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10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
11	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION			
12	PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES)	Case No.	3:17-cv-00451-JD
13	OF AMERICA AND THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,)		
14	Plaintiffs,)	IN SUPPO	
15	V.)	MOTION	TO DISMISS
16	DONALD TRUMP; UNITED)	Hearing:	May 11, 2017, 10:00 a.m.
17	STATES OF AMERICA	ĺ	<i>8</i> .	Courtroom 11 Hon. James Donato
18	Defendants.	<u> </u>		Tion. vanies Donato
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DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Case No. 3:17-cv-00451-JD

INTRODUCTION

Defendants' motion to dismiss established that attorney Andrew W. Shalaby lacks directparty or third-party standing to challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order 13780,
"Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States." Defs' Not. of Mot.
& Mot. to Dismiss & Mem. in Supp., Dkt. No. 22 ("Defs' Mot."), at 4-8. Conceding many of the
arguments made by Defendants and failing to distinguish the cases upon which Defendants rely,
Shalaby nonetheless insists that his lawsuit should survive Defendants' motion to dismiss in light
of his invocation of unspecified private attorney general statutes. Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt.
No. 26 ("Opp."), at 1-4. He also contends that his allegations of injury are adequate to
demonstrate standing. *Id.* at 2-3. As discussed below, these arguments are unpersuasive. The
Court should therefore grant Defendants' motion to dismiss due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court should grant Defendants' motion to dismiss because Shalaby has failed to adequately oppose it. Shalaby has not only declined to distinguish any cases relied upon by Defendants, but has also refused to cite any authority in support of his position. *See* Opp. at 1-4. In addition, he has not responded to Defendants' points regarding the traceability and redressability elements of standing. *See id.* Shalaby has therefore conceded that his claims fail, and the Court may grant Defendants' motion on that basis alone. *See Roy v. Contra Costa Cty.*, No. 15-CV-02672-TEH, 2015 WL 5698743, at *3 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2015) ("When a non-moving party's opposition to a motion to dismiss fails to address the moving party's arguments regarding certain claims, the non-moving party has conceded that those claims fail." (citing *Silva v. City of San Leandro*, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 2010))); *Guevara v. Marriott Hotel Servs. Inc.*, No. C 10-5347 SBA, 2013 WL 6172983, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2013) (viewing failure to respond to merits of argument as conceding that "claims would not withstand a motion to dismiss" (citing *Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc.*, 941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 2013))); *Allen v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.*, No. C 10-4492

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WHA, 2010 WL 5088227, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2010) (granting motion to dismiss in part because "plaintiff fail[ed] to cite a single legal authority in response to defendant's motion to dismiss" and because plaintiff did not address arguments in opposition brief); *cf. Intertrust Techs. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.*, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2003), *as amended* (July 7, 2003) ("[A]n argument that lacks appropriate supporting citations is no argument at all.").

Further, the arguments that Shalaby does make are without merit. Emphasizing that he is not a plaintiff to this action, Shalaby primarily argues that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction because he is bringing this lawsuit pursuant to unidentified private attorney statutes.¹ Opp. at 1-4. But as Defendants have already discussed, Defs' Mot. at 6 (citations omitted), a litigant cannot substitute a private attorney general statute for the standing requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution; rather, a litigant must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the case in order to proceed. *See, e.g., Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 373 F.3d 998, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004); *Vrooman v. Armstrong*, No. 3:16-CV-00770, 2016 WL 3563293, at *2 (D. Or. June 8, 2016), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. 3:16-CV-00770, 2016 WL 3566733 (D. Or. June 29, 2016). Here, Shalaby has claimed no such interest. Indeed, his repeated assertions that he is not a plaintiff serve as an acknowledgement that he has not suffered any Article III injury. Accordingly, Shalaby has neither direct-party nor third-party standing, and his argument fails.

Nor has Shalaby demonstrated that *any* individual has suffered an injury for purposes of Article III. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants explained that Shalaby's allegations of harm, as well as the "Statements of Support" he submitted to the Court, are insufficient because they are conclusory or describe injuries that are abstract or hypothetical. Defs' Mot. at 7 (citations omitted). In response, Shalaby simply states that "[t]he injuries are adequately pleaded and are non-speculative and concrete" and that "the plaintiffs include victims of harm, violence, discrimination, and other quite tangible concrete injuries." Opp. at 2. Such a rebuttal, tethered

¹ While Shalaby is willing to opine on the virtues on private attorney general statutes generally, he continues to refuse to identify the specific statutes on which he relies. *See* Opp. at 3. He therefore still has not established authorization to sue. *See Brockovich v. Cmty. Med. Ctrs., Inc.*, No. CV-F-06-1609, 2007 WL 738691, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2007).

1 to equally conclusory allegations in the amended complaint, is plainly inadequate. E.g., 2 Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 WL 5473144, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 3 2014) (dismissing cause of action where complaint contained conclusory allegations and 4 plaintiff's "[o]pposition brief is equally conclusory"). 5 Finally, Shalaby is unable to establish a legally cognizable harm by claiming that "[t]he 6 injuries continued to follow the filing of the First Amended Complaint." Opp. at 3 (referring to 7 "violence [that] erupted between people at a Trump protest" on April 15, 2017). "It is axiomatic 8 that the complaint may not be amended by briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss." 9 Tietsworth v. Sears, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Barbera v. WMC 10 Mortgage Corp., No. C 04-3738(SBA), 2006 WL 167632, at *2 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2006)). 11 And in any event, further amending the complaint to include this factual allegation would not 12 establish standing for the reasons already described by Defendants. See Defs' Mot. at 7-8 13 (discussing inadequacies of allegations that are conclusory or where alleged injuries are traceable 14 only to third parties). 15 **CONCLUSION** 16 For the foregoing reasons, Shalaby has failed to establish that the Court has subject 17 matter jurisdiction over this case. Defendants' motion to dismiss should therefore be granted. 18 DATED: April 24, 2017 Respectfully submitted, 19 CHAD A. READLER Acting Assistant Attorney General 20 21 JOHN R. TYLER 22 **Assistant Branch Director** 23 /s/Stuart J. Robinson STUART J. ROBINSON 24 (Cal. Bar No. 267183) 25 Trial Attorney 26 U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 27 450 Golden Gate Ave. 28 San Francisco, CA 94102

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