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8	The Honorable Judge Ricardo S. Martinez		
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11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON		
12	AT SEATTLE		
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14	GLORIA CROUCH,	NO. C04-2066RSM	
15	Plaintiff,	INTERVENER'S AMENDED	
16		SUPPLEMENTAL	
17	VS.	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FOR	
18	RLS, Inc., dba SEBO'S DO-IT CENTER,	HARASSMENT AND DISCRIMINATION WITH	
19	Defendants.	JURY DEMAND	
20			
21	COMES NOW, the above-referenced Plaintiff, by and through attorney of record,		
22	PETER MOOTE, and alleges as causes of action in this first Amended Supplemental Complaint		
23	against the Defendants named herein and above as follows:		
24	I. PARTIES		
25	1.1 Plaintiff, GLORIA CROUCH, resides in Island County.		
26	1.2 Defendant, RLS, Inc., dba SEBO'S DO-IT CENTER, is a domestic corporation		
	INTERVENER'S AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES - 1	vier, is a domestic corporation	

doing business in the State of Washington. It had authority to take all actions alleged herein and did take such actions by way of its agents and/or employees. This corporate Defendant is responsible for all liability caused by its employees and managers under the doctrine of respondent superior.

- 1.3 Plaintiff believes and, therefore, alleges that other persons or entities presently not known may be responsible for the allegations and damages alleged herein. Plaintiff is designating said Defendants pursuant to RCW 4.28.150 and reserves the right to specifically amend the Complaint to name such parties should their identity become known to Plaintiff. Plaintiff presently designates them as John Doe and Jane Doe, I III.
- 1.4 Alternative Hypothetical Pleading. Pursuant to Civil Rule 8(e)(2), Plaintiff pleads hypothetically against Defendants that in the event, and only in the event, that any Defendant attempts to avoid joint and several liability for the injuries, claims and causes of action set forth herein under RCW 4.22.070, that this said Defendant or some other Defendant 's negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries and causes of action alleged herein, then Plaintiff makes the same claims against the other alleged Defendants or alleged persons or entities as are made against the Defendants in this action. The Judgment sought herein would then also be claimed against said additional Defendants jointly and severally.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

2.1 The above-referenced Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the actions alleged herein and the parties hereto.

- 2.2 The above-referenced Court is the proper venue for this action.
- 2.3 Plaintiff exhausted her efforts to obtain administrative help. She filed a Complaint with the EEOC under Charge No.380-2004-00787. The EEOC has decided to act on the complaint and has filed an action against the same Defendants in Cause No. C04-2066RSM alleging Title VII and 42 USCA 2000e violations.
- 2.4 This Plaintiff is filing a Motion to Intervene as authorized under 42 USCA 2000e-5(f)(1) and FRCP 24. The Motion to Intervene and this Complaint are timely filed.
 - 2.5 Demand for a jury of twelve is hereby made.
 - 2.6 Damages are in excess of \$250,000.00.

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

- 3.1 GLORIA CROUCH is a resident of Island County, Washington. She is an individual residing in Island County, Washington.
- 3.2 The Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants commencing in 2001 as a sales associate.
- 3.3 During the course of her employment, she was subjected to pervasive, unwanted and offensive sexual conduct that was inappropriate and shocking to the conscience of a reasonable woman. The conduct was committed by her direct manager.
- 3.4 The Defendants were aware of, or should have been aware of, the offensive and wrongful sexual harassment and failed to take effective prompt remedial action to protect the Plaintiff and other women working for Defendants.
 - 3.5 No reasonable woman could be expected to continue to work under such

conditions that interfered in her ability to perform the essential functions of her job.

3.6 The Plaintiff was unable to continue working under such conditions and was forced to discontinue the employment to her financial and personal detriment. She was wrongfully constructively terminated.

IV. CAUSES OF ACTION

- 4.1 Sexual Harassment/Hostile Work Environment. Plaintiff is a female and a member of this protected class. Plaintiff was subjected to unwelcomed sexual and abusive conduct that caused her emotional distress, anxiety, fear and humiliation. The Plaintiff was offended by the wrongful sexual harassment of the Defendants. The wrongful sexual conduct occurred during work-required duties and interfered with her ability to perform her work and created a hostile or abusive work environment. Plaintiff gave notice of the sexual harassment to the employer and the agents of the employer. The employer had advance notice of the abusive and wrongful conduct and failed to take prompt remedial action to correct it in a reasonable manner. The wrongful sexual harassment was committed against the Plaintiff by her direct manager. As a consequence of this failure to take remedial action, Plaintiff was left to suffer such abusive conduct. These actions constitute sexual harassment, quid pro quo harassment and creation of a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991, 42 U.S.C., Section 2000e and the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60.030, 180 et
- 4.2 <u>Disparate Treatment Violations</u>. Plaintiff was discriminated against and harassed for civil rights violations that were caused by wrongful disparate treatment by the Defendants. These conditions are in violation of anti-discrimination laws found in Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 and 1991, 42 U.S.C., Section 2000e and the Washington Law Against Discrimination, RCW 49.60.030, 180 et seq. and other authority cited in this action.

