiana State Bar Association pertaining to the Bar examinations given as to the names of both successful and unsuccessful candidates for admission by the Louisiana Supreme Court. And, insofar as the records of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee is concerned they have seen many files involving the names of third persons involved in complaints or matters within the jurisdiction of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, which are not pertinent to the issues in this case. We feel an obligation and a duty to those persons as to whose identity is known to Government counsel, or in the event that copies have been made, known to others, in lieu of a Rule 30 (b) Order by the Court to protect those third parties, both unsuccessful Bar Candidates, or persons as to whom complaints have been made or who have been involved in proceedings or matters within which the Unauthorized

1 Practice of Law Committee has jurisdiction, that 2 all parties stipulate that any information obtain-3 ed by any attorney pertaining to persons not directly involved in this law suit, whether busi-5 ness firms or other associations of a partner-6 ship nature, whether corporate or individual, 7 be held to be confidential and to be used only 8 for the purposes of this case and are not to be 9 disclosed for any other purpose or to any other 10 person. 11 BY THE COURT: 12 Is that agreeable, Mr. Fiss? 13 BY MR. FISS: 14 As long as it is understood that for the pur-15 poses of this case they could be disclosed as 16 necessary on the record, I have no objection. 17 BY THE COURT: 18 Is that acceptable? 19 BY MR. SESSIONS: 20 Yes, sir. 21 BY THE COURT: 22 Did anyone else have any access to those re-23 cords other than Mr. Fiss? 24 BY MR. SESSIONS:

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Or who Mr. Fiss may have let see them.

BY MR. FISS:

None other than two letters that Mr. Sessions agreed Mr. Bronstein have.

BY THE COURT:

As far as you are concerned or have any knowledge, Mr. Bronstein, I assume the stipulation is agreeable.

BY MR. BRONSTEIN:

It is.

BY THE COURT:

It will be so noted.

BY MR. SESSIONS:

I would assume that all other parties so stipulate.

BY MR. PROVENSAL:

May I say something in order that the record might be complete? We had taken discovery given by the Defendants, the discovery deposition of Mr. A. P. Tureaud and there was correspondence between the United States Department of Justice and the attorney for the Plaintiff in connection with that deposition proposing certain corrections. For that reason Mr. Borello had not signed the original and that deposition is of record in the Court. He gave it to me the other day, the

1 original of that deposition with a proces verbal 2 that he made as the court reporter enclosing the 3 letter of the Lawyers' Constitutional Defense Committee and the letter of the United States 5 Department of Justice and he asked me to file this 6 in the proceedings. I am not introducing the 7 deposition but under the Rule we are required to 8 file the original of the deposition. 9 BY THE COURT: 10 Any objection? 11 BY MR. BRONSTEIN: 12 No objection. 13 BY MR. FISS: 14 No objection. 15 BY THE COURT: 16 You are not offering it in evidence you are 17 just asking that it be filed with the clerk. 18 BY MR. PROVENSAL: 19 Yes, sir. 20 BY MR. FISS: 21 With the letter of corrections. 22 BY MR. PROVENSAL: 23 The proces verbal and the letter are attached. 24 BY THE COURT:

The Court orders it filed with the clerk and it

is not a part of the record. BY MR. FISS: 3 Before the Plaintiff calls his first witness, 4 the United States would like to invoke the Rule. 5 BY THE COURT: 6 Is there any objection to invoking the Rule in 7 this case? 8 BY MR. BRONSTEIN: No objection. 10 BY THE COURT: 11 All witnesses in this case will please stand. 12 This would not include parties. Anyone who is 13 a party is not going to be excluded. 14 BY MR. BRONSTEIN: 15 Is it also correct that it does not include 16 attorneys of record? 17 BY THE COURT: 18 In this case? 19 BY MR. BRONSTEIN: 20 In this case. 21 BY THE COURT: 22 Does anybody have an objection to an attorney 23 of record remaining who is going to testify? BY MR. PROVENSAL: 25 On behalf of Judge Perez who is a party I would

mention to the Court that he has no interest in the proceedings.

BY THE COURT:

He has a right to stay in the Courtroom. You may remain in the Courtroom, Judge Perez.

BY MR. DOWLING:

Do we understand that lawyers who are witnesses have to be excluded? Mr. Kelly, for example, is a witness and is not an attorney of record in this case.

BY MR. BRONSTEIN:

I would strongly urge that since as I understand it most of the Defandant's witnesses are attorneys, almost all of them, who would be directly involved in rebutting the Plaintiff's proof, that they be excluded unless they are parties or attorneys of record in this case.

BY MR. FISS:

The United States would take the position that the attorneys who are not counsel be excluded.

BY THE COURT:

Ordinarily, we would not like to exclude the lawyers but since we will have a lot of testimony of lawyers and since the Plaintiff and Plaintiff-Intervenor insists, we would have to excuse them.

BY MR. DOWLING:

My associate in this case, Mr. Wessel, who is ill today and since Mr. Kelly is a member of the Criminal Courts Bar Association, with the Court's permission, I would like to have Mr. Walter Kelly enrolled as my associate.

BY THE COURT:

Any objection?

BY MR. FISS:

None.

BY THE COURT:

It is so ordered.

BY MR. BRONSTEIN:

I would have no objection as long as Mr. Dowling and the other Intervenors do not move to enroll all of the other attorney witnesses in this case.

BY THE COURT:

We would meet that later.

All witnesses in this case who are not counsel of record or parties will have to leave the Courtroom. The Court instructs you not to discuss this case with anyone while waiting your turn to testify. However, you may discuss this case with attorneys for any party. But, while waiting your turn to testify, do not discuss this case with

BY MR. SESSIONS:

others.

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Your Honor, Mr. John Pat Little, President of the Louisiana Bar Association, I'm not even sure that he is going to testify, but I would like to have him present and I might also say that I might also move that all members of the State Bar Association are parties since, apparently, Mr. Bronstein has associated all of his witnesses.

BY THE COURT:

Well, there is nothing before the Court on that so there is no ruling needed.

You may proceed, Mr. Bronstein.

BY MR. BRONSTEIN:

We would like to call Mr. Lolis Elie.

LOLIS EDWARD ELIE, called on behalf of the Plaintiff,
after first being duly sworn, testified as follows

BY THE COURT:

I might say that counsel, since we have no jury, we will give you the option of going to the podium to ask your questions or remaining at your seat, which ever is more convenient.

However, if you gentlemen determine or choose to use the podium you will be permitted to use the podium but we ask that all counsel select