- 4.3 <u>Breach of Contract/Wrongful Termination</u>. Plaintiff has written, verbal, and implied contractual terms of employment to be protected from wrongful and unsafe conduct in the work place. Defendants breached these contractual terms of employment and are liable to Plaintiff in equity and in damages at law in amounts to be proven at trial. The wrongful conduct resulted in a wrongful constructive termination of the Plaintiff.
- 4.4 <u>Public Policy and Common Law</u>. The actions of the Defendants violated public policy and common law protections against discrimination or other tortious and outrageous conduct in the State of Washington. The wrongful sexual harassment perpetrated against Plaintiff amounts to violation of employment and personal and civil rights and were in violation of <u>Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.</u>, 102 Wn.2d 219 (1984) and <u>Dicomes v. Washington</u>, 113 Wn.2d 612 (1989) and <u>Moorpark v. Superior Court for Ventura County</u>, 18 Cal4th 1143, 959 P.2d 752 (1998).
- 4.5 Infliction of Emotional Distress. As a direct and proximate result of the actions alleged herein by the Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Defendants knew or should have known the actions being taken would cause emotional distress. Any reasonable person would know the actions and conduct alleged herein would cause emotional distress to another. The Defendants had a duty to refrain from such actions or to stop such actions when they became aware of such actions and failed to do so. As a direct and proximate result, the Plaintiff has suffered damages in amounts to be proven at trial.

- 4.6 Outrage. The conduct and actions of the Defendants as set forth herein were so outrageous in character and so contrary to law and society as to exceed all possible bounds of human decency. The actions of these Defendants were so outrageous as to be totally intolerable in a civilized community. As a result of the outrageous conduct, there was an infliction of severe harm and emotional distress to the Plaintiff. Such harm and distress is wrongful in the State of Washington and subjects the Defendants to all damages causally related thereto of a general and special nature. The amounts of these damages will be proven at trial.
- 4.7 <u>Negligent Supervision and Training</u>. The actions of the Defendants were negligent in training, managing and supervising their managers, supervisors, employees and agents. The Defendants were aware of or should have been aware of the discriminatory and harassing actions of their managers and supervisors and employees and the failures of their managers to correct the wrongful conduct. As a direct and proximate result of such negligent supervision and management, Plaintiff has suffered general and special damages.
- 4.8 <u>Punitive Damages</u>. The actions of the Defendants were so reckless and indifferent to the rights of the Plaintiff as to constitute justification for award of punitive damages allowed under the legal authority set forth herein and <u>Kolstad v. American Dental Association</u>, 527 U.S. 526 (1999) and <u>Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc.</u>, 00-1699 (7th Cir., 2001). Further authority is found in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Punitive damages are prayed for.

V. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR/VICARIOUS LIABILITY

5.1 Defendants are liable for all actions of their managers and employees under the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior. The conduct of these employees, managers, and agents was

implicitly ratified by the employer making the employer liable for the wrongful conduct. <u>Lehmann</u> v. Toys R Us, 133 NJ 587, 626 A2d 445 (1993).

5.2 Defendants are vicariously liable for the actions of their managers, supervisors, agents and employees under the doctrine of vicarious liability. <u>Alexander v. Alcatel Cable Systems</u>, (4th Cir., Oct., 2002) Lexis 21498; <u>Paroline v. Unisys Corporation</u>, 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir., 1989) and <u>Burlington Industries</u>, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and in <u>Snyder v. Med. Servs. Corp. of E. Wash.</u>, 145 Wn.2d 233, 242-43, 35 P.3d 1158 (2001).

VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

- 1. <u>Special Damages</u>. Loss of earning capacity; past and future loss of wages and benefits of employment; medical treatment and other compensatory and special damages as proven at the time of trial.
- 2. <u>General Damages</u>. Emotional distress, psychological impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, mental health impairment/disability and civil rights violations in amounts proven at trial.
- 3. <u>Attorneys' Fees and Costs</u>. All reasonable attorneys' fees, including contingent attorneys' fees, and all costs of Plaintiff's should be awarded as a damage Judgment against Defendants.
- 4. <u>Punitive Damages</u>. Punitive damages should be assessed against the Defendants in amounts determined appropriate at trial.
- 5. <u>Taxes and Interest</u>. Defendants are liable for payment of the taxes of the Plaintiff and interest on certain damages awarded.
- 6. Other Relief. The Court should award such other and further relief as deemed appropriate, equitable or just.

1	DATED this 9th day of February, 2005.	
2	/s/	
3	PETER MOOTE	
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INTERVENER'S AMENDED SUPPLEMENTAL

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